

In the shadow of genetics:

an analysis of eugenic influences on twentieth century social policy for disabled people in European and North American societies.

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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I will also take this opportunity to assert my full, sole and complete ownership of any faults, errors, misunderstandings or omissions associated with this study.

Abstract

This thesis takes the form of an investigation into the joint role of eugenics and genetics in informing social policy directed at disabled people during the twentieth century. The major geographical locus is the 'transatlantic belt' stretching from northwest Europe to the United States. Drawing on several of the works of Pierre Bourdieu, an analytical tool is used here which relies upon the concept of intellectual and cultural fields, as a means of seeking understanding of the complex processes which underlie the conversion of thought, of ideology, into action in the form of social policy.

The discussion is broad-ranging and cross-disciplinary, but is influenced by the author's academic background in social policy and allegiance to disability studies. This is not, however, a study which necessarily conforms strictly to disability studies traditions in its analysis of the situation of disabled people within contemporary western society. The major difference is a relative disregard of material, economic and institutional explanations, and a corresponding emphasis on the realm of thought - the 'intellectual fields' of Bourdieu. This is not to say that materialism is absent, for the pervading social atmosphere is seen as being that of modernity and its constant companion capitalism. Both of these have strong materialist connections.

Modernity is not purely about materialism however, and emphasis is placed here upon two particular strands of thought within that societal form: normality and a search for order. A major argument within this work is that these two strands, or power lines within the cultural field, lead to a society which eschews and perhaps fears 'difference'. When combined with expanding knowledge about the genetic basis of life and the growth of diagnostic mechanisms associated largely with the accomplishments of the Human Genome Project, it is suggested here, these power lines are inimicable towards people who are 'different'. This is analysed in the terms of 'heterophobia', a concept drawn here from the work of Bauman {1989}.

The increasing use of pre-natal genetic testing is explored, and assayed alongside an apparent trend towards eugenic abortion following a 'positive' test result. In the case of post-natal testing, the implications for those with a 'defective' genetic endowment are considered within the context of a social policy regime which is tending towards insurance-based welfare provision. It is speculated that a 'genetic underclass' of those who are disadvantaged in terms of access to employment and to insurance products is becoming evident. Ultimately it is proposed that the western world is entering into an era of eugenics - the practice of human genetics within a societal atmosphere, or cultural field, which is informed by eugenic ideology.

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Abbreviations used in this work

The following abbreviations are used for convenience and brevity:

HGP:- The Human Genome Project.

NHS:- (British) National Health Service.

UK:- The United Kingdom, less formally 'Britain'.

UPIAS Union of physically impaired against segregation, a UK pressure group.

US/USA:- The United States of America.

'Eugenics Movement' as shorthand term

The Eugenics Education Society was founded in England in 1907. It later became the English Eugenics Society and today is known as the Galton Institute {Mazumdar 1992, 1999}. There is an unbroken descent from the foundation of the former to its present day successor, and within this work the various titles assumed at different times will often be subsumed for the sake of brevity within the abbreviated term "the British eugenics movement". This latter is/was not necessarily a coherent whole, but the term is a convenient shorthand to encompass those who subscribe(d) to a eugenic world view. In like manner 'the' USA eugenics movement, as used here, includes the Eugenics Record Office of Cold Spring Harbor, the American Eugenics Society and the American Breeders Association, which are closely linked by the persons of Davenport and Laughlin {Black 2003}.

On spellings

This thesis is written in UK English. However, many of the sources quoted employ US spellings which differ from their UK forms. The rule followed here is that quotations are reproduced as facsimiles of their originals, but that comment or analysis relating to them will use UK spellings. Thus, for example, a quote may contain the word 'counseling' whilst commentary on it will speak of 'counselling'. Although the result may on occasion appear unpleasing to the eye, the aim is to preserve the integrity of sources on the one hand whilst in general conforming to UK usage on the other.

Preface

Whilst this work is, to great extent, concerned with an exploration of one particular theoretical approach towards an understanding of the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of disablement as exemplified by the approach of eugenics, it is by no means detached from the mundane world of experience. On the contrary much of the impetus for this work is, in one way or another, firmly grounded upon my personal experiences and, to be absolutely frank, my consequent and unavoidable prejudices.

This is not to say that my work necessarily lacks academic objectivity, a point which I address at some length in the introduction. I am firmly convinced that such 'objectivity' may only be achieved by first confronting, and then accounting for, one's subjective experiences. When considering 'the social' we needs must remember that we are ourselves inextricably part of the societal collective. My approach is, then, unavoidably a product of my personal history. For this reason, I claim the right to introduce a very brief biography here. As feminist scholars have declared, 'the personal is political', and this idea has gained a degree of currency within disability studies.

Although not perhaps immediately obviously so, I am a disabled person. My impairments range from the physical (arthritis), through the medical (diabetes) to the affective (variously described by 'experts' as post-traumatic stress disorder, depression or anxiety). As a result of my impairments, I was (as the bureaucratic formula so nicely describes it) 'forcibly retired on medical grounds' from my chosen career in 1989. This discrimination brought about a marked loss of self-esteem, social status and, more importantly perhaps in the contemporary world, a considerable reduction in income. Discrimination on the grounds of impairment is disabling. My wife is both a disabled person and a pensioner, thus I also qualify as a carer. I am no stranger to the physical, psychological, social, and financial aspects of disability.

There are, however, other and deeper factors to consider. In my childhood during the 1950s and 1960s I experienced extreme, almost absolute, poverty. I was, literally, a hungry, unwashed and ragged-arsed slum dweller dependent upon welfare benefits. I have lived in gas-lit (when the supply was not disconnected due to non-payment) under dwellings over-run by rats and cockroaches and 'served' by shared two-seater earth closets. The overall effect was enhanced by being delightfully situated below (hence the earth closets) but adjacent to the local sewerage works, and fronting a river grossly polluted with chemical and human effluent.

My parents divorced when I was young and, effectively, I am the product of a single-parent upbringing. I have observed directly, as a child of eight, my mother being subjected to the medical miracle of electro-convulsive shock therapy. I have lived with the zombie-esque aftermath which transforms the child into the carer, and I note with the benefit of hindsight the

total absence of any form of external support. Again as a child, I have sat for hours in the drab waiting room of the local office of the (then) National Assistance Board and felt acutely the contagious despondency which accompanies the surrendered dignity of such circumstances.

In short, as a slum-dweller with a family history of 'mental illness' and 'pauperisation' I was, by definition, a member of that 'social problem group' which had excited so much of the attention of the eugenicists of the first half of the twentieth century. As the child of a welfare-dependent single mother I am a member, or at the least a survivor, of the 'underclass' of Charles Murray and his fellow-thinkers. I have been pigeon-holed, patronised, stigmatised, targeted, debated and ultimately abandoned in almost equal measure by some group of 'experts' or other, at one time or another. I am angry at this.

I am, then, both a disabled person and someone who has direct knowledge of life within the lowest stratum of our modern, contemporary, society. Without the hint of a blush I lay claim to a true level of 'expertise' in these topic areas. At the risk of descending into Pythonesque depths of pathos, I also have direct experience of what may be thought to be the ultimate in impairment: a lucid coma.

At the age of twenty-one I found myself trapped in a state of limbo: conscious and intellectually (and aurally) fully functional, but physically totally paralysed and absolutely reliant upon mechanical respiration. I was unable to communicate with the external world in any manner whatsoever, and was described as 'comatose'. During this subjective eternity (which lasted ten days in the 'objective real' world), my then wife was presented with 'expert' medical opinion that my situation was essentially irretrievable, and that she should seriously (with all that that word connotes) consider 'pulling the plug'.

What is of immediate relevance here is that the medical opinion was not that I would necessarily die in the short to medium term, but rather that I would potentially live and certainly be a quadriplegic with 'a mental age of six months'. In other words, that I would be a heavy financial and emotional burden upon my wife herself, and (albeit unspoken) a heavy financial burden upon society - in either case a utilitarian argument for my death. As things turned out, I recovered spontaneously to the extent that I was able to breathe unaided (and thus moved beyond 'passive' euthanasia) before a final decision was made. In the fullness of time I went on to become a building site labourer (which speaks of a degree of error in the physical diagnosis).

The point of this is that, firstly, I only live now because of the emotional inability of another to kill me, secondly that my continued existence was 'expertly' deemed to be undesirable, and thirdly that I belong(ed) to a 'worthless' stratum of society. I am pleased to live, but I am not at ease with the knowledge that I only do so because another was unswayed

by 'expert' medical opinion to the contrary. This unease is compounded by the knowledge that the 'expert' opinion of the doctors was predicated not upon my medical condition *per se*, but rather that it was based squarely on 'social' considerations. I am totally unenthused by the idea that I, or anyone else, may be considered to be fundamentally 'unworthy' of life.

It may then be thought unsurprising that, on returning to the education system in middle-age, I found myself drawn towards the study of social policy, with its concerns for the topics of 'poverty' and social justice, and ultimately to disability studies, with its investigation of the ways in which society constructs, categorises and often disvalues 'disability'. It would have been strange indeed had I felt able to ignore the challenge posed by eugenic thought.

As a result of my experiences, socialisation and upbringing, I care not for such things as gender, ethnicity, skin colour, sexual orientation, 'ability' or its alleged lack, religious observance or, indeed, educational attainment. I distrust expertise. I detest bigotry and elitism. It is in this context and against this background that I ask my reader to consider with me the following sets of questions, which relate to the contemporary world.

As the human race gathers ever more knowledge about its own physiology, and the means by which characteristics are passed between the generations, is it not 'natural' to act on an urge to 'correct nature's mistakes'? Meanwhile, as the world becomes both smaller due to improving technology (in terms both of 'information' and physical travel) and seemingly more crowded due to an alleged exponential growth in birth rates in the 'majority world' of so-called 'developing countries', is it not mere 'common sense' to encourage birth control in these latter societies? Would not this simple expedient put an end to world famine at the stroke, if not of a pen on a prescription, then of a surgeon's scalpel on a *vas deferens* or fallopian tube?

Equally, with evidence of a declining birth rate in the industrialised, 'modern', nations, does it not seem appropriate to decide that if, here, we are all going to raise fewer children, then it makes good sense to ensure that we increase the chances of those children being, and remaining, 'healthy' (and by implication 'happy')? Given that state welfare, or in Britain the Welfare State, is increasingly costly to maintain, and that with an ageing population the burden falls on fewer shoulders, is it not prudent to take steps to reduce that future load?

Indeed, in both 'majority world' and 'developed world' scenarios, with the scarcity of resources alleged to exist, what if anything is to be done about those who permanently lack those seemingly essential ingredients of human-ness: self-awareness and personal autonomy? If medical opinion is that a new-born or an adult will face a lifetime of pain and dependency, is society justified in sanctioning the withdrawal of active therapy intended to prolong life? In a truly just society is it not the ultimate expression of humaneness to allow 'suffering', even where such suffering may amount to a condition wherein nothing - not pain, not anguish - is

actually experienced by the subject, to come to an end: to allow or even to cause death? Should it be that, to use a phrase forever associated with German eugenics, some lives are 'not worthy of life'?

None of the expedients suggested or implied above is 'natural'. All are determined by social and societal attitudes. All rely upon some notion of ethics to justify the actions, and ethics are a construction of human society. All suggest that *someone* is 'expertly' qualified to differentiate between 'good' and 'bad': good and bad genes; good and bad societies; good and bad families; good and bad citizens. 'Expertise' is also a social construction, and all too often it seems to lead to elitism.

It is deceptively easy to answer 'yes' to any or all of these questions. Broadly, the first set of questions relates to the application of 'medico-science' to the social world, whilst the second is more obviously oriented towards 'domestic' social policy. The third refers to 'euthanasia', ostensibly as an act of mercy. Each paragraph, with its assumption of social constructs as being somehow 'natural', covers topics which fall unambiguously within the ambit of sociology. There is a strong hint of elitism running throughout, with the 'developed' world supposing that modernity brings with it the answer to all human problems; with medico-scientific 'experts' assuming the right to improve upon nature; with the 'learned' presuming to impose their mores upon the 'ignorant'.

Each of these questions relates directly to policies advanced at one time or another by eugenicists. Together they serve to illustrate the seductive nature of eugenics and the seemingly unobserved, or unremarked, ubiquity of eugenic thinking within the modern world. There is, it could appear, some sociological process which permits a mind-set, an ideology, to become so all-embracing as to seem 'natural'. This, then, is the underlying subject matter of this enquiry. No matter what 'academic' construction is demanded below by practice and precedent, no matter how complex the use of theory may at times appear, the essential if informal question to be answered here remains simply:

"Why is it so easy to answer 'yes' to questions such as these?"

Chapter 1: Introduction and backgrounds

1. 1 Proem

This work is an investigation into connections between ideas and ideology informing the study and practice of genetics and/or eugenics on the one hand, and social processes which have affected and continue to affect the lives and prospects of disabled people within contemporary society on the other. In effect, eugenics serves as proxy for a more general social process of 'disablement'. Whilst the academic slant of the writer tends towards social policy, sociology has had a major and vital part to play in informing the theoretical base of this investigation. This study is consciously cross-disciplinary, and is not intended to be located solely in disability studies, social policy or sociology.

The present work reflects to a certain extent the personal experiences of the author. This is an unavoidable consequence of the condition of being human, for it is impossible to stand outside of one's own knowledge and experience. We are all to some extent prisoners of our past. This writer certainly does have his own personal views, opinions and perspective. Similar problems and questions surrounding 'objectivity' in the social sciences have been well-rehearsed for over thirty years {e.g. Becker 1970:123}, and the subject has been discussed for much longer:

*[t]he demand that he (sic) should see **only** objectively is quite out of the question, for it is impossible. We must be satisfied if he (sic) does not see **too** subjectively* (original emphases) {Jung 1921, quoted by Randles & Whetnall 1981: 135}.

A similar sentiment is expressed in more formal terms by Nietzsche {1969: 119}:

*let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a "pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject"; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as "pure reason", "absolute spirituality", "knowledge in itself": these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unimaginable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing **something**, are supposed to be lacking ... There is **only** a perspective seeing, **only** a perspective "knowing"* (original emphases) {cited by Bourdieu 1990: 28}.

This is very close to the view of Wirth {1936: xxiv}:

in the realm of the social the observer is part of the observed and hence has a personal stake in the subject of observation.

A conscious and sustained effort has been made here to avoid deliberate or obvious biases in the selection of sources in the light of the above-cited opinions. A view which has been influential is that of Myrdal {1970}, who accepts that subjective bias is inherent in social research. For him such research may approach objectivity by a process of open and honest

appraisal of the internalised value systems of individual researchers {Myrdal 1970: 56}. Myrdal's is by no means a lone voice here:

[a] *new type of objectivity in the social sciences is attainable not through the exclusion of evaluations but through the critical awareness and control of them* {Mannheim 1936: 5}.

In this way researchers are able to maintain both their personal and professional integrity, for by offering-up their contextual positions to peer scrutiny they allow the 'rigour', and validity, of their methodology and findings to be tested. This is necessary, for unrecognised external influences "*are apt to cause systematic biases ... and thus lead to faulty knowledge*" {Myrdal 1970: 5}.

It is then appropriate to state clearly that this author has misgivings about the practice and ideology of eugenics, and questions the ethical values and philosophy which underlie it. He has similar reservations about the general direction of human genetic research and of the HGP in particular. Nonetheless, he accepts that much of therapeutic value has been, and may in future be, derived from the HGP. He does not support a Luddite-like view of technological progress as being inherently 'bad'.

A broad theme to be addressed here is whether or not the discrimination practised by contemporary society against disabled people is related to notions of intellectual and physical 'normality' inherent, it will be strongly suggested in sections 4.6 and 4.7 below, within modern society. In this investigation the specific approach of eugenic thinking is examined as, in many ways, a proxy for the more general process of 'disablement'. Both eugenics and genetics are central strands of the analysis employed, and a central theme is that these are nowadays so intimately related as to be potentially a single concept, "*eugenetics*".

'Eugenetics' is a word which does not appear in the dictionary. It is a term adopted by the present writer in an earlier work {Armer 2004: 48}, and there used tentatively to describe what may perhaps be best thought of as the practice of the science of genetics within an ideological framework descended from eugenic thought and imbued with the ultimately utilitarian principle that the overall purpose of social policy is to further 'the greatest good of the greatest number', in other words to act towards preserving the body of society. 'Eugenetics', then, combines the intellectual world of thought with the mundane world of action.

1. 2 Motivations for this study

Hitherto vague concerns with the potential for eugenic application of genetic knowledge were, for this author, crystallised by the following press release:

President Clinton announced that the international Human Genome Project and Celera Genomics Corporation have both completed an initial sequencing of the human genome -- the genetic blueprint for human beings {White House 2000}.

Notwithstanding the pledge *{ibid}* that genetic information would not be used for discriminatory purposes, the tone of this announcement, speaking as it does of a “*blueprint*”, raises certain concerns.

In particular the explicit idea that human beings are constructed according to a genetic 'blueprint' may be thought to resonate with notions of 'progress' and 'improvement' embedded in the cultural field of modern society (see section 4.5 below). This portends a manufacturing approach towards the creation or modification of human beings:

[h]uman germline engineering is a discipline of the future. Its objectives will be to reverse genetic defects or to enhance desirable human traits such as emotional stability, intelligence or longevity {Hood 2000: 17}.

This in turn suggests that HGP, or 'genetic' more generally, 'products' are likely to appeal to those with an outlook fashioned by eugenic notions of the possibility of 'improving' the physical and/or mental condition of a given population. In passing, the press release, with its joint reference to the “*Human Genome Project and Celera Genomics Corporation*” {White House 2000}, also provides some indication of the difficulties involved in separating 'the' HGP from commercial medico-scientific enterprise.

This writer is unconvinced that the cultural, social policy and economic forces which he sees as associated with the HGP in particular, and with genetic and/or eugenic ideas more generally, will be so amenable to control as Clinton and, of far more importance, governmental and other institutions within the industrialised world, seem to assume. One is forcibly reminded of the words of the Jewish Holocaust historian, Hilberg:

[o]ur evolution has outpaced our understanding; we can no longer assume that we have a full grasp of the workings of our social institutions, bureaucratic structures, or technology {cited by Bauman 1989: 83}.

If Hilberg is correct with this warning, and certainly Bauman (1989) gives credence to it, there would appear to be valid grounds for concern about the potential outcomes of both HGP and medico-scientific research. On perhaps a more philosophical, but equally pessimistic, note:

[t]he idea of progress rests on the belief that the growth of knowledge and the advance of the species go together ... [but] ... [k]nowledge does not make us free. It leaves us as we have always been, prey to every kind of folly {Gray 2003: xiv}.

Such concerns do not limit themselves to the purely technical aspects of medico-scientific research and development. Hilberg is unambiguous on this point, carefully placing both “*social institutions*” and “*bureaucratic structures*” alongside “*technology*” in his list of potential sources of danger facing contemporary society {Bauman 1989: 83}. In a complex industrial society, bureaucracy and the status of 'social institution(s)' may both be associated with either governmental or non-governmental organisations {Weber 1947}. Meanwhile the process of formulation and implementation of policy may be left to professional organisations of 'experts' (sections 5.4, 5.5 below).

Of these latter the medico-scientific community, both as a whole and as represented by its constituent parts 'medicine' and 'science', is an important actor in both the generation and application of genetic knowledge {Shakespeare 1995; Kerr & Shakespeare 2002 ch6}. Hilberg's comments point to an important role for social theory in attempting to gain insight into, and understanding of, the complex of forces, factors, fashions and currents which interact, react, even on occasion abreact, together to form the social nexus which is society. This nexus will be explored using an analysis drawn from the work of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*} (discussed in section 1.5).

Hilberg's misgivings, about the complex and arguably dangerous interplay between technological advance and alleged societal inertia in coming to terms with this 'progress', have acted to clarify and focus a vaguer sense of unease felt by the present author. Thus it is that the present work seeks to enquire into issues relating to a possible deficiency in "*our understanding*" of developments in both genetic research and eugenic ideas, set against the backdrop of a society which arguably displays both evolutionary progress and traces of continuity to earlier ages. A subsidiary but connected reason for this work is found in the following quotes:

[t]oday, most geneticists are unaware that euthanasia for the "hereditarily defective" was legalized in Germany in 1939, ultimately resulting in some 70,000 deaths, exclusive of Jewish deaths in the holocaust {Neel 1994: 17}; today many medical geneticists are unaware of, and sometimes deny outright, any historical link between their field and eugenics {Adams 1990d: 200}.

These statements beg the question: if "*most geneticists*", or "*many medical geneticists*", are really unaware of this, how then can their discipline be trusted to police itself? It may appear that a knowledge of the past is a prime requirement in ensuring that past mistakes are not repeated. It is in this spirit that this work sets out to explore and analyse the relationship between disability discrimination, eugenics, genetics and certain social policies adopted in selected nation states of the western world of the twentieth century. In the process, some of the essential tenets of eugenics, genetics and social policy will be examined.

Thus it is that the principal research questions to be addressed by this investigation are:

- (i) *Is there available evidence of some continuity, whether evolutionary or not, of 'eugenic' belief systems between ancient and modern eras?*
- (ii) *Is there evidence of a particularly 'modern' effect on eugenic thinking or practice?*
- (iii) *Is there evidence to support an idea of continuity in thinking between eugenics and (human) genetics?*
- (iv) *Are there identifiable effects flowing from the modernisation of eugenics upon the topic area of social policy directed towards 'disability'?*

1. 3 Eugenics, an introductory overview

The meaning and definition of 'eugenics' is not as straightforward as it may at first sight seem, nor has it necessarily remained static since the term was first coined by Galton in 1883. Indeed, 'eugenics' has been described as:

a word with nasty connotations but an indeterminate meaning {Paul 1992 cited by Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 2}.

As Paul hints at, in part 'eugenics' has become a pejorative when used by opponents of the ideology, but remains a positive for its supporters. In contemporary general usage there is most often an implicit understanding that 'eugenics' (and similarly 'genetics') relates directly to inherited characteristics: to the individual's genes as it were. For example, the "Oxford Reference Dictionary" (1987) has *"the science of the production of fine (esp. human) offspring by control of inherited qualities"*, whilst an associated dictionary, the "Concise Oxford" (9th ed) has the very similar *"the science of improving the (esp. human) population by controlled breeding ..."*. Either of these definitions very clearly supports an idea that 'eugenics' is related to 'the genes'. In each case, the understanding is that 'eugenics' is concerned entirely with inheritance and is thus focused on individual human beings rather than on social or societal matters.

However, the entry in the "Collins English Dictionary Millennium Edition" is subtly different to the two sources cited above: *"the study of methods of improving the quality of the human race, esp. by selective breeding"*. This latter definition is on the one hand more restrictive, in that it explicitly relates 'eugenics' to human populations only; on the other hand it is broader in so far as, by the insertion of *"esp."*, it does not restrict itself simply to issues of 'breeding'. In this respect the Collins definition is closer to that offered by Castle {1916} on the authority of Galton:

"the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally" (quotation marks in original) {Galton (F), cited by Castle 1916: 3},

and explored in section 8.6. In this extract Galton, who coined the word 'eugenics', makes no reference to inheritance (which Castle {1916: 2/3} explicitly assigns to the province of 'genetics'). Rather, he confines himself to a consideration of *"agencies under social control"*.

Although an evolution in meaning may well have occurred since, it is clear that the inventor of the word had a mind to emphasise social action in his definition. It is in this sense that eugenic impulses may be found to lie behind social programmes of one form or another. For example, in the industrialising society of Brazil of the 1920s:

Brazilian eugenics was associated with the call for the introduction of... social welfare legislation as a way of improving the Brazilian people {Stepan 1990: 113}.

Moving north, in the USA of the immediate post-second world war period, it has been said that:

eugenics was not abandoned but merely cast in a more restrained and cautious tone. The 'fit' were to be encouraged to propagate through financial incentives, child allowances and preferential housing arrangements {Mendelsohn 2000 unpaginated}.

Thus, although 'eugenics' is currently most frequently applied to the area of selective human reproduction, there are valid grounds for believing that the word may legitimately be used in a broader context which might include social action. Because of the dynamic nature of language earlier useages may become concealed.

The situation is further complicated by the etymology of the words 'eugenics', 'genetics' and 'gene'. 'Eugenics' was introduced to the language first, in 1883; 'genetics' next in 1906, and finally 'gene' appeared in 1909 (see pp193/194 and *fn* 67 below). There is not necessarily a linear connection between the three terms, and they have not arisen organically within the language. Each word is a conscious artefact, invented in the western tradition by the deliberate fusion of roots derived from the Classical languages. 'Eugenics' is a fusion of 'eu' (Greek, 'well') and 'gen' (Greek, 'be born') {"Concise Oxford Dictionary" 9th ed}.

The meaning of 'genetics' is unchallenged: *"the study of heredity and variation..."* {Concise Oxford; Oxford Reference; Collins}. Its etymology is, however, more mysterious. The three dictionaries cited above do not offer an origin, although each suggests that the possibly related 'genetic' is derived from 'genesis' which the Collins volume traces *via* old English and Latin to the Greek 'gen'. Thus both 'eugenics' and 'genetics' trace independently to the Greek, which is not surprising given the scientific propensity for such inventions. The one does not derive from the other.

The most recent of these scientific linguistic inventions, 'gene', is etymologically the most interesting. All three dictionaries consulted agree that it relates to a unit of heredity, but the Oxford Reference edition traces it directly to the Greek 'gen'. Meanwhile, the Concise Oxford and Collins volumes trace the word to a German root, *via* the French '*gene*', and ultimately to the Greek 'genes' ("born"). In part this may arise because the words 'eugenics' and 'genetics' were coined by English speakers, whilst 'gene' was coined by a German speaker. What is clear is that each of 'eugenics', 'genetics' and 'gene' was coined independently.

Because this enquiry is longitudinal and considers the entire twentieth century, it is necessary to bear in mind that the English language has evolved over this period in this area. Thus it is that at times 'eugenics' will be taken, in its earliest sense, to relate at least in part to programmes designed to affect the environment (be it physical or societal) in which a person matures. Elsewhere the word will be used in its later, more restricted, sense of relating directly to the inheritance of particular traits or characteristics. The general rule here is that the specific nuance of 'eugenics' employed is defined by the context of the sources cited.

A particular focus of this investigation will, of necessity, fall upon eugenics, albeit this is an area with which it is difficult to engage. Indeed, some scholars deny the validity of talking of a unitary 'eugenics', on the grounds that different cultures have produced such widely differing versions as to render any such move meaningless: for them, the only fruitful approach is a comparative one {Adams 1990b: 217}. This view will be tested within the present work, for it will be suggested that there is a sense in which eugenics may be meaningfully conceived of as a single topic: that is, as an ideology or belief system which underlies important aspects of the social foundations of western civilisation, and in particular attitudes towards 'disability'.

This idea of an ideology as an active societal agency is not without semantic difficulty. In common usage, it is often said that a particular ideology may 'act'; may be a causative factor in some societal outcome. This is not perhaps strictly accurate, for it may be argued that ideas merely suggest possible actions, and an ideology is but a collection of ideas. However, it has been suggested that:

[i]deas create belief systems. ... Belief systems are rather like a computer program: they serve to handle and interpret data ... but are themselves neither right [n]or wrong {Baigent 1999: 206}.¹

It is in this sense that eugenics is here presented as an ideology: as a means of processing information and suggesting appropriate (within the terms of reference of that ideology) actions to be taken under any given circumstances. In this strictly limited sense, it is suggested here, eugenics may be said to 'inform' or to 'underlie' human actions.

In certain academic circles it is now commonplace to talk of eugenics as an outmoded pseudo-science which has failed to stand the test of time and is now discredited in the light of social and scientific advances made in the late twentieth century. In contrast, 'genetics', and more explicitly 'human genetics', is now widely, if not universally, accepted as relating to a scientific discipline. These views are epitomised by the co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, James Watson, who contrasts 'bogus' eugenics which:

had lost its credibility in the scientific community long before the Nazis ... The science underpinning it was bogus ... {Watson with Berry 2003: 32},

with

*the **valid science** of genetics, human genetics in particular, ...* (added emphasis) {Watson with Berry 2003: 32}.

Thus for some commentators eugenics is/was at heart an aspiring scientific discipline {e.g. Farrall 1985; Jones 1998; Searle 1998}, although many commentators are of the opinion that such aspirations have not been fulfilled {e.g. Lifton 1986; Paul 2002}. This latter interpretation relies upon the idea of a strict division between 'pseudo-scientific' eugenics and 'scientific' genetics, an alleged division which will be thoroughly investigated and tested within the present work.

¹ See also Bourdieu {1971a *et al*} on 'intellectual fields' discussed in section 1.5.

Yet again, eugenics may be described as a social movement {e.g. Stepan 1990, 1991}; or it may be depicted as the reification of some abstract idea of normalcy, ideal or aesthetics {Hasian 1996}. These approaches may arguably be seen to be part of some:

attempt to reconfigure the history of genetics and evolutionary biology as the linear progression of a science away from the politics of eugenics {Hasian 1996: 4},

the components of a smokescreen engendered by some vague and amorphous 'international scientific community'. King {undated, unpaginated} has no doubt that:

genetics and eugenics are inseparably linked. Some form of eugenics is an inevitable consequence of the science of genetics.

There is, then, no theoretical consensus as to the status of eugenics. It appears undeniable that eugenics, whatever it may or may not prove to be, is (or for some commentators was) in some meaningful manner 'real'. Eugenics has led all too frequently to measurable effects on the lives (and deaths) of people who have been variously deemed, from time to time and place to place, to be beyond the societal Pale in terms of their supposedly hereditary characteristics {e.g. Gallagher 1995; Lifton 1986}. To the present writer, it seems that attempts to draw a strict demarcation between 'scientific' genetics and 'pseudo-scientific' eugenics are misguided at best, possibly a cynical effort to cloud the issue at worst.

The broad approach of this work is that 'genetics' is undoubtedly a science whilst 'eugenics' is arguably but one mind-set or paradigm amongst many wherein that science may be practised. There is no difficulty here in accepting that a geneticist may or may not be influenced by eugenic ideas, consciously or not, although this investigation will be adducing compelling evidence in chapter nine below that eugenic ideas have, in contemporary western societies, a continuing presence. It is rather more difficult to suppose that a present-day eugenicist would, or could, ignore advances in genetic knowledge and practice, for it may appear that:

the generation following Nazism is giving the world the tools of eugenics beyond the wildest Hitlerian dreams {Vaquin 1991: 25 cited in Kevles & Hood 1992: 315}.

It may appear that eugenic belief systems are not always to the fore in 'modern' societies, although it is a moot point as to whether or not they are reinvented from time to time or are ever-present but sometimes dormant. This doubt about the status of eugenics suggests that there is insufficient knowledge of the 'true' nature of the phenomenon (if it may be said that such a 'truth' exists). Of particular concern, especially to those who may suppose themselves to be potential targets of any possible future eugenic-inspired action, is the matter of whether or not there may be some identifiable trigger for such action.

In this respect it is perhaps telling that, at times of social or economic crisis, both ancient (e.g. certain Greek states of the times of Plato and Aristotle) and modern societies (notably but not by any means exclusively pre-Nazi and Nazi Germany) have apparently

sought, as a matter of policy, both to favour the 'survival of the fittest' and simultaneously to take responsibility for defining 'fittest' in that context {Burleigh & Wippermann 1991; Gallagher 1995; Lifton 1986; Roper 1913}. Whilst this work is not intended as a polemic, the major focus will fall upon the 'negative' eugenic approach of the restriction of breeding of 'inferior' groups within a society. This restriction arises as a result of the primacy given here to the effects upon, and ramifications for, disabled people of eugenic policy formulation.

Whilst the nominally 'positive' eugenics of encouraging the differential propagation of supposedly 'superior' social elites may, by its encouragement of 'differential incorporation' (of which more below in sections 1.5, 3.8, 7.9), be seen as having decidedly negative effects upon disvalued social groups, there is a third strand of, or facet to, eugenics which may appear to be largely beneficial to all. This is the promotion of a more hospitable environment, be that social or built, for the nett result is that each individual is a potential beneficiary. In this respect it is unlikely that many would seriously argue against, say, such potentially or openly eugenic measures as sewage schemes, town planning, widespread educational opportunities, improved antenatal care for women and their foetuses and 'public health' projects in their entirety {see, e.g., Stepan 1990}. Indeed, in the UK the 1948 Welfare State was largely designed by a committed eugenicist, Beveridge {Africa2000}.

Such 'environmental eugenics' policies are broadly welcomed here in so far as they act to benefit all, although specific programmes may be objectionable to some, not least on the grounds of ideas of paternalism and patriarchy said to underlie them {see, e.g., Williams 1989 on the UK Welfare State}. As the specific focus of the present work lies upon the allegedly deleterious aspects of eugenic thought, and particularly on adverse effects felt by disabled people, rather than upon the topic of 'eugenics' *per se*, less contentious areas will not be highlighted here. This is an acknowledged potential bias in the present enquiry, but one which is felt to be justified by constraints of time and space.

It is also necessary to emphasise here that contemporary researchers and practitioners in human genetics, and their directing or supervisory agencies, collectively demonstrate a clear awareness of the potentially harmful nature of their work. From the early days of the HGP a proportion of funding has been allocated to ethical, legal and social issues [ELSI], to the extent that the then Director of the (US) DOE² reported, in 1995, that "*ELSI programs have done a lot to educate the thinkers*" {Smith 1995 unpaginated}. The ethos behind ELSI is clear, as is an awareness of recent history:

[o]ne goal of the ELSI program is to address the implications of vastly increased genetic information and protocols on individuals and society. Another ... is to identify and develop appropriate policy options Because

² Department of Energy.

we know that "genetic information" has been misused previously in the United States and other countries, we must ensure that such mistakes are never repeated {Patrinos³ & Drell 1997, unpaginated}.

In the UK the statutory guardian of genetic ethics is the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Agency [HFEA] which:

was established in response to deep public concern about the implications which new techniques for assisted reproduction might have for the perception and valuing of human life and family relationships. The Authority's principal task is to regulate, by means of a system of licensing, audit and inspection, any research or treatment which involves the creation, keeping and use of human embryos outside the body, or the storage or donation of human eggs and sperm. Section 25 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act) requires the HFEA to maintain a Code of Practice giving guidance about the proper conduct of licensed activities {HFEA 2003: 9}.

The HFEA, as its name suggests, is largely concerned with issues relating to assisted reproduction, research on embryos and the thorny question of cloning of human cells. Of these, the topic most directly associated with the present enquiry is that of assisted reproduction, and here the HFEA *Code of Practice* is insistent that every step of the process must be accompanied by the informed consent of all parties {HFEA 2003 Part Six}, and that all parties must be referred for appropriate counselling, including where appropriate genetic {HFEA 2003 Part Seven}. Such counselling must be provided by accredited members of a relevant professional body, and this has the effect of including their codes of practice in the equation. As is discussed in detail in section 9.8 below, the major providers of counselling services in both the UK and US base their approach on the ideal of non-directive counselling, whereby the client is provided with the information to allow of an informed and free decision.

However, as is also discussed in section 9.8, there is some dispute as to how 'non-directive' such counselling is in practice. For example, Shakespeare {1998} cites research findings which indicate that:

in cases of Downs syndrome, 94% of genetic nurses, 57% of geneticists, but only 32% of obstetricians reported counselling non-directively {Shakespeare 1998: 668}.

This is not to suggest that individual practitioners are in the habit of ignoring their codes of practice, nor is it to claim that such codes are defective. Nonetheless, such findings point towards a situation wherein at least some health care professionals feel that the interests of their clients are best served by directive advice. The final decision remains with the pregnant woman, and no-one suggests that direct coercion is employed, but this raises an important point.

The point is both a philosophical and a pragmatic one, and may be reduced to "how free is free choice?". Philosophically, as members of human society we are all to greater or

³ Himself a one time Director of the HGP.

lesser extent influenced by the norms and values of 'our' society, a point which is explored in depth in chapter four below and is also at the heart of the intellectual field theory developed throughout this enquiry and derived from Bourdieu (see section 1.5 below). Pragmatically, in the US context:

how are genetic counselors to protect us from eugenics in a future where state-sponsored genetic screening seems unavoidable? A genetic counselor cannot be non-directive about a test if the test is mandated {McGee 1997 unpaginated}.

In the UK, but with much wider application, the comments of Shakespeare point to a coming together of the philosophical and pragmatic. Speaking of prospective parents whose foetus has tested 'positive' for some genetic abnormality, he suggests strongly that:

decisions about reproductive choices are likely to be influenced by the fact that an unjust society means that having a disabled child places a severe financial and practical burden on a family. ... Foetuses with genetic abnormality are terminated because our society places no value on disabled lives, and because the social and economic costs of having an impairment in a disabling society are considerable {Shakespeare 1998: 679}.

Shakespeare {1998: 669 *et seq*} defends a woman's right to choose whether or not to abort. His discussion centres on just how free this choice may, or may not, be.

This issue is addressed in forceful terms elsewhere:

there are powerful social and cultural forces that undermine people's autonomy, and which prevent individuals and families from exercising informed choice in the antenatal scenario. Recent research has revealed that the notion of non-directive counselling is a myth {Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 6}.

Without wishing to engage with or endorse Kerr & Shakespeare, the more so since "*recent research*" is not identified, the present author is not entirely convinced that the rhetoric of the various codes of practice relevant to this area is invariably reproduced in practice. This matter is explored in detail in chapter 9 below, and also forms the basis of section 7.11 below.

1. 4 Methodology and 'standpoint'

The type of research undertaken here is determinedly not 'practice-based'. There is neither an attempt nor an intention to discover any 'new facts' by means of the interrogation of individuals or sample populations, or by the conduct of some form of 'social experiment'. Rather, the chosen approach is one of analysis, synthesis and critical evaluation of relevant sources found within the academic literature, public records and published media of parts of the industrialised world, largely but not exclusively in Britain and the USA. This is a search not simply for 'objective facts' but also for fresh interpretation of, and insight into, established events and mind-sets. That is, it is also a search for 'social facts'. For Durkheim:

[a] social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is

general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations {Durkheim 1938: 13}.

As this investigation unfolds certain social facts which presently impose “*an external constraint*” upon disabled people will be examined, assayed and dissected.

Primary documentary evidence will be adduced from early eugenic writings, and particularly the work of Castle {1916} “*Genetics and Eugenics*” and Popenoe & Johnson {1925} “*Applied Eugenics*”. The official (UK) Reports of the “*Board of Education Mental Deficiency Committee*” {parts 1, 2, 4 as HMSO 1929a, part 3 as HMSO 1929b} (also known as the “*Wood Committee*”) and of the “*Departmental Committee on Sterilisation*” (“*Brock Committee*”) {HMSO 1934} also serve as ‘primary’ sources, as do the more contemporary official (USA government) HGP website and its archives; sites maintained by the Association of British Insurers; both British and American Medical Associations; recognised practitioner associations of genetic counsellors; government statements of intent (and, in Britain, relevant White Papers and committee records). Secondary sources consulted in the course of this investigation will be drawn from a broad selection of writings from relevant but distinct fields of academic research including sociology, social policy and history. Press and other media reports will be consulted here, not as competent ‘expert’ authorities but rather as indicators of public attitudes and concerns relating to ‘social facts’.

Immediate concerns arising with an approach of this type are the means by which the various sources may be tested against academic ideas of validity and problems which may occur through any real or alleged bias, intentional or not, on the part of the author in selecting those sources to be consulted {Becker 1970; Hammersley & Gomm 1997}. The first part of this problematic is readily addressed: the broad area of eugenics, and especially of social policies introduced in Europe and North America during the twentieth century, is a matter of public record. The ‘bare facts’ of this research are not in dispute - eugenics has a well documented historical ‘reality’. Similarly, genetic research is very much a ‘fact of life’ in contemporary western society and beyond.

The present writer has considered views from a wide spectrum of thought within the topic area addressed; this is, in effect, an exercise in sampling. As such it shares many of the problems associated with other social sciences research methods concerned with selecting sample populations from within a general population. It is considered important, especially within ‘traditional’ quantitative approaches to social inquiry, to select a sample which represents as faithfully as possible the diverse attitudes, and their relative proportions, found within the general population {e.g. Diesing 1972; Pawson 1989}. However, with the example of more recent ventures into qualitative research, it may be regarded as more important to sample the full spectrum of thought and observation. In this latter case, the sample interrogated should aim to “*...represent the range of experience...*” {Maykut & Morehouse 1994: 57} rather than seek a

rigid reflection of the fractions of the general population associated with different views. This enquiry then, in so far as is possible, is a critical survey of the various analyses and interpretations which have been applied to the subject matter.

The major methodological approach here is something of a modified version of the 'snowballing' technique sometimes employed in social surveying. In particular certain texts or other sources have been selected as being especially significant within given topic areas: for example Paul {1998a, 1998b, 2002} and Kevles & Hood {1992} in the area of 'genetics'; Galton (D) {2001}, Peel {1998} and Mazumdar {1992, 1999} on 'eugenics'; Burleigh & Wipperman {1991}, Burleigh {2000, 1997, 1994}, Gallagher {1995}, Adams {1990a} and Lifton {1986} on the application of eugenic policy in Germany; Witz {1992} and Hugman {1991} on professions. Major sources relied upon by these authors have then themselves been consulted and, where appropriate, some of *their* sources have been interrogated. The HGP and the British and American Medical Associations each maintain comprehensive websites which have links to other electronic publications. Again a quasi-snowballing technique has been employed, with one site leading to another to produce a cascade of information. In this way, the present researcher has sought to, as it were, share the task of identifying relevant sources amongst a large number of prior researchers. The hope is that unconscious biases have been balanced out by this means, for individual researchers will each have their own particular perspectives.

A leading source of information relating to the identity of past and present members of 'the' eugenic societies of Britain and the USA drawn upon here is the website entitled 'Africa 2000'. This website, maintained by 'Africa2000 Media Group', claims to be the work of

a private association of professional journalists in the USA and abroad
{Africa2000},

and further lays claim to being "*the premier*" internet-based source of, amongst other things, information on eugenics. There are indications of a political agenda in the preamble to this website, and one which appears to be biased against 'mainstream' USA social policy relating to marginalised groups. The site has been used here for 'fact-based' information rather than opinion. The overall validity of sources is evidenced here by a reliance, wherever possible, on the 'academic' or 'professional' bodies of literature.

1. 5 Analytical tools and perspectives adopted

Within (UK) disability studies it is common, if not 'traditional', to attribute the inequalities experienced by disabled people to a process of 'oppression' (often linked to 'exploitation' to form a dipole) practised upon them by either a ruling elite or by 'able-bodied' society more generally {see, *e.g.*, Abberley 1987; Barnes 1992; Oliver 1994; UPIAS 1976}. The present writer is not fully convinced by this apparently Marxist-style materialist analysis,

which is critically examined in chapter two below, and there are other voices of dissent. For the moment let it suffice to note that Shakespeare, from within disability studies, has also expressed his concerns:

I would ... suggest that mono-linear explanations, reducing everything to economic factors, are misguided {Shakespeare 1997: 225}.

It is as a result of such reservations that this enquiry will, in going about its task, seek to develop an alternative theoretical approach.

Neither of the two major components of the perspective adopted here are of themselves novel, although their combination may appear to be so. The intention is to facilitate a more flexible style of analysis, which is perhaps better suited to the task of understanding the mechanisms underlying eugenic thought forms, and to explaining an apparent ubiquity within modern society of this way of constructing individual identity and social value in terms not only of a person's usefulness to society, but also of their proximity to some notion of 'normality'. The first of these components, which relates directly to social policy, is the 'structured selectivity leading to differential incorporation' approach pioneered by Harrison {Harrison 2001; Harrison with Davis 2001} in the specific context of housing policy as it impinges upon disabled people. In large part this approach is offered by Harrison as an alternative to ideas of the 'oppression' of less-valued sectors of modern society by a dominant elite.

In similar vein to Shakespeare {1997} (cited above), Harrison (with Davis) finds that:

as a basis for developing a theory about differentiation and power, oppression is vague, too universal in its incidence within human interactions, and yet not comprehensive enough. The concept of oppression cannot easily embrace or elucidate the variety of circumstances and distributional issues that need to be considered ... {Harrison with Davis 2001: 59}.

In refuting 'oppression', Harrison suggests an alternative treatment centred on his concept of *structured selectivity* within contemporary society. This social process is then said to give rise to the *differential incorporation* of ideas, discourses and people within the societal whole, evidenced in material terms by the unequal distribution of goods and life-chances {Harrison with Davis 2001: 73, 191; Harrison 2001: 19}.

Thus although differential incorporation *may* be expressed in material terms, the concept is sufficiently flexible to accommodate abstractions such as 'human rights' and, in particular in the present context, 'rights' to life and to procreation. The case of Germany will be considered below (in chapter three) in the light of the enforced and directed 'differential incorporation' of designated sectors of the general population, particularly those considered by the state as 'unworthy' or 'unfit' to procreate, or indeed to continue to live, for reasons connected, whether accurately or not, to their supposed genetic inheritance. This line of analysis will then be applied to the general case of eugenic-inspired social policy initiatives.

The second analytical tool to be used here derives from a synthesis of a number of the works of Bourdieu and to a lesser extent of Mannheim {1936}. This is the concept of a 'field', for example:

[t]he **intellectual field**, which cannot be reduced to a simple aggregate of isolated agents ... is, like a magnetic field, made up of a system of power lines (original emphasis) {Bourdieu 1971a: 161}.

The immediate context of Bourdieu {1971a: 161} is that of 'high culture', or 'the arts and literature', but elsewhere {Bourdieu 1971b, 1977, 1985} he develops this field concept to cover a much broader landscape: in essence the whole intellectual underpinning of a general society. It is in this broader context that Bourdieu speaks of:

the specific properties of each field: haute couture, literature, philosophy, politics, etc {Bourdieu 1985: 18}.

It is immediately apparent from this that Bourdieu envisages an unlimited number of such fields, for any collective human project will of necessity first generate and then, in later existence, be influenced by its own tutelary field. However, each field may be conceptualised, and operated upon, in like manner, for there are:

structural and functional homologies among all fields ... [;] the invariable laws of structure ... of the different fields ... [and] ... properties which are shared by all fields ... {Bourdieu 1985: 18}. ... [Thus] *I found myself directly facing general properties valid for different fields* {Bourdieu 1985: 19}.

Bourdieu is not always consistent in his taxonomy of these different fields, a fact which does not aid the process of synthesis here. For example, he speaks of "*intellectual and artistic creation*" as a component part of the "*intellectual field*" {Bourdieu 1971a: 161}, and his discussion there contains much on creative authorship, but then speaks of a seemingly self-contained field of "*literature*" {Bourdieu 1985: 18}. Similarly, he mentions "*all fields of cultural production*" {Bourdieu 1985: 18} on the one hand, but also speaks of an apparently over-arching and singular "*cultural field*" {Bourdieu 1971a: 161, 1971b: 192} to which these 'production' fields maintain a reciprocal relationship on the other. (For example, "[t]he ... *intellectual field maintains a relation of interdependence with ... the cultural field*" {Bourdieu 1971a: 175}). The impression is of this cultural field as a type of 'super field', with many 'secondary fields' existing within its sphere of influence.

The overall thrust of Bourdieu's various works {e.g. 1971a, 1971b, 1977, 1985, 1993} in this area is that all human activity takes place within a social space defined by 'the' cultural field which both permeates and surrounds it. Within this super field, and in a state of 'interdependence' or reciprocity with it, are to be found a multiplicity of secondary fields. This is clearly a dynamic system, for there is also:

a plurality of social forces [which] almost always exists in all societies ... which ... are in a position to impose their cultural norms on a larger or smaller area of the ... [secondary] field {Bourdieu 1971a: 174/175}.

It is a moot point in the thinking of Bourdieu as to when such a "*plurality of social forces*" may be granted the status of a field in its own right, for:

the dynamic structure of the ... field is none other than the network of interactions between a plurality of forces {Bourdieu 1971a: 174}.

Bourdieu does not, and nor does this work attempt to, explain just how many forces are required to generate a network which may be termed a field.

Although often closely associated with Marxist approaches Bourdieu is, by this conceptualisation of many interlocking societal fields, able to avoid that "*mono-linear reductionism to economic factors*" of which Shakespeare {1997: 225, cited at the head of this section} complains in the context of disability studies. Bourdieu is explicit about this:

far from being the founding model, economic theory must probably be seen as a particular instance of the field theory [This] obliges one to rethink the presuppositions on which economic theory is based, and to do so precisely in the light of ... the analysis of the fields of cultural production. ... [T]hus it allows one to avoid all kinds of reductionism, beginning with economism, which recognizes as valuable only material interest and the quest for the maximizing of monetary profit {Bourdieu 1985: 20}.

Whilst distancing himself from an all-consuming materialism, Bourdieu retains an acute awareness of the class-based hierarchical form of modern society. Elsewhere {Bourdieu 1977}, he explores power relationships *via* the medium of "*symbolic systems*", which "*are ... instruments for constructing reality*" {Bourdieu 1977: 1}. One recent commentator notes that, in the thinking of Bourdieu:

there is 'symbolic capital', which is the authority to 'name' activities and groups, the power to represent what is understood as common sense knowledge, and above all to claim the legitimate right to proclaim the official definition of the social world (contrasting typeface in original) {Davis (M) 2004: 10}.

It is in this context that Bourdieu discusses the role of symbols in the propagation of ideology:

[t]he Marxist tradition privileges the political functions of "symbolic systems" ... [and] explains symbolic productions by relating them to the interests of the ruling class. ... The dominant culture contributes to ... the fictitious integration of the society as a whole, and hence to the demobilization (false consciousness) of the dominated classes; and to the legitimation of the established order {Bourdieu 1977: 2}.

What Bourdieu is describing here is the means by which a social elite is able to exert an influence upon the cultural field as a consequence of its exalted position within the societal structure. In this manner a numerically small group is afforded the potential not only to enforce its particular will in any given situation, but also to shape the entire agenda of a debate. In particular, Bourdieu provides an explanation for the reverence of 'expertise':

[e]very intellectual brings into his (sic) relations with other intellectuals a claim to cultural consecration (or legitimacy) which depends ... on the position he (sic) occupies in the intellectual field {Bourdieu 1971a: 179}.

Given a society in which a particular intellectual field has been imbued with a high degree of 'symbolic capital', let us say the scientific field within modernity, then not only will the general 'scientist' benefit from a share of this added status, but one who is accorded recognition by her/his peers will be seen as speaking with 'authority'. Ultimately any society in which 'symbolic capital' is valorised will reach a position where 'ideology' becomes so deeply engrained as to appear 'natural'. In such a scheme:

[s]ymbols are the instruments par excellence of social integration: as instruments of knowledge and communication ... they make possible the consensus on the sense of the social world which makes a fundamental contribution toward reproducing the social order {Bourdieu 1977: 2}.

This idea of a "*consensus*" is essential to the theorisation of Bourdieu, for it reflects the intellectual ground rules which define the parameters of debate within any particular societal setting: "*disagreement presupposes agreement on the areas of disagreement*" {Bourdieu 1971b: 191}. Hence elsewhere he speaks of "*a system of common references, a common framework ... the 'space of possibles' ...*" {Bourdieu 1993: 179}. It is such a "*space of possibles*" which informs the construction of a concept of a:

consensus in dissensus, which constitutes the objective unity of the intellectual field of a given period {Bourdieu 1971a: 183, repeated in Bourdieu 1971b: 191}.

Essentially, Bourdieu is here claiming that any debate between opposing factions only makes true sense when it is located against the 'symbolic' background which informs the intellectual (or cultural) field of the day - for:

[h]ow else are we to explain why so many ideological quarrels of the past are incomprehensible to us today {Bourdieu 1971a: 179}?

It is, for example, unproductive and potentially misleading to attempt to understand, as does Winzer (section 4.8 below), the intricacies of a non-modern society in terms of the symbolic framework of modernity.

This is not to deny the importance of a sense of 'the culture' of a society, which may in some respects be seen as providing a degree of continuity between the generations. What is assumed here is that there are many active intellectual fields within a given society, and that together they represent 'the' culture of that society. The rationale adopted is that 'culture' is itself the cumulative result of human intellectual activity:

Culture or Civilization ... is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom ... acquired by man (sic) as a member of society {Tylor 1891, extracted in Coser & Rosenberg 1982: 18}.

Such an idea is not alien to the thinking of Bourdieu. As he develops his thesis, he arrives at the concept of "*the cultural unconscious*", which informs:

ways of thought, forms of logic, stylistic expressions and catchwords ... which seem so natural and inevitable that they are not properly speaking the object of a conscious choice. They can be likened to what ... might be called the tonality

of mood which characterizes all the means of expression of an age ...
 {Bourdieu 1971a: 180}.

Although this construction, at first sight, may appear to share similarities with both the notion of 'ideology' as employed by Marx {e.g. 1845a} and the 'collective unconscious' of Jung {e.g. Gross 1992 : 922 *et seq*; Segaller & Berger 1989}, it differs markedly from each.

In the first instance, the 'ideology' of Marx {1845a} has the appearance of a tool or weapon fashioned or appropriated by a ruling elite, and used to maintain a societal *status quo* favourable to that elite. There is within Marxian and Marxist thought a sense of *consciousness* about 'ideology': it is an active and potent societal force. In contrast, Bourdieu {1971a} here posits something more akin to a repository of intellectual or cultural 'folklore'. This is more a passive collection of symbols which is available not to impose, but to inform and illustrate, ideas. In the second place, whilst the 'collective unconscious' of Jung is certainly, in like manner to the 'cultural unconscious' of Bourdieu {1971a}, composed of "*latent images*" {Gross 1992: 923}, Jung and his followers see these as both fixed and "*primordial*". In other words all humans have an inherited predisposition to react to particular stimuli in a pre-ordained manner. This is, in effect, a supposedly innate {Gross 1992: 923} or genetic instinct and, as such, it is both universal and not readily affected by social forces. In contradistinction, Bourdieu posits a reservoir of social effects which has accumulated over time, and may continue to receive deposits.

The 'cultural unconscious' of Bourdieu {1971a} does, however, appear to share many components with the thinking of Mannheim, who suggests that:

*[a]s a rule, human thought is not motivated by a contemplative impulse since it requires a volitional and emotional-unconscious undercurrent to assure the continuous orientation for knowledge in group life. Precisely because knowing is fundamentally collective knowing ... , it presupposes a community of knowing which grows primarily out of a community of experiencing prepared for in the subconscious. ... [O]ne is impelled to recognize the force of the **collective unconscious** (added emphasis) {Mannheim 1936: 28}.*

Mannheim continues {*ibid*} to speak of "*the irrational foundation of rational knowledge*". The force of his remarks is such as to convey the idea of a store of thought-forms, some of which, whilst each is inherently indestructible, may lie dormant until such time as they are re-activated, whether by force of circumstances or seemingly accidental ('subconscious') connection.

As the foregoing synopsis of the ideas of Bourdieu is intended to demonstrate, this genre of 'societal field theory' holds out the promise of a degree of flexibility with which to avoid the potentially stifling rigidity of either Parsonian functionalism (to be discussed in chapter four, and particularly section 4.6, below) or an uncompromisingly materialist interpretation of the ideas of Marx. Such flexibility arises because Bourdieu offers a means by which the complex interactions of seemingly disparate and disconnected streams of thought

may be conceptualised. By utilising the concept of 'symbolic capital', the theorisation of Bourdieu also suggests a way of understanding the processes by which thought - ideology - may be converted into action - social policy. Meanwhile, by providing a framework or matrix within which his thinking is located - a defined intellectual space, so to speak - Bourdieu evidences sufficient structure to evade a potential pitfall which may be thought to lie in the path of certain strands of recent sociological scholarship. He is able to avoid the descent into what has been described as the:

polymorphous perversities associated with some manifestations of the 'postmodern'. {Smart 1990: 28, cited in section 4.5 below}.

In its investigation into eugenic effects upon disabled people this work will, then, employ an analysis harvested from the fertile fields of Bourdieu. In particular it will be taken that these fields and their effects are a valid tool to facilitate this enquiry, and that it is meaningful to think in terms of some 'eugenic field' which may inform policy. As Bourdieu has it:

[t]o understand the social genesis of a field and to grasp what constitutes the specific necessity of the belief that supports it, of the language game which operates in it and of the material and symbolic stakes which are engendered in it, is to account for ... the producers' actions and the works they produce {Bourdieu 1985: 20}.

Having in mind a recent criticism of a perceived tendency within disability studies to expend much time and energy upon theorisation, with a corresponding neglect of the need for action:

we have spent too much time talking ... and not devoted enough attention to ... practice {Oliver 2004: 18},

the present writer also has aspirations to move beyond the restricted area of "*theoretical theory*" and towards "*scientific theory ... [-] a program of perception and of action*" {Bourdieu 1985: 11}. Such a progression may even afford the opportunity to escape from:

the kind of intellectual masturbation in which academics sometimes engage {Oliver 2004: 24}!

In order to address this aim, it may be thought necessary to reconsider the foundations of currently dominant theory within the disability studies arena. Bourdieu, at least, suggests that:

[i]t is ... important, if one is to have a bit of freedom from the constraints of the field, to attempt to explore the limits of the theoretical box in which one is imprisoned. This, in my view, is the principle function of theoretical culture: to provide the means for knowing what one is doing and for freeing oneself from the naiveté associated with the lack of consciousness of one's bounds {Bourdieu 1993: 184}.

The major use of the thinking of Bourdieu within the present enquiry is to provide an alternative to the approaches of Marxist theorists on the one hand, with their emphasis on the primacy of the economic realm and appeal in the context of modernity to what may almost appear to be a deliberately fashioned psychic weapon - 'the ideology of capitalism'. On the other hand lies the normative functionalism of theorists such as Parsons, examined in chapter four below, which assumes a semi-rigid societal matrix consisting of 'norms' and 'values'

{Parsons 1949, 1951, 1954} but does not fully explain the means by which such norm-based societies may evolve and change. Whilst it is not perhaps appropriate to think of the ideas of Bourdieu as representing some 'middle way' between these two schemes, his conceptualisation of a nexus of interacting intellectual fields promises an added degree of flexibility in the analysis here of a very complex topic which lies at the centre of this work: the seeming ubiquity of certain strands of eugenic thought within contemporary social policy formulation.

1. 6 Structure of the narrative

In chapter two this work will offer a brief discussion of prominent disability studies' standpoints and theorisation. As a short chapter, this is by no means intended to exhaust the topic area, but is rather designed to provide a flavour of the current debates. This chapter will, using the example of the socio-economic exclusion of irradiated survivors (*Hibakusha*) of the 1946 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs, go on to explore aspects of the societal construction of 'abnormality' and compare this with the more general process of disablement observed within modern society. Studies from within psychology {Asch 1952; Milgram 1963, 1977; Zimbardo 1973} will be introduced and their lessons applied to the case of disabled people within contemporary society. The concept of 'normality' will be broached here in preparation for the deeper study to follow in chapter four of the base of modern society. The overall lesson to be drawn from this chapter is that disabled people are most often constructed as being 'not normal' in modern society.

Chapter three is, in essence, a case study in applied eugenics. As such, the primary focus is upon societal developments and outcomes rather than underlying theory. The overall intention here is to chart the growing influence of eugenic ideas within a modern society over a period of some eight decades. In particular, the reliance upon a bureaucratic form of governance alongside an increasing emphasis on the role of the state in guiding the actions of its citizens is examined. The growth of scientific medicine and the coming to prominence of the idea of public, as opposed to individual, health is observed. The use of social policy as a means both of promoting inclusivity and of creating exclusion is noted before a more detailed examination of the policies associated with the Nazi period is offered. The point is made that the approach here is not that the German people are or were in some way pathologically different to western society more generally. To the contrary, and following the lead of Bauman {1989}, the thrust here is that Germany and the German people are largely representative of the general case.

Chapter four examines selected theoretical approaches towards gaining an understanding of the dynamics of modern society. In particular certain social effects of a world view which is influenced by utilitarian values are examined, alongside the growth of ideas of the efficacy of human intervention in the 'natural' world. The rise to dominance of notions of

'order' and 'progress' is explored in this context, and it is suggested that the setting of standards and the emergence of a concept of 'the normal' is due to these processes. In order to explore the possibility of continuity over long periods of time of dominant intellectual fields, a discussion of the views of two scholars, Bragg {1997} and Winzer {1997}, of aspects of premodern European societies is provided. Building on ideas of normality and its necessary corollary abnormality the foundations of Bauman's {1989} idea of 'heterophobia' are also examined here.

Chapter five is a relatively brief, but important, chapter in which the interplay between science, professions and bureaucracy is examined against the backcloth of selected processes within modernity and modern societies. A particular point educed here is the growth in the influence of 'the expert', and a corresponding tendency of bureaucratic society to, as it were, sub-contract areas of policy initiative and operationalisation to professional bodies in their perceived role as repositories of 'expertise'. In the course of this discussion, the point is made that bureaucratic governance may well assume an almost mechanistic appearance, and that this may then lead to a lessening of concern for individuals as the needs of society, or even of the given bureaucracy itself, take centre stage. The role of ideas drawn from utilitarian ethics, introduced in chapter four, are assessed.

Chapters six and seven are complementary, in that together they examine the emergence and (arguably) the rise to seeming ubiquity of eugenic thinking in western society. In chapter six a brief but illustrative excursion is made to explore the provenance of ancient Greek ideas, particularly those of Plato, which are often appealed to by eugenicists as in some manner justifying their stance. The contentious idea is advanced here that Plato has potentially been misunderstood, and hence misrepresented, in this context. Chapter six continues, to discuss the conflation of ideas supposedly drawn from ancient times with the pessimistic warnings of impending doom emanating from Malthus and the then revolutionary evolutionary teachings of Darwin, and concludes with the ideas of Galton which are generally acknowledged to inform modern eugenic thought.

Chapter seven continues from Galton, and examines the growth of eugenics in the first half of the twentieth century. In particular, this chapter focuses upon the situation in both the USA and UK. The overall thrust of this chapter is that the application of Galtonian theory led directly to the medicalisation of what may otherwise be seen as social issues. A particular line of argument here is that the eugenicists of the day were largely acting under the influence of ideas of social 'class' as the ultimate determinant of societal value. In this regard, evidence is advanced to suggest that essentially similar types of conduct and 'morality' were interpreted in radically different ways according to the perceived social status of the actors. In the course of this chapter certain social policy initiatives are compared and examined.

Chapter eight is intended to locate the European and USA experiences of eugenic thought and policy formulation within a wider geographical context. In this chapter comparisons are also made between capitalist and nominally socialist/communist societies, and the potential effects of (to use the ideas of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*}) different cultural and political fields upon 'the' eugenic intellectual field explored. The major conclusion to be drawn here is that whilst the eugenic field may well be modified by external effects from other fields, a finding which Bourdieu predicts (see section 1.5 above), the fundamental components of eugenic thought remain discernible. Perhaps the most readily identifiable of these components is the urge to 'improve' the overall standard of the citizenry.

Chapter nine opens with a discussion, and rebuttal, of the idea {Mazumdar 1992} that eugenics as a societal force for action petered-out around the mid-point of the twentieth century. Attention is drawn here to the alleged effects of other active intellectual fields and/or power lines extant within modern society which, it is claimed, have the potential to stimulate change within the eugenic field. The thrust of the argument here is that eugenic thinking did not vanish, nor was it neutered as a stimulus for action. Rather, it is suggested that this ideology adapted, or was adapted by its supporters, into a form which was more readily acceptable to societies experiencing changing cultural field effects. Having argued that eugenic intellectual field effects remain active, this chapter proceeds to adduce evidence which may be thought to support such a finding. Overtly eugenic proposals are examined, and then compared with current practices within the 'health professions' of the UK and US. The final parts of the chapter explore possibly unforeseen, and unintended, potential consequences of seemingly unrelated trends observed within the fields of economics, social policy and human genetics.

In chapter ten, the concluding chapter, the different strands of this investigation are drawn together. Here, the research questions posed in section 1.2 above are revisited and addressed individually. Ultimately, the whole is summed-up in 'the final analysis' and conclusions drawn about the effects, both extant and potential, upon disabled people of eugenic practices informed by genetic science.

Chapter 2: Disability studies; a brief discussion

2. 1 Proem

This chapter, which is primarily concerned with sketching the major principles of disability studies, will explore different means by which the 'social reality' of disability may be constructed. Hence 'medical' and 'social' models of disability will be compared and contrasted here, and a more general discussion on the topic of 'identity' provided, before the chapter concludes with a brief consideration of 'normality' (more of which in sections 4.6 and 4.7 below). An important strand of the current enquiry is that human genetic research is closely allied to medico-science, a point which is explored in chapter four and subsequently, and the discussion within this present chapter is in part intended to lay the theoretical foundations for a consideration from a disability studies perspective of the potential effects of situating 'disability' within the body (or genes) of the individual. As a consequence of its 'introductory' nature, this chapter does not directly address any of the research questions.

As will be seen in a 'real world' setting in chapter three, and explored theoretically in chapter four, in the modern world 'order' and 'normality' are valued highly {e.g. Bauman 1989; Parsons 1951; Spencer 1972a, 1972b}. Certainly on the functionalist analysis of Parsons {1951}, the onus is on the individual to conform as nearly as possible to the norms and role-expectations of the ambient society: else that individual is deemed "*deviant*". Individual 'failure' to conform has been observed to be inherently dangerous {e.g. Bauman 1989; Gallagher 1995; Hughes 2002}. In particular, chapter three will provide the opportunity to reflect upon the observed effects of a societal ethos which promoted ideas of the need of an individual to conform to a socially-approved template. This chapter, meanwhile, introduces themes current within disability studies which tend to run counter to such ideas.

Meanwhile the favoured mechanism of modernist governance, bureaucracy (discussed in chapter five below), is said by Cahoon {1996a: 12} to be an impersonal system which tends to destroy individuality, reducing each citizen to the status of "*a little cog*" {Weber, extracted in Coser & Rosenberg 1989: 335}. In like manner Stone {1985: 60 *et seq*} points to a modern bureaucratic urge to categorise people, and Bauman {1989} makes much of the bureaucratic method of dealing with people as inanimate objects, as representing (or indeed becoming) abstract 'problems' to be first defined and ultimately 'solved'. This, on a Weberian view, may be seen as indicating the increasing rationality of modern society and its governance.

This depersonalising rationality of modernity then leads to what, at first sight, may appear to be something of a paradox, for it will be argued here that in a modern society the dominant, hegemonic, societal construction of 'disability' is an intensely personal and

individualised one {e.g. Oliver 2004: 21; UPIAS 1976 amongst many}. This is not in fact paradoxical, but has its roots in 'normality'. As Finkelstein {1980}, Oliver {1990a} and Ryan & Thomas {1980} note, with a move in the nineteenth century towards factory manufacture there arose an expectation that workers would conform to the rhythm of the workshop or, later, production line.

Foucault talks of the role of normality within a modernising society, and in so doing suggests means by which an identification of some as inherently 'different' may come about:

the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels ... [W]ithin a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces ... as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences {Foucault 1991: 184}.

In this way, it is possible to explain how the seemingly irreconcilable social processes of homogenisation and differentiation may coexist within the same societal framework, modernity. Indeed, the logic of Foucault {1991} suggests that these are not distinct processes. To the contrary, it would appear that both are manifestations of the more fundamental process of normalisation.

2. 2 Disability: a valid concern of medicine?

There is no clearly formulated universal definition of 'disability' within the contemporary policy community. Instead, there is an implicit construction of disability as an individual attribute which may be inferred from practice and policy. Thus the claim, in an official (UK) government employment document, made by the then responsible Minister, Hodge, that there are:

disabled people who face substantial barriers to employment as a result of their disability {DfEE 2000 introduction} (added emphasis),

stands as evidence of the social policy position of isolating the individual as the locus of disability. Hodge's assumption here is that a disabled person should adapt to the work environment, not *vice-versa*.

It is not unreasonable for any one of us, if consulting a medical practitioner, to expect to be treated as an individual. There is a general (but not universal) acceptance within disability studies that medical intervention may well be of value to individuals with impairment, and therefore acceptable, *provided that* the intention is solely to benefit individuals *per se*, not to fit them more nearly to some pre-determined 'norm' {e.g. Oliver 2004}. Where problems may arise, however, is if medical intervention is seen as being designed to serve the interests of society, by reinforcing stereotypical 'normality', rather than addressing the needs of the patient. In essence, the general disability studies position is that the symptoms of impairment, in so far as they are personal to the patient, *may well* be the subject of (informed consensual) medical

treatment. In contrast 'disability', as a social construction, is not obviously a matter of prime concern to medicine.

As will be discussed in depth below (in section 3.5 and chapter five especially), there is much evidence that within modernity medicine has tended towards at least partial integration with the machinery of policy implementation. This has led to a role for medical practitioners as "*gatekeepers*" {Stone 1985: 148}, both to state ill-health and disability benefits and to the socially sanctioned 'sick role' of Parsons {1951}. In turn, in order to fulfil this role, medicine has formulated a 'check list' of criteria to be met in order for the applicant to be allowed beyond the metaphorical 'gateway'. This situation, for disability activists {e.g. UPIAS 1976} and many within disability studies, has then given rise to an individualisation of 'disability': the 'medical' (or 'individual medical') model.

This model is made up of the following components, arranged in ascending order and bearing a strict cause and effect relationship to one another:

Impairment:

any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological or anatomical structure or function.

Leading to:

Disability:

any restriction or lack, resulting from an impairment, of ability to perform any activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being.

Leading to:

Handicap:

a disadvantage for a given individual, resulting from an impairment or disability, that prevents the fulfilment of a role that is normal depending on age, sex, social and cultural factors for that individual {after Davis (K) 1996 para 2.2}.

It may be thought that this model has something of the nature of a straw man (or woman - gender is unimportant here), contrived by disability studies commentators to have the appearance of solidity but designed to be readily brushed aside. However, a World Health Organisation [WHO] report on the topic is informative in confirming the foregoing characterisation:

*[t]he **medical model** views disability as a personal problem, directly caused by disease, trauma or other health condition, which requires medical care provided in the form of individual treatment by professionals. Management of the disability is aimed at cure or the individual's adjustment and behaviour change.* {WHO 1999: 26, para 5.2} (contrasting type face in original).

It is abundantly clear from the above ("*...within the range considered normal fulfilment of a role that is normal ... for that individual ...*") that a major tenet of (individual) medical model thinking is that the current state of society, that is both the socio-economic and built

environments, is taken as a given. Indeed it is designated 'normal', with the emphasis on making the individual fit the social norm:⁴ *"the individual's adjustment"*.

This, then, is the basis for the major complaint from within disability studies about the medicalisation of 'disability'. If this is seen as primarily a medical matter, a disabled person becomes a 'patient', hence the focus of attention lies upon the individual and 'treatment' or 'therapeutic regimes' prescribed in order to bring about a 'cure'. The locus of any perceived 'problem' is firmly fixed within the individual, and the only role of society is to facilitate the provision of 'care'. Should a particular impairment not be amenable to 'cure', then the expectation is that the 'patient' will passively 'adjust' her/his aspirations and in the process accept a designation of being 'not normal'. Most frequently such a condition will entail material deprivation, but it is also likely to be accompanied by *"psycho-emotional dimensions"* {Thomas 2004: 37-39}. In other words, the structured selectivity practised by modern society in relation to disabled people often leads to their social dislocation. Such dislocation in turn has the potential to lead to quantifiable psychic effects, effects which may well be 'diagnosed' as requiring further 'medical treatment'. Intentionally or not, a major result of the medicalisation of 'disability' is to promote yet more medical intervention: it is effectively a job creation scheme for medical and paramedical professionals.

2. 3 Disability studies viewpoints: the primacy of 'the social'

There is no single voice to speak for disability studies, and in recent years there has been a lively debate surrounding views, analytical approaches and standpoints within what may best be termed the disability studies community {e.g. Priestley 1998a; Shakespeare & Watson 2002; Tregaskis 2002; Watson 2004}. Whilst at least one powerful disability studies voice {Oliver 2004: 24} has called for less talk and more emphasis on action, the continuing search for different theoretical approaches may not be a sterile exercise. As Abberley has it:

[t]he first thing you need to do when talking about disability today is to clarify your terms, and this immediately gets you into the realm of theory... {Abberley 1999: 1}.

Tregaskis {2002} and Priestley {1998a} are clear that there are a number of perspectives which have been applied to social modelling from within disability studies, several of which are ostensibly non-materialist. These latter, for Tregaskis, include *"psychoanalytic"* {Tregaskis 2002: 465} and *"cultural"* {op cit: 461}, whilst Priestley {1998a} contrasts materialism with idealism.

The debate continues, with some contributors preferring a Marxist-materialist style of approach {Abberley 1987; Finkelstein 1993, 2001; Oliver 1989, 1990a} which may have, to some extent, the appearance of a disability studies 'tradition'. As Shakespeare notes:

⁴ The normalising nature of modernity is discussed in detail in sections 4.8 and 4.9 below.

Social Model theorists such as Oliver, Finkelstein, Abberley, ... [use] an approach which I would suggest is close to the Marxist conception of ideology {Shakespeare 1997: 224}.

This 'social model' spoken of by Shakespeare is central to the work of a large majority of theorists and activists in the disability studies area. Although there is much debate about the topic {see, *e.g.* Crow 1996; Humphrey 2000; Llwellyn & Hogan 2000; Oliver 1996a, 1996b; Shakespeare & Watson 2002}, the broad outline of this approach is that individuals, whether labelled 'disabled' or not, have intrinsic value as human beings and what should be an automatic right to participate in a full range of social and economic activity.

On this view, physiology⁵ is, or rather should be, irrelevant to any question of an individual's social valuation. The underlying theme is that human 'ability' is ill-defined and, in any event, lies along a spectrum. At some arbitrary (and variable {Shearer 1981: 9}) point on this spectrum, 'ability' becomes 'impairment' and societal reaction (or inaction) in relation to such impairment then leads to individuals being expelled from the 'mainstream' of socio-economic society: 'disabled'.

A useful reference point here is Finkelstein's paper "*The Social Model Of Disability Repossessed*" {Finkelstein 2001:1}, and in particular what may appear to be his stance that the original social model, that of Oliver {1983a: 23 *et seq*} built upon the thinking of the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation [UPIAS] {UPIAS 1976}, should stand unrevised in tribute to its authors and their particular "*insight*" into the topic of disability. Finkelstein does not meanwhile object to "*people devising and promoting new social models in their own name*" {Finkelstein 2001: 3}, but strongly resists what he sees as a revisionist tendency within disability studies. Ultimately he appears to nail his colours firmly to the Marxist mast:

disabled people must find ways of engaging in the class struggle where the historical direction of society is fought, won or lost {Finkelstein 2001: 5}.

Finkelstein describes a model as being the middle stage of a three step process which begins with the "*interpretation*" of a phenomenon and ends in the formulation of a theory to "*explain*" the processes in train. For him:

[t]he disability movement still awaits an explanation of the social laws that make ... people with impairments into disabled people {Finkelstein 2001: 3}.

However, his position is unclear when he calls for a social theory, or "*explanation*", of disability formation. It is not immediately apparent whether he is referring specifically to an explanation of the insight provided by the UPIAS-inspired social model, or calling for a broader treatment. If the former, Finkelstein himself seems to lay the theoretical foundations with his claim that:

[o]ur society is built on a competitive market foundation and it is this social system which disables us {Finkelstein 2001: 4}.

⁵ Which here includes intellectual, sensory and affective condition.

If the latter, the tone of the paper suggests that Finkelstein will reject any attempt to apply non-Marxist, or at the very least non-materialist, theory to the existing UPIAS-inspired model.

Finkelstein is very clear about the UPIAS social interpretation of disability. It is “*a materialist approach*” {Finkelstein 2001: 4}, and only by taking part in what appears to be an ongoing “*class struggle*” {Finkelstein 2001: 5} will change be achieved. This formulation, with its talk of oppression and class struggle, may appear to have close parallels to the approach of Marx and later Marxists.⁶ It emphasises the perceived inequity, indeed iniquity, of societal constructions of disability. The social model, or rather the UPIAS-derived one, is effectively a political manifesto and speaks of a state of conflict between a minority group of disabled people and a host society which is at best uncaring, at worst deliberately oppressive:

[d]isability is something imposed on top of our impairments, by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society. Disabled people are therefore an oppressed group in society {UPIAS 1976: 3/4}.

Throughout his many writings in the topic area of 'disability' Finkelstein has consistently employed what appears to be a Marxist-style analysis. Meanwhile Oliver, credited by Finkelstein as the author of 'the' social model of disability, is specific about his personal inspiration:

[m]y own theorizing on disability is located in Marxist political economy {Oliver 1994: 1},

and an equally clear acknowledgement of a debt to Marx is found in the work of Abberley who informs us that:

[o]ppression is complementary to exploitation, extending Marxist analysis... {Abberley 1987: 8},

before presenting a discussion of the role of capitalism in producing certain forms of impairment, and in acting upon these and other impairments to produce 'disability'.

There is possibly an inherent theoretical problem, in the social model context, with Marxist analysis. As Abberley points out, the pre-eminence accorded to work, either as an economic necessity or as some metaphysical expression of human-ness in a Marxian Utopia:

implies that impaired people are still deprived, by biology if not by society {Abberley 1999: 9}.

Thus Abberley acknowledges that Marxist theory, when taken to its Marxian conclusion, runs contrary to the fundamental precept of a *social* model: *biology* has the ultimate power to disable. The Marxian Utopia is fundamentally an able-bodied construction {Abberley 1999}.

⁶ Vic Finkelstein, in public discussion with this author on 27th November 2002, declared that UPIAS itself was *not* a Marxist organisation. The present author is happy to note this statement, but his personal interpretation of the UPIAS 1976 document is that it *appears to him* to have links to Marxist thought. Certainly Abberley, Finkelstein and Oliver have all gone on to develop the UPIAS position using Marxist-style theory {Shakespeare 1997: 224}.

This seeming contradiction is sufficient to raise questions about the applicability of Marxist analysis to the *social* modelling of disability.

An important tenet of Marxist-inspired disability theory, as Oliver, Finkelstein and Abberley each repeatedly make clear, is that certain specified groups within capitalist society are systematically disadvantaged or *oppressed* by a dominant elite. Abberley appears to present a particularly robust analysis here, with his assertion that the:

disadvantages [experienced by disabled people] *are dialectically related to an ideology or group of ideologies which justify and perpetuate this situation. ... [This idea] involves the identification of some beneficiary of this state of affairs* {Abberley 1987: 7}.

This is specific: for Abberley the development of a Marxist analysis of disablement demands both the demonstration of active oppression *and* the identification of some 'winner' to balance the oppressed 'loser'. It is not sufficient to merely adduce evidence that disabled people are badly situated in economic society.

The present writer has no doubt whatsoever that Marxist-materialist-like styles of analysis have had great and valuable effect in raising levels of awareness of issues surrounding 'disability', both amongst disabled people themselves and in the wider community. However, he fears that in the longer term use of a theory of 'oppression' may prove counter-productive. As Thomas (who herself favours a "*feminist materialist perspective*" {Thomas 2004: 35}) notes:

[t]he oppression that disabled people experience operates on the 'inside' as well as on the 'outside': it is about being made to feel of lesser value, worthless, unattractive ... {Thomas 2004: 37/38}.

Here, Thomas is essentially referring to aspects of self-identity experienced by disabled people, and she then relates these to power gradients within social interactions involving disabled people, their families and society more generally. She is accepting psychological effects are wrought upon those 'oppressed', which she sees as a part of the disablement process. However, by emphasising the supposedly active and directed social process of 'oppression', on the model of Abberley {1987: 7, above}, there is perhaps a danger of inducing (or reinforcing) what Lifton {1971: 176} terms a state of "*victim-consciousness*".

Such a state is not to the benefit of any individual experiencing it, for:

[n]ot only is this kind of self-image humiliating to the [individual], but separates him (sic) in his own eyes from the rest of mankind (sic) {Lifton 1971: 176}.

Thus by emphasising the supposed victimhood of persons who have been 'oppressed', this form of theoretical approach may risk acting to perpetuate the very effects which it seeks to eliminate. Far from leading to the socio-economic inclusion of disabled people within their ambient society, it may lead to their continuing self-exclusion; a self-fulfilling prophecy. For Thomas:

the operation of disablism along psycho-emotional pathways is a crucial dimension of being disabled {Thomas 2004: 38},

a situation which is "*yet to be theorised*" {*ibid*}. It is ethically incumbent upon theorists to consider all of the potential effects of applying theory to an observed condition.

2. 4 Identity, self-identity and power imbalances

The means by which social identity is formed and reinforced have been subjected to much investigation within the disciplines of Sociology and Psychology, and this is not the place to rehearse the minutiae of the processes in train. There is, in both fields, a well-supported opinion that identity ensues from social processes, a view which has led to a theory of labelling as being an important part of the mechanics of the situation. (This process is evident in the work of Goffman {1963}.) For the present purpose, and drawing upon the authorities cited below, it will be accepted that a process of social labelling is both active and potent.

This is readily apparent in the case of assigned identity - the designation of groups in society as 'mainstream' or 'other'; 'good' or 'bad' - and the possible deleterious consequences of a label of 'other' have been well-documented, observationally (*e.g.* Nazi excesses; genocide in contemporary Africa or the Balkans), psychologically (*e.g.* Asch 1952, Milgram 1977) and sociologically (*e.g.* Bauman 1989). There is much more to the labelling process than assigned identity, however, for:

[o]ur sense of identity is constructed on the basis of other people's definitions
{Oliver & Barnes 1998 p67}.

This idea has been extant within behavioural psychology since at least the 1930s, viz:

[t]he self ... is a process in which the individual is continually adjusting himself
(sic) ... *to the situation to which he (sic) belongs, and reacting back on it*
{Mead 1934 p182}.

It is noticeable here that Mead appears to accept tacitly that society has, if not the 'right' then at least the power, to assign identity - "*the situation to which he belongs*" - and that the person so labelled is in general passive in accepting the authority of the host society: assigned identity, it would seem, is readily internalised.

Such a ready acceptance of 'social authority' lies at the heart of Bauman's sociological work on the Holocaust {Bauman 1989}, wherein he makes much of the concept of 'otherness' and the dangers inherent in being labelled as not 'normal' or not 'mainstream', ideas which are examined in chapter four below, and in section 4.10 specifically. Meanwhile, the psychological works of Asch {1952}, Milgram {1963, 1977} and Zimbardo {1969} all seek to gain empirical insight into this topic.

Of these latter, Asch demonstrated empirically what has for long been a 'commonsense' concept, that people frequently display a 'herd instinct' whereby they are willing to suspend

their critical faculties the better to gain or retain the approval of a peer group. The corollary, reported by Asch, is that those who insist on their personal interpretation of an event, even where accurate, risk the animosity of the majority. In some instances, such individualists became social outcasts, despite the fact that the ostensible research topic was a trivial one of estimating the relative lengths of lines in a diagram {Asch 1952}. Milgram {1963, 1977}, experimenting during the early 1960s, focused more on the perception of 'authority' and particularly on the high social status assigned to medico-science. The important results for the present purpose are that randomly selected members of society displayed an almost unquestioning obedience to the instructions of a white-coated (a potent 'scientific' symbol) researcher. This deference held, even to the extent of inflicting (unknown to them, simulated) pain on a third party. Finally, Milgram {1977} found that increased distance, physical or social, between actor and supposed subject led to a lessening of restraint.

Zimbardo's 1960s work on 'prisoners and guards' in the "Stanford Prison Experiment" is perhaps the most telling - the experiment was famously curtailed because the roles were entered into with over-enthusiasm. Here, as described by Haney *et al* {1973} (reported in Gross {1994 pps 98-121}), volunteers were randomly assigned identities as either 'prisoners' or as 'guards'. These assigned identities were rapidly internalised by all parties, to the extent that 'prisoners' became apathetic and subservient, 'guards' authoritarian to the point of physical bullying and the introduction of petty rules designed merely to underline their power, including a 'dress code' for prisoners. Tellingly, Haney *et al* {Gross 1994 p111} comment upon the:

arbitrary control ... for even the daily, commonplace functions like going to the toilet

imposed by the 'guards' which, in the words of the researchers, very rapidly led to "*dependency and emasculation*" on the part of the 'prisoners'. Thus one consequence of an assigned identity as a socially inferior 'prisoner' was a marked lowering of self-esteem, which resonates with the ideas of Lifton {1971: 176} (section 2.3 above). The research findings of Zimbardo were so stark that they have been featured and discussed in a major television documentary on the topic of 'torture' {BBC 2005}.

The situation revealed by Zimbardo {BBC 2005; Gross 1994: 98-121} is analogous to that described by Hunt {1966a: 151}, who speaks of disabled people's "*constant experience of ... pressure towards unthinking conformity*" and of:

staff who bully ... who dictate what clothes people should wear ... and will take away 'privileges' (like getting up for the day) when they choose {Hunt 1966a: 154}.

Although Hunt speaks here of institutionalised 'care', similar complaints have been made about 'care in the community':

care assessments all too frequently consolidate ... the ... social segregation of disabled people in their own homes {Priestley 1998b: 665}.

The linked processes of the assignment and internalisation of identity are demonstrated by a research project undertaken to study survivors of the Hiroshima atomic bomb {Lifton 1971}. Writing from a psychoanalytic perspective, Lifton presents a concise review of the sociological processes involved in ('impaired') identity formation. An important factor here is that, prior to August 6th 1945, atomic bomb survivors (*hibakusha*) as a group, or indeed as a concept, were unknown. There is, then, no centuries-long accumulation of ideological or cultural baggage to impede the view of the processes involved (Lifton is at pains to demonstrate that the socio-psychological effects are *not* unique to Japanese society).

That the *hibakusha* of Hiroshima have much in common with 'traditional' disabled people is clear from the narrative {Lifton 1971}. They are grossly over-represented in the lower socio-economic strata of society {Lifton 1971: 179}; they are considered a 'poor prospect' for marriage and frequently marry beneath their pre-*hibakusha* status {Lifton 1971:195} (in Japan this indicates a severe loss of social standing); they are routinely discriminated against in employment and workplace promotion, and frequently accept work which is associated with lower social origins than their own {Lifton 1971: 180}. In short, they are subject to "*socio-economic deprivation*" {Lifton 1971: 114} on the sole basis of their perceived and experienced social identity. This indicates that the *hibakusha* identity is an impaired one: the holder is *no longer* a full member of society. Indeed, Lifton {1971: 181} cites cases of *hibakusha* voluntarily joining "*the ranks of the outcasts*", the slum dwellers of Hiroshima, effectively relinquishing all social standing.

A major consequence of this discrimination, in the psychoanalytic view of Lifton {1971}, is that *hibakusha* have themselves developed a lowered sense of self-esteem. In the idiom of Mead {1934: 182}, they have "*reacted back*" on the social processes to which they have been exposed, to the extent that they feel a necessity to justify the oppression which they have faced:

[i]t can't be helped. ... It is only natural ... to employ healthy people
{*hibakusha* cited by Lifton 1971: 182}.

For Lifton this attitude represents the complete internalisation of the identity 'manufactured' by social processes for assignment to the *hibakusha*. They have come to see themselves as devalued, as intrinsically inferior, within their host society. This is despite a lack of evidence of any statistical propensity to medium- to long-term increases in morbidity or impairment. Although in the short-term many *hibakusha* died of radiation effects, Lifton {1971} finds nothing to suggest that survivors of longer standing face any greater risk than the general population.

There are several similarities between the *hibakusha* of Lifton {1971} and Abberley's {1987} thesis of the 'oppression' of disabled people by and within western society. For Abberley, disabled people are prevented from playing a full role within society, and are subject,

as are the *hibakusha*, to “social, financial, environmental and psychological disadvantages” {Abberley 1987: 17}. An integral part of Abberley’s argument relies on an assumption that people with impairments:

can be regarded as a group whose members are in an inferior position to other members of society because they are disabled people {Abberley 1987: 7},

which implies both that a labelling process is in action and that a lower social value is assigned to disabled people. Indeed, the parallels between disabled people and *hibakusha* are inescapable: identity is assigned by society and, at least to some degree, internalised by individuals.

2. 5 But they're just not normal, are they?

Language may serve to obscure rather than enlighten, and Oliver {1994} is certainly aware of potential problems arising from confusion between the word 'normal' and the specific concept of 'normalization'. Nonetheless, he remains adamant that:

the social structures of late capitalist societies cannot be discussed in a discourse of normality/abnormality ...{Oliver 1994: unpaginated}.

This statement would appear to represent, at least for Oliver and with him an important sector of disability studies thinkers, a clear divorce between Marxist political economy and any idea of 'the normal'.

Whilst 'traditional' disability studies Marxism, as informed and represented by Oliver, eschews 'normality' as an aid to analysis, the fact remains that the concept of 'the normal' itself has a central place in contemporary society (see chapter four, especially section 4.6, below). It is, so to speak, normal to talk of normality and, as discussed there, this seeming hegemony may appear to be a product of modern industrial society despite Oliver’s dismissal. The idea of 'normality' has an important place in either a non-Marxist or a non-materialist analysis of disability, and will be developed throughout this work.

Shakespeare {1997} looks to cultural factors as a major part of his analysis of the process of disablement. Drawing upon a European tradition, which he traces (*via* Lloyd 1983 and thence de Beauvoir 1943) to Hegelian philosophy, Shakespeare {1997: 225 - 229} directs the attention of his reader towards a pervasive concept of 'otherness' within which disabled people are firmly 'the other' in relation to whom 'able' people define their privileged status. Put another way, on this cultural argument disabled people are the 'abnormal' against which 'normality' is measured. As Thomas notes:

in talking about you as a disabled person ... I am also performing the construction of myself as 'normal' {Thomas 2004: 39}.

In his section on "*Anomaly and Liminality*", Shakespeare {1997: 229 - 233} approaches ideas of 'normality' ever more closely, for here the 'anomalous' is something which

does not conform to societal norms - and is thus axiomatically 'abnormal' - whilst the 'liminal' ('borderline') category, being:

betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention and ceremonial {Turner 1969: 95, cited by Shakespeare 1997: 232},

clearly does not fully conform to societal norms either. Shakespeare frames his paper around the idea that the major factor in disablement is 'culture'. Shakespeare appears to alternate between the 'high' culture of literature and art on the one hand, and a more mundane formulation of culture as that part of the substructure of a society which, in effect, contains the reference data which serve to inform the ideas of 'normality' within that societal setting on the other. In the theorisation of Shakespeare {1997} it is not immediately obvious exactly how and why certain stereotypes have entered into 'culture', nor is it made clear how culture may have a direct influence on social policy.

In a critique of this style of analysis adopted by Shakespeare {1997, referred to by Barnes as Shakespeare 1994, an earlier print of the same work}, Barnes observes that this:

reduces explanations for cultural perceptions of people with ... impairments as abnormal to the level of metaphysics or thought processes {Barnes 1997: 12}.

In the same work, Barnes earlier notes approvingly that Oliver {1990a}:

provides a materialist account of the creation of disability which places 'ideology' ... at the centre of his argument {Barnes 1997: 9}.

It might seem that 'ideology' itself, which figures prominently in much of the materialist-inspired work of disability studies theorists such as Abberley and Oliver, is also a product of "thought processes". The central analytical theme of the present work is that, following the lead of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*}, societal structure, and with it all of its included phenomena, does indeed stem from intellectual activity. These are issues approached in the present work by means of an analysis discussed in section 1.5 above.

The current author fully and unreservedly accepts the importance of the pioneering role of UPIAS {1976} in drawing attention towards societal factors, and away from individual physiology, in the consideration of disablement and 'disability'. UPIAS had a major objective of shifting 'blame', or 'responsibility', for disability from the individual to society in general. This objective is, for the present writer, entirely laudable but he is not convinced by the apparently Marxist-orientated, and often materialist-dominated, theorisation which has sprung from the work of UPIAS {e.g. Abberley 1987; Finkelstein 2001; Oliver 1983a, 1994}. Certainly modernity is a societal form which emphasises the material highly, but this does not necessarily imply that all or any of the phenomena encountered in such a society may only be explained or described in material terms. Nor does it rule out the influence of thought, of intellectual activity.

Chapter 3: Germany 1871 - 1945; a case study

3. 1 Proem

The purpose of this chapter is to consider certain ideological, sociological and political currents which may, it will be suggested, be seen to predispose a given, or arguably the general {Bauman 1989}, 'modern' society to the application of eugenic-inspired social policies. It is not disputed here that the case of Nazi Germany is an extreme example, but the fact is that these events happened within the modern world and within living memory. Moreover, the discussion here will point to evidence of at least some degree of continuity in belief systems over time (research question (i)), and seek to identify particular effects arising from modernity (research questions (ii) and (iv)). As a case study, the chapter tends more towards the descriptive level as opposed to the analytical and thus also serves to provide the foundation for the study of theoretical positions which will appear in chapters four and five.

The proposal is that there are indicators found within the case of Germany which have the potential to be used to help evaluate the risks of similar (but unintended) consequences contained within present policy initiatives current in western industrialised societies. As Bauman informs us:

*focusing on the **Germanness** of [the Holocaust]... is simultaneously an exercise in exonerating everyone else, and particularly **everything** else. ... [This] results...in the dire threat of moral and political disarmament {Bauman 1989: xii} (original emphases).*

Specifically the indicators considered here are (in no particular order of precedence): a concern by government or ruling elite with national identity; a predisposition to the application of Utilitarian ethics arising from ideas of the central importance of some intangible concept of an impersonal State, coupled with concerns for the 'health of the nation' and an accompanying notion that the individual counts for rather less than the whole in any consideration of the life of the nation; the achievement of high societal status by medico-science (as opposed to earlier forms of medicine as an Art); perceptions of some form of social and/or economic problem; and the growth of an idea that a lack of 'efficiency' amongst the collective population of the state entails some form of cost, either in terms of financial burdens or loss of national prestige.

The discussion of 'efficiency' will necessarily entail ideas of valued and less-valued members of society; notions of people accorded different social positions and statuses. It is almost a sociological commonplace that "[i]nequality is a feature of all complex societies" {Crompton 1993: 5}, and Crompton is clear that she does not confine her observation to purely economic or material factors. She talks of those:

[c]ustomary inequalities ... associated with age, gender and race [which] have persisted into the modern era {Crompton 1993: 5}.

Although Crompton fails to acknowledge disability as a factor in 'inequality' here, others such as Abberley {1987, 1991}, Barnes {1997} and Shakespeare {1997} would argue strongly for its inclusion. If this argument is accepted then inequality based upon supposed disability is itself, in Crompton's word, "*customary*". This idea would seem to have close links to the 'intellectual field' and 'cultural unconscious' of Bourdieu {1971a, 1971b} and to the 'collective unconscious' of Mannheim {1936}.

It is important to note that 'inequality' *per se* is not here a primary target for investigation. Rather, it is seen as an indicator of a social process of 'structured selectivity' leading to a condition of 'differential incorporation'. In essence the current work is not here concerned with the observed 'social fact' of a relatively ineligible social position occupied by disabled people (see, amongst many others, Abberley {1987, 1991}; Barnes {1997, 2000}; Davis {1997a}; Finkelstein {1980, 1993, 2001}; Hughes {2002}; Hunt {1966a}; Oliver {1989, 1990a}; Shakespeare {1996, 1997, 1998}), but with underlying societal processes which have led to this outcome. Thus it is that although eugenics with its fundamental ideas of the inherent 'inferiority' of certain people {Farrall 1985; Galton (D) 2001; Jones 1998; Kevles 1986; Mazumdar 1992; Nelkin 1992; Paul 1998a, 2002; Shakespeare 1998} may appear to go beyond 'simple' inequality, the contention here is that it represents structured selectivity leading to differential incorporation (perhaps even *excorporation*) in readily observable action.

Germany is, in many ways, a near-perfect subject for a case study of the conjunction of modernity, a well-defined sense of national identity, politico-economic instability and the operationalisation of eugenic ideas. For much the same reasons, Germany is also a topic which should be approached cautiously. Certainly, in the aftermath of the Nazi experience, there were attempts made (notably in the USA by Milgram {1963, reported in Gross 1994 pps 81-97} and Zimbardo {1973}) to suggest that there was something unusual about the German psyche of the 1930s and 1940s. There was no evidence found to support such a proposition.

Of equal importance here, Germany is seen as being possessed of a well-established and efficient state bureaucracy {Bauman 1989; Weber 1948}. Bureaucracy is addressed in detail in chapter five below. For the moment it must suffice to note that, in Germany:

[d]uring his long years in power, Bismarck brought his ministerial colleagues into unconditional bureaucratic dependence {Weber 1948: 229}.

Weber indicates that, from the outset, the Germany of 1871 was *designed* as a bureaucracy. This intentional design runs alongside and reinforces the "*unavoidable yet unintended promotion of bureaucratization*" which is associated with notions of a 'liberal state democracy' more generally {Weber 1948: 231}. It is a telling statistic that the number of German civil servants increased from 450,000 in 1881 to 1,180,000 in 1911 {Roberts 1967: 169}.

The specifically German experience of eugenics, especially after Hitler succeeded to national power in 1933, has been described and analysed {e.g. Burleigh 1997, 2000; Burleigh & Wiperman 1991; Gallagher 1995; Kerr & Shakespeare 2002; Rosenbaum 1999}, even on occasion excused or denied {see, e.g., Wiesenthal 1989: 330 *et seq*}, in great detail and from many perspectives both academic and populist. It is not the intention here to pass moral judgement. Rather, the topic is raised as an informative case study into the ways in which a eugenic mind-set may become established within an industrialised and sociologically modern nation state.

It is pertinent to note that there is no intention of proceeding from a position that eugenic thought must inevitably lead to the exercise of Nazi-type social policy. It is equally pertinent to note that such social policy *may* result from eugenic reasoning. As Mannheim informs us:

[w]hen ... any human activity continues over a long period of time without being subjected to intellectual control or criticism, it tends to get out of hand {Mannheim 1936: 1}.

3. 2 The very model of a modern scientific state

Germany, more or less as it appears today, was formally established as a political entity, a federation of semi-autonomous statelets or regions which claimed the added status of 'Empire', in 1871 {John 1996: 185}. This development came after an extended period of European war and revolution accompanied by change and consolidation amongst and within Prussia and the several lesser feudal-based areas and states which may be described in general as 'Germanic', and more particularly as remnants of an earlier (Medieval) German Empire {Pounds 1990}.

This 'new' Germany, the Second Reich, was superimposed upon a geographic area which was already partially industrialized and urbanized, and which was in a state of flux between a 'traditional' rural economy and 'modern' industrial production {Pounds 1990, 1996}. The Germany of 1871 was, in terms of population number, the second largest European state after Russia: in terms of the production of coal, iron and steel it was second only to Britain, and had achieved European primacy in these latter areas by 1914 {Pounds 1996: 19}.

As early as 1860, major areas of what was soon to become Germany are said to have “*come to the fore as the most important source of chemicals*” {Pounds 1990: 410}. Not only did the development of scientific techniques underlie western industrialisation, but what was perhaps the most scientific industry of the day, the manufacture of chemicals, comprised a leading part of the German economy. Perhaps of more importance nationally, German scientific ability had achieved world renown. The star of German scientism, and with it the social status of science within the nation, was in the ascendancy.

This process of evolution, from partial to full industrialization, wrought:

profound changes in the social and economic structure of the young Reich, engendering a myriad of ... social tensions and problems {Weiss 1990: 9}.

These "*profound changes*" may be seen as marking a societal rite of passage, celebrating the crossing of the boundary between 'traditional' and 'modern' social forms. As Allen *et al* have it:

Modernity ... coincides with the beginnings of a fully industrialized, capitalist economy and the development of the nation-state {Allen *et al* 1992: 1}.

Although modernity is often associated with ideas of 'progress' (see section 4.5 below), modernity is not (or arguably was not) purely forward-looking. As described by Hamilton {1992}, the eighteenth century European Enlightenment which provided important power lines for the cultural field informing much of the intellectual activity of the nineteenth century, contained amongst its tenets ideas not only of an inherent progress by human society within a rationalist framework, but also the proposition that:

the principal characteristics of human nature were always and everywhere the same {Hamilton 1992: 22}.

3. 3 In search of a mythical rationale

This idea of the continuity of human nature had legitimated interest in older societies, certainly those of classical Greece and Rome, but also of earlier European ones. Writing in 1939, on the eve of the second world war, Julian Huxley observed:

[a]ll the movements toward national unity that were so characteristic of the nineteenth century present certain features in common. Among these we would note especially the rise of a myth, so similar in all these cases that we must suppose it is a natural way of thinking ... Among all the newer and almost all the older nationalities a state of freedom ... has been fictitiously supposed to have existed in the past and has been associated with a hypothetical ancient unity ... {Huxley (J) 1944: 165}.

Thus, for Huxley, the "*myth*" of an older tradition, or archetype, of some unified racial group which existed as a precursor to the 'new', modern, German nation-state is an integral part of a drive towards the establishment of a sense of national identity. Here may be observed an intellectual field/cultural unconscious effect, for Huxley does not suggest a conscious manufacture of such a 'foundation myth'. It is for him "*a natural way of thinking*", a circumstance which is explicable in terms of the pervasiveness of a "*cultural unconscious*" {Bourdieu 1971a: 180}.

On the one hand European scholars brought to renewed prominence the supposed ideas and ideals of ancient philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle; on the other hand, and arguably of great importance, there was a keen awareness, at least in certain circles within German society, of the history of the Germanic people. In this latter respect, the works of

Richard Wagner (1813 - 1883)⁷, which portrayed a dramatised and romanticised vision of a supposed earlier Heroic German culture, were to have important cultural and political effects {Rosenbaum 1998: 31; Toland 1977: 15; Vieler 1999: 32}.

Certainly by the time of *Parsifal* (1882), it has been argued that Wagner's political message "*had become racist and nationalist*" {Jelavich 1996: 381}. Moreover, the Germanic *Volk* of Wagner represented an ideal not only of moral superiority but also of the physical regeneration {Vieler 1999: 34} of a latterly degenerate people - a world-view based upon the 'perfection' of a 'special' people.

The major importance here of Wagner is his standing in the cultural hierarchy of his day. Described as "*one of the two cultural giants of Bismarckian Germany*" (the other was Nietzsche) {Roberts 1967: 213}, Wagner was well placed to exert influence upon his contemporary cultural field. This is significant, for as Bourdieu {1971a: 174} has it, "*the dynamic structure of the intellectual field*" relies upon the combined effects wrought by "*a plurality of forces*" which may include the individual "*intellectual creator*". Not all of these forces are equal in potency, being:

*defined by the **position** they occupy in the intellectual field [and] ... by the **authority** ... which they exercise ... over the public* (contrasting typeface in original) {Bourdieu 1971a: 174}.

The point to be deduced is that there was, within a modern societal context, a sense of continuity of what, for some, was already a semi-mystical entity: the Germanic *Volk*. As Waite {1977: 300 *et seq*} makes clear, this idea had become common currency at the latest by 1901 and with earlier roots, not least amongst popular youth movements, manifesting itself in notions of a:

*mystical nationalism [and] expectations of a new and racially pure Volksgemeinschaft*⁸ (original emphasis) {Waite 1977: 300}.

This was a symbol of something more than narrow, feudal-based, loyalty to a small state or local ruler. Rather, there was a very real sense of racial, pan-Germanic, identity: the embodiment of the creation myth of the German state of which Huxley {1944} speaks. Perhaps above all else, though, this 'creation myth' spoke not so much of the economic utility of the *Volk* as it did of its aesthetic perfection. The Wagnerian *Volk* is in essence a celebration of the

⁷ Wagner's major work, the *Nibelung Ring* cycle, was first performed in 1876. *Tannhauser* (1845, revised 1861) and *Tristan and Isolde* (1865) pre-dated 'modern' Germany, whilst *Parsifal* was first produced in 1882.

⁸ It is difficult to translate the nuances of such a compound, although Waite does elsewhere and in a slightly different context offer an idea of 'people's socialism'. The present author suggests that the meaning is more complex than this. It evokes ideas of a clearly defined ethnic or social grouping tightly bound together by deep emotional bonds to one another and to the traditions and land of their society. It is socialism in the sense of Marxian notions of the inherent co-operative interdependence of humanity in a 'natural' state, but the strong nationalist implication of '*Volk*-' is totally alien to both Marxian and Marxist ideals of an inter- or trans- national *proletariat*.

ultimate and inevitable triumph of bodily and moral perfection over an otherwise chaotic, degenerate and amorphous world. This usage is stronger than the English translation 'folk', for it carries a very strong idea of exclusivity which, it may be thought, approaches on some level the Biblical appellation of 'the Chosen People'. It is for this reason that the word 'Volk' is capitalised here.

Although beyond the scope of the present work, it is immediately apparent that here, in the search for a *Volkisch* Utopia, is an interesting contrast with the contemporaneous mid to late nineteenth century work of Marx. Whilst both may be seen as a reaction to the societal turmoil which accompanied the proto-modernisation of much of western Europe, the vision of Marx was that of an international proletariat with a shared sense of mission rising up to throw off the shackles of international capital (clearly seen in the famous and oft-quoted words which conclude the *Communist Manifesto*: “*Workers of the world unite...*” {Marx & Engels 1992}). The Utopian vision of Wagner was that of a German *Volk* united against the very world which Marx sought to make all-encompassing.

In stark contrast to either Utopia stood the reality of the mundane German world of the later nineteenth century. The process of industrialisation, in Germany as elsewhere, had brought with it a mixture of 'blessings'. Whilst ultimately living standards were to rise {Tipton 1996: 75}:

industrialization involved human and political costs, with sickness and poverty on an unprecedented scale {Weindling 1989: 11}.

Although industrial growth overall was positive, there were cyclic trade depressions {Tipton 1996: 66/67} and an increasingly apparent degree of urban poverty {Lees 1996: 217}.

Disease, and especially cholera and tuberculosis (or consumption), was a major cause of premature death amongst the working class {Weindling 1989: 13}, whilst a widespread incidence of both venereal disease and alcoholism within the slum areas gave rise to fears of both physical and moral decay {Weindling 1989: 13}. Urban discontent, fed by poverty and a feeling of powerlessness amongst sections of the working class, was seen as a political danger. Given the then recent history of European revolution {Roberts 1967: 64}, alongside pressures for a reassessment of class relationships, the potential growth of socialism was viewed with particular suspicion amongst the political elite {Roberts 1967: 207/208}. One line of approach, which accorded with the importance granted to science in modern society, was to enlist the assistance of the rational-scientific way in the defence of the *Volk*.

3. 4 Social policy as societal cement

Almost from its inception, the German state consciously proposed and used social policy as a political tool to foster ideas of national unity and solidarity. This often took the form

of organisations ranging across the social spectrum, from collectives of workers, through church organisations to the scholastic *Verein für Sozialpolitik* (Social Policy Association) {Lees 1996: 218/219}. Bismarck, as Chancellor, specifically stated that one reason for his introduction during the 1880s of a coherent policy of providing welfare benefits for selected portions of the working class was to bind the worker more closely to the State {Hertz 1975: 360; Lees 1996: 220; Stone 1985: 56} and, in so doing, reduce pressures towards an early break-up of the German state or, perceived of by the dominant Liberal and Conservative political groupings as being far worse, a lurch into revolutionary socialism {Craig 1981: 151; Lees 1996: 218; Weindling 1989: 16}.

From the outset, structured selectivity was apparent in such a social policy. Although disability pensions were provided, they operated on the basis of insurance principles: they required that, at some time, the recipient had been an active worker and had contributed to the scheme {Lees 1996: 223}. The position of those who had never been accepted into the world of industrial work remained at best precarious. As non-members of the insurance scheme they were reliant upon locally funded poor relief, which was heavily stigmatised and brought automatic loss of political and social rights such as the franchise {Lees 1996: 221}. In important ways 'non-insured' disability (that is, disability which could not be linked directly to industrial illness/injury resulting from working within an insured trade) entailed both social and financial inequality. Far from being bound closely to the community of a wider Germany, it would appear that such disabled people were subject to a directed form of differential incorporation which held the potential to lead to their social dislocation.

In this respect, it may seem that one of those “*narrow norms of human authenticity*” associated with modernity {Hughes 2002: 572} (see chapter four below) is here being reinforced by social policy. To fail to comply with this norm is seen to result in the loss of 'full' citizenship. To rely upon poor relief as opposed to insurance-based benefits is, in nineteenth century Germany, to be marginalised {Lees 1996}. As a result, those people so marginalised become socially dislocated. They are not, or are no longer, 'normal' members of society. Indeed, in the terms of Parsons {1951}, they are “*deviant*”. It should be noted here that this distinction between 'insured' and 'non-insured' disability is a direct result of the formulation of a social policy which arbitrarily distinguished between 'able-bodied' and 'disabled' people on the one hand, and between 'differently-disabled' people on the other.

The immediate reasoning behind this restrictive policy initiative does not appear to have been linked directly to notions of the physical wellbeing of the *Volk*. Tipton {1996: 70} and White {1996: 139} both note that the juvenile German nation was beset with economic problems including a trade slump in 1873 which lasted until 1887 and, alongside continuing regionalism amongst its constituent parts, hindered the garnering of central funds. Elsewhere it

is claimed that party political factors led to delay and compromise in the introduction of insurance schemes {Lees 1996: 220 *et seq*}. The observed fact that the weakest and most vulnerable members of society were the ones to gain the least points to the operation of structured selectivity: the needs of the relatively strong politically were the first to be met.

The fact that the insurance scheme was limited to those trades, such as engineering, mining and chemicals {Hertz 1975; Lees 1996; Stone 1985}, judged to be economically the most important for the national interest, at first sight points to a purely materialist base to this structured selectivity. However, there is also evidence that the new Germany was witness to the rise of a patriotic sense of destiny, of a desire to feature prominently on the world stage:

[w]hen the twentieth century rises, the transatlantic world will know that the Germans are no longer ... fleeing from life's challenges... {Trietschke, cited by Craig 1981: 57}.

This presupposed that the German state would maintain its new-found territorial integrity and societal coherence. Coupled with then widely current ideas within the industrialised nations of the inherent superiority of white European culture as opposed to the culture of other areas of the world, ideas which were by no means exclusively Germanic {Weiss 1990: 9fn2}, there was a perceived need for a physically fit and vibrant population which went beyond the merely materialistic. Issues of national, indeed *Volksisch*, pride were also at stake.

It is now seen that the 'new' Germany had a pragmatic, materialist-based need for a healthy population, at least in the 'modern' trades most closely associated with industrialisation {Hertz 1975; Lees 1996; Pounds 1996; Stone 1985}. Alongside this was a perceived cultural and aesthetic need to preserve the 'superiority' of white Europe {Weiss 1990} in general, and the Teutonic ideal in particular {Jelavich 1996; Vieler 1999}. These dual needs, of themselves, would be sufficient to guarantee an important and powerful future for scientific medicine.

There was, however, a third factor to consider: the political need for a cohesive state. In this respect:

...health was seen as a way of guaranteeing orderly behaviour. Hygienic standards were to be imposed as a way of reforming lifestyle. Public health offered a subtle means of social integration by civilizing the Volk {Weindling 1989: 18}.

This “civilizing” action attaching to public health efforts, which Weindling sees as an important contribution towards “social integration”, is a less obvious and highly politicised function of medicine, which runs alongside the more readily observed drives for national fitness and efficiency.

3. 5 The rise of socialised medicine

As a direct, although not necessarily intended, result of the move towards social policies concerned with providing insurance-based, health-related benefits, in Germany (as elsewhere) doctors became the necessary gate-keepers with the power to admit or exclude applicants for benefit {Stone 1985: 62; Weindling 1989: 18}. Thus doctors achieved an officially sanctioned authority and associated increase in social prestige, alongside the financial benefit of secure paid employment as important functionaries within the state bureaucracy. This bureaucratic status is of importance, for there was a pre-1871 Germanic tradition of bureaucratic policy implementation which was strengthened as the state grew {John 1996: 193 *et seq*}. At the same time as German social policy, with its growing emphasis on health insurance, provided a spur towards the training and professionalisation of medical practitioners, Germany is described as already possessing “*the most advanced medical techniques*” amongst the industrialized nations {Bullough & Bullough 1972: 99}.

In a move to be copied by other states, Germany took the lead in the introduction of “*socialized medicine*” {Bullough & Bullough 1972: 99}, with the benefits of scientific medical practice becoming available to the poorer members of society. This may be seen as marking the beginnings of public health-based medical practice. It may also, with regard to the views of Weindling {1989: 18} cited in the section above, be seen as a form of social control. Further benefit accrued to medical practitioners, as their former Art became more and more based in science and their emerging professional associations sought a privileged social and economic status. With the discovery of the bacteriological propagation of much disease {Weindling 1989: 16}, although cure remained largely in the future, prevention now became a matter of the application of science, and the application more particularly of *medical* science. This growing awareness of the possibility of preventing various illnesses marked an important change in the nature of medicine: a distinct move from reactive to proactive 'treatment'. It was also a landmark in the development of notions of public (as opposed to individual) health. Medical practitioners found themselves in a position not only to inform, from a pinnacle of scientific authority and new-found expertise, the social policy formation of governments, but also, as an increasingly integral part of the state bureaucracy, to implement such policy.

Given these considerations, it is perhaps unsurprising that between 1876 and 1900 there was a large increase in German medical practitioners, even for some a “*catastrophic overproduction of doctors*” {Weindling 1989: 17}, with numbers doubling within the period from 13,728 to 27,374 {Weindling 1989: 17}. Partly in response to this increased supply, the medical community organised itself into restrictive associations and political lobbies. This marks the beginnings both of medical professionalism and the direct involvement of such professionals within the policy process.

A major call was for professional self-regulation, including the right to decide on admission to the profession, coupled with an agreed higher social status for scientifically trained practitioners as against the followers of what may be described as 'folk-medicine'. In the modern German state science was to take precedence over tradition, academically accredited education was to stand above folk-learning {Weindling 1989}. Weindling {1989} clearly illustrates the differences between collective and individual health. By operating at a collective level, medical science is able to engage with a political programme expressly designed to alter not only physical health and individual efficiency, but also social attitudes and consciousness. From treating the individual body German medicine had made an important and profound progression to treating the social body. As part of this change of emphasis, there is evidence of an evolving relationship, in Germany, between the worlds of medicine and politics. The direction of this evolution is crystal clear:

...the State is not there to see that the individual gets his (sic) rights, but to serve the race {Lenz 1917 cited by Lifton 1986: 24}.

The logical development of Lenz's 1917 dictum is that the function of the individual is also to further the interests of, not her/himself, not the State, but the German *Volk*. It is against this background that statements such as:

[d]octors became imbued with a sense of social responsibility to promote the nation's health and to ensure the survival of the nation as a competitive world power {Weindling 1989: 2},

and

at issue for the medical profession was its role in protecting and revitalizing the genetic health of the Volk {Lifton 1986: 42}

must be viewed. Ultimately, for Lifton {1986: 15/16}, this attitude would lead to what he terms "*killing as a therapeutic imperative*" (italics in original), whereby the killing of 'sub-standard' human beings may become likened to the removal of a cancer from the societal body: an act designed to restore the nation to health. There is another important inference to be drawn from the words of Lenz reported by Lifton {1986: 24}. He assumes a proactive and wide-ranging state: a societal edifice which exists not only as a vehicle for the preservation and protection of the *Volk*, but also as a potent agent willing and able to become embroiled in the details of social life. In short, a powerful state existing within an ethos which is unmistakably utilitarian. This is by no means a peculiarly German notion during the earlier twentieth century.

By 1920, twenty-five States of the USA had introduced laws to allow for the "*compulsory sterilization of ... people considered genetically inferior*" {Lifton 1986: 22}: by 1930 this had risen to thirty-three States {Pfeiffer 1994: 483}. Although the laws themselves were enacted by politicians, this was done on the basis of medical opinion and advice (Lifton {1986: 23} specifically mentions the "*eugenics research institutions in England and the United States*" in this context). In the west generally (including Germany) the scientific medical

establishment was becoming, by the early twentieth century, a potent agency informing social policy.

To return to Germany specifically, the overall picture is of a medical establishment which had become increasingly wedded to the political aims and ideals of what has been styled “*the big State*” {Burleigh 1997: 157, 2000: 348} whilst, simultaneously, displaying a marked concern with the wellbeing of a semi-mystical notion of the *Volk*. This shift of medical emphasis from reactive treatment of the symptoms of the individual to the proactive promotion of the ‘improvement’ of the overall health of the German nation, is of prime importance. The unified message, from both political and medical circles, is of the primacy of the German *Volk*. The combined effect of the evidence of Burleigh {1994, 1997, 2000}, Weindling {1989} and Weiss {1990} is that the German medical establishment had interested itself in social policy matters almost from the 1871 birth of the State. Furthermore, the evidence is such as to indicate that a significant and influential portion of the German medical elite had embarked upon a specifically eugenic path towards the formulation of policy by, at the latest, 1905.

The ethical basis is very clearly one of utilitarianism. At heart the only important individual right is to be a member of the *Volk*. This, although owing much to birth, is no simple birthright. It remains contingent upon possession of the physical and mental attributes required by the *Volk* in order to further its own progression. The individual, rather after the example of the soldier ant, is in this system of little if any intrinsic value. All are suborned to the fate of the whole, and the primary duty of medicine is to preserve life and efficiency, not of the individual, but of the collective.

Lenz was not a German politician. He was, according to Lifton {1986: 23}, a “*physician-geneticist*” who was to achieve high office, and the status of founder-member, in the Freiburg branch of the German Racial Hygiene movement {Weindling 1989}. This organisation had been founded in 1904 by Professor Ploetz, a medical academic who conjoined ideas of social Darwinism with the primacy of a physically strong and vigorous *Volk*. Indeed, the quote above regarding the function of the State is drawn from a thesis prepared by Lenz as part of his studies under the guidance of Ploetz {Lifton 1986: 24}, a circumstance which may serve to demonstrate the value-norms of at least a section (and an influential one at that) of medical-scientific thought in Germany of the early twentieth century. This is suggestive of an intellectual field effect. The later (1931) words of Lenz - “*National Socialism is nothing but applied biology*” {cited in Wyndham 2003: 114} - illustrate the complex nature of field interactions. Here is seen the conflation of power lines drawn from distinct intellectual fields; the interweaving of ideas relating to party politics, eugenics, medico-science and the *Volkisch* movement. With the exceptional clarity of hindsight, it now seems obvious that the later

Germany of Hitler was inevitably predestined to become a state besotted with 'racial purity', and that the medical establishment would be draughted to assist in the achievement of its aims.

3. 6 From national health and efficiency to eugenics

We have seen above the socio-economic and, to some extent, ideological background to German society at the dawn of the twentieth century. A wider international scene is dealt with elsewhere (chapter 8 below), but it is pertinent to note here that scientific concern with demographic and social issues was widespread throughout Europe of the time, and had reached the New World of the Americas both North {e.g. Popenoe & Johnson 1925} and South {e.g. Stepan 1990}, and Australia {Wyndham 2003}. Thus it is that whilst Ploetz was to prove an influential figure in German society, his views on 'racial hygiene' were in many respects concordant with a trans-national, almost global, school of thought which reflected a growing idea of the relevance of scientific methodologies to population dynamics {Burleigh 2000; Lifton 1986; Pfeiffer 1994; Weiss 1990}.

The view of Burleigh {2000} that ideas which may be loosely termed 'eugenic' have had a wide application which transcends political differences and national boundaries is supported in part by Weiss, with particular reference to the early twentieth century German Race Hygiene movement. In her view, this movement:

captured the interest of individuals whose allegiance spanned the breadth of the Wilhemine and Weimar political spectrum {Weiss 1990: 9}.

As Weiss {1990} makes clear in her discussion of late nineteenth century Germany, the notions underlying both German eugenics in general, and the Race Hygiene Movement in particular, came to fruition against a background of the fear of social disintegration and political turmoil arising as a result of industrialization, of modernisation. Labour unrest was growing and the Marxist Social Democracy Party was making headway at the polls {Roberts 1967: 209; Weiss 1990: 12}.

This was particularly problematic for the ruling elite, for it came at a time (the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries) when Germany, although nominally a parliamentary democracy, was in practice ruled by a bureaucracy and:

possessed a rigidly authoritarian political structure shaped primarily by the self-interest of preindustrial elites and their allies in heavy industry {Weiss 1990: 11},

leading to government by 'experts' {Weber 1948: 111}. Whilst bureaucracy is neither uniquely associated with modernity nor with Germany,

technically the great modern state is absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basis {Weber 1948: 211}.

Speaking in 1918 of the pre-world war one state, Weber drew attention to:

the tremendous importance of the trained expert officialdom in Germany. ... Our officialdom was second to none in the world {Weber 1948: 111}.

Similarly, Mannheim {1936: 105} speaks in the German socio-political context of "*the role which bureaucracy has always played*".

It was against this socio-political backcloth that discussions of the nature and future of the German *Volk* continued, largely amongst an academic, and especially medico-scientific, elite. Intense if informal discussion led, in 1905, to the foundation of the Race Hygiene Movement in Germany. The prime mover in this development was Professor Ploetz, met with above, an academic with qualifications in medicine and anthropology. Weiss {1990: 12} informs us that "*fully one third*" of the early Race Hygiene membership were medics, whilst Weindling {1989: 142} is more precise: of the forty members in 1906, there were "*nine doctors, six zoologists and three anthropologists*". The remaining members were drawn exclusively from those with an academic background and some degree of social standing. Although starting from a small beginning, it should be noted that the Movement had grown out of a journal, the *Archiv fur Rassen-und Gesellschaftbiologie*,⁹ founded in 1903 by Ploetz after a long period of discussion and consultation with leading German academics {Weindling 1989: 123 *et seq*}.

Whilst the formal membership of the Race Hygiene Movement was small, according to Weindling {1989} it reflected the views of a large and influential sector of German society. In the scheme developed by Bourdieu:

[t]he Academy ... contributes to the organization of the intellectual field in respect of orthodoxy {Bourdieu 1971a: 179}.

Hence, populated largely by prominent academics, many of whom had espoused a 'selectionist' variant of social Darwinism, the movement was able to exert pressures seemingly disproportionate to its numerical strength. Its members were heavily imbued with "*symbolic capital*" {Bourdieu 1977: 2} (section 1.5 above), and therefore their ideas were influential. The leading lights of this 'selectionist' approach were the biologist Haeckel and the embryologist Weismann, both of whom were eminent in their respective fields, and both of whom had a professional interest in heredity {Weindling 1989: 131; Weiss 1990: 13}.

Meanwhile it has been noted that, politically, social Darwinism in general tended to oppose notions of liberal democracy {Hobsbawm 1994: 118; Roberts 1967: 226}, on the grounds that individual freedoms and unfettered rights were not invariably in the best interests of the human species. In a specifically (USA) eugenic context, it has been held that:

too great democratization of a country is dangerous. ... The vox populi may and often does want something that is ... detrimental to the welfare of the state {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 361}.

⁹ *Records of Racial and Social Biology*. The introduction of a notion of 'social biology' is a telling point.

This idea resonates with the views of Weber {1948: 111} on the undemocratic nature of German bureaucracy of the period. It is an example of the mutually reinforcing nature of different 'power lines' within an intellectual field context.

The medico-scientific developments noted above, regarding the bacterial propagation of disease and the supposed hereditary nature of certain conditions, which had already led to the self-imposed task of the German medical profession to attend to the health and, in more general terms, wellbeing of the collective *Volk*, assume great importance here. It is this conflation, of scientific knowledge that disease could to some degree be controlled with *Volkisch* ideas of a Teutonic quest for a rightful place in history and a widespread opinion that the needs of the 'race' should take precedence over considerations of the wishes of individuals, which led to the growth of German eugenic idealism.

3. 7 *Volk* medicine

Without this consideration of the needs of 'public health', or an awareness of 'racial and social biology', it is impossible to fully appreciate the forces behind the formation of this Race Hygiene Movement. In particular, it is suggested here that this concern with the wider good of the nation and its *Volk* lies behind the fact that:

Haeckel ... fused the notion of killing as an act of mercy with the crudely materialistic argument that this would save a great deal of public and private money {Burleigh 1994: 13}.

It should be noted here that Burleigh implicitly assumes that the growth of eugenic ideas in Germany was *not* based simply upon materialist considerations. For him, ideology also had a large part to play.

If the *Volk* was to achieve its destiny, then not only did it require fit and active individuals, it also called for a vibrant economic environment to provide the springboard for national regeneration. As Haeckel himself had it:

hundreds and thousands of incurables ... are artificially kept alive ... without the slightest profit to themselves or the general body. ... We are not bound under all circumstances to maintain and prolong life even when it becomes utterly useless {cited by Gallagher 1995: 56 and, in part, by Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 22/23}.

This utilitarian concern of medico-science with not only individual bodily health, but also with the physical and economic well-being of society, is a point to which we will return when considering below the present-day HGP and some of the arguments used to justify its further development.

The consensus of academic opinion is that the Race Hygiene Movement was, from the outset, informed by fully-fledged eugenic ideas and ideals. Furthermore, it was imbued with the utilitarian principle of the primacy of the collective over the interests of the individual. Thus:

Ploetz ... saw a fundamental conflict between individual hygiene as opposed to racial ... hygiene. For individual hygiene conflicted with the racial priorities of the elimination of undesirable characteristics. ... [He] concluded that if no more weaklings were bred, then they need not be exterminated {Weindling 1989: 131}.

Meanwhile, Weiss comments upon Ploetz' use of the term *Rassen-hygiene* "as a synonym for *eugenics*" {Weiss 1990: 16}, whilst Lifton specifically associates Ploetz with a view that:

[t]he State must own death - must kill - in order to keep the social organism alive and healthy" {Lifton 1986: 46fn}.

Further, it is reported that Ploetz was a major contributor to the first International Congress of Eugenics, held at London University in 1912 {Clay & Leapman 1995: 16}. This is suggestive of the idea that German academic thought of the time in this area was in harmonious resonance with that of the industrialised west more generally. Germany was by no means isolated intellectually, and here there is every indication of the presence of wider intellectual field effects.

The sum of the effects of the disparate German social processes considered here: the move towards a modern nation-state; growing concerns with public health and the concept of the *Volk*; a growing emphasis on the potential economic effects of inherited impairment, and the advancement of medico-science in its self-imposed role as guardian of the race is clearly demonstrated in the words of the historian Burleigh. Burleigh {1997} talks of Ploetz as being "strikingly" representative of:

the idea that the health of society, construed as an atemporal genetic collective, should be patrolled by medical experts, who would determine who should marry or reproduce, or in other words, what type of people should be born. Scope for this interventionist power-seeking on the part of the medical profession ... was dramatically enhanced as the rather modest concerns in this area of the early nineteenth-century small state were replaced by the big government reaching into most areas of life characteristic of the twentieth century {Burleigh 1997: 157}.

The particular context within which Burleigh writes makes it abundantly clear that he sees these ideas, not as being those of some small and uninfluential 'lunatic fringe' of abstract academic thinkers or social misfits, but, rather, as coming to represent a widely-held and respected view within German society in the early twentieth century.

Although Burleigh {1994} (cited earlier in this section) indicates that there was indeed a pronounced economic or material element to the development of these ideas (that is a concern with the financial burden potentially placed upon German society by the birth of people seen as being subject to congenital impairment), he also concerns himself with the move by "*medical professionals*" to insinuate themselves collectively into the policy making apparatus of the state. This incorporation of professionals was, for Burleigh, aided by the growth of notions of:

the big state [and its accompanying] *armies of professional do-gooders* {Burleigh 2000: 348}.

This represents a massive and rapid expansion of the functions of 'the state', an expansion which created a vacuum in the policy-making process. The inference is clear that professionals, and medical professionals in particular, were well-placed to respond to the need for additional policy makers. This expansion of the role and ambition of the state was only possible due to the reciprocal growth of a bureaucratic system of administration: a minimalist state has little need of an advanced bureaucracy, whilst a state without an advanced bureaucratic machinery has not the means to intervene in societal affairs to any great degree. The story of Germany here represents the process of western modernisation in microcosm.

When coupled with both the high status granted (medical) science and, more especially, its practitioners {Weindling 1989; Weiss 1990}, and the eugenic-leaning social Darwinism then current throughout western Europe and the USA {Castle 1916: 263; Roberts 1967: 226}, the scene was set for the categorisation of people into 'desirable' and 'undesirable' proto-citizens. The necessary power lines, or indeed distinct intellectual fields, are here seen to be in place to inform eugenic social policy.

The German medico-scientific establishment has been seen above {Burleigh 1997; Lifton 1986; Weindling 1989; Weiss 1990} to have been both willing and able to undertake the eugenic selection of people. The German administrative system has been seen to have been open to influence from compartmentalised experts {Weber 1948} at the same time as the number of qualified medics increased rapidly, leading to an excess of qualified experts who then sought to secure both professional closure and a wider scope within which to operate {Weindling 1989: 17}.

The young German federation was not entirely stable, whether in political, economic or social terms {Lees 1996; Roberts 1967; Tipton 1996; Weindling 1989}. Meanwhile as is evidenced by the popularity of the works of Wagner amongst the *intelligentsia*, there was a deep belief in a Teutonic version of that 'creation myth' said to be "*fictitiously supposed*" in order to legitimate "*all the newer ... nationalities*" {Huxley 1944: 165}. It would, on the eve of the first world war, take little to tip the seemingly precarious German societal balance from the intellectual formulation and discussion of eugenic ideas towards their pragmatic application to social policy.

3. 8 From the tumult of war to the chaos of peace

The first world war was exhausting for the European combatants in both human and material terms. Germany in particular suffered from the combined effects of embargo, blockade and poor farming weather. As a result food supplies became severely restricted, whilst the war was increasingly expensive in monetary terms. Resources, of both food and material, were

diverted from civil to military use, with compensatory savings sought on the home front, to the extent that:

in the years of starvation during the war [German psychiatrists] had to get used to watching [their] patients die of malnutrition in vast numbers {Bonhoeffer 1920, chair of the German Psychiatric Association, quoted but not sourced in Weale 2001: 64/65}.

In the same vein, Kerr & Shakespeare {2002: 23} note that:

[v]ast numbers of psychiatric patients died during the conflict from hunger, disease and neglect,

whilst Weale {2001: 67}, drawing upon but not citing Burleigh, offers a figure of 70,000 for the number of deaths attributable to starvation in psychiatric institutions during the first world war.

These deaths are a highly visible result of structured selectivity in action within a utilitarian atmosphere. The apportionment of food and heating was prioritised with, in the civilian sector, priority being given to those most closely involved with the demands of the war effort. There are parallels here with the reported practice amongst Native American and Inuit peoples of allowing first the old or infirm to starve, then the very youngest, in times of famine. As will be seen below this extension of the battlefield practice of triage¹⁰, used to decide the assignment of scarce resources, was to set a precedent for the development of a distinct strand of social policy.

Germany at the close of the first world war was apparently a society in psychic turmoil: in the form of “*a great moral crisis*” {Watson 2000: 188} or “*deep trauma*” {Read 2003: 13} which led to reappraisal of the 'standard' of the remaining citizenry. Politically, Germany experienced in 1918 an essentially bloodless republican revolution {Burleigh 2000: 32-34; Waite 1977: 312}, although this rapidly developed into schismatic, but short-lived, socialist and Bolshevik 'soviets' or 'workers' councils' in major cities such as Munich and Berlin, which expanded to briefly include the whole of Bavaria. These were put down with military and paramilitary forces generally seen as belonging to the political right {Toland 1977: 74; Read 2003 *inter alia*; Weale 2001: 24}. Economically, the seeds of hyperinflation had already been sown during the war {Burleigh 2000: 29; Watson 2000: 188} and now began to shoot vigorously {Read 2003: 66}. Culturally, in the words of Gallagher {1995: 55}, the:

trauma of World War 1 and its appalling aftermath added a cynical, nihilist twist ... [to] a nation ... [r]ich in art, music, literature, science, and medicine... .

Germany had become a society familiar with, and perhaps inured to, death {Burleigh 2000: 8, 349; Weale 2001: 64/65, 67}, principally as a result of the industrial-scale mechanised slaughter of trench warfare but also due to the severe hardship and malnutrition experienced by

¹⁰ “*the assignment of degrees of urgency to decide the order of treatment of wounds, illnesses etc.*” - Concise Oxford Dictionary 9th ed, sense 2.

the civilian population. It was against this backdrop that ideas of structured selectivity and its consequential effect differential incorporation, already clearly discernible as strands of pre-war German ideology and implicit in certain policy initiatives, came to the fore as increasingly explicit social policy tools.

If a social policy is to be fully and effectively implemented, especially in the context of a parliamentary democracy such as was Germany in the years between 1919 and 1933, then it must resonate to some appreciable degree with the opinions of a significant section of the public. As has been noted, pre-first world war German society had already been exposed to eugenic thought which at the least drew attention to both economic and social factors supposedly associated with impairments of many forms. Thus it may be thought that the door to public opinion, if not actually open, was certainly unlatched by 1920.

3. 9 Differential incorporation in action

The German cultural field had been, as it were, primed. It was in 1920 that professors Hoche (a psychiatrist) and Binding (a lawyer) published a scholarly but widely disseminated work entitled *“The Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Life”*. Notably, Hoche and Binding moved their argument beyond the congenitally *“unworthy”* to include those who had undergone traumatic injury leading to physical impairment {Gallagher 1995: 60; Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 24; Lifton 1986: 46}. According to Lifton, this tract of Hoche and Binding was neither idiosyncratic nor ground breaking; rather, it:

reflect[ed] the general German mood during the period following the First World War {Lifton 1986: 47}.

Hoche and Binding may be seen as decidedly 'mainstream' thinkers in this area.

Indeed, Hoche's position, that killing *“empty shells of human beings”* is to be seen as *“an allowable, useful act”* {Lifton 1986: 47}, and that *“[a]lthough they looked like humans ... they could not really be said to have human personalities”* {Weale 2001: 67, paraphrasing Hoche} finds a closely contemporary echo in the 1933 words of the then (UK) Bishop of Birmingham:

blind humanitarianism is neither Christian nor sensible ... we ought to become willing to accept ... measures against which religious sentimentality will raise an outcry {quoted by Africa2000 under entry for 'Barnes, Bishop E W'} (expanded upon in section 7.11 below).

This line of thought remains current in contemporary times.

A document published some sixty years later than Hoche, and at least forty-five years after Barnes, by the Anglican Church of Canada and cited by Shearer as *“recent”* to her time of writing, contains the following:

[o]ur senses and emotions lead us into the grave mistake of treating human-looking shapes as if they were human... ...the only way to treat [them] humanely is not to treat them as human {Shearer 1981: 88}.

Although he spoke specifically of the German context, Hoche had prophesied just such a development:

[a] new age will come which ... will no longer heed the demands of an inflated concept of humanity and an overestimation of the value of life as such {Hoche, cited by Lifton 1986: 47}.

Further evidence that Hoche and Binding were not, in 1920, merely giving voice to some maverick or malicious idea of their own imagining is to be found in the work of Ernst Mann.

Mann published, in 1923, a German best-seller in which he drew attention to the economic burden of supporting war-wounded and other disabled people within Germany. It appears that Mann was inclined neither to subtlety, nor to generosity for past services to the armed forces, with his insistence that:

[i]t's just not right to spend ... millions of marks on the cripples, the diseased, and the incurable ... [at a time of] economic crisis {Mann 1923 cited by Gallagher 1995: 60}.

With this statement, it may be thought, Mann is clearly and unemotionally enunciating the logical culmination of the application of the core values of the utilitarian ethic.¹¹

As is made clear in the relevant literature, influential voices from both the Arts and the sciences of the period between the end of world war one and the rise of Nazi-ism spoke in close harmony on the need to eradicate impairment, however caused, from German society. The messages from academia, from medical and legal practitioners, from literature and from the new medium of films were essentially variations on a theme: individual life was not an end in itself, but merely a means towards the advancement of the societal whole seen as being far greater than the sum of its parts {e.g. Gallagher 1995: 61 *et seq*; Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 22 *et seq*; Lifton 1986: 48 *et seq*}.

3. 10 Corpus Germanicus

In the Germany of the period, the societal whole was a seemingly paradoxical amalgam of the ephemeral, Romantic and semi-mystical *Volk* with its Wagnerian destiny to conclude, and the mundane socio-economic world of a modern nation-state. The binding agent was an increasingly selective notion of a pan-Germanic identity dating to the nineteenth century and

¹¹ For Singer {1993}, who states that he derives his ethics from utilitarianism, the degree of morality of an ethical position depends in a direct linear fashion upon how closely it satisfies the dictum 'promote the greatest good of the greatest number'. Singer does not advocate euthanasia of conscious, sentient people. He does however, basing his argument on the absence of self-awareness, find a high degree of equivalence between a foetus, a new-born, and a non-self-aware adult {Singer 1993: ch4}. Ultimately he arrives at the conclusion that in such cases, killing is "*often ... not wrong at all*" {Singer 1993: 191}.

founded on somewhat mystical ideas of 'Blood and Soil' - "*Blut und Boden*" - giving rise to the ideal of a tightly knit, emotionally bound society {Read 2003: 47}. The result was, or was at least close to, a notion of *Volksgemeinschaft*.

This is not to claim that the whole of German society was of one mind, but it is to say that there was, in the words of Lifton {1986: 48 *subtitle*}, a pervasive "*Euthanasia Consciousness*". To use an analysis based upon the ideas of Bourdieu {1971a} and Mannheim {1936}, the German cultural field had become strongly influenced by eugenic ideas and ideology withdrawn from the collective/cultural unconscious repository. As a result, amongst the intellectual and political elite of the period, it arguably came to seem 'natural' to think, and to act, in a eugenic manner. In Marxist terms {e.g. Marx 1845a, 1845b}, this ideology of the elite had achieved dominance. The ideal of a perfectable Germanic people had become hegemonic.

Returning to Bourdieu {1971a *et al*}, the primary power lines involved here are clearly distinguishable from an inspection of the evidence: post-Darwinian social philosophy; applied utilitarian ethics; a conceptualisation of both the possibility and the desirability of seeking a 'perfected' state of humanity; and pragmatic 'cost and benefit' economics set against a background of scarce resources. It should be noted that no single one of these factors is of itself unique to any particular time, society or spatial location, and nor is their combination in this or any other compound. What *may* be a distinguishing and uniquely German power line is the apparent fusion of 'rational, scientific' modernity with pre-modern, Romantic and mystic ideas of the destiny of the *Volk*. Be that as it may, the more mundane power lines will now be examined in closer detail.

The rise of Hitler and his Nazi party to constitutional power (on one level, Hitler's political power remained constitutional up until his death in 1945: he and his supporters simply amended the constitution at will) in 1933 together with the consequences of this event is extensively documented. Some sixty years after Hitler's death at least the broad outline of Nazi social policy relating to less-valued groups within society remains common currency, and requires little description here {see especially, in the present context, Bauman 1989; Burleigh 1994, 1997, 2000; Gallagher 1995; Kerr & Shakespeare 2002; Lifton 1986; Toland 1977; Waite 1977 and Wiesenthal 1989}.

However, there may be a tendency to adopt what might be thought to be a commonsense or populist view, that of Hitler as an unstable megalomaniac ruling by whim. The fact is, from the outset of his rule in 1933 and until his death:

[f]ew dictators have enjoyed so much genuine support from so great a number of people {Waite 1977: 3}.

Gallagher {1995: 19/20} also comments upon the "*mass adulation*" enjoyed by Hitler. To achieve this popularity required more than personal charisma: it required identification of the very real social, political and economic problems confronting Germany between the wars, an analysis of their causes which was convincing to many constituents and, above all, a coherent (albeit deeply flawed in the view of a very large number of commentators both of the time and later) policy to address these problems.

Reduced to fit the smallest of nutshells, and at the certain risk of over-simplifying an extremely complex situation, two major problems in post-first world war Germany were the political instability and threat of Bolshevik revolution after the Russian model {*eg* Burleigh 2000: 39} and severe shortages of food, raw materials and productive capacity. Both of these were arguably exacerbated by the stringent terms of the Versailles Treaty of 1919, part of which had annexed the industrial Ruhr district {*e.g.* Burleigh 2000: 46 - 50}. Whatever the merits or demerits of this Treaty, its terms certainly meant that Germany lost a degree of both economic and political autonomy. Versailles has been said to be the birthplace of a:

peace that passeth all understanding {Brittain 1978: 470}.

Hitler's analysis of the situation, again with the utmost brevity, was that German society had to be unified and 'purified'. The population must become extremely efficient, with the menfolk working productively and the womenfolk breeding prolifically; agitators and profiteers must be weeded-out and neutralised; industry and commerce must be concentrated in Germanic hands. The ultimate aim was:

to secure for the German people the land and soil to which they are entitled
{Hitler 1926 "*Mein Kampf*" vol 2 quoted by Tolland 1977: 220}.

This goal could only realistically be attained by renegotiating or ignoring key areas of the Versailles Treaty. In other words, Germany must unite against an 'unjust' group of world powers. Meanwhile, it was inconceivable to Hitler that the first world war could have been lost. Rather, Germany had been betrayed and the traitors must be punished {Burleigh 2000: 50, 55; Watson 2000: 189/190}.

3. 11 Fear and aversion: the rise of heterophobia

Hitler is justly infamous for his scapegoating of Jewish people, and is noted for his hatred of communism. Unsurprisingly, he repeatedly named these two groups as major factors in German decline {*e.g.* Toland 1977: 242; Watson 2000: 190}. Hitler, however, was not innovative in this: he was drawing upon deep-seated prejudices {Hobsbawm 1994: 118; Watson 2000: 188}. For example, on February 10th 1918, some fifteen years before Hitler gained power:

the Kaiser spoke of a world-wide conspiracy against Germany [which] included the Bolsheviks [and] 'international Jewry' {Gilbert 1997: 486}.

In like manner, Hitler was also receptive to pre-existing eugenics-inspired arguments about the wastefulness of supporting 'useless eaters' and to ideas taken from social Darwinists which suggested that it was in some way 'unnatural', and certainly counter-productive, to nurture 'the weak'. Hitler was subject to cultural and intellectual field influences. He was also drawing, to use the idioms of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*} and Mannheim {1936}, upon a cultural unconscious fund of stereotypes and imagery.

The proposed policy line which would address all of these problems and/or tenets was, indeed, simple. It was essentially a conscious and coherent process of state-sponsored structured selectivity, leading to a stratified society, whereby large numbers were to be differentially incorporated within (or indeed excluded from) German society. If we were to view Bismarck's strategy (section 3.4 above) as to some degree 'positive' differential inclusion, on the grounds that he sought to bind different sections of German society to the then new state, then it would be reasonable to consider the version promulgated by Hitler as 'negative'. He sought, rather, to slough-off supposedly 'contaminated' sectors of society.

The Nazi policy of 'structured selectivity' (although, in so far as the present author is aware, not presented in those terms) has been very largely discussed in the wider literature in relation to the 'Jewish question' and the ensuing Holocaust. Notable exceptions to this tendency are seen in the works of Gallagher {1995} and Kerr & Shakespeare {2002} who each approach the topic from an explicitly disability studies direction. Meanwhile, the approach of Lifton {1986} is interesting in that he examines the progression from 'euthanasia' of intellectually impaired persons/those with certain psychological or psychotic conditions, through the application of such procedures to those with physical impairments, to the culmination in the mass killing of millions of healthy people on racial grounds. Further, Lifton's approach is unusual, if not unique, in the literature for he concentrates his focus on the underlying psychology not of the politicians nor of the masses, but of the doctors involved.

In the present context it is desirable to avoid what could be seen as an unwarranted digression from the core topic of the treatment and devaluation of disabled people. For this reason the very widely reported and deprecated death of some six million people as a direct consequence of malicious Nazi-inspired action, and the systematic abuse of a large proportion of the Jewish people found in Europe of the time, will not be highlighted here. It is worthy of note, however, that the case of Jewish people in Nazi controlled Germany is in many ways similar to that of disabled people. Indeed, in some sense it could be argued that their cases are identical, for Nazi-ism aggregated both into a broad class of 'the genetically inferior' (which also included Slavs {Burleigh 2000: 87}, Romany Gypsies {Read 2003: 753; Watson 2000: 190} and homosexuals {Waite 1977: 235/6} alongside "*inferior, flawed Germans*" {Gallagher

1995: 21})) most often on grounds which are now generally acknowledged to be spurious or, at the very least, questionable.

3. 12 Efficient killing in an industrialised society

As is seen in the preceding sections above, there had been a eugenic undercurrent present throughout much of the post-1871 history of Germany. A large number of psychiatric patients had died from a *passive* lack of assigned resources during the strictures of world war one, the later 1930s were to witness a change of policy. Structured selectivity was to become *proactive*. At first proceeding in an *ad hoc* manner, but rapidly becoming surrounded by bureaucracy, the 'euthanasia' of designated persons (initially children, but then expanded to include adults) began in earnest in Germany in 1938 {Lifton 1986: 50 *et seq*}. At the outset relatively strict criteria as to both individual 'patient' and qualifying conditions were observed but, in the words of Lifton {1986: 56}, “[i]nvariably there was great slippage” leading to a rolling relaxation of conditionality.

There is a strong case to be made for the idea that, within two or three years, inside Nazi Germany the killing of people deemed medically unfit to live had become at best routine, at worst casual. Evidence for this claim may be found within the reports of the 'child euthanasia' programme (for example the claim that life and death decisions were made on the basis of a pro forma questionnaire completed by a midwife or nurse, rather than following a direct examination by a doctor {Lifton 1986: 52/53}), but the greater evidence is to be found within the 'T4' programme. This programme, named after the postal address (Tiergarten 4, Berlin) of its bureaucratic headquarters {Gallagher 1995: 27; Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 30; Lifton 1986: 65} was concerned with the selection and fatal 'treatment' of adult candidates for 'euthanasia'. It was large in scale and, by its official termination in August 1941 had resulted in the death of 70,000 'patients' {Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 32}. Gallagher {1995: 86} is more precise, citing a figure of 70,273, whilst Watson {2000: 192} speaks of “*some 94,000 mental patients*” being killed during the two-year term of T4.

Whilst there appears to be little doubt that, in the case of those labelled 'mentally ill', the racial wellbeing of the *Volk* was an important consideration {e.g. Lifton 1986: 62} in the institution of this policy, Hitler himself is reported as having observed that:

a certain saving in hospitals, doctors, and nursing personnel could be brought about {Hitler, October 1939, cited by Lifton 1986: 62}.

Thus the pragmatic husbanding of increasingly scarce resources is also seen to be a compelling factor in the equations behind the programme.

This analysis is fully justified by the terse wording of the single sentence of the Fuhrer decree which formalised the legal foundation of T4, which in its entirety enacted that:

Reich Leader Bouhler and Dr. Brandt are charged with the responsibility for expanding the authority of physicians, to be designated by name, to the end that patients considered incurable according to the best available human judgement of their state of health, can be granted a mercy death {Führer Decree of October (but backdated to 1st September) 1939, cited on the authority of testament given at the Nuremberg Trials by Lifton 1986: 63. Also cited by Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 29; Watson 2000: 191}.

This decree is perhaps of most note for what it does *not* say. There is no mention here of congenital or hereditary conditions, no mention of intellectual impairment and (unlike certain other decrees targeted specifically at Jewish people) no suggestion that the 'purity' of the *Volk* or of the 'German blood' is at issue (although as interpreted and applied these factors were in fact introduced. On this see Lifton {1986: 69}). The single criterion for 'euthanasia' within the decree is that the candidate be "*considered incurable*". S/he then qualifies for the 'grant' of death.

There is no evidence that Hitler paid any close attention to the bureaucratic workings of T4 having once promulgated his decree (although he did reportedly take an interest in the most efficient means of killing people *en masse* {Lifton 1986: 71}). The interpretation of the decree was effectively sub-contracted to the medical profession, and its operationalisation became a joint effort between medical practitioners and bureaucrats. Indeed Lifton (himself a medical doctor and professor of psychiatry) goes so far as to claim that T4:

involved virtually the entire German psychiatric community and related portions of the general medical community {Lifton 1986: 65}.

Gallagher {1995: xv} is equally blunt:

it would be a mistake to call [T4] a Nazi program. It was not. The program was conceived by physicians and operated by them.

This was certainly no 'maverick' action by isolated or 'rogue' elements of the medical fraternity, nor was it some *diktat* imposed by politicians or bureaucrats upon unwilling practitioners.

Whatever the motives underlying Hitler's initial decree, it is made clear by Lifton {1986} that it was interpreted, by the medical experts and bureaucrats charged with its implementation, in material terms. As evidence he reproduces, in English translation, an official questionnaire and accompanying instructions for its completion issued as part of the T4 process {Lifton 1986: 68/69. See also Gallagher 1995: 34-37}. This questionnaire contains sections for "*cost-bearer*", the length of time institutionalised, "*incurable phys[ical] illness?*" and precise details of the type of work, including the frequency and efficiency, in which the patient is engaged. The accompanying "*Instruction Sheet*" is specific in stating that:

*[a]ll patients are to be reported who ... **can be occupied not at all or only at the most mechanical work** ... or have been continuously in institutions for at least 5 years...* {Lifton 1986: 68}(added emphasis).

The unspoken corollary here is that those who *could* work productively *would* do so.

As Lifton {1986: 67} describes the T4 selection process, “*the pressure was always towards death*”, and once entered into the system very few 'patients' found themselves reprieved. Gallagher {1995: 66} notes that whilst some claimed that as many as 6% of those referred were subsequently returned alive, this figure was later disputed as being too high. Even accepting a death rate of 'only' 94% following selection, clearly the mere fact of referral to the T4 programme was most often fatal. Given that the 'individual' questionnaires were accompanied by another requesting details of the costs, staff numbers and capacity of the institution concerned {Lifton 1986: 65}, the inescapable conclusion is that material matters are to the fore here. This is structured selectivity as a policy tool whose only possible outcome is the differential incorporation (or excorporation) of disabled people.

No doubt the degree of enthusiasm amongst the doctors involved varied, and it is perhaps unlikely that many shared the Messianic conviction of the essential rightness of the Nazi biosocial vision enunciated by the eminent psychiatrist Dr. Pfannmuller. This latter complained of:

feebleminded and irresponsible asocial elements [granted] a secure existence in the sanatorium {Lifton 1986: 63}.

Nonetheless the fact remains that this was a programme which relied heavily upon, and received the co-operation of, a large number of doctors and other medical staff. As Lifton {1986: 74} points out, due to the camouflage of T4 within an ostensibly therapeutic regime, “*every death certificate had to be falsified*” (italics in original). Meanwhile, “*only doctors should carry out the gassings*” {Brandt, cited by Lifton 1986: 72}.

Whilst this T4 programme has often been sanitised or dignified with the title of 'euthanasia', it has also been said that:

[k]illing someone who has not consented ... can properly be regarded as euthanasia only when the motive for killing is the desire to prevent unbearable suffering on the part of the person killed {Singer 1993: 179}.

Given that Singer {1993} in general supports euthanasia and eugenic abortion or infanticide, the logical interpretation of this position leads to a finding that the T4 programme was more correctly one of murder. By and large the evidence is that, in the vast majority of instances, the beneficiary of this so-called 'euthanasia' was the German state, not any distressed individual. Furthermore, given that the victims were almost exclusively confined within institutions and physically prevented from forming heterosexual liaisons, it appears that the motive was largely one of material gain (in the form of decreased costs for care) rather than an attempt to improve the breeding population, or gene pool, of the Reich as embodied within the concept of the *Volk*.

Certainly this was a policy of extreme structured selectivity but, despite attempts at camouflage, it had very little if anything to do with euthanasia:

'[d]oing away with useless mouths' - a phrase used by those in charge - gives a better idea of the objectives of the program than 'mercy killing' {Singer 1993: 215}.

Drawing on the ideas of Bauman {1989}, what is seen here is perhaps the result of bureaucratic rationality applied to the problem of allocating scarce societal resources, albeit under the strictures of wartime conditions. This is a rigid application of utilitarian ethical principles, with the intention of assisting in the 'survival of the fittest', and is thus certainly eugenic. The underlying principle is, in some respects, akin to the thinking of Malthus: if society cannot feed all of its members, it is better to assist the 'fit' rather than the 'unfit'. In the context of Germany, this idea was developed further to encompass the active killing of large numbers of 'unfit' people. This is not, with its focus on the immediate as opposed to the future, a policy based upon genetic considerations.

3. 13 Purifying the 'racial stock'

Prior to, and later alongside, the extreme of the T4 'euthanasia' programme ran another scheme which, although itself harsh, may appear in comparison almost benign. This was the enforced sterilisation of men and women who were deemed unfit or unworthy to contribute to the gene pool of the *Volk*. In some contrast to the unadorned aim of the T4 programme, of ridding the nation of the necessity of making material provision for 'useless eaters', sterilisation was specifically intended to improve the future condition of the general population:

*[t]he volkisch state must see to it that only the healthy beget children ... [i]t must declare unfit for propagation all who are in any way visibly sick or who have inherited a disease and can therefore pass it on {Hitler 1925: 404, *Mein Kampf*, quoted by Lifton 1986: 22 and Paul 1998b: 86}.¹²*

With his direct reference to the "*volkisch state*", Hitler appears to introduce ideological concerns alongside the purely material motivation of the T4 scheme. There are also ideas of 'racial purity' evident here, of a concern with the health of the *Volk*, and this connects with non-material aspects of eugenic thought relating to the 'improvement' of humanity..

The wider concern for the impact of psychological, physical or psychic conditions supposed, whether accurately or not, to be hereditary also represents the direct influence of human genetic ideas on German (Nazi) eugenic social policy. This is the application of science, not an appeal to some populist ideology nor yet a reliance on some quasi-scientific quackery, to a perceived 'real world' problem. The fact that the understanding of the precise means of transmission of inherited traits, susceptibilities and conditions was not then as far advanced as it is today does not detract from this. If human genetics is a science now, it was a science in the 1930s. This view is clearly expressed in the literature:

¹² The reference to those who are "*visibly sick*" is suggestive of a Lamarckian view of heritability (see section 8.2 below) held, consciously or not, by Hitler.

[t]he German human geneticists active during the Third Reich accepted Mendelism. They stood within science {Muller-Hill 1994: 134, citing Proctor 1988 and Weindling 1989 as further authority}.

It was on this basis that the German state introduced its eugenic sterilisation law, 'Law for the Prevention of Progeny with Hereditary Diseases'¹³, effective from January 1st 1934 {Kevles 1986: 116; Paul 1998a: 144}. This was not in itself a Nazi idea, for:

German eugenicists ... pushed for a law legalizing sterilization long before the Nazis came to power {Muller-Hill 1994: 136},

but it clearly resonated with Nazi ideology. The statute introduced compulsory surgical sterilisation for:

(1) *Anyone who is suffering from a hereditary disease ... if it may be expected with some certainty ... that his (sic) posterity will suffer from serious physical or mental hereditary disease.*

(2) *Persons will be considered as hereditarily diseased ... if they suffer from any one of ... :-*

- (i) *Innate mental deficiency.*
- (ii) *Schizophrenia.*
- (iii) *Manic-depressive insanity.*
- (iv) *Hereditary epilepsy.*
- (v) *Hereditary (Huntington's) Chorea.*
- (vi) *Hereditary blindness.*
- (vii) *Hereditary deafness.*
- (viii) *Severe hereditary physical abnormality.*

(3) *Further, persons may be sterilised who suffer from severe alcoholism.*

{the Act is reproduced in English translation, in its entirety, in appendix viii of HMSO 1934: 122 - 125}.

It should be noted that sections (1) and (2) are complementary: the effect of section one is to render *any "hereditary disease"* likely to lead to "*serious ... disease*" in a person's progeny actionable, whilst section two sets out certain conditions which will *always* fall within the ambit of the law. Conditions unspecified in section two may then still fall within the purview of section one. Section three appears to acknowledge that alcoholism may not be hereditary, but specifies the condition nonetheless as actionable. Qualifiers such as "*severe*" and "*serious*" are not defined within the Act, and thus are left to the interpretation of practitioners and the competent tribunal (see below). Although the list of actionable conditions within the 1934 Nazi Act {HMSO 1934: 122 *et seq*} is comprehensive, and specifically includes physical and sensory impairments, it appears that the law was in practice enforced selectively. Of the large number of operations performed ("*[w]ithin three years some two hundred and twenty five thousand*" {Kevles 1986: 117}; "*reliable estimates are generally between 200,000 and 350,000*" {Lifton 1986: 27}; "*350,000 persons*" {Muller-Hill 1994: 137}), "[o]nly about one tenth were for physical disorders" {Paul 1998a: 144, 1998b: 122}.

¹³ An official British government Report {HMSO 1934: 122 *et seq*} renders the title thus: "*Law For The Prevention Of Hereditary Disease In Posterity*".

Gallagher {1995: 23} provides figures which suggest that, between July 14th 1933 and September 1st 1939, of a curiously exact total of 375,000 sterilisations, only 1,875 (0.5%) were on the grounds of "*severe hereditary physical deformity*", with "*hereditary deafness*" accounting for 2,625 cases (0.7%) and "*hereditary blindness*" a further 1,125 (0.3%). On Gallagher's figures, a very small proportion (1.5%) of total sterilisations were performed on non-intellectual grounds during this period. A further 28,500 people (7.6%) were operated upon on the grounds of their "*acute alcoholism*", a category which is neither 'physical' nor indisputably 'intellectual' but which was, as will be discussed in chapters seven and eight below, a firm favourite of international eugenics movements of the first half of the twentieth century.

The Nazi sterilisation law was amended in 1935 to allow for previously illegal abortions in the cases of pregnant women deemed to be "*hereditarily ill*" {Paul 1998b: 87. See also Kerr 1997: 9}. Given that the Act included within its remit "*congenital feeble-mindedness*" and "*manic-depressive insanity*", both rather vague in the face of the psychiatric knowledge of the day, a very large number of pregnant women became eligible for compulsory abortion of their foetuses. Clearly the future collective mental health and intellectual vigour of the *Volk* were of paramount concern when selecting candidates for sterilisation or abortion.

This sterilisation law was a properly promulgated statute. The law was enshrined within a legalistic and apparently democratic structure which required an initial application by a physician for a person to be considered for sterilisation. A competent tribunal had then to hear medical evidence of the condition said to affect the 'candidate' and, on that basis, reach a decision as to whether or not the named individual should be sterilised {Lifton 1986: 25}. There was a right of appeal to a higher authority enshrined within the law, but in practice it would appear that the tribunals were more often than not a bureaucratic rubber stamp placed upon an application by a doctor:

[m]ore than 90 percent of petitions ... in 1934 resulted in sterilization ... and fewer than 5 percent of appeals ... were upheld {Lifton 1986: 27}.

The medico-legal apparatus of this sterilisation law confirms the position of doctors as both experts and sub-contractors within a bureaucratic social policy structure.

The tribunals tended to find that people deemed 'deviant' or 'asocial' were *de facto* 'feeble-minded' and thus eligible for 'treatment' {Paul 1998b: 87}. It is clear that the sterilisation law was interpreted to relate to the moral health of the nation, alongside the physical, mental and intellectual factors which were enshrined within its formulation. Perhaps even more disturbingly, because it was uncompromisingly racist, an entire cohort of some 600 children born of white German mothers and black French colonial troops occupying parts of Germany after the first world war were sterilised in 1937-8. Although this action may not have been carried out within the strict framework of the law {Kerr 1997: 9; Muller-Hill 1994: 135}, it

represents a clear and shocking example of the “*slippage*” spoken of by Lifton {1986: 56} (noted above in relation to the application of 'euthanasia').

There was a second genetically based eugenic policy introduced in the Germany of the time which, whilst still questionable and having clear racist overtones, was by far the least objectionable of all: genetic counselling clinics were set up in the 1930s {Paul 1998a: 135, 1998b: 123}, but the forerunner of these were instituted rather earlier:

[b]y 1923 ‘family advice’ or marriage clinics were established by eugenicists in Munich, Halle and Dresden (Weindling 1989: 424).

In a time before precise genetic testing procedures, the counselling was based upon the taking of family histories of prospective parents. These were then used to form a human pedigree with the intention of noting Mendelian-type contra-indications to breeding. The efficacy of pedigrees is open to doubt (see section 7.6 below), but they remain a part of present day genetic counselling practice {Resta undated: 6}. The 'counselling' approach led to the institution of 'positive' eugenics in Germany: the active encouragement of fecundity amongst those deemed genetically fit {Kevles 1986: 117}. This, in part, took the form of loans granted to preferred couples, with the loan being written-off on the birth of their fourth child.

Meanwhile, Himmler encouraged his SS men (all of whom were pre-selected on grounds of their 'racial purity' {Read 2003: 179/180}) to impregnate suitably 'Aryan' women. This was surely one of the less onerous tasks given to this elite group. In 1936 this policy reached its logical conclusion with Himmler's *Lebensborn* project of well-appointed clinics to care for the mothers and their children {Kevles 1986: 117}. It is, however, claimed that this project “*never realized ... its full potential*” {Toland 1977: 764*fn*}, largely because men (and to a lesser extent women) and materials were increasingly diverted to the 'euthanasia' and 'final solution' programmes which were to lead to some six million deaths.

3. 14 Chapter summary

This chapter represents a case study of eugenic-inspired social policy within a modern nation state. As such, theoretical considerations have largely been deferred. However, important lessons may be drawn from the German experience, and already some light is cast on the research questions posed in section 1.2 above. For this reason, it is convenient to provide a brief summary of tentative conclusions which may be deduced from this case study.

Question (i): Is there available evidence of some continuity, whether evolutionary or not, of 'eugenic' belief systems between ancient and modern eras?

The apparent popularity of Wagnerian ideas and ideals of a Teutonic heroic 'race' with its ('Aryan') roots in prehistory and mythology, and the elevated position accorded them within the cultural field, certainly points to a degree of nostalgia for a supposed long gone 'Golden Age'. However, much of the evidence here tends to suggest that the eugenic urge as it

developed in Germany was at least in part materialistic as well as ideological, although there is good evidence that German thought was informed and influenced by international factors. Many of the Nazi strands of thought relate to ideas of 'fitness' which themselves may appear to be derived from social Darwinism. This chapter has consciously applied an analytical approach based upon the intellectual field and cultural unconscious of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*} (and the collective unconscious of Mannheim {1936}), and this form of analysis suggests that modern eugenic ideas *may* have a part to play.

Question (ii): Is there evidence of a particularly 'modern' effect on eugenic thinking or practice?

There is evidence that, as the 'new' German state of 1871 came into being, decidedly modern ideas of the primacy of the 'nation-state' were to the fore. As the German state developed, evidence suggests that the idea of the health of the collective came to supersede notions of the health of individuals as the prime target of medical practice. The state, in some contexts, became reified and personalised thus seemingly taking on a life of its own which overshadowed that of individuals. Certainly this marked a change from 'traditional' or feudal society with its local rather than national focus but, as will be suggested below, may in part be seen as having parallels with ancient Greek thinking. However, the application of science to both medicine and public health is most definitely modern. The balance of probabilities here points towards a modern influence, the continuing "*community of experience*" of Mannheim {1936: 28}.

Question (iii): Is there evidence to support an idea of continuity in thinking between eugenics and (human) genetics?

It appears in this case that human genetics, as it developed, was directed towards family advice clinics, and that these were established by eugenicists. The avowed aim of genetic counselling was to encourage the birth of eugenically 'sound' children, whilst discouraging the proliferation of the 'unsound'. There are good grounds here to suppose that the practice of genetic counselling was influenced by eugenic ideas.

Question (iv): Are there identifiable effects flowing from the modernisation of eugenics upon the topic area of social policy directed towards 'disability'?

With the advent of modernity and its apparent reverence for scientific rationality on the one hand, alongside its reliance on a bureaucratic administration on the other, the status of medicine was greatly elevated. Medical practitioners became acknowledged 'experts' in their fields and, assisted by the formation of autonomous professional bodies and the approval of academia, gained sufficient authority to become interpreters, promulgators and practitioners of social policy relating to disabled people. In the Nazi era, there is some evidence that the medical profession had, in practice, moved beyond the role of interpreter of social policy. The T4 programme in particular demonstrates an increasing degree of autonomy for medicine in the

policy process, and the practice of the tribunals established under the provisions of the 1934 Act suggests the continuing integration of medical practitioners within both the judicial and policy-making bureaucratic functions of the state.

To conclude this chapter, the case study of Germany is illuminating. There are strong hints here that the rise of a modern state, with its dual ideals of scientific and bureaucratic rationality, may have the effect of relegating a portion of the population to the societal sidelines. There is a clear indication of a process of selectivity, by means of which those deemed 'worthy' of 'full' societal membership may be differentiated from the 'unworthy'. An important general point is that the notion of who is classed as a 'worthy' or a 'valued' citizen is not in any way a 'natural' process. It is a political decision, and political values may and often do vary over time.

Chapter 4: Modernity and modernisation

4. 1 Proem

Having introduced the concept of modernity in the preceding case study, the major role of this chapter is to add a theoretical underpinning to, and in part an explanation of, the reported effects of modernisation. In this, the chapter most directly addresses research question (ii).

Although the underlying ideas of both genetics and eugenics may well have their roots in ancient, or indeed prehistoric, society {*e.g.* Roper 1913; Stubbe 1965, discussed in chapter six below}, there are very clear indications from the case study of Germany that the rise of the modern cultural field modified the subsidiary eugenic intellectual field. It is in order to facilitate the demonstration of the influence of modernity that this chapter will examine the salient characteristics of selected power lines to be found within the associated cultural field. Here, research question (i) is addressed.

It is difficult, and in the present context fruitless, to attempt to fit the individual power lines of any given intellectual or cultural field into some arbitrary hierarchy. This is primarily because an alteration in any one of the power lines must perforce alter the overall character of the field which it helps energise. Thus it is that when considering modernity, it is but an analytical artifice to consider particular strands of thought or power lines in seeming isolation. With this proviso in mind, this investigation will here examine selected aspects of modernity with an overall aim to isolate particular power lines which may be thought to be especially relevant to the study.

Amongst these power lines are found, firstly, an idea of ethics or morality which appears to have undergone a process of change around the onset of modernity. History teaches that such notions have been dynamic or fluid, a fact which of itself suggests that they are at least in part a social artefact. In part, it is conjectured below, this changing morality may be associated with a broader power line relating to religious tenets. In particular, the role of utilitarian ethics is considered here.

A major contention in this chapter is that changing worldviews contributed to an intellectual atmosphere which was increasingly receptive to ideas of 'progress' and direct human agency as a means of imposing 'order' to the ensuing dynamism of society. This in turn, it will be suggested, was to lead to the energising of further power lines within the nascent modern cultural field. These changing lines of force had the effect of introducing a distinct societal ethos to modernity: an ethos which, it is suggested below, was ultimately to lead to the popularising of eugenic ideas. An important part of this process, discussed in some detail

below, is the growth of an idea of 'the normal'. Of equal importance, it is suggested, is the advent of work as an abstract (and ultimately normative) concept.

As this chapter continues, contrasts and comparisons will be drawn between the emergent modernity and certain of those societal forms which had preceded it. The focus here is unremittingly upon Europe. This is necessary because the European society which emerged at this time was to be exported to large parts of the 'New World'. Given that the primary focus of the entire investigation lies upon Europe and the USA, this is not an exercise in ethnocentricity but is, rather, essential to the coherence of the whole.

Towards the end of this chapter, the scene having by then been set, the topic of 'otherness' will be examined in some detail. Here, the approach of Bauman {1989}, and in particular his use of a concept of 'heterophobia', has been influential upon the present writer. A major suggestion of this part of the investigation will be that the idea of 'normality' was to provide a yardstick against which the 'other' could be measured. As this chapter will be unavoidably complex and far-reaching, a summary will also be provided for convenience.

4. 2 The moral character of modernity?

The academic study of ethics is a major sub-division of philosophy: it is said to be one of the "*three main parts*" of the discipline {Quinton 1995: 666}. As such, there is neither possibility nor intention here of offering a full, balanced and erudite discussion; space is strictly rationed. Rather this section, in so far as it touches on ethics, concerns itself with what Singer {1993} styles in his title "*Practical Ethics*". Given that, for Singer, "*the whole point of ethical judgments is to guide practice*" {Singer 1993: 2}, it makes equal sense to think here in terms of 'the ethics of practice'. As the dominant cultural field of a society or social system changes over time it is not unreasonable to propose that the major ethical scheme(s) which guide(s) practice within the social matrix may also change. Indeed such a change of moral thinking is the central thesis of Weber {1958 "*The Protestant Ethic...*"}. There he posits that the development of capitalist accumulation which underlies much of what we routinely think of as 'modernity' {Hall, Held & McGrew 1992: 3} was made possible by an intellectual reformulation of the relations between humanity and deity on the one hand, and between individuals on the other.

As a result of this reformulation, for Weber {1958} it became acceptable for people to aspire to, and work towards, a more comfortable socio-economic position than that of their parents. Commonplace in western society today, this marked a profound change in philosophy. In the words of a present day historian, speaking of the development of (British) Protestantism:

[f]or the first time in the history of Christianity individualism was sanctified
{Schama 2000: 321}.

Thus the pursuit of personal profit and the employment of one's fellows in this cause became not only acceptable but also 'ethical'. On Weber's analysis of the *Protestant Ethic*, with the relative decline of the formerly hegemonic (in Europe) Roman Catholic church came the idea that to be industrious and successful in business was to glorify God. Weber, as part of his argument, draws attention to differences between northern Europe (largely Protestant) and the predominantly Catholic south.¹⁴

Commenting on Weber's *Protestant Ethic*..., Morrison remarks that the:

spirit of capitalism had the effect of [promoting] work as a moral duty... . This elevation of work ... was historically new {Morrison 1995: 247}.

For the first time in western history, work has here been severed from the purely material and mundane need to ensure continued physical survival. Rather work, on Weber's analysis, has acquired quasi-metaphysical meaning. It has been reified; it has become an end in itself detached from the simple need to ensure physical survival. Within the nascent modern society of which Weber {1958} writes can be seen the birth of work as a cultural imperative.

This marks, assuming that Morrison is correct to claim novelty, the genesis of one of the most potent power lines of the modern cultural field: the idea that 'work' may have a symbolic meaning. Whilst the particular effect of this symbolism upon disabled people is examined further below, a wider-ranging consequence is that the idea of work as a symbolic imperative within modernity could appear to have led to a differentiation between 'work' performed in the economic or public sphere (and thus valued as being 'culturally normative') and labour which is associated with the domestic or private arena (and arguably dismissed as some form of 'natural function'). There are clear ramifications (beyond the scope of the present study) for feminist scholarship here.

One pertinent result of this apparent reification of work, and of its incorporation into the norms and values of modern society, is seen in the ideas of Parsons {1951}, and especially his construction of the "*sick role*" {Parsons 1995: 421-423}. This topic is discussed in more detail below but, to anticipate slightly, a recurrent theme of the functionalism of Parsons is that it is 'normal' in modern society for a person, or at least a family unit, to be self-supporting. The world of work is the medium through which this materialist state is attained and maintained, but this is only part of the story. In the final analysis, a:

work-based model of social membership and identity is integrally linked to ... the specific instrumental logic of genetic engineering, abortion and euthanasia {Abberley 1999: 14}.

¹⁴ This difference between northern and southern Europe, which Weber {1958} confidently and convincingly attributes to developing cultural (and hence societal) influences in the north, was to be construed in genetic terms by USA eugenic activists seeking to control, in the first half of the twentieth century, the immigration of allegedly 'inferior' southern European migrants {Black 2003: 30; Ordovery 2003}.

Abberley {1999}, in moving to some extent beyond his earlier and more strictly Marxist-material analysis of disablement {Abberley 1987}, approaches a discussion of the reification of work *per se* in modern society. Whilst noting that:

[t]he ability to labour in some socially recognised sense still seems a requirement of full membership of a future good society based upon Marxist theory {Abberley 1999: 9},

he does not there enquire into the origin of this idea or norm.

Work occupies a central position in Marxian thought, as Morrison {1995: 92} makes clear:

Marx stressed the idea that human beings define themselves in nature and history primarily through their laboring activity.

Whilst Marx himself seems to have thought that this condition was a historical constant, the evidence of Weber {1958} and Morrison's {1995: 247} commentary upon it may suggest that Marx was mistaken in this. As a product of western European modern society and the University of Berlin {Easton 1978: 58}, it is almost inevitable that Marx was under the influence of modernity and its associated complex of intellectual fields. As Bourdieu has it:

the school produces individuals who possess ... [a] system of unconscious ... schemes constituting their culture {Bourdieu 1971a: 185}.

In these terms it is entirely reasonable¹⁵ to propose that Marx, in claiming that work was a fundamental part of human 'nature', was unconsciously steered by the modern power line identified by Weber {1958}. The centrality of work to human cultural activity is not, perhaps, 'natural', but is rather a social construction or cultural artefact.

The growth of Protestantism in northern Europe may be thought to have had a wider, and potentially even more potent effect in terms of the development of modernity, than that on individuals. One of the major constituents of modernisation is the idea of a national identity; the crystallisation of the nation-state {Allen *et al* 1992: 1; Hall, Held & McGrew 1992: 3}. Under a Europe-wide Catholic hegemony, although kingdoms and principalities had some form of territorial identity, their rulers were expected to defer to the overall authority of the Pope as God's earthly representative, and pay dues both temporal and spiritual {Macaulay 1889: 554}.

4. 3 A cultural field in flux

This was to change. Speaking on the authority of a German scholar, Ranke {1840}, Macaulay informs his reader that:

[i]n the northern parts of Europe ... [t]he dominion of the Papacy was felt by the nations of Teutonic blood as the dominion of Italians, of foreigners ... {Macaulay 1889: 554},

¹⁵ And ironic, given the Marxian/Marxist use of ideas of 'false consciousness' said to result from the hegemony of capitalist ideology {e.g. Marx 1845a, 1845b}.

going on to speak of "*the national feeling which ... was directed against Rome*". There is a potential conflict here. If Schama {2000} is correct to speak of the rise of individuality, whilst Macaulay {1889} sees a growth in nationalism and Weber {1958} talks of a changing societal matrix, all of which are said to arise from the same cause (Protestantism), then it is necessary to seek some means by which these seemingly disparate notions be may reconciled.

Spencer {1972c, 1st pub 1855} offers one potential explanation based on his view of "*moral law*":

the moral law - the law of equal freedom, is the law under which individuation becomes perfect ... The increasing assertion of personal rights is an increasing demand that the external conditions needful to a complete unfolding of the individuality shall be respected. ... [After a period of moral evolution], none will be hindered ...; for whilst everyone maintains his (sic) own claims, he will respect the like claims of others {Spencer 1972c: 238/239}.

For Spencer, writing here in 1855, modernisation remained an ongoing process.

Personal autonomy, which Schama {2000: 321} connects in Britain with the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the rise of Protestantism, requires the shield of "*the civilized state*" {Spencer 1972c: 240}, which Spencer likens to a family unit, to protect it from external and, in Spencer's thinking 'less civilised', influences. This "*civilized state*" of Spencer, with its encouragement of (ethically restrained) individuality, appears to resonate with the "*spirit of capitalism*", itself circumscribed by a religiously inspired ethic which (at least in theory) prevents the abuse of one's fellows {Weber 1958}. Implicit in the reasoning of Spencer is an idea of a group identity, some 'us' who band together from a fear of some other 'them', which is analogous to the growth of national identity noted by Macaulay {1889}. The composite picture painted jointly by Macaulay {1889}, Schama {2000}, Spencer {1972c} and Weber {1958} is of economic, social, societal and moral (ethical) change occurring so close together (in relative terms) as to be effectively co-temporal. At the end of this period of change, for Weber {1958} the foundations of modernity had emerged in the (northern) parts of Europe most directly affected. For Macaulay {1889}, ideas of the nation state had been established.

In the terms of Bourdieu {1971a: 161 *et seq*} it would seem reasonable to suggest that the new found 'respectability' of profit, the changing social organisation and societal mores which enabled or encouraged this change within the social matrix, from 'traditional' society to modernity, should be accorded equal status. There is no obvious hierarchy here, and potentially some apparent relationships may be coincidental. Bourdieu cautions against adopting a simple 'cause and effect' analysis of field fluctuations, for synchronicity may be misleading:

changes within the restricted field are largely independent of the external changes which may seem to determine them because they accompany them
chronologically (contrasting typeface in original) {Bourdieu 1993: 187}.

There is, then, no bar in logic to entertaining the possibility that each of these power lines arose spontaneously, or evolved from separate roots. In considering their joint relationship the

question of whether or not the one caused the other is simply irrelevant. What is relevant here is their cumulative effect. The seemingly metaphysical 'spirit' of capitalism to which Weber {1958} alludes is seen to be, like the seeming 'magic' of distant magnetic attraction, the visible manifestation of an unseen background web, or field, of power lines.

A recurrent theme in much of the work of Weber {e.g. 1958, 1961, 1978} is the notion of 'rationality' as the guiding principle of modernity. As Quinton, writing in the context of 'philosophy', informs us:

to guide our conduct rationally we need a general conception of the world in which it is carried out and of ourselves as acting in it {Quinton 1995: 666}.

It is, for Quinton, one of the functions of philosophers to enunciate and clarify such a "*general conception*". The period around the appearance of a fully modern and industrialised (British) society, the later eighteenth into the nineteenth centuries, saw important developments in this area of intellectual endeavour.

In particular, it is said that Bentham (1748-1832) and then Mill (1806-1873) developed the ancient Greek idea of Hedonism - the pursuit of pleasure - from an individual ethic to a societal one {Porter 1980: 103}. In the process the birth of utilitarianism, with its pre-eminent regard for 'the greater good of the greater number', was announced {Porter 1980: 103}. Given that modernity is closely associated with the rise and crystallisation of the idea of the nation-state as a self-contained societal entity {e.g. Hall, Held & McGrew 1992: 3}, there is a clear intellectual resonance between the advent of modernity and the reported reformulation of a formerly individualistic ethical code into one which itself prioritises the collective interest.

In the same vein, and returning to the ideas of Weber {1958}, in an intellectual climate which approved of both the accumulation of personal wealth and the employment of others to further this end, again there is a resonance with the idea of utility. In such a world view, since capitalist enterprise is a societal 'good', then its furtherance is to the ultimate benefit of society as a whole. *Ergo*, whilst some (say the labourers) may well receive less personally than others (say their employers), any imbalance, or lack of social justice, here is more than compensated for by the overall increase in utility for their society.

4. 4 The individual in a utilitarian world

For Singer {1993}, it appears that the interests and utility of society may, at least in part, be furthered by lessening the incidence of disability: in other words by increasing the overall levels of 'fitness' of the general population. In this regard, whilst seeking both an historical grounding and evidence of continuity for his views, Singer goes further than does Porter {1980}. Rather than seeing utilitarianism as a modern intellectual development of

ancient individual hedonism, he looks to a longer historical view of the primacy of the collective.

It is in this context that Singer notes with seeming approval the alleged recommendation by Plato¹⁶ and Aristotle of infanticide as a response to the 'problem' of 'deformed babies' {Singer 1993: 173}, before tracing this line of thought forwards through the Roman philosopher Seneca, who:

also thought infanticide the natural and humane solution to the problem posed by sick and deformed babies {Singer 1993: 173}.

Much the same link, but without the approval, is made by Barnes {1997}. In the case of either Barnes or Singer, utilitarian-type thinking and consequent social policy, especially in relation to what is now known as eugenics, is said to have strong and direct ties to ancient Greece.

At its simplest, on this argument people in ancient Greece, and later in Rome, were valued for their ability to labour on the land, defend the city/state from aggression or bear 'useful' children. A 'deformed' or 'sickly' child was thus unlikely to become a 'valuable' or valued adult. On this view Bentham, and later Mill, built upon these pre-existing ideas of an over-arching society whose interests took precedence over those of the individual {Slote 1995: 890}. Within this utilitarian tradition, as with Singer's usage, the avoidance of ills is equated with the positive achievement of 'goods', and the major duty of the individual is to contribute to the overall store of good within society {Slote 1995: 890}. Hence utilitarianism is in essence an impersonal ethical code. It treats people individually as means to an end rather than as an end in themselves.

This impersonal view of individuals is readily traced through history. About 1800 BC the Mesopotamian laws of Hammurabi laid down differential amounts of compensation for causing death, according to the social class of the deceased {Hawkes 1973: 176}: at the present time in England any damages due for the death of a person are calculated on the basis of the deceased's earning power. Meanwhile, Singer comments (neutrally) upon:

the [historical] practice among the Eskimo [Inuit] of killing elderly parents no longer able to fend for themselves {Singer 1993: 285},

and elsewhere reminds his reader that, at the opposite end of the life cycle:

[i]nfanticide has been practised in societies ranging geographically from Tahiti to Greenland and varying in culture from the nomadic Australian aborigines to the sophisticated urban communities of ancient Greece or mandarin China {Singer 1993: 172}.

The connecting thread is that in all of these situations people are valued on the basis of their supposed contribution or its lack to society, not on any scale according to their intrinsic worth as human beings. This utilitarian approach of denying or minimising the personal is echoed in the functionalism of Spencer {e.g. 1972a, 1972b} and Parsons {e.g. 1949, 1951}.

¹⁶ But note the caveat regarding the work of Plato introduced in section 6.4 below.

A major inference to be drawn from the works of Barnes {1997}, Singer {1993} and Slote {1995} is of some degree of continuity over long periods of time and across different societies: a continuity which, it would appear, links premodern and modern worlds. Moreover, there seem to be clear links between utilitarian (and more specifically *outcome* utilitarian, wherein the end, to very large extent, may justify the means {e.g. Slote 1995: 890}) ethics and notions of 'the public interest' and the functionality of modern society. What is not altered by any disagreement over the *provenance* of utilitarianism is its *character*.

Simply because an action or a mode of thinking is widespread, and despite the efforts of Singer {1993} and others to establish precedents, does not make it intrinsically 'right' or ethical in absolute (if such may in truth exist) terms. To look ahead to the discussion of 'modernity' in following sections here, Singer (especially but not exclusively) may appear to be seeking to establish the 'normality' of such utilitarian practices: one of the major arguments emanating from disability studies may be summarised as saying that 'normality' is a concept fraught with danger for 'non-normal' people {Armer 2004; Davis (LJ) 1997a; Hughes 2002}.

To appeal momentarily to a 'common-sense' argument, slavery has been a major component of human societies both historical and contemporary, and spread across an extremely wide range of socio-economic bases. Slave-using societies have ranged from the relatively unsophisticated, through the ancient Greeks to the modern case of Nazi Germany. In a very real sense, the use of slave labour has been a 'normal' part of human economic society. Very few people in contemporary academia would see this ubiquity as any sort of recommendation that this practice should be encouraged today (and Singer {1993: 23} argues against it). Nonetheless, the (ab)use of slaves is a practice which clearly has utilitarian potential. Large sectors of the Nazi war effort, and particularly the 'V' weapon projects, depended heavily upon slave labour {e.g. Cesarini 2004; Read 2003}. From the internal perspective of a war economy in crisis, the abrogation of the rights of the slaves may be seen as tending to increase the overall utility of society: it promotes 'the greater good'.

The same argument may be extended to cover a more general case wherein a given society relies for its prosperity - the greater good - on slavery. Put simply:

Utilitarian ethics ... does not provide us with a proper standard of behavior ... and could well approve of immoral actions {Porter 1980: 114}.

If Porter is correct here, and many may agree with him especially given the Nazi example, what does this say of Singer's claim noted in section 4.2 of this chapter, that "*the whole point of ethical judgments is to guide practice*" {Singer 1993: 2}? Of rather more practical importance, and one of those (if not *the*) key issues implicit in the work of Bauman {1989}, is a consideration of the value-base of a societal form (modernity) which appears to have adopted this as its standard against which social policy is measured. It may appear that a utilitarian ethic

has more attraction for an elite than for 'the normal', and decidedly little to commend it to anyone who, for whatever reason, 'fails to meet the norm' of modern society.

The emphasis accorded utilitarian ethical approaches here derives from the view that "*liberal utilitarianism*" is an integral part of "*the central value system upon which western capitalism rests*" {Barnes 1997: 7}. There are other, often competing, strands of ethical thought contained within modernity. Utilitarianism, nonetheless, often appears to occupy a "*central*" position in contemporary western society. As a result of this, it must be seen as representing an active power line of the modern cultural field.

Singer {1993: ch2} is at great pains to stress his adherence to equality amongst individuals whilst pointing to difficulties in conceptualizing this equality. The net outcome of Singer's deliberations is that equality hinges on "*the principle of equal consideration of interests*" {Singer 1993: 47} where "*interests*" refer to such considerations as the avoidance of pain or the satisfying of desires. Thus all are, in theory, accorded equality of treatment. However, as has been seen above, a prime requirement of utilitarianism is that there is a contingent requirement to consider actions, and thus social policy, in terms of the net gain or loss to society as a whole {Mill (1861) as abridged in White 1991: 9}.

In practice, this is a depersonalising process:

a utilitarian perspective forces us to see people as quantifiable entities whose autonomy and dignity lose before the good of the majority - however that good may be defined, and whoever may define it. It makes mockery of the notion of autonomy and respect for persons, and of the notion of individual rights. ... That is to say, it fosters the imposition of an externally defined good onto the values of the individual person {Kluge 1999: 1}.¹⁷

The immediate lesson may appear to be that, in the utilitarian worldview, 'equality' exists primarily in the sense that all are equally subservient to the 'common good', or as Skorupski characterising the philosophy of Mill has it:

the interests of all make an equal claim on the consideration of all {Skorupski 1995: 568}.

There is no commitment here to equality of outcomes, nor is there any suggestion that such a construction of equality has any merit. The potential effects upon individuals of this type of ethic have been seen in the German experience (section 3.8 above).

The same utilitarian notions may be seen to underlie modern and contemporary public health initiatives. For example, there is a recognition that a small number of children may be damaged by vaccines, but the benefit for society as a whole in eradicating or controlling certain diseases is held to outweigh individual risk. Ultimately, whether to adopt this personal ethical

¹⁷ Kluge is described as "*Canada's pre-eminent biomedical ethicist*" by his editor.

code or that one is a matter of individual conscience. The same cannot be said of a societal ethic, for this dominates: it is woven into the pervading cultural field.

4. 5 Order and Progress: twin Muses of modernity

Whatever else modern society may be said to be, it is quintessentially dynamic. In the west we are accustomed to scientific discovery, economic 'boom and bust', social and political innovation, war and unrest. The modern era has been one of armed revolution, with the latter eighteenth century war of American independence followed by French regicide and, some sixty years on, the 'Year of European Revolution' of 1848 {Hobsbawm 1975: 10, Pounds 1990: 348}. This idea of change, and its potentially unsettling effects, is seen in *The Communist Manifesto*:

Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois [ie modern] epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned ... {Marx & Engels 1847: 5}.

The Industrial Revolution, itself inextricably linked to modernity {Hall *et al* 1992: 2}, brought about immense social, economic and political change throughout the nineteenth century and arguably into the twentieth {Pounds 1990: 313 *et seq*}.

This dynamism has been reflected and discussed in depth in the works of 'classical' sociologists such as Durkheim, Marx, Tonnies and Weber {Fukuyama 1992: 81}, with Bauman {1989} contributing a sociological analysis of the Holocaust closely associated with world war two. There is in each of these views, to varying degree, a sense of the inevitability of impermanence within modernity. There is a pervading notion of 'progress', at least in the sense of an incremental and uni-directional motion through history. In the modern age human society is seen as continually moving away from a past condition and towards a future form which, for better or worse, is confidently expected to be different to the transient present:

there are good reasons for thinking that the history produced [by] the unfolding of modern natural science moves in a single coherent direction {Fukuyama 1992: 81}; *[t]here is ... in culture the possibility of indefinite cumulative development* {Parsons 1951: 498}.

This notion of progression through time, which has become a norm of modernity, stands in some contrast to a view of a pre-modern age "*when time was cyclic*" {Clapton & Fitzgerald undated: unpaginated}.

The importance of science to the onset of modern society has already been noted in section 3.2 above in the German context, and 'science' itself is dealt with in some depth in chapter five below. For the moment it will be accepted here that science and its associated rationality {Weber 1948, 1961} informed a significant power line within the modern cultural field. Within the wider European and North American areas, the status and consequent value

placed upon all things scientific (itself seen as a result of the Enlightenment {Hamilton 1992}) was enhanced by the most readily observed effect of applied science, industrialisation. The pervading 'scientific' atmosphere led to the efforts of European social philosophers, prominent amongst them Comte and Spencer¹⁸, to seek to apply the methods and analytical tools of the emerging 'natural sciences' to the study of society.

Following this lead Durkheim was, from the later nineteenth century, to consciously employ scientific techniques and mathematical tools to investigate the social world. In particular, Durkheim pioneered the use of mathematical and statistical techniques alongside his hypothesis that the social world was governed by 'natural' laws {Durkheim 1933, 1938, 1951}. In this is seen the application of a move towards the “*rational organisation of everyday social life*” noted by Habermas {1981: 9, cited by Smart 1990: 17} in the specific context of modernity. Durkheim was by no means the only one to apply 'scientific' methodology to the social world.

For one example, much of the approach of early eugenicists was based upon statistical treatments of collated data {e.g. Farrall 1985; Davis 1997a; Kevles 1985; Mazumdar 1999}. Within the industrialised countries of the west there was a widespread notion that science and scientific methodology potentially held the answer to almost every question, whether medical, economic or social. Given the apparently forward march of industry and urbanism, bringing with them the alleged advancement of society, an important belief was that humanity, at least in the industrialising economies, had embarked upon some progressive journey towards a scientifically formulated socio-economic Utopia.

The underlying supposition is that every social question not only *could* but, in the interests of 'scientific progress', *should* be answered. This is a standpoint which differs markedly from the Judeo-Christian religious tenet that it is not for humanity to question the will of God, and that some things are beyond the range of human cognition. The core axiomatic assumption of science, and this may well be thought to be a defining attribute of modernity, is that for every question in the world of events there is ultimately an 'objectively true' answer to be discovered. This approach is itself potentially problematic on many fronts, not the least of which directly affects disabled or other 'non-standard' people, for:

[i]t is the demand for rationality that imposes uniformity on the social development of industrializing societies {Fukuyama 1992: 79}.

Certainly in the 'traditional' science which emerged from the Enlightenment to inform the birth of modernity, there appears to be little room for ambiguity. This search for rationality, and with it 'certainty', represents an influential power line within the dominant modern intellectual field.

¹⁸ Spencer, in 1852, coined the phrase 'survival of the fittest' often erroneously attributed to Darwin {Goldthorpe 1969: 77,78, Gallagher 1995: 42}.

In contrast, although contentious, certain strands of postmodern analysis tend towards the proposition that, at least in the social world of human action and interaction, 'objectivity' does not and cannot exist. All events resulting from or mediated by human agency are thus open to subjective interpretation giving rise to, as Smart {1990: 28} has it:

polymorphous perversities associated with some manifestations of the 'postmodern'.

The search for 'objective' truth and certainty, within the context of some notion of constant 'progress', which may be thought to mark modernity is not without its problems. Nonetheless, it may appear to some that modern rationality provides a more faithful reflection of 'real world' experience than does the shifting and "*polymorphous*" (or even perhaps amorphous) musing of some manifestations of postmodern theory. Certainly whilst consciously moving away from the structural rigidity of, for example, Parsonian functionalism, the present writer has not felt drawn to postmodernism.

The sensation of constant change within modernity, alongside a feeling that the future is an uncharted and potentially dangerous land, lie at the root of ideas of a 'risk society' postulated by Giddens {1991} as associated with 'late modernity'; by Beck {1992} as accompanying 'new modernity'. Indeed, the terminology adopted here - 'late' and 'new' - is itself the language of movement, of change, of 'progress', whilst the notion of potential danger is self-evident in the word 'risk'. The overall impression is of a sense of a "*transient ... fleeting*" {Habermas 1987: 8} present rushing headlong towards a future which is potentially chaotic and inhospitable.

This idea of risk is not as recent as Giddens or Beck may appear to suggest. The seeming potential for chaos which accompanied societal modernity gave rise, from at least the mid nineteenth century, to ideas of a need to exert human agency over the direction of society. This is clearly seen in the work of Spencer, said to be:

the most powerful evolutionary thinker of the nineteenth century [whose] doctrine dominated social thought {Coser & Rosenberg 1989: 520}.

As Beatrice Webb, a founder member of the British Eugenics Society, has it in her *Diaries*:

[w]hat [Spencer] thought and taught has become part of our mental atmosphere {Mackenzie & Mackenzie 1983: 286}.

Writing contemporaneously with Darwin, Spencer offers a view of modern society as an ordered entity with this analogy of societal structure:

[o]ut of bricks, well burnt, hard, and sharp-angled ... the bricklayer builds, even without mortar, a wall of some height that has considerable stability. With bricks made of bad materials... ...he cannot build a dry wall of the same height and stability. ... [Thus] the character of the aggregate is determined by the characters of the units {Spencer 1972a: 35, from edition pub 1889}.

Here the stability and strength of a society is reliant upon the regularity of its components. However, it would have been rare for someone such as Spencer, an Anglo-Saxon middle class Victorian 'gentleman', to suppose that all members of his society were either homogeneous or even of equal worth, as this analogy might at first sight suggest.

In the event Spencer proposed a complicated process of societal evolution whereby 'simple' societies moved through ever greater degrees of complexity, from "*barbarous tribes, society in its first and lowest form...*" {Spencer 1972b: 78, from edition pub 1893} up to the present day and beyond. Each step along this road, which he likened to both the microcosm of physics and the macrocosm of astrology as well as the biological world {Spencer 1972b}, was for Spencer accompanied by an overall loss of homogeneity as society became ever more differentiated and specialised. In particular, Spencer makes much of the arrival of 'regulative' and 'operative' relationships {Spencer 1972a: 42; 1972b: 81}. This is, in other words, an evolutionary social differentiation into leader and led, director and worker. This evolution is in effect an aggregation of aggregates, and in this way the need to preserve the 'character' of both individuals and discrete aggregates persists:

...there is progressive aggregation of the entire mass. ... At the same time, the parts into which the mass has divided, severally consolidate in like manner {Spencer 1972b: 73}.

Should, then, the standard of an appreciable number of members of (say) the labouring class degenerate, then that aggregate would itself reflect this degeneration. Since this aggregate is in turn a 'unit' in the more complex social whole, ultimately the entire societal edifice would be in danger of collapse.

Spencer's views, which were to inform the later functionalism of Parsons {Parsons 1949: 1}, have the effect of depersonalising the individual. People become 'bricks' and bricks are but a mass produced commodity. As such an individual brick is of little intrinsic value, and a misfired one is valueless. What Spencer {1972a} appears to advocate is the 'negative' process of simply discarding ill-fitting bricks. There is nothing here in the words of Spencer to hinder, and much to support, a move towards actively producing a stock of more regular bricks with which to build a higher and more stable societal 'wall'. The idea of direct human intervention in both societal and human evolution, and thus of 'positive' eugenics, may be discerned in the thinking of Spencer.

Meanwhile, although adopting a very different approach to that of Spencer, Marx (both with Engels and in his own right) seemingly accepts that human agency may have a direct and directed influence on societal trajectories. In the Marxian view:

[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles {Marx & Engels 1847: 3},

which very clearly suggests that conscious (ie "*struggles*") human activity may change the form of a society. Elsewhere, Marx again posits the potency of human intervention:

he (sic) acts upon external nature and ... simultaneously changes his own nature. He ... subjects the play of its forces to his own sovereign power {Marx 1990: 283}.

Marx conveys with his political writing {e.g. Marx & Engels 1992; Marx 1970, 1977} a very clear idea of conscious and direct human agency in bringing about future societal change. Whereas Spencer {1972a, 1972b} may appear to speak more of the value of reactive human intervention in the societal constitution, Marx (and Engels) seek a proactive form. In Marxian thought it is not simply *possible* for people to change the society in which they live, it is *inevitable* in a non-communist world: active human agency is an ever-present factor. Moreover it may seem obligatory for the Marxian *proletariat* to make the conscious effort to achieve this ideal communist society.

The value of considering these contemporaneous but very different social theorists, Marks and Spencer, is that it is possible to see a major area of consensus in their thinking. Each has no conceptual difficulty in positing human intervention in the societal arena, and this is suggestive of a field effect:

*[f]ields of cultural production propose ... a **space of possibles** that tends to orient their research, even without their knowing it* (contrasting typeface in original) {Bourdieu 1993: 176}: ... *[w]hat attaches a thinker to his (sic) age, what situates and dates him, is above all the kind of problems and themes in terms of which he is obliged to think* {Bourdieu 1971a: 183}.

Such an idea, of the potency and legitimacy of human agency within modern society, marks an important departure from reputed premodern ideas of an ordered and eternal universe existing as a result of the will of some or another omnipotent deity:

[i]n the simpler societies ... religious beliefs comprise a set of 'metaphysical speculations on the nature and order of things' {Giddens 1978: 80, 81 drawing on Wundt}.

This view is very similar to that posited by Comte as his first, or "*primitive theological*", stage of human thought about the social world {Comte 1989: 524}.

4. 6 Societal control and structure

A, if not the, founder of sociology as a field of study {e.g. Coser & Rosenberg 1989: 1}, Comte himself was clear about both the ethos of his final¹⁹, "*positive*", stage of society and the question of human agency, with his credo:

[t]o know in order to predict and to predict in order to control {cited by Coser & Rosenberg 1989: 2}.

So it is that, from the very outset of reflexive human thought about the nature of 'modern' society, there has been a notion of dynamism and potential instability within this societal form.

¹⁹ Comte's middle stage was the relatively short-lived "*metaphysical*".

The supposed human ability to both "*predict*" and thence "*control*" the universe of future events is an important change in philosophy. This shift from 'religion' to 'positivism' as the preferred explanatory mechanism of the observed world brought with it the idea that social change may be consciously influenced - 'ordered' - by human agency. As Mannheim puts it:

[the] *disruption of the intellectual monopoly of the church brought about a sudden flowering of an unexampled intellectual richness* {Mannheim 1936: 11}.

Far from relying upon an unpredictable and axiomatically unknowable, and hence irrational to human eyes, deity to ordain the future direction of a society, Comte suggests that science has become the tool by which humanity may take control of its own destiny.

So it is that influential and disparate sociological traditions of modernity are seen to share an essential unifying feature:

[a] **concern** *with order, the urgency of doing something about it, the fear that unless something is done the order will dissipate into chaos. ... In a modern society, only the vigilant management of human affairs seems to stand between order and chaos* {Bauman 1990: 182/3} (original emphasis).

Drawing upon and influenced by Bauman's sociology, it is claimed that:

[m]odernity sought (sic) *to legislate and control, to engineer the social and to dominate nature* {Hughes 2002: 577}.

Bauman {1989}, as will be seen below, uses the idea of, as it were, an orderly modernity as a potent tool in his analysis of the transition of Nazi ideas of racial purity from the mental realm of ideology to the practical world of social policy.

A major sociological, indeed cultural, effect of a worldview which places a high value upon notions of order and regularity is that it seems in some way 'natural' to think in terms of standards: of conduct, of socio-economic activity, even of physiological endowment. Such a world-view, or dominant intellectual field, lends itself readily to ideas of social conformity and, of some importance here, its corollary deviance. Thought of standards in turn, at the present day, leads one inexorably towards a consideration of 'normality': it is, so to speak, normal to speak of 'the' normal.

Parsons {1951} employs a functionalist analysis which he elsewhere {Parsons 1949} attributes in its origins to Spencer (and Durkheim), and which is therefore itself a product of modernity. On this analysis society is stratal, and hence hierarchical, simply because this is the form which allows for increasing complexity in socio-economic life.²⁰ Parsons finds that all (not just modern) societies are to some extent "*normative*":

[t]here is an *expectation of conformity... [which] implies the existence of common standards of what is "acceptable"...behavior* {Parsons 1951: 249}.

²⁰ Parsons appears to be heavily influenced by the values inherent within the cultural field of western capitalist society. His work was formulated against the backdrop of the 'cold war'.

An inevitable consequence of this 'normative' development of 'acceptable' standards of human action is that 'non-standard' behaviour will be seen as 'unacceptable', or as Parsons {1951} has it, “*deviant*”. This term refers to the action (or inaction) rather than the actor and, in the context of Parsons’ functionalism, does not necessarily imply the exercise of will. One may be deviant without specific intent to offend. That deviance does not necessarily require a conscious formulation of intent on the part of the 'deviant' is conceded by Parsons in his discussion of 'the sick role' {Parsons 1951: 312-315, 428-479}.

Parsons appears ambiguous when considering individual experience of illness. On the one hand, he concedes that:

the definition of the patient as “sick” gives the basis for the element of permissiveness, he (sic) cannot be “held responsible” for his condition {Parsons 1951: 314},

but much of his discussion then revolves around “*psycho-somatic*” illness and the role of psychotherapy in its treatment. Consciously or not, Parsons is more concerned with the potential for malingering rather than with physiological incapacity. He does not fully address 'disability' *per se*, rather he assumes that the 'sick' person will either recover or die. It is, nonetheless, possible to extrapolate from the position of Parsons on 'illness' in order to consider impairment.

A major source of risk deriving from the incidence of 'illness', for Parsons, is that it:

is predominantly a withdrawal into a dependent relation, it is asking to be “taken care of” {Parsons 1951: 285},

to the extent that:

[i]llness seems particularly to involve orientation to dependency on persons {Parsons 1951: 289}.

Meanwhile the general expectation, or norm, within modernity is that an adult, or at least a family unit, will be essentially self-sufficient. Within:

modern industrial capitalism ... [t]he labourer ... has to support his (sic) own family {Eldridge 1970: 35, paraphrasing an uncited work of Weber}.

Parsons is clear that 'illness' is inherently dangerous, for:

too high an incidence of illness is dysfunctional {Parsons 1951: 430},

and the context of this remark suggests that the major problem is that 'illness' detracts from the self-sufficiency of the individual. Should the 'norm' of self-sufficiency be seriously undermined, on the analysis of Parsons, social stability would be directly threatened.

Thus for Parsons the smooth operation - 'order' - of society relies upon a large majority of individuals being both prepared and able to conform, for most of the time, to a set of externally-defined rules, or 'norms':

[t]he point of reference is, as always, a stabilized system of interaction {Parsons 1951: 257 fn 3}.

Ultimately, as Parsons rather inelegantly puts it:

*the mutuality of expectations is oriented to the shared **order** of symbolic meanings* (original emphasis) {Parsons 1951: 11}.

Parsons also introduces another dimension to the discussion with regard to 'premature death', which he sees as a special aspect of 'illness':

the birth and rearing of a child constitute a "cost" to the society, through pregnancy, child care, socialization, formal training and many other channels. Premature death, before the individual has had the opportunity to play out his (sic) full quota of social roles means that only a partial "return" for this cost has been received {Parsons 1951: 430}.

This 'cost' is not merely, or even primarily, financial or material. It is a social expenditure of time, effort and care which for Parsons would have been better - more profitably - directed at an individual who lived a 'full' life.

In a Parsonian tradition, the individual is reducible to an aggregate of social roles performed. Each of these roles either serves a useful purpose in the furtherance of the greater social project, in which case it is 'functional' and valued, or it does not. In this latter case, labelled 'deviant' or dysfunctional by Parsons, rather than a benefit for society the actor represents a drain. This in effect leads to a profit and loss calculation with the functional (positive) roles of any individual weighed against the dysfunctional (negative) ones. Should the sum prove to be negative, then that individual is an 'expense' to society. This drain is not by any means limited to the material, although in the modern world material matters are often to the fore.

On this Parsonian type of impersonal analysis, a person subject to a degree of impairment which impinges upon the ability to perform a full range of expected roles, for example to undertake employment, raise children, and, above all perhaps, to be self-supporting and 'independent', may well be judged to have a negative effect on the overall utility of the host society. Hence the individual subject to such impairment (whether congenital or acquired), not having played the "*full quota of social roles*" {Parsons 1951}, has not provided the expected return on societal investment. S/he has not repaid the societal costs involved in conception and nurturing: this is 'premature functional death' as the present writer sees it.

Whilst Parsons {1951} does *not* directly advocate eugenics, this style of functional analysis, if applied systematically, would lead one to question whether it is functional or dysfunctional for society to sanction the birth of a foetus known to be subject to impairment. The answer is self-evident: where people are valued solely or largely on the likelihood of their providing a return on 'social investment' it would be imprudent to knowingly incur a 'bad debt'. In a utilitarian world-view such as this, the interests of the collective take precedence to those of any individual. The recent growth of human genetic knowledge and associated technical expertise (discussed in chapter nine below) allows of the identification of foetuses with a

predisposition to future illness or impairment. This adds another dimension to a Parsonian utilitarian view of individuals. For the first time in history it is possible to identify with some confidence people, foetuses or embryos at risk of premature death, whether physical or functional. The 'bad risk' is now foreseeable; the probable social profit and loss account may be forecast with 'scientific' precision.

4. 7 The rise of 'the normal'

Ultimately, in the utilitarian world of the functionalist, 'illness' (and by extension impairment) constitutes:

a state of disturbance in the "normal" functioning of the total human individual {Parsons 1951: 431},

and here may be seen the crux of the problem. For Parsons it is just 'not normal' to fail to play a full, and conformist, part in the everyday business of society. It would seem that the concept of what is, and is not, 'normal' is often considered to be of great and fundamental importance in society generally {Parsons 1951}, and in modern society more specifically {Bauman 1989; Finkelstein 1993; Hughes 2002; Oliver 1989; Ryan & Thomas 1980}.

For Davis (LJ) {1997a: 9-11} the words 'norm', 'normal', and 'normalcy', alongside any other of their derivatives, did not enter the English language until around 1840, at least in their current meaning of something approximating to 'average', 'standard' or 'common'. The concept of a 'norm' is of frequent and central application in the branch of mathematics now known as 'statistics', and Davis draws particular attention to:

[t]he rather amazing fact ... that almost all the early statisticians had one thing in common: they were eugenicists. ... Statistics is bound up with eugenics because the central insight of statistics is the idea that a population can be normed. ... The next step in conceiving of the population as norm and non-norm is for the state to attempt to norm the nonstandard - the aim of eugenics {Davis 1997a: 14}.

Given the centrality of mathematics to ideas of 'scientific rationality', this is evidence of the importance of the eugenic intellectual field in informing parts, or power lines, of the modern cultural field.

There are good grounds to suppose that 'normality' was also readily absorbed into the practical world of industry. Here the idea remained close to its roots, for it continued to define the individual rather than the action. For example, Finkelstein states that the move to factory work, an integral part of modern society:

raised the importance of 'normality' ... Being normal ... became a dominant criterion for employment in industrial societies {Finkelstein 1993: 12}.

This use of 'normal' is different from, but closely related to, the theoretical sociological sense employed by Parsons {1951: 431 cited above}. What Finkelstein {1993} and others such as Ryan and Thomas {1980} are saying is that people who were not themselves adjudged to be

'normal' were in consequence *prevented* from fulfilling a 'normal' role in modern society. Meanwhile, for Parsons {1951} an individual who does not *behave* 'normally' is said to be 'deviant'. Cause and effect are inverted. Essentially Parsons speaks of an impersonal 'behavioural (ab)normality' which may impinge negatively upon societal functionality, whilst Finkelstein {1993} points to a personal and externally ascribed (ab)normality which most certainly acts against the interests of the individual.

As was seen in the preceding section, within modern society a general expectation, or 'norm', is that individuals will accept financial responsibility both for themselves and for their dependent children. This is implicit in the work of Parsons on 'illness' {Parsons 1951: 428-479}, and is made explicit by Weber {1930: 177}. Similarly, for Marx it is a central theme throughout much of his life's work that the influence of capitalism is such that people are forced to work for wages in order to support themselves and their families {e.g. Marx 1990; McLellan 1977}. In all of these cases, the major source of both material security and social identity is the labour market. It is, within modern society, not only 'normal' to work, but more importantly it is 'normal' to work for wages.

Work then, as a normative activity, is both central to economic wellbeing:

[e]xclusion from the labour market means exclusion from ... the major means of avoiding poverty {Alcock 1993: 177};

and a prerequisite of full social identity, as:

to be deprived of a role is to be deprived of the possibility of full societal membership {Abberley 1999: 4}.

Following Finkelstein {1993}, economic marginalisation, and with it social exclusion, of people with impairments is directly due to an increased emphasis placed upon the concept of (personal) 'normality' within modern industrial society. Hughes {2002} goes beyond Finkelstein {1993}, finding that modernity:

was (sic) desperate for order, quick to stifle transgression [and] uncomfortable with difference {Hughes 2002: 571}.

As a result, for Hughes:

[m]odernity is a normalising culture. Narrow norms of human authenticity have played havoc with the lives of those who have been marked with 'incidental variances' from the ideal {Hughes 2002: 572}.

Hence for Hughes modernity creates disability *via* the medium of normality, a medium which modernity has at the least appropriated for itself, if not directly manufactured. Once the concept of 'normality' is established, 'abnormality' is a logical progression. Although in its origins 'abnormality' simply implies a state different from the norm, which could be either above or below the datum, the generally understood meaning is one of inferiority, of *subnormality*.

Drawing together these strands of a normative modernity nervously peering around for any signs of dysfunctional deviance, which may have the effect of disturbing the ordered

progress of society, it is unsurprising that the topic of social control should arise. In Parsons' model of society there is an inherent danger of instability arising from deviance:

tendencies towards deviant behavior on the part of the component actors pose functional "problems" for the social system in that they must be counteracted by "mechanisms of control" unless dysfunctional consequences are to ensue {Parsons 1951: 35}.

In this statement can be seen both the influence of Spencer with his idea that a better quality of 'brick', one that is regularly-shaped, will lead to greater stability {Spencer 1972a: 35 above}, and the more general notion of modernity as a dangerous condition which must be constantly monitored and regulated found in, for example, Bauman {1989 above}. This leads us directly to a consideration of social control.

'Social control' may be said to consist of:

those mechanisms by which society exercises its dominion over component individuals and enforces conformity to its norms and values {Coser & Rosenberg 1989: 80}.

Thus here 'social control' is a proactive process by which society ensures that its business is conducted in an orderly manner. There is a sense of pre-emption, of seeking to forestall the dangerous forces of disorder. Meanwhile, Parsons formulates his definition somewhat differently, speaking in terms of:

those processes ... which tend to counteract the deviant tendencies... {Parsons 1951: 297}.

For Parsons then, in some contrast, 'social control' is more of a reactive response to those seen as acting in a manner prejudicial to good societal order. This appears to be a rather more personal and targeted process than that of Coser & Rosenberg {1989}.

Just such a personal approach is developed and discussed by Foucault {1996}. Commenting on the work of Nietzsche in the areas of genealogy and history, he first notes a perceived tendency of people to consider the human psyche and physical body as constants around which the social world evolves and revolves, and then refutes as erroneous such views:

[w]e believe in the dull constancy of instinctual life and imagine that it continues to exert its force ... in the present as it did in the past. But a knowledge of history ... seizes the slow elaboration of instincts. ... We believe ... that the body ... escapes the influence of history, but this too is false. The body is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays... {Foucault 1996: 370}.

Here Foucault sets out the idea that both body and mind may be shaped and reshaped by external influences. Elsewhere {Foucault 1991}, he suggests that by working on one, an effect may be wrought on the other.

In "*Discipline and Punish*" Foucault {1991} explicitly develops the thesis that an action on the physical body may produce a psychic effect. As the title suggests, he then links this notion directly to processes of social control. Moreover Foucault is specific that the

discipline of the period of which he treats, the eighteenth century (which is largely the cusp between premodern and modern eras in Europe), differs in both style and intent from those forms which had preceded it. Whilst discipline and coercion had long been known in human society - Foucault {1991: 137} cites slavery, military, religious and economic examples - at the dawn of modernity:

[t]he human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A 'political anatomy', which was also a 'mechanics of power', was being born {Foucault 1991: 138}.

This is clearly 'social control', but it is an analysis which differs markedly from those of both Coser & Rosenberg {1989} and Parsons {1951} discussed above. Rather than a conservative force seeking to maintain the societal *status quo*, as both those other formulations are at heart, Foucault's notion of social control is of a radical force which is intended to further both societal and individual change. It:

produces subjected and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience) {Foucault 1991: 138}.

This force then acts to engender change at both the physiological level ('utility') and on the mental plane ('obedience'). Meanwhile:

[t]he Normal is... ..established in the standardization of industrial processes ... normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end of the classical age {Foucault 1991: 184}.

Another lesson to be drawn from the works of Foucault is that the world of work is an important factor in the imposition of discipline ("*the body is ... broken down by the rhythms of work*" {Foucault 1996: 370} cited above). The world of work itself is an agency of normalisation and hence a means of imposing order.

Hughes {2002} uses the concept of an orderly and regulated modernity as a central plank of his discussion, whilst Giddens makes a similar point about modern society and the human drive to exert control:

[t]he universe of future events is open to be shaped by human intervention ... regulated by risk assessment {Giddens 1991: 109},

in which he appears to accept that contemporary society has the will, the power and, by implication, the right to control nature and engage in social engineering. When linked to notions of social control, this control of risk may logically lead to the urge to dispense with social 'deviants'. Ultimately, for Bauman {1989: 92}, it appears that:

[m]odern culture is a garden culture. It defines itself as the design for an ideal life and a perfect arrangement of human conditions ...there are weeds wherever there is a garden. And weeds are to be exterminated. Weeding out is a creative, not a destructive activity.

Summing the contributions of Abberley {1999}, Bauman {1989}, Foucault {1991, 1996} and Parsons {1951}, it is not difficult to imagine impaired people who have been

excluded from work, and are therefore 'inadequately disciplined' on the one hand and 'failing to repay' the costs of their existence to society on the other, as 'weeds' to be plucked from the modern garden. For Foucault {1991}, the beginning of the modern era is witness to socio-economic and political forces which tend on the one hand towards the enforced standardisation of an economically useful population, on the other heralding the end of craft artisanship, to be replaced by 'industrial processes'. There is seemingly a tacit acceptance that society, or perhaps an elite grouping within it, has both the right and the might to prescribe and enforce templates of behaviour and even physiology (see also Giddens {1991}; Marx {1990}; Spencer {1972a}).

Here, again, is a view of modernity which stresses the importance and the centrality of both order ('obedience') and 'the normal'. For Foucault {1991} as for Finkelstein {1993}, Ryan & Thomas {1980} and other commentators within disability studies, the world of work, and specifically the move to a factory system of production (which is integral to modernity {Hall et al 1992: 2}), provides the catalyst for the onset and promotion of ideas of 'normality'.

4. 8 Deviancy and (ab)normality in European history

It would appear from the foregoing that there is a weighty volume of disparate academic opinion to suggest that modernity is not well-disposed towards impaired ('non-normal', 'deviant' or 'dysfunctional') members of society. Indeed some, especially from within disability studies, go further and claim that disablement is primarily a modern phenomenon {Finkelstein 1980; Oliver 1990a *et al*}. This notwithstanding, it remains almost a truism that impairment, as a fundamental feature of the human condition, is present in every age and is by no means confined to modernity. There have always been accidents, chronic illness and congenital 'defects' on the one hand, and it is a simple fact of life that the longer one lives the more likely one is to experience some degree of impairment. It may well be thought that:

[i]mpairment is a form of first nature that certainly imparts a given set of abilities and inabilities, which then places real and ineluctable conditions on the social capacities of certain individuals {Gleeson 1999: 52}.

Despite the seeming ubiquity of this human condition, impairment in one form or another has not by any means been uniformly well-received in premodern societies. Contrasting with claims to the contrary, especially by Finkelstein {1980} who, in the words of Barnes {1997: 9}, finds that:

disability is a paradox emerging out of the development of western capitalist society,

there is a body of scholarship which holds that the construction of disability, and with it an accompanying process of structured selectivity, has a much longer history. Whilst this investigation remains focused on modernity, a brief detour will now be taken to consider selected academic views of premodern society in the geographical target area of this study. The

purpose here is to investigate the provenance of claims of the novelty of modern approaches to impairment.

Whilst Barnes in general concurs with the belief that materialism is a root factor of disablement, he is critical of those who adopt a relatively short-term historical view which focuses almost exclusively on the suggestion:

that the basis of disabled people's oppression is founded upon the material and ideological changes ... [stemming from] the emergence of capitalist society {Barnes 1997: 10}.

Rather, for Barnes:

the roots of disabled people's oppression lie in the ancient world of Greece and Rome, and ... [this oppression] is culturally produced {Barnes 1997: 12}.

Thus he appears to suggest that there is a continuous and evolutionary process of disablement with an active history stretching over millennia. In like manner, Shakespeare {1997} posits a strong cultural component to present-day disablement. It should be possible to trace this evolution, if it exists.

Premodern European societies are the subject of a study by Winzer {1997}. She points first to the supposed social conditions in prehistoric societies and then to the (authenticated) often less than sympathetic treatment of classical Greek and Roman infants deemed 'unfit' {Winzer 1997: 82}, concluding that many (and particularly intellectual- and sensory-) impaired adults in these societies were treated with "[a]version and distaste".

This supposed "aversion" demonstrably did not prevent, however, the epileptic Gaius Julius Caesar {Reddisability 2003}, nor Tiberius Claudius Nero Germanicus who:

suffered from severe physical disabilities (sic) ... [and] may have suffered from cerebral palsy {BBC 2003: 1},

from becoming illustrious Roman Emperors (respectively, Julius Caesar who twice invaded Britain, and Claudius I who later incorporated Britain into the Empire). Neither were the Classical Greek poet Homer {Collins 1999: 740} nor the legendary Roman seer Capys {Macaulay 1889: 893} prevented by their visual impairments from finding respected and respectable positions within their host societies.

Similarly, amongst the victims of the AD 79 eruption of Vesuvius, the discovery at Pompeii of the remains of a heavily pregnant young woman is of interest. She was apparently richly bejewelled at the time of her death, the daughter of a wealthy citizen and an important (and apparently pampered) member of her society. Her skeletal remains clearly indicated that she was subject to spina bifida: nonetheless she had retained her position in society, and her age at death is estimated to have been about seventeen years {Wilkinson 2003: 159}. At least in this individual example, there is no evidence of differential incorporation attaching to

impairment. On the contrary, this young woman appears to have enjoyed the (elevated) status and material rewards common to her contemporary class and gender.

It could be argued that the “*aversion*” referred to by Winzer {1997: 82} had a largely materialist or economic base: for example a supposition that these people were unable to help defend the group or city (although the cases of Julius Caesar and Claudius I argue against her here), or that they were unproductive in the hunting, agriculture or manufacture of the day. As Winzer, speculating about prehistoric society, has it:

[s]everely impaired individuals ... as noncontributing members ... would have constituted an economic hazard {Winzer 1997: 81}.

However, this is to impose a modern world-view on a premodern society. Such an approach is resisted by Gleeson {1997} who, citing the words of Dettwyler {1991: 381}, suggests that it:

is presumptuous of anthropologists to assume that they can accurately assess how productive disabled individuals might have been in the past {Gleeson 1997: 190}.

Commenting directly on this quote, Gleeson concludes that Dettwyler's words provide:

a general caution against the historicist tendency to cast impaired people as the objects of a 'distributive dilemma' throughout history {Gleeson 1997: 190}.

As Bragg puts it:

it is our task ... to suspend our own cultural notions and to determine, in so far as possible, the view of the culture at hand {Bragg 1997: 166}.

Meanwhile Gleeson {1997: 186 - 196} is particularly scathing with his finding that:

[t]emporality has been ignored or trivialised by disability commentators in a range of ... ways {Gleeson 1997: 186}.

Put into the Bourdieuan analytical framework favoured here, both Bragg {1997} and Gleeson {1997} may be interpreted as inferring that different cultures have, axiomatically, different power lines active within their associated cultural fields. As a result, both teach that it is potentially fallacious and misleading to attempt to impose the values found in one society upon another. There is, on such an analysis, seemingly little to justify Winzer {1997} talking in relatively certain terms of the “*economic hazard*” of impaired people in a premodern era, and all the less in a prehistoric one. This is hinted at but not developed by Winzer herself, for she speaks of:

*[c]onspicuously abnormal persons ... surrounded by **superstition, myth, fatalism** ... Their lives were severely limited by widely held beliefs and **superstitions**...* {Winzer 1997: 76} (added emphasis).

For Weber, modern society is largely the product of a process of rationalisation accompanied by the increasing:

proclivity of human action to free itself from its dependence upon magical thinking as a means of understanding the world {Morrison 1995: 218}.

The thinking of Weber here is suggestive of a re-ordering of the cultural field informing western society. Thus the power line of 'rationality' is energised, whilst that of 'magic' wanes.

The logic of the situation is that this suggests an inverse relationship between the two concepts, which in turn points to a potential interpretative artifice to allow a snapshot view of the premodern cultural field. By reversing the flow of these processes in order to consider an earlier age, the suggestion is that rationalisation in economic and societal terms decreases as reliance upon 'magical' explanation increases.

The "*aversion*" spoken of by Winzer {1997} is not, on this view, indicative of some materialist-inspired, scientifically rationalised, socio-economic discrimination against impaired people, nor does it suggest discrimination founded upon the basis of 'abnormality'. This is, to the contrary, a 'magical' process rooted in religion and/or superstition. There is possibly evidence in the account of Winzer to the effect that people with certain types of impairment were *sometimes* seen as being 'different': there is no compelling evidence that they were *inevitably*, or even consistently, disvalued. With "*superstition*" and "*myth*" given centre stage, Winzer {1997} appears to speak of a cultural field which differs radically from that which informs modern society.

In the context of a Christian society dating from around 370 and leading towards the Middle Ages, Winzer refers to the institutionalisation of people with a variety of impairments in monastic retreats. She suggests that this was largely motivated by a sense of Christian charity and ideas of a duty to protect individuals from the vicissitudes of an otherwise uncaring society {Winzer 1997: 90}. A similar view, that the wellbeing of people unable to live independently within the prevalent socio-economic climate was a matter of Christian ethics, is to be found elsewhere:

these were seen to be [matters] appropriate to the role of the church {Tindall & Alaszewski 1998: 26}.

The place and period considered here by Winzer {1997} represents a Europe very largely under the influence of the (then technically unified: this was a pre-Protestant era) Christian church. Because of this widespread influence, the theoretical approach of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*} would suggest that the cultural unconscious of the day drew heavily upon Christian archetypes and symbolism. Contemporaneously, with a cultural field which emphasised theism, religious practice was consciously promoted as the dominant explanatory mechanism of worldly phenomena.

Within the tenets of Judeo-Christianity is a long-standing duty to provide for:

...the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow, that they may eat within thy gates, and be filled {Deuteronomy 26:12}.

Meanwhile, Christians are specifically exhorted to:

[g]ive to every man that asketh of thee... {Luke 6:30},

not simply as an act of charity but also as a sound investment, both profane, for:

[g]ive, and it shall be given unto you... For with the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured to you again {Luke 6:38},

and sacred:

lend, hoping for nothing again ... and ye shall be the children of the Highest {Luke 6:35}.

A similar duty of care to the 'less fortunate' is to be found within many other religions, including Islam:

[t]he Quaran assumed ... a moral framework that ensures support for the weak through the compassion and self discipline of the strong {Dean & Khan 1997: 198, quoted by Dwyer 2000: 34}.²¹

In the premodern Europe of which Winzer {1997} speaks, there is no real evidence of a perception of individual 'abnormality', whether it be 'conspicuous' or not. All is ordained by God, for reasons inscrutable to humans {e.g. Ecclesiastes 3: 11}, and as a result:

[t]he individual should remain once and for all in the station and calling in which God had placed him (sic) {Weber 1930: 85}.

As the Old Testament itself puts it:

[t]hat which is crooked cannot be made straight: and that which is wanting cannot be numbered {Ecclesiastes 1: 15} ... whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor any thing taken from it {Ecclesiastes 3: 14}.

Being an Old Testament source, Ecclesiastes has relevance not only to Christianity, but also to Judaism and potentially to Islam.

Further, that which has come to be a pejorative in disability studies and, perhaps, in modern society more generally - 'charity' - has its origins as a sacred duty:

Mediaeval ethics not only tolerated begging but actually glorified it in the mendicant orders. Even secular beggars, since they gave the person of means opportunity for good works through the giving of alms, were sometimes considered an estate and treated as such {Weber 1930: 177}.

Hence the statement, that:

being presented as objects of charity effectively robbed disabled people of the claim to individuality and full human status {Barnes 1997: 16},

must be set against its contemporary cultural field setting, not a modern one. At that time it would be presumptuous, if not blasphemous, for mortals to seek to change the preordained order of society. As Weber {1930} makes clear, the recipients of charity performed a valuable function and retained the possibility of remaining full members of their society.

²¹ Islam, which honours many prophets in common with the Judeo-Christian tradition, has its roots within the same socio-geographical-temporal region as does the latter. There are shared power lines within these two major world religions, although their respective cultural fields have developed over time along different tracks. This is indicative of the complexity of the interactions which contribute to changing intellectual fields.

In Christian Europe of the time, just as kings ruled by the will of God so did serfs labour and beggars beg. All, having been created and situated by God according to His plan, were intrinsically 'normal' and shared the distinction of having been assigned their social status by the deity. From a modern viewpoint it is easy to analyse this as social control blatantly serving the interests of a ruling elite (as does Marx {*e.g.* McClelland 1977: 39}), and there is little doubt that historically many powerful people, both clergy and laity, have cynically manipulated religious dogma for their own politico-economic or social benefit.

Nonetheless, to an observer *of the time* the entire social order existed to serve the interests or express the will of God. At least in theory this was divine, not 'social', control. Within that context it would make no sense to speak in terms of structured selectivity and differential incorporation. The prevailing cultural field insisted that all socio-economic position emanated from God, and that God alone had the power to assign social status. Spinoza (1632 - 1677) is reported as commenting that a:

cripple (sic) is such because of its (sic) place in the system: God has not tried to produce perfection and failed {Gleeson 1997: 187}.

Winzer {1997: 93-95} also draws attention to “*almost three centuries*” of European persecution and destruction of alleged witches, a period which takes her to the brink of modernity. It may be tempting to speculate, as Winzer does, that “*many people*” with impairments were “*implicated*” as witches. From this it is then possible to construct a theorem involving people with various outwardly apparent impairments - 'abnormal' people - being excluded from social interaction, and often killed, purely on the grounds of their perceived 'difference'. Again, this is to risk judging a premodern age by the standards of modernity.

The fact is, as Winzer {1997: 93} herself notes, that witchcraft was most often seen at the time as an active attack upon Christian mores by people who had either as adults deliberately entered into a pact with the Devil or, if children, had been born of a union between woman and Devil. This being the case, and in the cultural field context of the time, death was a just if bloody retribution for the *mental act* of conspiracy, not for any outward difference in appearance or behaviour. For a 'misbegotten' child, being not fully human, death was not a punishment but a return to its origin.

Indeed, it would appear that in many instances external appearance or behaviour was presumed to be the *result* of deviance, not its *cause*, and by no means all 'witches' were immediately identifiable on cursory inspection. Given that “*perhaps 80 percent of the accused were women*” {Winzer 1997: 94}, many of whom it would seem were non-impaired, there may appear to be far more solid grounds to consider witch-hunting as institutionalised misogyny than there are for any claim that the enterprise was directed specifically, or even largely, against people with impairments.

4. 9 Looking to the north

When seeking evidence for the existence (or absence) of cultural factors, or power lines within intellectual fields, having some measure of continuity over time, it is advisable to search widely. Particularly in the UK context, it is potentially misleading to look only to the south-eastern domains of Greco-Roman or Middle Eastern influence. The English language and British culture have also been heavily influenced in pre- and post- Roman times by Celtic and Norse traditions, some pagan and others Christian. Even the Normans of 1066 fame, as their name implies, were also of predominantly Viking (i.e. *Norse*) stock, although themselves much subject to Latinate and, of course, Christian influence.

Starting from pre-Christian Norse and later Celtic writings, Bragg {1997} paints a picture which is sometimes in contrast to that of Barnes {1997}, and which often differs markedly to that of Winzer {1997}. From the outset there is apparent a clear difference in the findings of Bragg as against those of Winzer:

we notice a general disinterest in impairments as they might affect a character's competence. While there does seem to be some concern for dangers an individual's impairment might pose to society ... there is no ... hint of marginalising pity or consequent charity {Bragg 1997: 165 abstract}.

As Bragg {1997} continues to analyse premodern reactions to impairments of differing forms, the general picture of pre-Christian Norse times which emerges is one of non-differentiation on the basis of physiology: as one Eddic poem has it:

[t]he lame ride horseback, the handless drive herds, the deaf may be dauntless in battle {cited by Bragg 1997: 173}.

Elsewhere the point is made that people with visual and other impairments were able to find niches such as bard or storyteller {Bragg 1997: 165,166}. In short, this society was able to accommodate people with many types of 'non-standard' capabilities. Assuming that Bragg is correct, the overall situation seems to be one of the general acceptance of individual difference: of a non-differential social incorporation accorded all members of the societal group.²²

Bragg records a change in attitudes with the spread of Christianity, with an increasing emphasis on the individual accompanied by, in Bragg's analysis, the rise of 'pity' {Bragg 1997: 168} and 'charity' (the latter of which could encompass "*burning at the stake*" {*op cit*: 169}). In contrast, the earlier Norse age had focused "*on the community rather than the individual*" {Bragg 1997: 174}. The comments above relating to Winzer {1997} and the biblical concept of Christian duty towards 'the poor' remain pertinent here: it is possible to see this 'charity' in its origins as a religious tenet which offered the notion of some form of reward for the donor,

²² The situation of 'outsiders' was often radically different. This was a warrior society which had no compunction towards killing or enslaving people from other ethnic backgrounds.

rather than as merely a product of pity. Moreover, as has been seen above in relation to Islam, this is not a specifically Christian, nor western, duty imposed upon affluent members of society.

Bragg {1997: 173} is clear that impairments of one form or another have often been seen as “*undesirable*”: it is also apparent that different impairments have been subject to a varying assessment of their importance or its lack to society. What has at one time been accepted without comment or even celebrated has, at another, been seen as disastrous for either the individual concerned or the host society and *vice-versa*. What seems to be the case is that there is no coherent evidence for the existence over time of some form of a western 'culture of oppression' directed against disabled people:

what we call disabilities (sic) are perhaps always and everywhere exceptionalities, but not always disabilities {Bragg 1997: 167}.

For Bragg this indicates, rather than a smooth progression of oppression, a “*sequential redefinition*” {Bragg 1997: 167} of both impairment and consequent disability. This is indicative more of dynamic intellectual field effects, as opposed to a relatively static cultural component.

Parsons {1951: 168}, with his general notion of:

modes of adaptation to the exigencies of institutionalizing the value patterns ... in the light of the strains to which the population in question are subjected,

may be thought to address this point, at least partially. Because different societies exist within very different frameworks of both material and intellectual worlds, and there is a reciprocal relationship between a given society and its “*collective unconscious*” {Mannheim 1936: 40}, it follows necessarily that societal value-judgements of people and/or their physiological and personal traits will also differ.

From the evidence of Winzer {1997} and Bragg {1997} it may be deduced that throughout history some people with impairments have been seen as 'different', 'dangerous' or, occasionally, both. However, these formulations do not appear to have been consistent. What was (arguably) seen as provoking 'aversion' in ancient Rome may well have elicited a quite different response, of 'Christian charity', at a later date. In the Norse tradition the particular condition may not even have been noteworthy. The dispensation of 'charity' during the earlier Christian age was not, at least in theory, some stigmatising dole grudgingly meted out to one's social inferiors: it was instead a God-given duty on the part of the donor, and a God-given right on the part of the recipient. These people were not in general seen as being social deviants, or even as being inherently 'different'.

An exception to this is found in the case of witchcraft, for this was most certainly often interpreted as individual deviance. The 'perversion' of witchcraft was seen as a consciously adopted state of mind, a pact with the Devil, which may or may not manifest itself outwardly.

This was a wilful act of war on the community, not a result of impairment. Indeed, where some form of impairment was evident the general assumption was that this was *caused* by the deliberate deviance of that individual or a parent. Even here, though, there was no consistency throughout an extended period or within geographical areas. Witch hunting was a sporadic not a sustained activity, which is suggestive of a fluctuating intellectual field effect. Following the advice of Bragg {1997: 166} and seeking “*the view of the culture at hand*”, the persecution of alleged witches should not be seen as a response to physiology or 'difference' *per se*. This was not so much an attempt to impose standards or norms as it was action to repel an invading demonic force. It was a product of that “*superstition*” of Winzer {1997} aimed not at 'different' people but at supposed malcontents within society.

If we are to accept the idea that:

[m]odern culture is marked by ... an uncritical view of itself as ... the handmaiden of progress and **the vanquisher of superstition** {Hughes 2002: 571} (added emphasis),

then it is difficult to support the notion that the persecution of witches in any way points to the existence of a continuing and long-established predisposition to oppress ‘disabled’ people within western culture. Simply, witch-hunting is a product of an intellectual field contained within a non-modern and essentially irrational cultural field.

Such a premodern intellectual field does not appear to be concerned with 'order' or 'normality' as abstract constructions. These are to the contrary manifestly modern notions, as discussed above {e.g. Bauman 1990: 182/183; Hughes 2002: 577; Parsons 1951: 249}. There is no convincing evidence here of a line of eugenic thinking which may be said to provide a direct and unbroken link between ancient and modern. The weight of evidence suggests that the eugenic intellectual field may have lain dormant under the influence of a religiosity which accorded responsibility for worldly affairs to a supreme deity. What this excursion into premodern times *does* suggest, however, is that there is clear and compelling evidence of a concern to avert societal danger.

This urge towards social protection may seem to be so widespread as to be almost omnipresent throughout recorded societies, at least in the western tradition(s). Indeed, as a moment’s reflection suggests, it appears clear that any society which did not seek to actively defend itself would be at constant risk of disruption or even extinction. This observation would apply equally to any 'society', whether or not defined in territorial terms and of any size. In this respect, societal self-defence is something in the nature of a universal social imperative. It may be thought of as an elemental power line of any given cultural field.

4. 10 Otherness as stigma: 'heterophobia'

There is a synthesis of modern ideas of 'order' and 'the normal' with an older notion of the prevention of societal danger which is to some degree explicitly discussed by Bauman {1989}. Whilst most certainly affecting individuals, the resultant social force is more specifically directed at identified and disvalued groups. This is the concept of "*heterophobia*", which:

seems to be a focused manifestation of a still wider phenomenon of anxiety aroused by the feeling that one has no control over the situation {Bauman 1989: 64}.

Bauman develops an image of modern society having a need for self-assertion and control over nature: a potent urge to impose and preserve 'order'. Bauman is clear that his remarks may equally be applied to disabled people as to racially defined 'others':

the Nazis ... attempted to exterminate their own mentally insane (sic) or bodily impaired compatriots {Bauman 1989: 72}.

It is necessary to distinguish 'heterophobia' from the more familiar concept of 'xenophobia'. There is evidence from the earliest times of an idea of 'us and them'; a distinction between 'our' society and 'their' society and a notion that the 'foreigner' may be dangerous in both physical and cultural terms {e.g. Exodus; Isaiah}. For Bauman:

[h]istory is fraught with communal and sectarian enmities ... in some cases resulting in extermination of whole populations and cultures {Bauman 1989: 88}.

However, this dangerous other is clearly identified as an 'outsider' in the most basic sense of the term. S/he is a stranger, an alien, who represents an external threat to any given society. This is xenophobia; in its origins literally a *fear* of foreigners, but nowadays most commonly understood to signify a strong *dislike* of them. As the discussion of the work of Winzer {1997} above suggests, premodern witch finding is best understood in terms of xenophobia. At root this was action against an allegedly organised and identified invading force, albeit that the supposed invasion took place across internal psychic borders rather than external geographical ones.

'Heterophobia' is somewhat different to xenophobia. Yes, there is a notion of 'otherness' and this difference is associated with societal danger, but:

[t]his is the 'enemy in our midst' case {Bauman 1989: 65}.

In a relatively undifferentiated society, logically there is little or no opportunity for the rise of heterophobia. If all are essentially similar, it is a moot point as to how or even if some may then come to be construed as 'other'. With increasing societal complexity and the social division of labour associated with modernity {Durkheim 1933} comes the opportunity to draw boundaries, to construct social spaces and to configure hierarchies {e.g. Crompton 1993; Hughes 2002; Marx & Engels 1992; Parsons 1949, 1951, 1954; Spencer 1972a, b, c}. By these means,

difference and inequality amongst and between members of the same society become manifest {Marx 1970, 1977 *et al*}.

For Bauman, as a result of the coming of modernity:

[t]he old securities disappeared ... and new boundaries had to be built around new identities {Bauman 1989: 40}.

It is in such a context that Bauman suggests that modernity, by engendering a cultural ethos which is sympathetic to the application of scientific rationality within a bureaucratic framework, may facilitate and indeed actively promote the growth and course of heterophobia. In the modern cultural setting, difference:

[I]ike everything else in modern society, ... now had to be manufactured ..., rationally argued ..., monitored and managed {Bauman 1989: 57}.

It may well appear that an important component of this 'manufacturing' process is the potential for drawing a datum line offered by the advent of ideas of "*normalcy*" {Davis 1997a}, especially when set alongside seemingly related notions of the 'deviant' status of the 'non-normal' drawn from the functionalism of Parsons {1951}.

'Deviant' groups are by definition 'other' than the 'normal' majority and as such are especially vulnerable to the effects of heterophobia. It has already been seen above (section 4.9) that, following a Parsonian line of reasoning, disabled people may be readily defined as deviant. Meanwhile Foucault {1991} suggests that 'normalisation', closely associated with modernity {Davis 1997a; Hughes 2002}, is an important factor in facilitating differentiation between social groups. Arguably, the distinctions made need not themselves rest on 'objective' grounds:

[t]he difference may be arbitrary or fictive: it is enough that 'we' have set up the boundaries of 'us' for 'them' to become 'they' {Cohen 1994: 54}.

However, Bauman {1989} suggests that once "*manufactured*" the rational foundations of modernity will require that such boundaries are defended or justified by 'objective' arguments.

For one example of this process of rationalisation, functionalism does not necessarily view heterophobia as being inherently 'wrong' or 'dysfunctional'. The Parsonian model {Parsons 1951} emphasises the needs and priorities of the societal collective over the interests of individuals, it is utilitarian in nature. Hence anything which acts to reduce the 'costs' imposed upon a society is, by definition, beneficial to that society and therefore a positive force in terms of functionality. This is a rationalisation which is closely attuned to the core values of the dominant modern intellectual field as discussed above, and this concern for rationality and the greater good of society mirrors the utilitarian approach to ethics.

4. 11 Chapter summary

A more comprehensive synthesis of the views expressed here by Bauman {1989}, Foucault {1991} and Parsons {1951} is now possible. This suggests a scenario wherein the emerging societal form of modernity, drawing upon Enlightenment values of rationality but remaining subject to much older (and possibility ubiquitous) fears of dangerous others, adopted a form of self-reflexivity grounded in scientific ('rational') ideas. By measuring and comparing, it became possible to differentiate between 'normal' and 'other' members of a modern society with as much confidence as had previously been applied to xenophobic ideas of 'us' and 'them', built upon racial, tribal or cultural difference. Modernity is, it would seem, an efficient incubator for ideas of heterophobia.

Meanwhile the particular circumstances which accompanied the emergence of modernity, and specifically the sense of unrelenting change and with it a fear of societal instability, may be thought to have redirected attention from external threats to internal ones. The "*enemy within*" of Bauman {1989} is now potentially identifiable by using the techniques suggested by Foucault {1991}. In this way, it is suggested here, an older xenophobic concern with societal survival may be transferred to a reflexive heterophobic concern with order. As part of this process of reflexivity, it may be thought, the focus of attention shifts from individual benefit to a broader idea of 'the public interest'. This change of focus itself of necessity fosters an older utilitarian ethic of 'the greatest good of the greatest number' wherein any individual is, in the final analysis, expendable.

There is evidence that the onset of modernity marked a 'sea-change' in societal attitudes towards those identified as 'other', and especially towards disabled people. This does not, however, seem to *fully* support the ideas of disability studies stalwarts such as Abberley {1987}, Finkelstein {2001} and Oliver {1989; 1990a; 1993; 1996b} that this change is *directly* dependent upon any or all of capitalism, industrialisation or the growth of a market economy. Weber {1958}, with his "*Protestant Ethic*", certainly suggests that the search for material benefit, both individual and societal, gained prominence with the advent of modernity, but a wider view is perhaps required. The words of Bourdieu {1993: 187} (cited in section 4.3) introduce a note of caution here, for Bourdieu specifically warns of the danger of being misled by seeming synchronicity into inferring possibly erroneous cause and effect relationships between field fluctuations. It may well be that the particular conjunction of intellectual fields and power lines which together comprise modernity is particularly inimical towards disabled people, and modern society has the clear appearance of valuing the material highly, but this does not confirm a direct relationship between these observations.

Rather than noting what modern society values (ie the material), it may be informative to approach the discussion from the direction of what it disvalues. From this perspective, the

combined evidence of Bauman {1989}, Davis {1997a}, Foucault {1991}, Hughes {2002} and Parsons {1951} points towards a cultural field and an enclosed intellectual space wherein the predominant concern of society is to exercise control. The prime measure of the degree of control achieved is, in this model, the level of 'deviancy' {Parsons 1951} within society. Thus, the more effective the mechanisms of social control are, the lower the observed rate of deviancy is and *vice-versa*. It follows from this that deviance is deeply disvalued.

'Deviance' may be understood as a short-hand term for 'deviation from some norm', and both Davis {1997a} and Parsons {1951} place particular emphasis on the normative nature of modern society. Hence to be different, however this difference may be constructed, is in a very real sense to be deviant. It is a commonplace that there are many norms within the societal structure of modernity and, in this context, the search for profit and the performance of 'economically valuable' work are but two of this multitude. What may be derived from the theorisations of Davis and Parsons particularly, and Bauman and Hughes more generally, is the idea that the prime norm of modernity is to be 'normal'. From here it is but a very short conceptual step to arrive at an argument that, in modern society, disabled people are disvalued not on material grounds, but on the grounds that they are different. They are, by definition, 'not normal' and are therefore 'deviant'. This construction is highlighted by Wootton, who draws her reader's attention to what she terms a "*curious*" collection of consecutive chapter headings found in a 1951 (US) work on "*Social Pathology*". In the context of "*Deviation and Deviants*", Wootton {1959: 13} remarks upon the juxtaposition of:

Blindness and the Blind; Speech Defects and the Speech Defective; Radicalism and Radicals; Prostitution and the Prostitute; Crime and the Criminal; Drunkenness and the Chronic Alcoholic; Mental Disorders.

Chapter 5: Science, bureaucracy and professionalism

5. 1 Proem

To anticipate here, this chapter will lay the foundations for the consideration of ideas of the implicit authority of science and medicine which will be considered at length in chapter nine below. Ultimately the intention is to explain the means by which what is nominally a 'free' choice, to abort or carry a particular foetus, may come to be circumscribed by what are in effect norms of contemporary society. There are, it will be suggested, unrecognised but nonetheless potent forces in play when a woman comes to make such a decision. A similar point about the sterilisation of members of either sex is made in section 7.11. This chapter sets the scene for these later discussions. In this, the chapter content is pertinent to each of the research questions in more or less equal measure.

Continuing the major themes of 'progress', 'order' and 'control' introduced in the preceding chapter, and observed in the German case study of chapter three, this work now moves to consider in more detail potential means by which abstract ideas such as these may be translated into a more structured, and hence in some way 'solid', form. In essence, this represents the interface between intellectual field and social action. To build upon the analogy between intellectual and magnetic fields {Bourdieu 1971a: 161} noted in section 1.5 above, what is sought here is some explanation of the means by which an invisible field may produce observable and tangible effects. In the magnetic illustration, this relates to how power lines may deflect a compass or arrange iron filings into patterns; in the intellectual case to how thought-forms and ideals may influence policies and thus define both individual and collective life (and death) trajectories. This is in keeping with:

the Enlightenment ... image of rational, scientific Man (sic), ... before whom the whole of human history was laid out for understanding and mastery {Hall 1992: 282}.

The modern industrial world of western society remains at the forefront here, and it is germane to note the assertion that, amongst other indicators:

[m]odernity can be characterized by ... the growth of large-scale administrative and bureaucratic systems of social organization and regulation [and] the dominance of ... rationalist ... cultural values ... {Hall, Held & McGrew 1992: 3}.

Similarly, in the context of "*modernism's dream of progress and social order*", King {undated} speaks of the application of ideas of rationality to human affairs, and draws parallels with the growth of the 'scientific' organisation of the world of work due to Taylor and Ford. This has led, for King, to:

increasing control over society in the form of scientific management, or bureaucracy. ... [A]n important aspect of science is to enhance control and

order. In the case of genetics, the managerial tendency is expressed through eugenics {King undated, unpaginated}.

There are, then, several mechanisms of interest here. Each of these may be thought to represent:

a complex of ... role integrates which is of strategic structural significance in the social system {Parsons 1951: 39}.

These are repositories for specific subsets of the dominant norms and values of society.

Thus it is that this chapter will concentrate its gaze upon the most salient of these 'mechanisms of conversion' which serve to translate ideology into policy: science and bureaucracy. This is not the whole story however, for a further explanation is required of the means by which a body of "*role integrates*" may assume a distinct and coherent identity. This, it is suggested below, is a product of the process of 'professionalisation'.

5. 2 Science as deity, scientist as intercessor?

Within modernity the branch of human activity dedicated to the overthrow of superstition, the discovery of order, the standardisation of procedures and the description of norms of behaviour is defined as:

*the **systematic** study of the nature and behaviour of the material and physical universe ... and the formulation of **laws** to describe these facts...* {Collins 1999: 1378} (added emphases).

This is, of course, 'science', and:

[t]he place of science in Western society is part of the ascendancy of a cultural tradition which involves a high valuation of certain types of rationality {Parsons 1951: 340}.

Bauman, at least, posits a central role for science within the modern societal framework. He is confident of the elevated status of both science and scientist:

with the Enlightenment came the enthronement of the new deity, that of nature, together with the legitimation of science as its only orthodox cult, and of scientists as its prophets and priests. Everything, in principle, had been opened to objective enquiry; everything could, in principle, be known - reliably and truly {Bauman 1989: 68}.

Moreover, science is accustomed to assume the incremental increase of human knowledge in any given area of research, to the extent that:

[s]cientific work is chained to the course of progress {Weber 1948: 137}. ... *In science ... [w]e cannot work without hoping that others will advance further than we have* {Weber 1948: 138}; *Knowledge of [scientific] laws [is] cumulative ... Thus the modern notion of progress had its origins in the success of modern natural science* {Fukuyama 1992: 57}.

The words of Bauman, Fukuyama, Parsons and Weber here all resonate in sympathy with the analysis of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*}. As individual power lines, or even subsidiary fields, fluctuate or are superseded by others, then the dominant cultural field is itself modified. In this way fresh or refreshed world views may rise to dominance. What is seen here is the conflux of ideas of progress, order and rationality as power lines of a scientific intellectual field.

Bauman {1989: 68, cited above} suggests that 'the scientist' has become, as it were, the new High Priest(ess) of modern society. This implies the existence of some form of 'scientific authority', alongside an idea that 'scientific' wisdom is somehow accepted as being of a different order to 'lay' knowledge. Science itself cannot stand still. It is predicated upon "*cumulative ... progress*" {Fukuyama 1992: 57} and to cease to progress is to cease to be 'scientific'. To lose the 'scientific' label, in turn, would be to lose the status, respect and authority which contemporary society accords its practitioners {e.g. Milgram 1963, 1977}.

Thus modern society displays an emotional, almost religious, attachment to 'progress', whilst science has a fundamental need to use its past achievements as a foundation for further development. Science and scientists have a strong vested interest in demonstrating never-ending 'progress' in order to justify their enhanced social standing. It may even appear that science is the last bastion of modernity in the contemporary world, if one is to believe the claim that:

[t]oday, only science supports the myth of progress. ... The political projects of the twentieth century have failed, or achieved much less than they promised. At the same time, progress in science is a daily experience... {Gray 2003: 19}.

5. 3 Scientific authority

A major focus of the present investigation falls upon the potential and/or actual role of both medicine and science (and their more recent partial synthesis as 'medico-science') in the application of what may arguably appear to be eugenically-inspired procedures (most recently through the agency of the HGP). To make any such suggestion of a proactive role presupposes not only that adherents and practitioners of these abstract concepts, or social constructions, may in some way influence contemporary society, but also that they are able to translate policy into action: that they are some form of elite imbued with societal power. At first glance it is by no means obvious that this should be the case. How or why a collection of individuals, no matter how learned they may be, should individually or as a body achieve a position of unelected power within a modern democracy is a moot point here. It is necessary here to answer this question directly, for if medico-science cannot be shown to possess such power then this entire investigation is palpably misdirected.

One potential explanation for societal power attaching to general notions of 'the scientific' is that proposed by Auguste Comte (briefly noted in section 4.5 above) with his Law of the Three Stages. In this, Comte opined that all human societies pass through three stages of development: the 'theological', the 'metaphysical' and ultimately a final, finished, state of scientific reason (the *positive* stage) {Coser & Rosenberg 1989: 521 *et seq*}. On Comte's analysis, then, the power of science within any given modern society (and the contemporary industrialised world, whether considered as modern or postmodern) is explained by the coming of a new World Age informed not by religion or philosophy, but by science.

Superficially, Comte's theory has its attractions for the present task. The societal power attaching to science, and medico-science in particular, is thereby simply explained. It is neither more nor less than a necessary result of a changing social base; an axiomatic adjunct to the rise of science as the dominant mechanism by which the nature and structure of the observed world is explained, understood and, ultimately, controlled. However, it has been suggested that such a simple explanation may also be simplistic (or in the rather stronger words of one commentator, "*pathologically absurd*" {Gould 1969: 38}): there are problems here.

Gould {1969} points more to technical shortcomings but, as a more practical example, Comte is unable to account for the observed fact that what should be a defunct and superannuated social influence, religion, remains in one form or another a major force in the industrialised world of today: perhaps subdued, perhaps no longer granted its former primacy, often fragmented, but nonetheless still a power to be reckoned with in contemporary society {Glock & Bellah 1976; Hall *et al* 1992: 310-314; Stark & Glock 1968}. One must either posit a remarkably extended transitional period for what would appear to be, at least nominally, a revolutionary change or look to a deeper explanation.

Primitive as Comte's methodology may appear to a sophisticate such as Gould {1969}, and notwithstanding that his sweeping assertions may be somewhat overstated, there are opinions {*e.g.* Bauman 1989; Fukuyama 1992; Gray 2003; Hall 1992; Milgram 1963, 1977; Parsons 1951} which tend to suggest that there is indeed something about modernity which favours 'the scientific'. On this point Parsons {1951} is explicit and, unlike Comte (or indeed Gould {1969}), he proposes a sociological mechanism for his findings. This mechanism operates, for Parsons {1951}, on two levels. At the practical level Parsons observes that science has, in effect, colonised the university system. As a result science is accorded equal status with older schools of thought such as theology and philosophy to the extent that:

the scientist shares the status ... [of] other key groups who are primary culture bearers ... such that the values of science come to be inculcated in the value-system of society generally {Parsons 1951: 342}.

Thus science has, for Parsons, succeeded in insinuating its values into the cultural framework of modern society. Using an intellectual field analysis, one of the influential power lines of modern society is based upon scientific rationality.

Interesting as such a proposition may be, this is only a part of the process. The adoption of a certain way of thinking does not, of itself, serve to explain why or how science has gained the ability to influence action at the mundane, practical, level of everyday life. That such ability exists was demonstrated empirically by Milgram {1963, abstracted in Gross 1994} with his striking (it is tempting in the context to say 'shocking') "*Behavioural Study of Obedience*". The finer details of this (in)famous experiment are not of relevance here. Suffice it to say that the scenario involved the supposed infliction of pain by one member of the public upon another. In

the 'normal' course of events such an action would be contrary to a fundamental western cultural value (or ethic): "*the tendency not to harm other people*" {Milgram 1963 in Gross 1994: 91}. However, many of the naive subjects consciously and deliberately inflicted what they thought was severe (but transient) pain and suffering upon another person. Some even went so far as to supposedly endanger life. In his report, Milgram {1963} explains this result in the following terms:

the demands of the experimenter carry the weight of scientific authority {BBC 2005; Gross 1994: 91}.

The major finding of Milgram {1963} is that the strength of this "*scientific authority*" was sufficient to override other cultural values in a significant proportion of his subjects.

In fact the experimental psychological findings of Milgram {1963} had been predicted sociologically by Parsons {1951}. Not only have scientific values become incorporated into modern culture, but 'the scientist' has also been cast in an abstract, impersonal, mould. Moreover, this abstraction has attained the status of an institution: it has become:

institutionalized predominantly in terms of collectivity - rather than self-orientation {Parsons 1951: 343}; ... *the scientist has in fact acquired a fully institutionalized role in modern Western society* {op cit: 345}.

Literally, there is nothing personal about this 'scientific authority'. It does not depend upon the charisma or physique of the individual. Rather, it is a function of a social role to the extent that "*the scientist is institutionally endowed with authority*" {Parsons 1951: 344}. Thus 'the scientist' is an embodiment of legitimate authority. As Milgram {1963} observes, there is a strong psychological (Parsons and other sociologists would prefer either 'sociological' or 'cultural' here):

tendency to obey those whom we perceive to be legitimate authorities {reported in Gross 1994: 91}.

There is here an explanation for the 'authority' of science (and medicine, for "[m]odern medical practice is ... overwhelmingly oriented to science" {Parsons 1951: 469}).

The functionality of scientific knowledge within modern society is, then, a product of the assimilation of scientific thinking into the cultural base on the one hand, and a result of 'scientific authority' on the other. It appears that this situation is not common to all societal forms, for:

applied science ... requires quite definite conditions in the structure of the social system. ... Knowledge does not "apply itself" ... [i]t gets applied only through the mechanisms of institutionalization of roles Only by becoming ... incorporated into the structure of the social system ... does empirical knowledge acquire the basis for a major influence on action {Parsons 1951: 348}.

The foregoing discussion, which shares many features of the intellectual field of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*}, suggests a mechanism by which (medico-) science may exert "*a major influence*" on social action. This is the reciprocal interaction between society and those

perceived as having authority in its widest sense. With the rise of a cultural field which emphasises rationality {e.g. Weber 1961}, practitioners of such rationality gain the ascendancy. This in turn influences the academy, which for Parsons {1951: 342, cited above} leads to the "*values of science*" becoming assimilated within the "*value-system of society*". The consequent "*consecration*" {Bourdieu 1971a: 179} of valued modes of thinking of itself lends authority to those schooled in that vein, but simultaneously influences their way of thinking. The system becomes self-reinforcing as, ultimately:

[w]hat attaches a thinker to his (sic) age, what situates and dates him, is above all the kind of problems and themes in terms of which he is obliged to think {Bourdieu 1971a: 183}.

This is why Comte is able to envisage a series of 'ages', each with its own system of logic to describe and explain the world of phenomena. This is why it is possible to describe modernity as an age of 'rationality'. A change in the over-arching cultural field of a society is able to influence the relative strengths of different power lines in subsidiary intellectual fields, which then take on, as it were, a life of their own within the intellectual space delineated by the specific cultural field.

5. 4 Professional bureaucracy

One potential theory to account for the social power and inherent authority of institutions, has its roots in the sociological concept of professionalism allied to the work of Weber on bureaucracy. Weber {1947, 1961, 1978 *et al*}, with his investigations into modern society, suggests that there is, in bureaucracy, an agency which may act to facilitate the promotion of a professional organisation into a position of power. This work has been extended by other sociologists and Bauman {1989}, in particular, has influenced the present author in this respect. Whilst the two concepts of professionalism and bureaucracy are closely intertwined in a modern society, for ease of analysis they will be considered sequentially here. There is no fully consensual definition within sociology of what constitutes, and of equal importance what does not, a 'profession' {Elliott 1972: 5, Wilding 1982: 2, Freidson 1983: 21, Macdonald 1995: ch 1 endnote 1; each of these sources cites many other authorities to the same end}. However, and at least in relation to an 'ideal type' form of the collegiate model, ideas of a degree of autonomy by a self-governing elite with regulatory powers over membership are central to the concept.

This autonomy is then said to lead to greater or lesser degrees of occupational closure often by means of the academic qualification-based control of aspirants, resulting in a degree of enhanced social standing for both individual member and collective. There is a general notion of some form of proprietorship over a prescribed body of learning and formal or quasi-formal state recognition of specialist competency within a defined area. It is in this sense that Witz {1992: 40}, citing Johnson {1972} as authority, speaks of "*a profession as [being] not an*

occupation per se but a mode of controlling an occupation", a sentiment which is closely echoed by Hugman {1991: 3}.

Throughout the literature, medicine and law are held up as joint exemplars of both professionalism *per se* and processes of professionalisation in action: as the yardstick against which all other aspirants to the status of profession are to be measured {e.g. Ben-David 1972; Hugman 1991; Portwood & Fielding 1981 amongst many others}. No contributor to the academic literature, it seems, would seek to suggest that medicine (or indeed law) as it is practised within the industrialised nations of the present era is *not* a 'profession'. This status is axiomatic:

[t]he professional type is the institutional frame work [with]in which many of our most important social functions are carried on, notably the pursuit of science ... and its practical application in medicine... {Parsons 1954: 48}.

Whilst recognising the essential circularity of the definition (something is a profession if it shares significant components with medicine (or law); medicine contains these components: *ergo* medicine is a profession), academic opinions relating to 'profession' in the abstract will be taken here as being directly applicable to modern medicine.

Autonomy is an essential ingredient of 'traditional', or 'collegiate', professionalism {Beckman 1990: 137; Elliott 1972: 61; Portwood & Fielding 1981: 758; Rueschmeyer 1983: 45}. In common usage 'autonomy' implies not only the assumed right of a body to regulate itself and its practitioners, and to control entrance to its ranks, but also a high degree of freedom of action, of unhindered self-determination. As will be seen as this discussion unfolds, there is a strong suspicion that bureaucracy itself seeks to control and regulate, to reduce previously autonomous people (and by extension organisations) to the "*little cogs in the machine*" of Weber {Coser & Rosenberg 1989: 335}. In the context of a bureaucratic state apparatus, there may appear to be a tension between the professional call for autonomy on the one hand, and the state's inclination to control on the other.

This has led to an argument that, in order to prevent its assimilation within the state bureaucracy:

the knowledge of the profession has to have a distinctive mystique which suggests that there is a certain professional attitude and competence which cannot be reduced merely to systematic and routinized knowledge {Turner 1987: 136, paraphrasing but not directly citing the argument of Jamous and Peloille}.

Whilst 'science' is far too wide a subject area to be able to attain professional status *per se* (because it is not sufficiently circumscribed in terms of "*specificity of function*" {Parsons 1954 cited above}), there is no room for doubt that the various 'scientific sub-divisions' fit the criteria of both Parsons {1954} and Turner {1987}. Specifically it would appear that medicine in

general, and medico-science in particular, are well-imbued with the requisite "*mystique*" {Turner 1987} and functional "*specificity*" {Parsons 1951, 1954}.

It would seem that this specialist knowledge-base has been effectively utilised:

the modern [medical] profession has attained high status ... on the basis of its ... current specialist knowledge. ... [T]he success of the doctors' efforts is seen in their maintenance of great autonomy... {Portwood & Fielding 1981: 754}.

This view of Portwood & Fielding {1981} appears to imply that there must inevitably be a state of struggle between, on the one hand, a manipulative and regulatory modern state and, on the other, a thrusting and dynamic profession which covets full self-determination and independence of action; with each seeking jealously to gain and maintain advantage over the other in the context of, to quote Burrage {1990: 4}, "*a major ... confrontation between two well-matched adversaries*". Such a gladiatorial construction of the relationship of state to profession and *vice-versa* is not unchallenged within the literature. Johnson {1982} opposes it outright, at least in the specific case of modern Britain (but arguably with wider application).

Johnson's {1982} paper is a conscious effort to move the analysis of the professions forward from what he claims is a common, perhaps dominant, sociological treatment of the situation. For Johnson, others employ what is essentially a species of conflict theory which concentrates, from one side or the other, on the alleged interplay between:

*the concepts of **state intervention** and **professional autonomy**, and the attendant assumption that there is a simple, inverse relationship between the two - the more 'intervention' the less 'autonomy'* (original emphases) {Johnson 1982: 186}.

As Johnson develops his thesis, he takes a hypothetical view first from the state's perspective, then from that of the professions. In the process he depicts a sociological tradition which, for him, views 'professional autonomy' as having a dynamic quality which leads it to ebb and flow according to the current position in an ongoing struggle with the state for supremacy.²³

This 'traditional' view, for Johnson, is based on a false premiss. He argues that it:

is in part ... the product of a confusion in the way in which the concept of autonomy is used {Johnson 1982: 189}.

This "*confusion*" arises because the concept is pitched at too high a level: that of the system. Rather, Johnson proposes that 'autonomy' should be examined at "*the level of action*" {Johnson 1982: 189}. In other words, that we should judge the process of professionalisation on

²³ Johnson's standard of scholarship has been questioned here - "*No reference is made to anyone who actually holds this view, so it may be assumed that it is a straw man to be knocked down by his own view, with its supporting data...*" (Macdonald 1995: 102). However, to name but two, Elliott (1972: 147) speaks specifically of competition between state and profession, whilst Rueschemeyer (1983: 45) speaks of arguments suggesting hypothetical *control* of professional expertise by *the modern state*. Meanwhile, the effect of the argument of Portwood & Fielding (1981), as discussed above, is to imply conflict. Despite Macdonald's accusation of an unfounded rhetorical stance by Johnson, the latter's claim is not unsupported, but rather it is under-referenced.

empirically observed results: on deeds not words; on product not policy. This being the case, Johnson develops his theory that the professions (again, Johnson talks here specifically of Britain) are not endowed with 'autonomy' *per se*, but with:

partial autonomy, being limited to specific areas of independent action which are defined by an occupation's relationship to the state... {Johnson 1982: 207} (original emphasis).

It is important to note here that Johnson does *not* speak of some form of *licensed* autonomy, for that would presuppose an all powerful state with the grant of autonomy within its gift. What Johnson is proposing is a symbiotic, not hierarchical, relationship between (modern) state and profession. A relationship which is, for him, essentially organic as opposed to planned and consciously implemented. Although Johnson seeks to limit his analysis to Britain, his comments on the importance of "*the imperial dimension*" {Johnson 1982: 208} open the door to a consideration of the situation within another late nineteenth/early twentieth century European imperial power: Germany.

Jarausch {1990} examines professionalisation within the German context during the period from 1900 to 1950. Although not specifically concentrating his gaze upon the medical profession, Jarausch notes that originally the state, from the eighteenth century (in areas which later became incorporated in the Empire), had sought to impose standardisation, both in matters of practice and academic qualification, upon the emergent professions. During the life of the German Empire which came into being in 1871, but which ultimately became another fatal casualty of the Great War of 1914-1919, Jarusch notes that academic and practitioner self-organisation led to increasing calls for autonomy and improved social status. Despite this, he finds that within:

unified professions such as medicine, practitioners did not obtain all their cherished desires ... {Jarausch 1990: 9}.

The case study of Germany in chapter three above indicates that the medical profession there certainly enjoyed high status. By the time of the Nazi regime medicine, although more precisely psychiatric than physical, had established itself to the degree that Gallagher felt justified in his claim that the 'euthanasia' of psychiatric patients was "*conceived by physicians and operated by them*" {Gallagher 1995: xv}. Clearly, and the opinion of Jarusch {1990} notwithstanding, the German medical profession had achieved the *de facto* position of an executive arm of government. The evidence of, particularly, sections 3.6, 3.7 and 3.12 above is strongly suggestive of the organic growth of a symbiotic relationship between state and profession. Within this relationship is seen both the partial deferment of policy formulation to a recognised expert body, and the endorsement of professional implementation of politico-economic action.

From a viewpoint more closely aligned to social policy perspectives, Marshall {1950} identifies two 'duties' which a profession must seek to discharge simultaneously. These are an obligation to the individual client on the one hand, to the societal collective on the other. Usually, for Marshall, these two duties coincide and:

are harmonious. A profession proceeds on the assumption that they are. When they seem to be in conflict it is usually because the individual does not know what is good for him (sic). ... Authority passes to the professional, who must give him what he needs, rather than what he wants {Marshall 1950: 136}.

Whether this is seen as breathtaking arrogance or merely a pragmatic acceptance that, in a complex society, the full picture is beyond the grasp of the individual, is a matter for the interpretation of the reader. What Marshall illustrates clearly here is the ready assumption of 'expertise' and 'authority' as attributes of "*the professional*" which has become an influential power line within the modern (and, if it be considered to be different, the contemporary) cultural field.

5. 5 ... or bureaucratic professionalism?

In its simplest form 'bureaucracy' may be thought of as the 'nuts and bolts' of the everyday life of any society which has moved beyond the undifferentiated nomadic lifestyle of hunting and gathering, and developed notions of hierarchy and property. In essence this is an archiving function, recording details of obligation and ownership. It may well be that some form of bureaucracy is a fundamental requirement of 'civilisation', for it is claimed that some 5,500 years ago at the beginning of city dwelling:

[t]o keep and transmit to successors some account of the stores ... and other wealth ... the administrators needed durable records {Hawkes 1973: 7},

and that:

writing was invented solely to keep account of the wealth of temples {Hawkes 1973: 38}.

Certainly it is difficult to imagine a property-owning society of any complexity existing without records, and Weber {1948: 197} explicitly connects bureaucracy with the keeping of written records.

There is also an evolved function of bureaucracy, with which we are familiar at the present time, as the means by which an executive edict or desire is put into operation. Bureaucracy has moved beyond the mere collection and storage of records and assumed an ever more active role, to the extent that, as is discussed here, it has become involved in the interpretation and even formulation of executive action. This evolution, from passive record-keeping to policy formulation, is the subject of much study by Weber.

That bureaucracy in its present western form and modernity are intimately connected is an idea which is an important theme within the work of Weber:

[o]ne of the chief interests which Weber had in developing a historical understanding of bureaucratization was to show that it was a development of modern society {Morrison 1995: 294}.

Likewise, Bauman {1989} makes much of the place of bureaucracy within a modern state. Echoing Weber's ideas cited above he also points to the tendency of a bureaucracy to depersonalise those with whom it comes into contact, to reduce the personal to the categorical. Indeed, it has been said that:

[s]ome ... see modernity ... as ... the rise of alienation, the death of individuality in bureaucracy {Cahoone 1996a: 12}.

Weber himself was explicit on the depersonalising effects, the “*death of individuality*” of Cahoone, flowing from bureaucracy:

*each man (sic) becomes a little cog in the machine ... it is ... horrible to think that the world could be filled with nothing but those little cogs {abridged from Weber *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* in Coser & Rosenberg 1989: 335}.*

This is not to suggest that bureaucracy is a negative concept *per se*. For Weber bureaucracy, in its ideal form, is an ultra-efficient style of national government or organisational management which, its potential ill effects for individuals notwithstanding, remains:

superior to any other form [of administration] in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability {Weber 1947: 337}.

Bureaucracy is, essentially, for Weber a *system* which theoretically removes individual whims and prejudices from the equation of management/government. It operates on a collective, not individual, level. Further, it is said to be a fundamental feature of this system that its members or officers should have no proprietary interest in the organisation which they manage {Littlejohn 1978: 295; Morrison 1995: 300}, leaving them free from influence based upon personal financial profit or loss. This view accords well with an idea of a rational {e.g. Weber 1947} underpinning to the dominant modern cultural field.

Ultimately bureaucracy may almost appear to be management for its own sake:

bureaucracy presupposes a system of impersonal guidelines Rules are designed for typical cases and officials deal with them effectively by applying uniform rules and procedures. Decision making is carried out with regard to a reliance on technical knowledge and the concept of the expert prevails {Morrison 1995: 300}.

As a result:

the discharge of responsibilities is ... carried out ‘without regard for persons’ {Morrison 1995: 300, drawing heavily on Weber 1978}.

For its practitioners the establishment and maintenance of an efficient system is an end in itself. There is also a tendency towards specialisation, or the recognition of expertise, within this mode of organisation. Bureaucracy:

offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations {Weber 1978 cited by Bauman 1989: 14}.

Thus the measure of a 'good' bureaucrat is the extent to which s/he is able to apply the rules efficiently to any given problem lying within the "*sphere of competence*" {Littlejohn 1978: 294} of a given department.

5. 6 The measure of bureaucratic competence

This impartial expectation of bureaucracy seen above, by divorcing the officer from ideas of personal advantage or conscience, of necessity requires that a bureaucratic system of government should remain apolitical. This situation is not without its difficulties however, for:

the sphere of activity of the official exists only within the limits of laws already formulated ... the genesis or the development of laws falls outside the scope of his (sic) activity. As a result ... the functionary ... takes it for granted that the specific order prescribed by the concrete law is equivalent to order in general {Mannheim 1936: 105}.

The potentially extreme end result of this process is exemplified by the words of Eichmann, a leading bureaucrat under Hitler who had much responsibility for the organisation of the 'final solution':

... I had nothing to do with killing the Jews. I never killed a Jew ... I've never killed anybody. And I never ordered anybody to kill a Jew, or ... a non-Jew. ... All our work was paperwork {quoted by Cesarini 2004: 117}.

The 'good and efficient' bureaucrat is, by the design of the structure of authority, executive power and speciality, potentially insulated from the reality of the end product of the process.

Weber, underlining both the impersonality and efficiency of bureaucracy, turned to the world of manufacturing industry for a simile:

[it] compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production {Weber 1948, cited by Clegg 1990: 121},

This point, that bureaucracy is akin to an unthinking machine which merely reproduces outcomes according to some preset programme, is developed by Bauman {1989}:

[once bureaucrats] have been distantiated from the ultimate outcomes of the operation to which they contribute, their moral concerns can concentrate fully on the good performance of the job at hand. Morality boils down to the commandment to be a good, efficient and diligent expert and worker {Bauman 1989: 102}.

With no concern other than the specialised job in hand, a bureaucracy and its individual members need not agonise over the rights and wrongs of the organisation's ultimate goals. It is entirely sufficient, for the bureaucrat, to ensure that the organisation is well-managed and conducts its business efficiently. This is, apparently, the mode of thinking into which Eichmann had slipped (which in no manner justifies either his, or his organisation's, role in mass-murder).

Within the bureaucratic framework there is ample evidence of specialisation, of the breaking-down of tasks and policies into component parts. This leads to compartmentalisation within the bureaucratic scheme of things {Bauman 1989 ch4, 1990: 80, 132; Davies 1983: 178,

fig 8.1; Eisenstadt 1989: 361; Macdonald 1995: 61; Morrison 1995: 300}. It is in keeping with this analysis that Bauman {1989} talks of a bifurcated process by which bureaucracy succeeds in reducing its task to a succession of simpler steps: “*meticulous functional division of labour*” on the one hand, and “*substitution of technical for a moral responsibility*” on the other {Bauman 1989: 98, italics in original}.

Bauman {1989 ch 4} makes use of this bifurcation to describe and explain in detail the bureaucratic tendency to separate individual office-holder from responsibility, either moral or practical, for the overall 'product' of any particular organisation or department. Where the demands of any given office call for a level of responsibility, this is, for Bauman, restricted to the merely 'technical': that the particular task assigned to that sector is accomplished efficiently and in accord with the rules of the organisation. There is no higher imperative than the demand for 'efficiency'. Using the shocking but effective example of children burned by napalm bombs Bauman, in talking of any awareness of moral responsibility for the outcome amongst individuals involved in the process of manufacturing weapons, finds that:

[t]he splitting of the baby-burning process in[to] minute functional tasks and then separating the tasks from each other have made such awareness irrelevant {Bauman 1989: 100}.

An important accompaniment of this divorce of personal interest from the machinery of government is the concept of the 'public interest', which stands in direct contrast to the former notion of the *personal* interest of some omnipotent ruler being sufficient cause for any promulgation of policy. Loosely defined but widely understood, 'public interest' is a catch-all phrase with connotations akin to the ideas of outcome utilitarianism. The lack of a precise definition here may well point to the influence of the “*cultural unconscious*” of Bourdieu, which in part:

consists of credos which are so obvious that they are tacitly assumed ... [e]xamples are ways of thought ... {Bourdieu 1971a: 180}.

Something is in the public interest if it may be said to benefit the societal collective. In the process of meeting this 'higher' need the interests of individuals or subsidiary groupings within a society may be treated as being of secondary importance or even set aside. This compares closely with the philosophical and ethical concept of utilitarianism, and particularly *outcome* utilitarianism. It has been said that:

utilitarianism is an impartial or impersonal moral view (Slote 1995: 892).

One consequence of this style of approach is that *outcome* utilitarianism is judged according to a set of criteria under which:

the goodness of any state of affairs is solely a matter of how much overall (or average) well-being people ... are enjoying in that state of affairs (Slote 1995: 890).

It may appear that 'impersonal' utilitarianism is a good fit with 'impersonal' bureaucracy.

Indeed, if 'democracy' is to be understood as the ascendancy of public over personal interest, it may well be that bureaucracy is an inevitable product of such a societal development:

[a]ll states which have become more democratic have simultaneously become more bureaucratic, because the process of bureaucratization is to a great extent the consequence of the process of democratization {Bobbio 1987: 38}.

A further consequence of the division of labour and responsibility within a bureaucratic structure is the use of experts and, more germanely, an appreciation of 'expert knowledge' {e.g. Morrison 1995: 300}. Although a bureaucracy will often employ such experts directly, there is also a marked tendency to rely on outside sources.

Thus, in Nazi Germany, a very brief command from Hitler was passed to the Nazi Party bureaucracy, from there to the state bureaucracy, and ultimately to the medical profession (see section 3.11 above). In this way an idea became a policy, and a policy became an effective if brutal means of greatly reducing the socially dependent population of the German psychiatric institutions {Gallagher 1995; Kerr & Shakespeare 2002; Lifton 1986}. Throughout, and to return to Marshall {1950: 136}, the ethos here is that the individual does not always appreciate the larger picture - that s/he *"does not know what is good for [her/] him"*. It might appear that in a utilitarian world, what is good for society is also good for the individual, even if this leads to the individual ceasing to exist.

5. 7 The 'Levers of Power' - mechanised government?

Marx meanwhile uses, at least on occasion, an idea of state government which seems to fall part way between Weber's earlier oligarchical administration and his modern bureaucracy. Marx suggests that, on the one hand, a 'modern' state is, indeed, ruled by a mechanical system; but on the other hand he sees this machine as being partial, as serving the interests of a ruling elite rather than uncritically following a set of impersonal rules. Hence it is that Marx speaks of *"seizing the levers of power"* of the state machinery {Marx 1977}, and implies that this bureaucratic entity will continue to serve the interests of whichever elite gains power {e.g. Marx 1970, 1977; Marx & Engels 1992}.²⁴ The rise to power of Hitler in Germany of 1933, ironically given his anti-communist stance, provides evidence in support of the ideas of Marx. It was precisely by colonising key Reich ministries and institutions such as the army and police that Hitler first consolidated, then maximised, his grip on power {e.g. Read 2003; Toland 1977: 293 *et seq*}.

Both Marx and Weber agree to a significant degree on the essentially impersonal nature of the bureaucratic system of administration which, for each, is an integral part of modern

²⁴ Toland {1977: 293} attributes these words to Marx: *"Neither a nation nor a woman is forgiven for an unguarded hour in which the first adventurer who comes along can sweep them off their feet and possess them"*.

society. Bureaucracy, then, facilitates the maintenance {e.g. Weber 1947, 1961, 1978} or imposition {Marx, especially in Marx 1977, 1990 and Marx & Engels 1992} of a sense of order in a complex human organisation. The major area of disagreement between Weber and Marx, it may be thought, lies not so much in the nature of the bureaucratic structure but in the means by which it is programmed to carry out its task: a disagreement which might be thought to owe much to their differing treatment of the socio-economic relationships informing modern society, rather than to any dispute about the observed impersonal efficiency of bureaucracy. A modern society is one constructed - literally - along mechanical lines.

This is a society with an inherent inertia, which will continue along a set trajectory unless and until some 'lever' is manipulated. Marx {1977} appears to suggest that the machinery of government is to some degree compartmentalised - he talks of "*the levers*" in the plural - which leaves open the possibility that particular sectors of the state apparatus are open to seizure, or sub-contract, without the whole being subverted. Special interest groups may attain a position which allows them to assume partial control over the policy-making processes of a modern state. Thus Marshall {1950} speaks of a learned opinion:²⁵

that the State should control the professions, but that the professions should at the same time control the State. And that is not easy, unless State and professions are agreed on the fundamentals of policy Marshall 1950: 141}.

There is much here in the words of Marshall which resonates with the "*partial autonomy*" of the professions spoken of by Johnson 1982: 207} (section 5.4 above), and he appears to describe a symbiotic relationship between state and profession.

A profession which is of great interest to this enquiry in this context is the medical profession, particularly given the suggestion that "*professional associations become almost a part of government*" {Wilding 1982: 67}. As Weber describes bureaucracy as an essential development of the modern state, others propose that there is something inevitable about the growth of professions:

an industrialising society is a professionalising society (original emphasis) {Wilding 1982: 1, quoting Goode 1960: 902}.

The implication here is that in a complex modern society (elected) government as a non-specialist and, due to the political nature of contemporary society potentially transient, organisation frequently defers to 'expert professionals' in more or less clearly defined areas of policy:

professional authority ... [is] based on the "technical competence" of the professional. ... This is possible because the area of professional authority is limited to a particular technically defined sphere. ... [It] is characterized by "specificity of function" {Parsons 1954: 38}.

²⁵ "Professor Laski".

It is in this way that the concept of professionalisation fits into the social equation as “*almost a part of government*” {Wilding 1982: 67 cited above}. Writing in 1939, Marshall is well aware of this trend in social policy:

it is a commonplace that the growing technical complexity of the public services is shifting the balance of power from the politician to the administrator {Marshall 1950: 145}.

Professionalised institutions, and in the present context medico-science in particular, find in the modern bureaucracy a means by which they may exert influence beyond their numerical weight. Deriving from the modern cultural field, their societal status as bastions of rationality confers upon them an aura of authority. Thus:

an organised profession rightly regards itself as a body placed in charge of an art or science and responsible for directing its use in the interests of society {Marshall 1950: 136}.

The bureaucratic framework found within modern society, by recognising this professional status and conscripting the often self-conferred 'expertise' of such a collective to the service of the state, might seem to allow the professions a disproportionate degree of power within the policy making process. This power then leads to an increasing level of status, which may then entail even greater respect in the process of government. Such a train of events has been observed in chapter three above, in the context of twentieth century Germany. It is in accord with the analysis of Marx that a change of regime from democratic to totalitarian did not lessen the position of the German medical establishment within a bureaucratic policy process.

Chapter 6: Eugenic ideas and ideology

6. 1 Proem

Relevant societal effects of modernity and certain of its embedded intellectual fields have already been discussed above in chapters 4 and 5. The immediate task here is to examine the ideology of eugenics which, although the term 'eugenics' is itself recent {Jones 1998: 3}, potentially has a long history, as will be discussed. Although 'historical eugenics' has a role to play in this investigation, it may well appear that there is something intrinsically different in the way in which eugenic ideas have been manifested in more recent times. The suggestion below will be that there is a discernible continuity of eugenic thinking, of *ideology*; but that the field mechanics by which and through which such thought is translated into *action* have changed more recently. In this, the chapter directly addresses research questions (i) and (iii)

To draw a line in the sand between ideology and practice is to risk imposing arbitrary and perhaps unwarranted distinctions. In the field of human activity it is accepted wisdom that 'the thought is father to the deed': a major attribute of that rationality which Weber {1947 *et al*} assigns to modernity is that social policy and action is based upon calculation. It is, then, intrinsically difficult to differentiate between the ideology which underpins a mode of thought, the intellectual activity of formulating specific policy initiatives, the act of constructing the bureaucratic framework within which policies may operate effectively and, finally, the implementation and prosecution of those policies.

All of these stages of necessity take place within an intangible and non-geographic 'social space' which is itself, if Bourdieu {1971a *et al*} is to be believed, permeated and modulated by one or more intellectual fields. They are each subject to the prevailing 'lines of force' and are thus intimately related. Essentially the whole movement, from ideology to active policy, is a single process. This chapter will trace the growth and development of particular lines of force within 'the' eugenic intellectual field of the western world, although these will be viewed through the prism of the early modern era.

Only in the absence of evidence (which of itself may never be assumed to amount to evidence of absence) for a causal connection may casual 'coincidence' be invoked and, it is suggested, only then as a tentative last resort. The *prima facie* suspicion, developed from the evidence of chapters four and five, is that modernity has a case to answer in the matter of the alleged discrimination against people who do not fit some norm. However, in order to preserve some sense of chronology, the task here is to trace eugenic ideas from their ancient (and decidedly premodern) roots forwards to the dawn of modernity.

This of itself is a complex process, and particularly so as the modern eugenics movement in its beginnings made frequent appeals to the supposed practices of ancient civilisations, and particularly of Greece. These attempts to link with earlier societies will be examined, but they are found to share a common theme in that they do not approach ancient sources critically. It is for this reason that the immediately following section will examine the most frequently early source, Plato.

6. 2 Plato's *Republic*:- fact or frolic?

In the *Republic* {Ferrari 2000; Jowett 1953 (1st pub 1871)} from which many of the 'eugenic' ideas ascribed to Plato are drawn, Plato adopts what may appear to be a rather whimsical attitude. Thus Plato makes the specific point that his primary narrator (Socrates) is famous for his use of irony {*Republic* Book V section 337, Jowett 1953: 175} and this, it may be thought, sets the tone for the work. Indeed in places there is a surreal atmosphere to the dialogue which borders on the Pythonesque, as Plato builds in small seemingly logical steps to a conclusion which may appear to his intended audience to be absurd. An example of this is to be seen in the case of female 'guardians', members of a proposed ruling elite. By a series of assertions and propositions, Plato has Socrates arrive at a position wherein these hypothetical females, because of their high moral standing and principles, should go about naked whilst "[v]irtue will be their cloak" {*Republic* Book V section 457a, Ferrari 2000: 154; Jowett 1953: 312}.

It is in this same area {Book V section 457 *et seq*} of his *Republic* that Plato speaks, *via* Socrates, of encouraging the selective breeding of 'quality' children by promoting promiscuous sexual activity ("*wives in common*" {Book V section 457d, Ferrari 2000: 154; Jowett 1953: 312}) amongst those citizens licensed to breed. The level of promiscuity was to be such that:

no parent shall know its child, no child its own parent {Book V section 457d, Ferrari 2000: 155},

with children reared in communal nurseries and suckled by any available lactating woman (blindfolded if necessary to prevent her recognising her own child). As the supposed discussion between 'Socrates' and his companions progresses in these terms, the potential problems of unlicensed pregnancy and unwittingly incestuous relationships are aired {Book V section 461, Ferrari 2000: 159/160; Jowett 1953: 316/317}. It is in this context, and in this tenor, that Plato makes his remarks about abortion and infanticide which have excited the interest of modern eugenicists and other commentators.

Given that Jowett, in his introduction to his (1871) English translation of *The Republic*, remarks that:

[n]owhere in Plato is there a deeper irony or a greater wealth of humour [than in *The Republic*] {Jowett 1953: 1},

certain questions (of which no resolution is attempted here) arise. In particular, it is a moot point as to how much credence may be placed upon this work of Plato as a serious societal prescription. One must ponder whether Plato's *Republic* is intended as a satire upon 'upper class' lifestyles, or even if it is, with its 'free love' and public female nudity, designed to be 'merely' a bawdy tale intended to titillate and amuse the audience. This is certainly a great work of literature, but that of itself does not guarantee its historical accuracy.

It is for individual readers to arrive at their own conclusions, but it might appear that caution is indicated, particularly on the issue of how literally Plato's remarks should be interpreted. As final evidence of this conclusion, Plato has Socrates arrive at a position of female equality:

whether they remain in the city or go out to war, women should ... so far as possible ... share in every way in all the men's duties {*Republic* Book V section 466c, Ferrari 2000: 166; Jowett 1953: 323/324},

moreover suggesting that men and women should fight in battle side by side, with their children positioned on high ground so as to enjoy a clear view of the action. The overall tone of Plato's *Republic* is surreal, and it is difficult to accept that he is making a serious policy statement. Plato's pupil Aristotle is clear that women rank above slaves, but below men, and that this hierarchy is part of the 'natural order':

the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature {*Politics* Book I, Everson 1996: 29}.

Thus it is that for Aristotle, and in direct opposition to Plato:

the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over the child {*Politics* Book I, Everson 1996: 29 }.

Despite the introductory comments of Jowett {1953}, whose work was both highly acclaimed by scholars and available to the early modern promoters of eugenic ideas, Plato has often been cited without reservation by eugenicists. This has led to the idea that Plato actively championed eugenic ideology becoming part of the 'received wisdom' of contemporary society. Singer {1993} cites Plato as partial authority for his utilitarian prescription of 'practical ethics', whilst opponents of eugenics such as Barnes {1997} do not feel the need to question the authority of Plato as it has come to be presented. The possibility that much of the ensuing debate is founded upon a misconception of the true meaning of Plato is very real.

This present work needs must engage with that debate, and will do so largely on the terms used by the protagonists, but the strongest interpretation which may reasonably be placed upon the contribution of Plato is that he clearly indicates the existence of an ancient appreciation of inter-generational transmission of traits (genetics) and concerns about the health

of the 'social body' (eugenics). This of itself is evidence at least of relevant power lines, and potentially a fully-formed intellectual field, relating to eugenics. It is not compelling evidence of the widespread translation of ideology into policy in antiquity.

6. 3 Genesis of an intellectual field?

It is widely accepted that the actual word 'genetics' was coined as recently as 1906 by the British biologist Bateson {Stubbe 1965: 272, Kevles 1985: 44} (but Watson {2003: 5} has '1909' for this). Likewise, the term 'eugenics' is of relatively recent origin, credited to Francis Galton in 1883 {Farrall 1985: 10 *fn2*}²⁶. Although the terms 'genetics' and 'eugenics' are then demonstrably recent in their origins, the same is not necessarily true of the underlying ideas and theories. Stubbe {1965} suggests that the origins of genetics are lost in prehistory. For him the first traces of humanity's concern with breeding, and hence with genetics, are to be seen in archaeological evidence for early plant and animal domestication.

From its origin human interest in the mechanics of the inter-generational passing of characteristics, whether in animal or plant kingdoms, has centred on a search for greater utility: better wheat, fatter stock, stronger people {Stubbe 1965; Watson 2003}. As a result of millennia of empiric selective breeding:

[a]lmost everything we eat - cereals, fruit, meat, dairy products - is the legacy of that earliest and most far-reaching application of genetic manipulations to human problems {Watson 2003: 5}.

For Stubbe {1965} and Watson {2003}, from the earliest 'genetic' observation that, as it were, 'like begets like', humanity has sought to tailor and 'improve' nature.

Meanwhile, Roper is adamant that:

the first Eugenist was ... the primitive savage who killed his sickly child {Roper 1913: 1}.

For Roper then, the origins of eugenics are as ancient as those of genetics. He does not, however, provide convincing evidence for his supposition of infanticide amongst "*primitive savage[s]*" (sic), which remains an assertion unless his reader is to assume that ancient Greece was home to such 'savages'.

In either case, it would appear that the history of the topic area extends back to a time before records were kept, indeed to a time predating that which we term 'civilised'. Roper {1913}, however, here speaks only of the negative eugenics of culling the 'unfit', whilst Stubbe {1965} and Watson {2003} confine their prehistoric genetic surmises to the case of non-human populations. A comprehensive treatment of the topic area must include both the positive eugenics of selective breeding, and the application of genetic principles to human populations.

²⁶ The first reference to conjoin the two, so far as the present author is aware, is found in the title - *Genetics and Eugenics* - of a 1916 text written by Castle.

Traces of evidence for the beginnings of a history of genetic observations made of human populations are to be found in the Indian *Vedas*:

a man of base descent inherits the bad characteristics of his father or mother or both; he can never escape his origin. {Stubbe 1965: 11},

the ancient writings of Aristotle:

children are born like their parents {*Politics*, Book II, Everson 1996: 33/34}

and in the Judaeo-Christian Old Testament, especially the much-cited laws of purity laid down in *Leviticus*.

Indeed, it may appear that it is only in the context of an idea of the inter-generational inheritance of characteristics that the threat of a vengeful God to:

[visit] the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, unto the third and to the fourth generation {Exodus: 34; 7}

may be fully appreciated: this seems to be a genetic curse. Considered in another light, it may be interpreted as an early attempt to explain genetic or congenital impairment as a form of punishment for some religious transgression by a progenitor, a notion which finds a loud and current echo in reincarnationist doctrines of 'Karma' found amongst several religions including, for example, Hinduism and Buddhism.

6. 4 Early modern arguments - looking backwards

Whilst acknowledging very early influences, both Stubbe {1965} and Roper {1913} point to ancient Greece as the place of origin of, or at least the beginnings of a recorded history of, a coherent system of thought which clearly synthesises the ideas of both the inter-generational transmission of characteristics and notions of selectivity in human breeding: the combination of genetics with eugenics {see also Hasian 1996: 14; Watson 2003: 6}. Stubbe paints a picture of a slowly evolving understanding of the role of heredity in determining the characteristics of progeny, giving prominence to the works of Democritus and Hippocrates {Stubbe 1965: 19 *et seq*}. Watson {2003: 6 *et seq*} meanwhile gives precedence to Hippocrates, and speaks of the theory of "*pangenesi*s" which arose largely from his thinking. As explained by Watson, pangenesi held that miniature copies of all the separate body parts - "[h]airs, nails, veins, arteries ..." {Watson 2003: 6} - circulated around the body and in particular became concentrated in the reproductive organs. With sexual intercourse each parent therefore contributed a (variable) proportion of these copies to the embryo.

As an explanation of the trans-generational transmission of characteristics, this theory in essence survived until the work of August Weismann was held to have invalidated it {Kevles 1985: 18/19; Watson 2003: 8}, and pangenesi was espoused by Darwin {Black 2003: 13; Castle 1916: 48; Kevles 1985: 18; Watson 2003: 6}. From this it would appear that, with the honourable but neglected exception of Mendel in 1865 {Watson 2003: 8}, the proto-science of

genetics, or rather its associated intellectual field, lay dormant between c400 BCE and the end of the nineteenth century.²⁷

This was not necessarily the case with the *application* of empirical observation of inheritance to human populations. Whilst Stubbe {1965} concentrates his gaze upon animal and plant husbandry, he also notes that from early times:

Greek statesmen introduced eugenic measures that aimed at the preservation and perpetuation of the best people {Stubbe 1965:12}.

In like manner, Roper appeals to the classical sources of Greece and Rome, and in particular to the regime of Sparta, in order to legitimise his personal view of the efficacy of eugenics, both negative:

[t]he systemized infanticide of Sparta ... is an advance towards civilization {Roper 1913: 15},

and positive:

[t]here was a penalty appointed for celibacy, a penalty for late marriage, but the third and the greatest penalty was for a bad marriage {Roper 1913: 18}²⁸.

The essential duality of eugenic ideology is evident from the work of Roper. On the one hand is seen the (negative) urge to eliminate the weak or 'unworthy', those who do not fit a prevailing social norm or ideal form; on the other hand is seen the concurrent (positive) drive to nurture and encourage the procreation of those who do meet the required standard. Above all stands the principle that the human race may be 'improved' or, at the very least, protected from 'degeneration'. This eugenic dyad of positive and negative may be clearly seen in the ancient writings themselves. A present day medical professor, David Galton (unrelated to Francis Galton), discusses the theory of eugenic social policy as proposed by Plato and his student Aristotle in the fourth century BC {Galton (D) 2001: ch 1}.

Whilst in great part both of these philosophers speak hypothetically, they were men of influence in their own day, and perhaps of even greater influence to later generations. In the thinking of Bourdieu this is of prime importance, for a:

cultural act ... contains the implicit statement of the right to express oneself legitimately. It thereby involves the position of the person concerned in the intellectual field {Bourdieu 1971a: 175}.

²⁷ Before the term 'gene' was coined, there had been many attempts to conceptualise the 'packets' of heredity which empirical observation had suggested played a part in the sexual inheritance of characteristics. The basic idea of Weismann, and one which remains largely current albeit with different terminology, was that 'germ plasm' represented some form of material by means of which hereditary factors were transmitted regardless of environmental factors {Kevles 1985: 19, 70, 71; see also Castle 1916: 21-24}. With the qualification 'social' environment (for chemical and radiological effects may alter genes physically), this is by and large not incompatible with current genetic thinking. Watson {2003} does not provide a date for this work. Kevles {1985: 18} contents himself with the vague statement that this was "[i]n the eighteen-eighties".

²⁸ Roper is not precise about the definition of a 'bad marriage'.

Given their high standing in the modern intellectual field, or "*their specific capital*" {Bourdieu 1993: 183}, the thoughts of Plato and Aristotle cannot be easily dismissed as 'mere' speculation. Galton (D) {2001: 17} notes that, at least to some degree, these theories corresponded with Spartan practices: practices appealed to by Roper {1913}. As summarised by Galton (D) ²⁹ {2001: ch 1}, Plato largely targeted the ruling class for his scheme of positive eugenics, prescribing rules and regulations regarding who should be allowed to mate with whom. In contrast, it seems, Plato was content for the lower classes to procreate at will.

6. 5 Positive and negative - the eugenic dichotomy

It appears from the recorded thoughts of Plato, who draws comparisons between the breeding of both hunting dogs and domesticated birds with that of humans {*Republic* Book V section 459, Ferrari 2000: 156 - 157; Jowett 1953: 314 - 315}, that he combines a genetic awareness of the sexual nature of human inheritance (that is that characteristics may be passed by either or both parents to their joint offspring) with a eugenic concern for the future development of the city-state. As a matter of city-state policy, Plato advocated antenatal care for pregnant women, together with neonatal inspection of their offspring {Ferrari 2000; Jowett 1953}: perhaps the first recorded instance of a concern with 'public health'. A similar view is expressed by Aristotle, who significantly goes on to acknowledge the effects of nurture upon children:

[w]omen who are with child should ... take exercise and have a nourishing diet. After the children have been born, **the manner of rearing them may be supposed to have a great effect on their bodily strength.** {*Politics* Book VII, Everson 1996: 192} (added emphasis).

This ancient recognition of the importance of environmental effects upon physical development (as opposed to inheritance) has not always been stressed by modern eugenicists such as Roper {1913}, many of whom have preferred to concentrate their gaze upon the destruction of 'imperfect' newborns.

On this 'negative' side of eugenics the evidence is less clear:

[n]either infanticide nor exposure ... was openly recommended by Plato {Galton (D) 2001: 11},

although Galton {2001: 12} notes that a passage from Plato's later work *Theaitetos* could be seen as suggestive of a tradition of infanticide directed at those children deemed unhealthy. Here Galton (D) is perhaps mistaken, for Plato {*Republic* Book V section 461, Ferrari 2000: 159/160; Jowett 1953: 316/317}, having first proposed that only those between the ages of twenty and fifty should be permitted to breed on the grounds that younger or older parents were likely to produce 'weak' children, then goes on to suggest that those outside this range should be

²⁹ Galton is here making use of those passages discussed in section 6.2 above.

permitted to engage in promiscuous recreational sexual activity, with the proviso that, should a pregnancy result, then:

ideally the embryo should never see the light of day. If one does force its way into existence, the parents must deal with it on the understanding that they cannot bring up a child of this sort {Plato, *Republic* Book V, Ferrari 2000: 159/160}.³⁰

In this relatively 'modern language' treatment by Ferrari {2000} (trans. Griffith) there is, at the least, a very broad hint of infanticide. In the (1871) translation by Jowett this same passage is rendered in stronger terms:

*the parents must understand that the offspring of such a union **cannot be maintained, and arrange accordingly*** {Plato *Republic* Book V, Jowett 1953: 317} (added emphasis).

In this latter translation, available at the time of Galton (F) and his contemporaries, there is no space for manoeuvre. In the Griffith version {Ferrari 2000} there is room for interpretation: perhaps the *parents* are judged 'unfit' for a role as child-nurturers, rather than the child being deemed 'unfit' as a proto-citizen. In Jowett's rendition, it is the *child* who "*cannot be maintained*". This latter, with its markedly different emphasis, is unequivocally a prescription for infanticide. Moreover the condition of the child is not taken into account here: the decision is based purely on parentage, and thus on genetic considerations.

Aristotle took issue with Plato in certain areas, and in particular regarding the lower classes. Here, he suggested, unrestricted procreation had the potential to lead to social problems arising from overpopulation, particularly "*poverty, crime and revolution*"³¹ {Galton (D) 2001: 15}. The solution, for Aristotle {*Politics*, Book VII, Everson 1996}, was to restrict the birth rate. In so far as 'imperfect' children are concerned, Aristotle {*Politics*} is clear with his prescription:

let there be a law that no deformed child shall live {Everson 1996: 192}.

The situation regarding other, 'surplus' but healthy, children is rather less clear cut.

In part Aristotle appears to be self-contradictory for he does not object to infanticide *per se*, seeming to bow to local practice:

as to an excess in the number of children, if the established customs of the state forbid the exposure of any children who are born ... {Everson 1996: 192} (added emphasis).

The unspoken corollary here appears to be that if infanticide is not forbidden then Aristotle has no objection on ethical grounds. However, this sentence then continues:

*... let a limit be set to the number of children a couple may have; and if couples have children in excess, let abortion be procured **before sense and life have***

³⁰ The surrounding text is unclear here. It appears that these remarks apply to the children of incestuous relationships *and* to those of other non-permitted unions, but may possibly only apply to the former.

³¹ Compare Stopes: "*We have been breeding revolutionaries*" {Shapiro 1987: 8} (section 7.2).

begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation {Everson 1996: 192} (added emphasis).

Now Aristotle appears to argue against infanticide on ethical grounds, clearly differentiating between child and foetus. The overall thrust of this passage is that, whilst in general abortion is to be deemed 'lawful' (ethical), infanticide is most definitely not. Implicit within this passage is the information that infanticide, in Aristotle's time, was *not* universally practised amongst the Grecian city-states ("**if the established customs ...**") (added emphasis).

Although Aristotle does not here {*Politics*, Book VII, Everson 1996: 192} address "*the question of life and sensation*", it would appear illogical and contrary to experience and observation were he to contend that an infant does not possess either of these qualities. The implication is that, although he is prepared to accept on pragmatic grounds that pre-existing laws or customs carry much weight, in his *ideal* state (for that is what he is proposing here) infanticide of 'healthy' but surplus children would be proscribed. Given that Aristotle adopts the contrary position regarding "*deformed*" children - that they should be killed as a matter of course - this demonstrates a very clear division between the 'valued' and 'disvalued' child, between the 'fit' and the 'unfit' proto-citizen.

6. 6 Whose body is it?

It is interesting to note the progression in thinking from Plato to Aristotle, as reported by Galton (D) {2001}. Whereas Plato concentrated his gaze upon the higher levels of society, Aristotle adopted a more holistic approach, seemingly treating society as a whole. This idea of the state as a body politic with its own past, present and future conditions distinct from the life trajectories of individuals, introduces a third facet to the topic of eugenics.

An important point implicit in the works of Plato and of Aristotle is the idea that children are properly the concern of the state, and not necessarily the responsibility nor 'property' of their parents. As Castle {1916: 260} reports of Plato's *Republic*:³²

the best of both sexes should be mated with each other ... the young being taken at birth into a state nursery.

(Compare this ancient Greek prescription with the *Lebensborn* project sponsored by Himmler in Nazi Germany and noted in section 3.13 above).

Taken together with those ideas of infanticide, or the possibility of infanticide, noted above, the works of Plato and Aristotle show the early appearance of notions of state proprietorship over the lives of its citizens, and especially of children. This idea is developed through the medium of social policies mooted by Plato and Aristotle, and partially operationalised in Sparta {Galton (D) 2001}, relating to issues which would nowadays fall

³² But note the caveat in section 6.2 about *The Republic*.

under the heading of 'public health'. This marks, in some respects, the transition of human society from a relatively loosely-knit group of individuals sharing some degree of common interest and need, to a discrete whole with an existence of its own transcending the sum of its parts.

For Plato and Aristotle, as noted above, 'society', or the nascent 'state', had developed into a body politic with its own aspirations, future and 'rights' quite independent of, and prioritised over, those of its individual constituents. To this end, we are informed that:

[n]either must we suppose that anyone of the citizens belongs to himself (sic), for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole {Aristotle, Politics Book VIII, Everson 1996: 195}.

This appears to fit the picture of utilitarian ethics painted by Singer {1993} and others, a picture which was outlined in section 4.4 above, and certainly Singer himself draws parallels with ancient Greek thinking. The modern application of such ideas, and the potential for 'slippage', has been seen in the case study of Germany presented in chapter three above.

There is a deeper social undercurrent revealed here. If the state is to accept responsibility for deciding who is or is not to be deemed a 'worthy' citizen, then this indicates a clear idea of a sense of difference between the worthy 'us' and the unworthy 'them'. This in turn implies a means of grading human beings, and such a notion in its turn represents evidence of the development of a concern with the 'greater good' of society taking precedence over the preferences and, indeed, interests of individuals:

the legislator must mould to his (sic) will the bodies of newly-born children {Aristotle Politics Book VII, Everson 1996: 190/191}; [t]he citizen should be moulded to suit the form of government under which he (sic) lives {Aristotle Politics Book VIII, Everson 1996: 195}.

'The people', or 'the state', becomes an entity which assumes an over-riding importance; individual sacrifice is expected, even demanded, as a relatively cheap price to pay in order to assure the continuance of the greater society 'in the public interest'.

Whilst statements such as these may provide inspiration for modern eugenicists and their possible heirs, it is important to note that Aristotle was distinctly non-modern (and potentially even in part arguably 'post-modern') in his thinking. In particular he rejects ideas of social uniformity, in so far as he argues against increasing "unity" amongst the citizens. For Aristotle, greater homogeneity ultimately:

would be the destruction of the state ... [for] a state is ... made up ... of different kinds of men (sic) {Politics Book II, Everson 1996: 31},

and this inherent heterogeneity provides the stability needed to maintain social cohesion. Aristotle explicitly warns against allowing any one 'class' to, as it were, mould society in its own image. This caution does not appear to have been noted by twentieth century eugenicists, as chapter seven below will suggest.

It has already been seen here, in chapter three, that the German *Volkisch* project contained the major (and utilitarian) elements said to be seen in the works of Plato and Aristotle: a concern with the material well-being of the greater whole over the individual; a belief that it is morally and ethically (Singer uses the two words "*interchangeably*" {Singer 1993: 1}) correct to sacrifice the weak in times of national emergency; the application of ideas of preferential breeding to the population. These ideas are by no means exclusively Teutonic, nor are they modern. The preceding sections have demonstrated that their origins are prehistoric {Stubbe 1965; Watson 2003}, and that they form an integral part of the cultural heritage of 'the west'.

6. 7 Historical fact or eugenic wishful thinking?

Taken together, the testimony of Castle {1916}, Galton (D) {2001}, Hasian {1996}, Roper {1913} and Stubbe {1965} amongst others is strong evidence for an intimate connection between ideas of genetics and eugenics from the earliest times. There are indications here that both are manifestations of the same intellectual or cultural field, whilst there is nothing to suggest that the one spawned the other, as in some chicken and egg conundrum. Rather, the relationship may appear to be one of siblings; perhaps of fraternal rather than identical twins.

What is not quite so clear is the answer to the question as to whether this intellectual field is genuinely ancient, or owes more to the backward projection of modern eugenicists and other commentators. Is it a vision or a revision of history? This is more than a rhetorical question, for contemporary commentators such as Barnes {1997}, Galton (D) {2001}, Shakespeare {1997}, Stubbe {1965} *et al* base their discussions of the topic area on the unspoken assumption that the translated works of, for example, Plato and Aristotle are on the one hand faithful reflections of the thoughts of these men and, on the other hand, that Plato and Aristotle speak literally of 'mainstream' ideas of their time.

Neither of these points is fanciful. In the first instance translation, the more so from a 'dead' language, is an often subjective affair with translators drawing upon their own experiences and beliefs. In this context Jowett, who translated the works of Plato in 1871, was very much an 'establishment' figure, being Master of Trinity College {Jowett 1953: *frontispiece*} at precisely the time when work by Darwin and Spencer was to the forefront of academic thinking. 'Cross-contamination' of academic ideas may not be ruled out here, for it is noticeable that the translation of *Republic* by Griffith {Ferrari 2000} tends more towards an advisory tone whilst that of Jowett is distinctly mandatory.

As for the second point, it is sufficient to consider a hypothetical situation two thousand years hence. Suppose that historical researchers then were to re-discover *Mein Kampf*, alongside a factual internal account of the Third Reich, alone of all the works of the twentieth

century. Certainly Hitler was (tragically) a powerful figure able to impose his will and policies upon much of Europe for a considerable period of time, but it is a contentious point as to just what his philosophy and approach to social policy would tell our descendants of the ethical and practical values then current in the wider modern world of the industrialised west. Yes, the broad outlines of eugenic thought could be reconstructed, as could notions of the integrity of a people's ('racial') identity and ideas of the primacy of the nation-state, but the fact remains that nowhere else in the modern world of the twentieth century did these factors combine to inform such mayhem and cruelty. These imaginary future historians would then possess only a partial and thus unbalanced record of the period. It should be recalled that Aristotle was pupil to Plato, and therefore their combined views represent but a single school of thought.

So it is that certain conclusions drawn from the foregoing sections are qualified. There is clear evidence of close intellectual linkage between ideas now termed 'genetic' and those we call 'eugenic', but it is unclear as to how widespread or influential such ideas were in ancient times. Nonetheless the evidence of Plato's *Republic* {Ferrari 2000; Jowett 1953} and, perhaps more soberly, that of Aristotle's *Politics* {Everson 1996} is strongly suggestive of the currency of 'eugenic' ideas in their time (c 400 - 350 BCE). Certainly there seems no doubt from either of these two sources that the ('genetic') issue of heredity was alive and a topic of speculation then.

It seems that once the nature of inter-generational heredity is appreciated, be it in relation to vegetable, animal or human populations, human thought has a propensity to turn towards ideas of how to 'improve' upon the products of nature {Stubbe 1965; Watson 2003}. Of equal, if not greater, importance here is the evidence of the effects of greater societal aggregation: the evidence from both Plato {*Republic*} and Aristotle {*Politics*} indicates that, as human societies grow in size and complexity, then for the most part (with the possible exclusion of a small elite) there is a tendency towards de-individualisation. People are subjected to a grading process, at first in terms of their position in society - guardian, soldier, trader or whatever - but then, and most germane here, in terms of their likely utility in their allotted role. It is this latter grading process, if Plato {*Republic* Book V, Ferrari 2000: 154 - 160; Jowett 1953: 312 - 317} is to be taken as an indicator of wider beliefs, which draws on both an awareness of the effects of heredity ('genetics') and a concern with societal utility ('eugenics').

6. 8 Malthus and Darwin - feeding and breeding

It is generally acknowledged that England of the nineteenth century was the birth place of modern eugenics {e.g. Castle 1916: 3; Farrall 1985: 10; Mazumdar 1992: 3}, although Kevles {1985: 21} makes the important point that, "*from the eighteen-sixties onward*", and inspired by the work of Darwin and of Francis Galton, "*various sexual radicals*" within the United States had advocated human breeding programmes. As described by Kevles such

"radicals" did not always see a virtue in monogamy, a standpoint which resonates with that (possibly ironic) propounded by Plato in his *Republic* {Book V section 457d, Ferrari 2000: 154, discussed in section 6.2 above}. Be that as it may, it would appear that the seeds of social Darwinism³³, and with them a revitalised eugenic ideology, had rapidly been propagated far and wide within the modernising west.

Although not springing from an intellectual vacuum {Fraser 1984: 38}, the 1798 work of the English churchman Reverend Malthus is often cited as the foundation upon which nineteenth and twentieth century eugenic ideas were to be based {Castle 1916: 25; Hasian 1996: 15; Mazumdar 1992: 36; Pfeiffer 1994: 489; Stepan 1991: 21}. Given the background of concern about the perceived problem of pauperisation in England at the cusp of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries {Fraser 1984: 38}, it might appear that Malthus was giving eloquent voice to an influential intellectual field, or at the very least one of the major power lines within it, of the day. In this respect Castle {1916}, reproducing Darwin, demonstrates that the latter was himself directly influenced by Malthus:

I [Darwin] saw, on reading Malthus on Population, that Natural Selection was the inevitable result of the rapid increase of all organic beings {Darwin, introduction to *Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, extracted in Castle 1916: 15}.

It is noteworthy that Darwin here, by his use of the phrase "*all organic beings*" as opposed to 'animals' or 'creatures', explicitly does not exclude humanity from this statement.

In brief, Malthus was deeply concerned that the supposedly increasing rate of population growth in the England of his day suggested to him that unrestrained human fecundity would inevitably, and rapidly, lead to widespread starvation, the impoverishment of much of the population and ultimately to societal collapse {Black 2003: 13/14}. In part, Malthus blamed an 'overly generous' benefits system which, for him, allowed the poor the opportunity to raise larger families than they would otherwise have been able to feed. With a nascent 'family allowance' scheme built-in to poor relief programmes in many areas of the country, Malthus saw an 'unnatural' incentive for greater fecundity amongst the poor. By mitigating material pressures to limit family size to what was individually affordable and sustainable, social welfare was, for Malthus, favouring the (allegedly feckless and irresponsible) individual whim over the common good {e.g. Fraser 1984: 36-40; Midwinter 1994: 45}.

In the event, later scholarship suggests that Malthus was wrong in his assumption of a rising birth rate. It appears that this remained steady at that period but that the death rate, especially of infants, declined {Midwinter 1994: 45}. Bleakly, it may well be that Malthus was

³³ The application of ideas of natural selection to the human social world.

correct to 'blame' welfare schemes for population growth. Through the provision of food to the poorest infant mortality, linked to malnourishment and/or starvation, was reduced amongst this sector of the population. In the later terminology of Darwinism, whether 'social' or not, this prevention of starvation marked an interference with the mechanisms of natural selection.

The argument was that, by reducing competition for scarce resources the weak, who were thus relieved of their need (or duty) to engage in an endless struggle for survival, were being favoured over the strong, who were otherwise best placed to win the battle for food and other resources. For Malthus and his contemporaries, as for later social Darwinists and eugenicists, the artificial inversion of the natural order of things was fraught with societal danger. The weak may perchance come to supplant the strong with dire consequences for future generations. Whilst the *meek* may perhaps legitimately aspire to inherit the world {Matthew 5: 5}, for the heirs of Reverend Malthus it would never do for the *weak* to emulate that ambition.

Building upon this received wisdom, that resources were limited and that permitting unrestricted access to them would lead to their rapid depletion to the detriment of all, the intellectual heirs of Malthus were receptive to the idea that the husbanding of resources was best achieved by reducing demand, and that it was prudent to ensure in so far as possible that the best available return was received for their expenditure. In the analytical terms used here this amounted to a call for the reversal of an existing policy of structured selectivity in the allocation of material resources. In Malthusian terms, such structured selectivity was acting to the detriment of society at large by encouraging over-population by the economically incompetent.

Ironically, given the frequent appeals to ancient Greece by eugenicists {e.g. Castle 1916; Roper 1913; also described by Hasian 1996: 14/15}, and by Singer {1993}, the 'poor relief' schemes of that era are most often, if not entirely, ignored. In fact Aristotle, in his *Constitution of Athens*, reports that:

there is a law that anyone with a property of less than three minae who suffers from a physical disability which prevents his undertaking any employment ... should receive two obols a day subsistence from public funds {Everson 1996: 249}.

Means-tested public incapacity benefits have, it seems, a long history within the western tradition: a history to equal that of any (negative) eugenic policy. It should be noted here that Aristotle is reporting upon a historical fact, not promoting his personal Utopian vision as is the case with his *Politics*, or perhaps writing with irony and humour as may well be the case with Plato's *Republic* {Jowett 1953: 1}. Aristotle reports this 'benefits' law with approval.

6. 9 Galton, class and race

The intellectual impulse for the modern eugenics movement was provided in large part by Francis Galton, contemporary of and cousin to Charles Darwin {e.g. Castle 1916: 9; Kevles 1985: ch1; Popenoe & Johnson 1925}. From a starting point which has been characterised as "*Social Darwinian*" {Watson 2000: 181/182}, and thus owing much to the ideas of Herbert Spencer {Zimmer 2001: 317}, Galton developed his interest in the supposedly inherited aspects of academic and intellectual success, coining the term "*eugenics*" along the way {Castle 1916: 3}.

Based originally on ideas taken from animal husbandry and horticulture, Galton approached his new study by means of what nowadays may be thought of as an uncritical series of simple observations: the rich and famous were, on the whole, related to other rich and famous people; the poor and uncultured, likewise, had poor and uncultured relatives. The conclusion was clear to Galton: in large part these observations were to be explained by inheritance. A carthorse does not often sire a Derby winner, after all. It may be thought that Galton does not have the appearance of a man of great insight, nor was he seemingly given to introspection. Indeed, one critic argues that:

had he been more self-aware he might have understood that his proto-eugenic pronouncements celebrated the social milieu - and met the psychic needs - of Francis Galton {Kevles 1985: 5}.

So it was that, in what may appear to be a stereotypically British approach to social problems (although a similar observation has been made about the USA movement {Watson 2000: 183}) modern eugenics in its inception had a very pronounced class bias. The middle class (or Marxist *bourgeoisie*) was *per se* assumed to be inherently morally and physically superior to the subordinate working class and its pauperised sub-stratum, the residuum {Mazumdar 1992: 2; 97/98} (respectively the *proletariat* and the *lumpenproletariat* of Marx). This elitist view is summed-up by the ardent eugenicist Beatrice Webb, who reportedly described herself as:

the cleverest member of one of the cleverest families in the cleverest class of the cleverest nation of the world {Freedland 1997: 2}.

In Britain 'class' is generally understood in terms of socio-economic position. In America, with its waves of immigration and (at the end of the nineteenth century at least) a recently emancipated former slave population alongside a subjugated and dispossessed native American population, the concept is not as easily defined:

[w]hat in England was the biology of class, in America became the biology of racial and ethnic groups. In America, class was, in large measure, racial and ethnic {Black 2003: 21}.

Thus although the broad range of components of eugenic thought, of, indeed, the eugenic intellectual field, remain the same, the social grouping designated as particularly problematical may be differently identified.

Eugenic policy and action was, and is, often founded upon pre-existing prejudices which are themselves defined by power lines within the relevant intellectual field. Potentially, these power lines are linked to the 'heterophobia' of Bauman {1989} (section 4.10 above) thus providing a powerful field effect with which to energise social action. In Britain, and drawing directly upon Malthusian fears of the imminent exhaustion of scarce resources {Fraser 1984: 38; Mann 1992: 40}, the 'traditional' object of prejudice was the lower sector of the working class {Hasian 1996: 15; Mann 1992: 33 - 42}.

Due primarily to economic factors (largely but not exclusively unacknowledged at the time) such as low wages and intermittent employment opportunities, these people were often seen as being frequently welfare-dependent, and the more so at times of ill-health or in old age {Fraser 1984: 31 - 55; Midwinter 1994: 52 - 54}. The prevailing (middle class) attitude of the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, in both Britain and the USA, held that capitalism had brought with it great opportunities for individuals to flourish. In consequence, on this view, those who did not 'better themselves' were victims not of the socio-economic order, but of their own individual incompetence. Yet again, reciprocal interaction between intellectual fields is apparent here.

In the USA, with seemingly unlimited resources of land and minerals upon which to draw, Malthusian analysis had much less apparent substance. Leading American eugenicists could be forthrightly dismissive:

[s]carcity of food may put sufficient pressure on [people] to cause emigration, but rarely death. The importance of Malthus' argument to eugenics is too slight to warrant further discussion {Popenoe & Johnson³⁴ 1925: 117}.

Indeed in many respects, the 'problem' here was quite the opposite of resource depletion. The USA required a physically 'fit' and thrusting population in order to be able to exploit these resources, and it is in this context that another American commentator, Gillette, calls for "*practical eugenic measures*" in order to ensure that:

more of the superior members of our race will stay on the land and raise families {Gillette 1916, cited at length by Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 357}.

Ironically given the fact that, more so but not exclusively in the Southern states, much cultivation had been achieved literally on the backs of slaves, people of African descent were in general typified as lacking in the necessary qualities. It has been claimed that, for political and

³⁴ Of these, Popenoe is described as "*Editor of the Journal of Heredity (Organ of the American Genetic Association)*", and Johnson as "*Professor in the University of Pittsburgh*" on the flyleaf of their text.

socio-psychological reasons and primarily "[i]n order to legitimate the existence of slavery" {Hasian 1996: 52}, these people had become stereotyped as incompetent, incapable, "*inferior*" {Hasian 1996: 53} and even as (in adulthood):

a happy - go - lucky child ... oppressed by the restrictions of civilization, and unable to assume the white man's burden {East, cited by Hasian 1996: 54}.

In this context, the 1925 work of Popenoe and Johnson is most informative:

the Negro (sic) race is germinally lacking in the higher developments of intelligence {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 284}; ... *it must be admitted not only that the Negro (sic) is **different** from the white, but that he is in large part eugenically **inferior** to the white* (contrasting typeface in original) {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 285}.

With an assigned social identity constructed in such terms African-Americans were an easy and obvious target of eugenic attention. This racist attitude should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the root justification (if such a position may ever be 'justified') of discrimination against African-American people was materialist-based:

the Negro (sic) ... is said to be lacking in that aggressive competitiveness which has been responsible for so much of the achievement of the Nordic race {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 289}.

In the USA, as in the western tradition more generally, the utilitarian idea of 'the greatest good' is to the fore: the search is for people who will not only be self-supporting {Eldridge 1971}, but will also make a positive contribution to the overall benefit of their host society {Parsons 1951}.

Eugenic attention in the USA was not exclusively racial. Class prejudice was also to the fore, evidenced by a 1902 book which was clear that:

[t]he pauper is the victim of heredity, but neither Nature nor Society recognizes that as an excuse for his (sic) existence {Jordan 1902 cited by Black 2003: 65}.

Alongside, and often linked to, 'the pauper' is found the *bete noir* of eugenicists everywhere, those of 'suspect' intellect, the "*insane*" or the "*feeble-minded*" who will feature prominently in the next chapter. What will be found there to be a familiar worry about the costs of institutionalisation and social support is seen in the USA: because many "*insane persons*" were not "*prevented from reproducing their kind*":

society is putting a heavy burden of expense ... on coming generations {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 178}.

The definition of 'insanity', as of 'feeble-mindedness', is often elastic, as Popenoe and Johnson {1925: 178} freely admit. In so doing, they take care to reserve their eugenic attention for those deemed to suffer 'hereditary insanity'. It is in this utilitarian spirit of seeking to balance 'cost' against 'societal benefit' when deciding on the 'value' of people that USA and British thought reconverges.

Chapter 7: A medical model of social problems?

7. 1 Proem

Returning to the discussion in chapter two of disability studies perspectives on the preferred locus of 'disability' - the dispute between medical and social model approaches - this chapter considers the ideas of eugenicists as to the site of social 'problems'. At its broadest, this represents a debate between those who saw (or perhaps see) perceived inherent 'defects' in the physicality and/or psyche of a 'lower' class within the social strata as the root cause of social 'ills' such as poverty, and others who suggest(ed) that urbanisation, industrialisation and capitalism - in short, modernity - may be rather more culpable than individuals. Here, research questions (i), (ii) and (iv) are addressed.

In Britain the identification of social problems with heredity, and the incorporation of impairment into the equation, in the earlier twentieth century is clearly displayed by the official government *Report of the Mental Deficiency Committee* (Wood Committee) in 1929:

[i]f, as there is reason to think, mental deficiency, much physical inefficiency, chronic pauperism, recidivism, are all ... parts of a single focal problem, can it be that poor mental endowment ... may be not merely a symptom but rather the chief contributory cause of these kindred social evils? {HMSO 1929b: 39 para 38}.

This question appears rhetorical given the overall tone of the report. Here, in an echo of USA eugenic thought, alleged intellectual and physical impairment has become a 'social problem' on a par with both poverty and criminality: a matter of social deviancy.

Although physical impairment, as will also be seen below, was never absent from the debate, the sharpest focus was to fall upon the alleged intellectual shortcomings of many of the 'problem class' within modern society. In a classic 'top down' approach to social surveying, the largely self-appointed guardians of society interpreted different outlooks on life as being 'deviant' or 'immoral' and inherently injurious to the fabric of 'their' society. This led to a perception that the structure of modern society was in danger of succumbing to "*the racial disaster of mental deficiency*" {HMSO 1929b: 81 para 93; Tindall *et al* 1996: 9}.

Moreover, this was a 'problem' which supposedly may be transmitted inter-generationally by a genetic mechanism:

[it is] quite evident that mental deficiency is to a great extent a family problem, and that it is not infrequently associated with insanity {HMSO 1929a, Part IV: 134}.³⁵

³⁵ Confusingly, pagination in Part IV of this publication restarts at page 1, whilst Part III is a separate volume {HMSO 1929b}.

As such, this "*was both a genetic and a social problem*"³⁶ {Mazumdar 1992: 198}, although it might equally well be described as a perceived 'genetic social problem'. It is this seeming medicalisation, of what would appear to others to be social issues, which forms the subject matter of the greater portion of this chapter. Here the progression in eugenic thinking is examined, and the construction of one class as being inherently 'inferior' to another is discussed.

It will become apparent that, in part, material considerations of 'welfare dependency' were to the fore in eugenic thinking. This does not appear to be the only motivation, however, for eugenicists of the first half of the twentieth century will also be seen to have debated the supposedly 'inferior' physical genetic endowment of at least a portion of the 'lower' class(es) alongside considerations of what may best be described as 'morality'. This latter supposedly hereditary trait, it is suggested, moves beyond the purely material and approaches the aesthetic.

The construction of the 'problematic' said by eugenicists to have faced society having been discussed and established, the later part of this chapter will then shift focus to consider the growth of policy initiatives formulated on the back of such thinking. Particularly in an intellectual field context, it makes no sense to divorce thought from action at the level of theory, and it is not the intention here to imply any such separation. This 'split focus' is simply employed here as an aid to discussion. The locus of this chapter centres upon the UK/US axis.

7. 2 Defining the problematic

One major (and reiterated) conclusion of the Wood Committee, which resonates closely with trans-Atlantic opinion of the period, was that a significant causative factor in the incidence of the allegedly socially disruptive conditions of 'insanity', 'feeble-mindedness', neurological conditions such as epilepsy and even the notably vague 'unemployability' was to be found in inheritance {HMSO 1929a: Section IV; HMSO 1929b: 81/82 para 92}. As such, these problems had the potential to be addressed by openly eugenic methods and policies {Mazumdar 1992: 198 *et seq*} directed towards individuals, specific families and nominated social groups. The Wood Committee report in part approaches the tone of a eugenic eulogy:

[t]he science of eugenics is doing invaluable service in focussing scientific thought and public opinion upon the racial, social and economic problems that the subnormal group³⁷ presents to every civilised [(sic!)] nation. The prevention of mental deficiency is a problem whose solution depends largely upon the progress made by this science, and no nation that regards its future welfare seriously can afford to ignore the results and recommendations of the scientific study of this problem {HMSO 1929b: 82 para 93}.

³⁶ Whether coincidental or not, the title of chapter V of Part III of the Wood Committee Report is "*Mental Deficiency As A Genetic And Social Problem*" {HMSO 1929b: 78}.

³⁷ "*approximately the lowest 10 percent in the social scale*" {HMSO 1920b: 80 para 91}.

Of course the "*prevention of mental deficiency*", which as at the present day is the 'prevention' of 'birth defects', is not here a matter of individual therapy. It is rather a matter of preventing the birth of possibly 'contaminated' children, in part to address "*economic problems*" posed for society. However well-meaning or "*scientific*", this remains an attack upon people and potential people thought to be congenitally 'impaired'.

The tone of the report of this UK government committee is not entirely surprising, for:

[t]he Eugenics Society was well represented on the Wood Committee [and its] mandate, to find out the incidence of mental defect in the population, was a central part of the eugenics tradition {Mazumdar 1992: 197}.

In the event, of the chair(man) and nine members of this committee {HMSO 1929a: iv}, four (Cyril Burt, Evelyn (later Dame) Fox, Frank Shruballs MD and Alfred Tredgold MD) are listed as members of the British Eugenics Society {Africa2000}³⁸. Eugenacists were indeed "*well represented*" here, with forty percent of the personnel being formal members of the English Eugenics Society

It is already seen above that the Wood Committee spoke in terms of a "*racial disaster*" associated with "*mental deficiency*" {Tindall *et al* 1996: 9}. On the question of maintaining the quality of the "*racial stock*" Marie Stopes had already developed this concept, holding:

that birth control was the best method to eliminate the hoards (sic) of weak, unhealthy, and tainted poor children whose dependence on tax-supported welfare programs prevented the overburdened middle classes from producing more children of good quality {Stopes, cited by Soloway 1990: 179/80}.

It is notable here that Stopes, very much in the mainstream of eugenic thought of her day (and a member of the UK movement {Africa2000}) links both physical and intellectual 'improvement' of the 'race' and the elimination of 'welfare dependency' with eugenics. She was to go further, by seemingly associating working class (socialist) revolutionary ideology with heredity. In the context of the 1917 Russian revolutions, she contended that:

we have been breeding [working class] revolutionaries {Stopes 1920, *Radiant Motherhood*, quoted by Shapiro 1987: 8},

and was again to expand on this theme 1922 in the USA publication *Birth Control News*:

[t]he root of revolution is not obvious, it is hidden in the most secret place - in the womb of woman when she bears children warped by disease ... {Stopes 1922, quoted by Shapiro 1987: 8/9}.

The views of Stopes here appear to be based on a somewhat mixed foundation. On the one hand, she very clearly deplores and fears the supposed 'super-fecundity' of the working class (especially its lower echelons). On the other hand, Stopes' logic is itself "*not obvious*" in the latter extract. She gives the appearance of fearing a social uprising led by "*warped*" and

³⁸ Of these, Burt was an influential educator and child psychologist, later the focus of academic scandal {Africa2000}; Fox was the "*1st Hon. Secretary, Child Guidance Council*" {Africa2000}; Shruballs is described {HMSO 1929a: iv} as Senior Medical Officer, London County Council and Tredgold was a long-standing and influential eugenicist {Africa2000}.

"disease[d]" people who rebel, seemingly, as a direct result of birth 'defects'. There is, in these words of Stopes, no apparent engagement with 'lower class' people on an individual, or even a human, level. In essence they are seen simply in terms of a threat to social order rather than as an integral part of society with their own legitimate aspirations. This owes rather more to (middle class) ideology than to purely material considerations, and noticeably overlooks the possibility of a social answer to a social problem.

What may be inferred from the reported views of Stopes {Shapiro 1987: 8/9; Soloway 1990: 179/180}, and the more general eugenic-inspired opinions discussed above, is a progression from ideas of inherited physical characteristics with their roots in pre-history {e.g. Stubbe 1965}, through supposedly inherited (im)moral attitudes {e.g. Black 2003: 23} to a notion of an inherited susceptibility to espouse an ideology which is at odds with that of a ruling elite. This is a reasoning process which, at its crudest, may be summed-up as 'difference = deviance'. It is also very close to that reported by Caplan {1992} (sections 9.9 and 9.12 below), who finds that in contemporary genetic counselling and research a genetic difference from the norm is often seen as indicative of 'disease' *per se*.

Stopes' views, along with those of many of her eugenic colleagues of the time, may be examined in terms of the 'intellectual field' and 'cultural unconscious' of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*}, alongside the 'collective unconscious' of Mannheim {1936}. Although Stopes adds a specifically ideological element, fears of lower class fecundity are directly linked to the ideas of Malthus {see, e.g., Darwin, extracted in Castle 1916: 15}, ideas which have been current throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries (noted in section 6.9 above). These ideas are themselves a potent power line underlying the eugenic intellectual field, which itself forms part of the dominant modern cultural field. There is evidence here of a feed-back loop, for it has been seen above in chapter four that modernity is closely linked to ideas of conformity, of 'normality'. On this level the eugenic intellectual and modern cultural fields are mutually reinforcing.

The issue of being "*warped*" through disease {Stopes 1922 in Shapiro 1987: 8/9} appears to link to a separate and more widespread intellectual field than the narrowly eugenic one. This topic is discussed by Shakespeare {1997: 218 - 221} in terms of the "*cultural representation*" of disability in the western tradition. In this tradition, he informs us, 'deformity' is often linked in literature and art to villainy, crime and anti-social sentiment, to the extent that he comments upon the "*ubiquity*" {Shakespeare 1997: 219} of the metaphor. As Shearer {1981} has it, in the west we:

*are all the inheritors of a deadening weight of notions about what disability signifies ... perhaps the more damaging for being **unconscious** and implicit Disability is unclean, it is polluting; unwholeness is unholy* (added emphasis) {Shearer 1981: 75}.

The 1922 views of Stopes on the "*root of revolution*" {Shapiro 1987: 9} may be seen as representative of the reinforcement of the eugenic intellectual field by images drawn from a wider 'cultural unconscious' source.

Meanwhile, in the USA, a 1924 contributor to the periodical "*Birth Control Review*" {vol 8 No. 9: 252} felt able to affirm that:

studies indicate that insanity, epilepsy, criminality, prostitution, pauperism, and mental defect are all organically bound up together and that the least intelligent and thoroughly degenerate classes in every community are the most prolific. Feeble-mindedness in one generation becomes pauperism or insanity in the next. There is ... a feeble-minded peril to future generations - unless the feeble-minded are prevented from reproducing their kind. To meet this emergency is the immediate ... duty of every state ... {Bevan 1924 quoted in Ordovery 2003: 140}.

This sentiment, and indeed the language, is very closely echoed five years later by the Wood Committee report {HMSO 1929b: 80 - 82 paras 92, 93}. This is evidence from either side of the Atlantic of the essentials of modern eugenics. Here is seen, besides the use of 'feeble-minded' as a shorthand for any number of traits and/or conditions including "*criminality, prostitution, pauperism, and mental defect*" {Bevan, above}, and even perhaps "*revolutionary*" {Stopes in Shapiro 1987: 8, 8/9}, the mixing of disparate ideas. These include the supposed inherently greater social value of the "*middle classes*" {e.g. Mazumdar 1992} over the working class(es) and the contention that 'welfare dependency' is hereditary. Perhaps most notable is the assumption that society has the right, perhaps even the duty, to "*eliminate ... weak, unhealthy, and tainted poor children*" {Stopes in Soloway 1990: 179/180}, or indeed 'paupers' {see, e.g., Black 2003; Hasian 1996}.

Above all is seen in the thinking of Stopes and her contemporaries the idea that the 'inferior' pose a real and imminent threat to the societal *status quo* based on the *genetic transmission* of their supposed 'defects' {e.g. HMSO 1929b: 82}. At the risk of stating the obvious, eugenic thought would be impossible without some appreciation of the action of genetic mechanisms. These ideas represent the major power lines of the eugenic intellectual field of the western world during the first half of the twentieth century.

7. 3 Of hens' eggs and eagles' nests

Popenoe and Johnson {1925: 176 - 183} detail what they term "*the dysgenic classes*" as a necessary step towards identifying which:

classes of the population can properly fall within the scope of such [eugenic] treatment {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 176}.

Alongside the (hereditarily) "*insane*" are included "*the feeble-minded*" {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 176}, "*epileptics*" {op cit: 179}, "*germinally physical weaklings or deformed*" and "*those born with a hereditary predisposition toward some serious disease*" {op cit: 180} and the

"*germinally blind and deaf*" {*ibid*}. These conditions, allowing for changes in the use of language, would nowadays be most likely to be recognised as 'impairments' and their bearers considered to be 'disabled' people. Essentially Popenoe and Johnson are here setting out their case for the 'breeding out' of various impairments from the societal gene pool.

Lest these foregoing categories are not sufficiently broad to encompass all of the "*dysgenic classes*", Popenoe and Johnson also include:

the great class of delinquents ... the confirmed criminal, the prostitute, the pauper, all [of whom] deserve careful study by the eugenist {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 180}.

Of this latter seemingly catch-all grouping, Popenoe and Johnson {1925} are at pains to eliminate from their considerations those whose 'condition' may owe much to environmental factors. In particular, they oppose:

[l]aws such as have been passed in several states, providing for the sterilization of criminals **as such** {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 181} (original emphasis).

Nonetheless, and thus in large part minimising the effects of environment, Popenoe and Johnson remain confident that "*many*" prostitutes, criminals and paupers "*will be found to be feeble-minded*" {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 180}, and thus 'proper' candidates for 'eugenic treatment'. It would appear that eugenicists of the period were prepared to cast their net widely. It has already been seen in section 3.13 above that the 1934 German law "*For the prevention of progeny with hereditary diseases*" employed a similarly broad approach {HMSO 1934: 122 - 125}, and in Britain likewise the topic of "*mental deficiency*" was sufficiently elastic to be capable of encompassing all manner of social issues.

As in the USA, in the UK environmental effects were noted, particularly in relation to *secondary amentia*³⁹, defined as being:

due to injury caused by environmental factors at some stage subsequent to the fertilisation of the ovum {HMSO 1929b: 79 para 90}.

However, such environmental factors are again taken as being of relatively minor importance, since it:

*is still the generally accepted view that the majority of mental defectives are cases of primary*⁴⁰ *amentia* {HMSO 1929b: 79 para 91}.

Hence the major problem identified by the Wood Committee is the *genetically propagated* incidence of 'mental defect' (although five years later the Sterilisation Committee Report was to consider hereditary "*grave physical disability*" as being equally serious to 'mental defect' {HMSO 1934: 57}). The overall tone of the 1929 report confirms that a major consideration

³⁹ 'Amentia' is derived from a Latin root meaning, literally, 'absence of mind'.

⁴⁰ i.e. congenital.

remained the cost of 'care', 'education' and 'relief' of 'defectives', much of which fell upon either Poor Law authorities or Local Mental Deficiency Authorities⁴¹.

What might appear, at first sight, to be a remarkably current and liberal stance is taken, perhaps surprisingly, by the North American academic geneticist Castle:

[w]riters on sociology have shown that human progress is largely limited and determined by the social environment ... Racial progress does not require a constantly advancing biological standard in the individual. ... Civilization is a matter of collective achievement; it is not a biological inheritance at all, but a cultural one {Castle 1916: 272/273}.

However, lest his position be misunderstood, Castle then continues in his next paragraph:

[i]t is of course essential that the racial stock be kept sound and free from taint of disease or racial poison {Castle 1916: 273}.

Yes, environment was important: but only in so far as it was acting upon inherently 'sound' stock.⁴²

For eugenicists a poor environment could have a deleterious effect on basically sound individuals, but the converse, that so-called 'bad' stock may be improved by the influence of a benign environment, was dismissed out of hand:

we have a better chance of rearing eaglets from eagles' eggs placed under a hen than from hen's eggs placed in an eagle's nest {Professor Cattell, 1915, reproduced in Castle 1916: 266}.

Inheritance was still the dominant factor in the equation, and only 'good' genes should, ideally, be allowed to pass to later generations. In this, Cattell was repeating the eugenic orthodoxy of his day. Kevles {1985: 70 *et seq*} draws attention to the germ-plasm theory of Weismann⁴³ (available in English translation from the 1890s) which held that in the final analysis environmental improvement could exert little if any influence over the innate characteristics of the individual.

In this version of the nature-nurture debate, the battle would always be won by nature because, in Kevle's report of Weismann's thinking, "*people's germ plasm remained the same*" {Kevles 1985: 71} whatever ambient social conditions existed. The nett result of this opinion is to establish the individual firmly at the centre of the problem of supposed 'race degeneration'. However such ideas do not arise from an intellectual vacuum. Speaking of "*the cultural unconscious*" within an overall context of "*intellectual field effects*", Bourdieu {1971a} suggests that:

the intellectual is socially and historically situated. His (sic) most conscious intellectual and artistic choices are always directed by his own culture and

⁴¹ As an example, the section headed "*Alleviation of the burden imposed upon the community by the mental defectives existing at present*" {HMSO 1929b: 86}.

⁴² Castle is described on the flyleaf of his 1916 book as "*Professor of Zoology in Harvard University and Research Associate of the Carnegie Institution of Washington*".

⁴³ See section 6.4 above.

taste, which are themselves interiorizations of the objective culture of a particular society, age or class {Bourdieu 1971a: 180}.

Whilst action was directed at the individual level, the 'improvement' of wider society remained the end objective. Thus as a result of preventing or restricting the reproductive activity of identified individuals, of imposing a policy of structured selectivity, "*the race ... will move on toward ultimate perfection*" {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 2}; leading to "*a totally reshaped human species*" {Black 2003: 207}. In this, the wider eugenic community was apparently drawing upon the same intellectual field as that which informed German thought and, ultimately, Nazi policy (see chapter three above). Meanwhile the tone of, for example, Castle {1916} and Popenoe & Johnson {1925} very clearly implies 'expertise', whilst the entire ethos of the Wood Committee is founded upon the idea of an 'expert' enquiry.

7. 4 Class wars

It is against this intellectual backdrop that the (UK government) *Report of the Departmental Committee on Sterilisation* {HMSO 1934} finds no embarrassment in saying that:

the social problem group ... contributes much more than its numerical proportion to the total volume of defect, and an equal or even larger proportion of children of low intelligence. ... Defectives drift to the slums. Like marries like ... {HMSO 1934: 41, para 75}.

Elsewhere in this report, "*the social problem group*" is again discussed:

sociologists generally would accept the view that there is a concentration in the lowest social stratum of the physically and mentally defective, the chronic unemployables, the habitual recipients of relief, and a delinquent element of a mentally sub-normal type ... {HMSO 1934: 54, para 102},

and a reference made to "*social and economic conditions*" which may have a part to play in "*causing social failures*". There is, then, an acknowledgement of the potential role of environment here.

What is, however, noticeably absent is the idea that "*social and economic conditions*" necessarily have a societal cause:

*low mentality and poor environment form a vicious circle ... an enquiry would throw valuable light on some of the social consequences of mental defect and **its tendency to perpetuate itself by creating an environment inimical to the development of normal mentality*** {HMSO 1934: 54, para 102} (added emphases).

With its appeal to 'normality' this statement places itself firmly within a modern framework. Simultaneously, with what appears to be a bland and unreflexive assumption that society in general has little role to play in improving social conditions *apart from 'improving' the 'quality' of individuals*, this passage serves to highlight middle class attitudes of the time in relation to "*the social problem group*".

This group does not *suffer from* a 'social problem': to the contrary, it *is* a 'social problem' from which society suffers. That the British eugenics movement was drawn from an overwhelmingly middle class constituency is not in any real doubt. Research has failed to find any working class member of the Eugenics Education Society and those members for whom sufficient details are extant were found to come "*almost entirely from the middle class*". The only exceptions being those who could more properly be assigned to the 'upper' class {Farrall 1985: 291}.

In Edwardian England, at the dawn of the twentieth century, were to be found striking differences in health and morbidity statistics between members of one class or another. As an example:

[e]xpectation of life in middle-class Hampstead was fifty years at birth, but in working-class Southwark only thirty-six years. In ... many other cities the general death rates for the most prosperous wards were half those of the poorest. You were four times more likely to develop tuberculosis in central Birmingham than in well-to-do Edgbaston. ... In a healthy middle-class suburb, ninety-six of every hundred infants born would survive their first year of life. In a bad slum district, one in every three would be dead {Thompson 1977: 27}.

The benefits of modernisation had not been evenly spread. As Seebohm Rowntree reminds us:

the nineteenth century ... was a century of poverty. Even at the end of the century 15.46 per cent of the wage-earning classes of York ... were, through no error or omission of their own, living in poverty. It was a century, too, of destitution {Rowntree BS & Lavers GR 1951: 368/369}.

This picture was repeated throughout the modernising world, and the topic of "*pauperism*" excited much (largely middle class) attention in England from 1850 onwards {Mazumdar 1992: 7-23}.

The general consensus of middle class elite opinion from the mid nineteenth century onwards was that the poor were to blame for their poverty whether, as the Charity Organisation Society supposed, as a result of their alleged low moral character {Fraser 1984: 130-131} or as the UK eugenics movement suggested, because "*inherited defect in turn underlay the lack of character*" {Mazumdar 1992: 23}. In either case, the locus of attention was the poor themselves. They, and not society, had to change. For eugenicists in the first decade of the twentieth century:

control of the excessive fertility of these people would get to the root of the matter {Mazumdar 1992: 23}.

Almost from the outset of industrial modernity 'the poor', then, were regarded by the middle class in general as a race apart. A race, moreover, which was thought literally to carry the seeds of its own destruction. The seeming ubiquity of this thinking amongst a large portion of elite (and thus influential) people leads to the suspicion that this may be a manifestation of an intellectual field effect. Such an idea is bolstered by the observation that, in the early 1900s:

the Eugenics Education Society was just one of a network of organisations representing a common front of social activists who might be doctors, teachers or social workers, or simply ladies interested in social problems {Mazumdar 1992: 9}.

Needless to say, all of the above "*social activists*" were typically drawn from the middle or upper classes of the day. Again, at that time, further and higher education was very much the preserve of these same social classes. This had a twofold effect, for the 'educated' were both most likely to be directly influenced by an intellectual field and, simultaneously, were in a position to exert influence over it {e.g. Bourdieu 1971a, 1993}. In effect middle class biases were being reinforced by biased members of the middle classes and *vice-versa*. This was by no means a phenomenon restricted to Britain. In the USA:

eugenicists were driven by a need to rationalize and shore up social categories {Ordoover 2003: 56}.

The inherent class bias and lack of objectivity on the part of eugenicists did not go unremarked at the time. Whilst the early researchers into eugenics cited the observed lack of physical and psychical vigour of the 'lower' classes as 'proof' of their genetic inferiority with little or no regard for environmental factors, a political activist of the first decade of the twentieth century (using a novel as his vehicle) made the counter point:

[t]he difference in height and weight and general condition of the children in poor schools and the children of the so-called better classes constitutes a crime {Tressell 1993: 475; written c1910, 1st published, posthumously, 1914}.

Tressell is very clear that, in his overtly political view at least, 'lower' class lack of robustness is the result, not the primary cause, of poverty. For him, poverty is an artefact of modern urban society; therefore its elimination is a matter for society, for sociology and for social policy, not for direct 'scientific' manipulation at the individual or collective level. Almost a half-century later than Tressell, it was again observed:

that children of the lower social classes are less tall and weigh less than those of the same age in a better social position ... and that this difference is of long standing {Wootton 1959: 45/46}.

Whilst moral issues surrounding the alleged sexual incontinence and lack of adherence to the work ethic said to exist within the lowest stratum of the working class were not absent from the debate, these were most often attributed to supposedly hereditary factors such as 'feeble-mindedness' {e.g. Kevles 1985: 79} or a congenital proclivity to alcohol abuse {e.g. Hasian 1996: 17}. In this manner the eugenic debate from a very early stage became focused upon bloodlines, essentially upon (supposed) genetic heredity. Since the mother of a child, 'illegitimate' or not, is far more likely to be positively identified than its father, there is an in-built tendency towards a consideration of the role of motherhood in this line of thinking. Thus the eugenic fascination with bloodlines, with pedigree, led directly to an emphasis on the position of 'approved' women as, in effect, brood mares on the one hand, and to the identification of certain women as 'maternal risks' on the other.

The negative side of this emphasis may be seen in the USA figures for statutory sterilisations between 1927 and 1932, during which years some two-thirds of such operations were performed on (by definition 'non-approved') women {Ordovery 2003: 135}. In North Carolina:

[b]etween 1929 and 1940, 78 percent of candidates approved for sterilization by the Eugenics Board ... were women {Ordovery 2003: 165}.

Meanwhile the 1934 (UK) *Report of the Departmental Committee on Sterilisation* notes that, in relation to the operation of USA sterilisation laws more widely:

[w]e have not been able to obtain any explanation of the preponderance of females over males [sterilised] {HMSO 1934: 35}.

These statistics, for Ordovery:

[r]epresent the corporeal fulfilment of eugenic constructions of women ... as de facto regulators of the national gene pool {Ordovery 2003: 135}.

Thus eugenic procreation and non-procreation became embroiled with the wider 'woman question' of the social role and standing of females which came to the fore (certainly in Britain and the United States) around the end of the nineteenth century and continued to be politically prominent at least into the 1920s {see, *e.g.* Kevles 1985: 24; Stepan 1991: 107}. This 'woman' topic, important as it is in its own right, is beyond the scope of the present work. Suffice it to say that from the outset of modern eugenics women have played an active role in the formulation of policy and the dissemination of ideas. This is seen from an analysis of membership rolls; for example, in the British eugenics movement of 1913, of 405 full members 162 were women: amongst associate members, women accounted for 209 of a total of 307 {Farrall 1985: 211 *fn*18}. Using Farrall's figures, taking the two categories of membership together 52% were female in 1913. Of the more influential 'full' (that is, voting) members, this ratio was a respectable and, for scientific organisations of the day remarkable, 40%. In the event, the formal British eugenics movement was founded, in 1907, by a widow, Sybil Gotto {Resta 1999: 67}.

7. 5 Setting standards, drawing boundaries

We have seen in the preceding sections of this chapter how the 'problem' posed to western society by a supposedly 'inferior' or 'degenerate' group of people had, during the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries come to be constructed by members of the middle class. Having identified this 'problem' the logical progression was to address it by the implementation of policies deemed appropriate. Before active steps could be designed and implemented in this, as any, engineering project, it was necessary to survey the (societal) landscape. A preparatory stage was to develop a means to differentiate between the 'fit' and 'unfit' sectors of society. In other words, to be able to decide who held the genetic keys to the future of the race, and whose genetic endowment was to be deemed flawed and spoiled. Eugenic theorists and activists were to adopt a shorthand designation: *feeble-minded*.

'Feeble-minded' (with or without a hyphen) was often used by eugenicists as a residual diagnosis. The essential flavour is that anyone whose intellectual endowment, and often 'morality', was neither 'normal' nor 'supernormal' was by default labelled 'feeble-minded'. For example Castle {1916} citing "Dr Goddard"⁴⁴, a United States medical practitioner associated with a "*Training School for Feeble-minded*", informs us that:

[f]eeble-mindedness ... characterizes a large proportion of ... paupers, drunkards, or criminals {Castle 1916: 254}.

Again on the authority of "Dr Goddard", we are told that, in an Illinois reformatory:

tests ... of girls committed for immorality showed 97 per cent of them to be feeble-minded {Castle 1916: 255}.

Given that the self-same "*immorality*" was supposedly one of the key indicators of this 'feeble-mindedness' {Kevles 1985: 79}, the findings of Goddard are distinctly tautological and eminently predictable. A very similar point is made by Wootton {1959} in the British context.

Speaking critically of attempts to define 'the social problem group', she observes that:

if the heads of problem families are by definition socially inadequate, and if social inadequacy is itself the proof of deficient mental capacity, the discovery that problem parents are of poor intelligence amounts to no more than that they are, in fact, problem parents {Wootton 1959: 62}.

Indications of the lack of intellectual rigour highlighted by Wootton may be seen from the definitions accepted by authoritative bodies.

In Britain there was an officially-sanctioned taxonomy of three 'grades' of supposedly intellectually 'subnormal' people which included a definition of 'feeble-mindedness':

Idiocy. - This is the lowest grade of defect ... they cannot perform any kind of work ...

Imbecility. - This is the medium grade of defect ... they are generally incapable of earning their living, or of contributing materially towards their keep. ...

*Feeble-mindedness. - This is the mildest grade of defect, and ... form[s] a connecting link between the imbeciles and the dull or backward members of the normal population ... they can be trained to perform work which will contribute materially towards or entirely pay for their keep. ... In a small proportion of cases these defects are less prominent [i.e. these people would otherwise be judged or 'mistaken' as 'normal'], **but they are accompanied by such a marked lack of sense of right and wrong, of responsibility and social obligation** ...* {HMSO 1929a: 11/12 para 20} (added emphasis).

It is seen that a major criterion employed in this grading process is the ability, or its lack, to be financially self-supporting (the others are personal hygiene, forward planning and financial self-management). This compares directly with the Nazi census of asylum 'inmates' discussed in section 3.12 above, and cited by Lifton {1986: 68}.

⁴⁴ Goddard was a leading USA eugenicist who "*entered the scene as translator of Alfred Binet's articles [on IQ testing] and as proctor of the first IQ tests on American soil*" {Ordover 2003: 11; see also Black 2003: 78 *et seq*}.

As the above quote demonstrates, the mere fact that a person may have chosen to follow a moral code which differed from that prescribed by a social elite, or may have indulged in minor criminal activity, could of itself be sufficient to warrant a diagnosis of "*feeble-mindedness*". In effect supposed 'immorality' becomes medicalised under this head. Evidence of the social construction of 'morality', and hence 'immorality', is abundant: one need only consider the general Judaeo-Christian norm of monogamy alongside sections of the Church of Latter Day Saints, or the Islamic world, where polygamy (more correctly polygyny) is allowable under some circumstances. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that "*feeble-mindedness*" is itself to be considered properly as a social construction.

The medicalisation of what are behavioural traits, noted above, is intimately connected to the ideas of Francis Galton. Galton himself, a grandson of the eminent Erasmus Darwin and first cousin to Charles Darwin, had a major and personal interest in the transmission of 'genius' within families {Mazumdar 1999: 19; Paul 1998b: 30}. Galton also paid much attention to less positive human traits which he assumed were heritable⁴⁵, such as:

a craving for drink, or for gambling, strong sexual passion, a proclivity to pauperism, to crimes of violence, and to crimes of fraud {Galton (F), from a magazine article of 1865 cited by Paul 1998b: 31}.

7. 6 If it's in the blood, trace the bloodline

Others around and after Galton's time, on both sides of the Atlantic, tended to concentrate more on these 'negative' characteristics, particularly sexual licentiousness, drunkenness, criminality, poverty and the catch-all 'feeble-mindedness' which was often explicitly linked to these areas of behaviour {e.g. Ordovery 2003: 140}. Belief in the heritability of these traits had the effect of deflecting attention away from social factors and, instead, focusing it upon the physicality of individuals. A major result of this was the early twentieth century fascination of eugenicists for pedigree studies:

heredity is the interpretation of genealogy, and eugenics the application of genealogy {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 337}.

What is important about the collation of human pedigrees in the context of eugenic enquiry is that this activity is/was essentially an exercise in charting the (supposed) transmission of heritable characteristics through the generations: a topic which is nowadays the domain of the undisputed science of human genetics and its close cousin genetic counselling (see section 9.4 below). This led directly to a consideration of the moral, intellectual and physical 'standard' of progeny, a mind-set which stands at the heart of this

⁴⁵ As will be seen below in section 9.12, contemporary genetic researchers have recently claimed to find genes or genetic combinations which are said to indicate a propensity for alcoholism, gambling and criminality, alongside the so-called 'gay' gene. The early modern eugenicists were, potentially, partially correct here. Contemporary researchers in behavioural genetics do, however, stress the role of environment.

inquiry into the effects of eugenic thinking and practice upon disabled people. So it was that, during the later nineteenth century and into the 1930s, much energy was expended by those interested in eugenic research on the compilation of vast numbers of human pedigrees {Mazumdar 1992: ch 2}. Perhaps the most notable and prolific of these researchers were Davenport and Laughlin in the United States {e.g. Black 2003: ch4} and Pearson and Lidbetter in Britain {e.g. Mazumdar 1992: ch2}.

Of these, Pearson became professor of eugenics (1911) at University College and promoted the use of statistical mathematics to analyse his pedigree data {Mazumdar 1992: 60}. Meanwhile Davenport founded, in 1903, the Station for the Experimental Study of Evolution at Cold Spring Harbor {Mazumdar 1999: 25} (where "*United States eugenic activity was centred*" {Resta 1999: 65}), and established the Eugenics Record Office there as a repository for the collected pedigrees. In the already established tradition:

like the British society, it interested itself in the so-called feeble-minded
{Mazumdar 1999: 25}.

In 1910 Laughlin became Superintendent of this Office, with responsibility for training and directing a large team of researchers {Mazumdar 1999: 25-28}. The rationale behind the Office and its project is clear:

[u]pon such traits society is built; good or bad they determine the fate of our society {Davenport & Laughlin, cited by Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 341}.

The Eugenics Record Office ceased its pedigree research activities on New Year's Eve of 1939/1940 {Mazumdar 1999: 31}, although many of its archives are still extant.

The Cold Spring Harbor pedigrees were collected enthusiastically and assiduously but not, it seems, in a suitably 'objective scientific' fashion such as to satisfy the eugenic modernisers. Eugenics had progressed beyond what may be thought of as a social movement with some vague aim of 'improving' society. Now, in the early twentieth century, eugenics was to become scientific. As early as 1916, we are told that:

much of [the American data] is unreliable because it was accumulated by "trained field workers" imbued in advance with the idea that all inheritance is Mendelian and instructed to look simply for "presence or absence" of particular characters, rather than for quantitative measurement of the same. A similar theoretical bias permeates the analytical treatment of the data ... the potential value of this great collection of data ... seems greatly impaired
{Castle 1916: 241}.

In the view of Castle the (USA) researchers and analysts had been educated to expect certain characteristics to be transmitted genetically, and thence to look for evidence of these traits. The danger, clear to Castle {1916}, is that they may have, albeit unwittingly, decided their likely results in advance and then simply found what they were seeking.

Other commentators have been equally damning. The primary cause for the closure of the Eugenics Record Office was the report of a visiting committee of experts which found, in

the words of Mazumdar, that "[t]he collected records were worthless for human genetics" {Mazumdar 1999: 31} and, in consequence, recommended that the project be wound down. It is interesting to note in passing that Mazumdar here assumes a large degree of continuity between eugenic enterprise and later human genetic practice.

Meanwhile the UK government *Departmental Committee on Sterilisation*, reporting in 1934, was particularly scathing on the subject of pedigrees despite a strong presence of eugenicists amongst its number. Naming Goddard, whose research in this area had been part-funded by Davenport's agency {Black 2003: 78}, this committee commented that:

the technique employed was unscientific and the instructions to the field workers so tendentious that it is not surprising that they succeeded in finding what they were told to seek. ... [W]e do not think it necessary to spend time on any analysis of the dismal chronicles of the Kallikaks, the Jukes and the Nams {HMSO 1934: 13 para 19}.

The UK eugenics movement met with similar criticism to its American counterpart and, by the 1930s, was being heavily criticised, in particular for its failure to take adequate account of environment in its research into the 'pauper class' {Mazumdar 1992: 107 *et seq.*}. Pedigrees, by their nature, catalogue individuals in isolation from their social environment: this methodology must perforce obscure a large number of variables, thus introducing a large and unquantifiable risk of error. This is not to say that the collection of pedigrees was an unproductive exercise for the eugenics movement, whether UK or US. To the contrary:

[t]he Eugenics Education Society was relying on the pedigree to educate its audience about ... the hereditary source of pauperism and feeble-mindedness, as well as a whole range of physical defects {Mazumdar 1992: 87}.

Or as it was put with rather less subtlety, but probably greater honesty:

pedigrees were more a form of propaganda rather than a rigorous scientific tool {Rosta 1999: 69}.

On both sides of the Atlantic, eugenicists were faced with a two-fold task: on the one hand to gain clear insight into the workings of inheritance but, and of equal if not greater importance, on the other hand they laboured under the self-imposed imperative to inform and influence social policy. It was (and is) in this latter context that the propaganda value of eugenic 'research' advances to the fore. Propaganda perhaps, but seemingly effective propaganda nonetheless. The eugenics movement may be thought to have achieved one of its primary aims, the reinforcement amongst members of the middle class of pre-existing class prejudices.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ This is an interesting example of intellectual field effects, as it suggests that conscious and directed activity may result in changes in the *unconscious* repository of the cultural field of Bourdieu {1971a *et al.*}. In practice, although not perhaps fully theorised, a similar process may be seen with 'political correctness' wherein use is made of language as a means towards modifying social behaviour. There are possible pointers here towards a role for education in a concerted and controlled effort to overcome disablement.

7. 7 Class still counts

'Immorality', 'criminality' and alcohol 'abuse' are flexible concepts open to class-based interpretations. At a time when the use of alcohol was widespread amongst the 'upper' classes of the day, and illegitimate children of noble sires were openly acknowledged, illegitimacy and drunkenness were apparently primarily seen as problematical amongst the 'lower' classes. Similarly notions of what was sharp business practice on the one hand, or 'criminal' behaviour on the other, varied, and indeed may continue to vary today, according to the social status of those involved {Geis & Meier 1977; Pearce 1976}.

In the United States of the twentieth century one of the most prominent families socially and politically was founded by a patriarch who made his first fortune through 'insider trading' on the New York Stock Exchange during and after world war one and as an illegal 'bootlegger' during the days of Prohibition, before making another fortune from the lawful importation of alcohol after the end of Prohibition. He was a notorious philanderer and fathered a famous son whose extra-marital sexual appetite is legendary. Both father and son had strong links to leading figures from the world of United States 'organised crime' {e.g., Andersen 1996; Bradford 2000; Dallek 2003}. The father was the United States Ambassador to Britain at the outbreak of world war two, Joseph Kennedy; his famous son President John F Kennedy.

One family's forgivable indiscretions, prized virility or even praiseworthy business acumen could be, it would appear, another's 'immorality' and potentially 'feeble-mindedness'. Clearly:

[f]eeble-mindedness was truly in the eye of the beholder {Black 2003: 55}.

The fracture line between the two characterisations was, and to greater or lesser extent remains today, congruent with class boundaries. The real motive here, it might appear, is the elimination of dependency. 'Immorality', 'feeble-mindedness' and alcohol use are only to be deprecated where they impose a cost upon the public purse. In this are to be seen reflections of Weber's 'independent labourer' {Eldridge 1971} and Parsons' {1951} non-deviant, non-dependent citizen.

For Muller, blatant class and race prejudice alongside a lack of objectivity in the research process and a suspect approach to statistics had hopelessly compromised the then *practice* of eugenics. Given that he is listed as a member of the USA eugenics movement for 1930 and 1932 {Africa2000}, and that he is ascribed a "*fervent belief in the selective breeding of human beings*" which he displayed into the 1940s (when he won his Nobel prize for his work in genetics) at least {Ridley 2000: 47}, it would appear that Muller had less problem with the underlying *ideology* of eugenics.

Politically Muller was decidedly left wing, and at the very least a communist sympathiser who spent time in Stalin's Russia before returning to the USA {Ridley 2000: 47-48}. This political orientation is potentially of importance, for in the eugenics field of the 1930s there was said to be a marked leftward tendency, especially amongst scientifically trained sympathisers. The lay members and followers of the movement ranged along the spectrum from "*conservatives*" to "*social radicals*", whilst the "*prominent biologists among them ranged from the moderate left to the Marxist left*" {Kevles 1985: 170}. This orientation was itself a reflection of a more general liberalisation (some may say radicalisation) of society which, in Britain, saw the rise of the Labour party from obscurity in 1900 to government in 1924 {Fraser 1984: 186}.

In this political and intellectual climate, with its ready acceptance of at least the principle of human equality, the 'old' ideas of middle and upper class superiority which had marked the early eugenics movement were no longer likely to be accepted uncritically. Class elitism on the nineteenth and early twentieth century model was no longer in fashion, in either eugenics or contemporary society more generally. This view is supported by Kerr and Shakespeare {2002: 62} although they find the immediate post-war period, rather than the decade prior to world war two, as the major turning point. Whatever the exact timing, this is an example of a particular (in this case eugenic) intellectual field being modified by changes in the surrounding cultural field of modernity.

7. 8 The political becomes personal

Whenever the precise moment of change, if it could be determined with any accuracy, the fact is that the eugenic intellectual field had shifted. This is not to say that 1930s and 1940s (and later) eugenics was no longer elitist, and it is emphatically not to say that the eugenic tradition was lost. Rather, the major focus shifted from the 'unfitness' of a whole stratum of society to the unfitness of individuals, with an increasing emphasis on medical interventions at the individual level rather than broader attempts at class-based social engineering. Eugenics had become personal, with the preferred elite now consisting of those people deemed (most often on intellectual grounds {Paul 1998a: 144 *et seq*}) 'able'. Ability was judged not only in terms of full participation in modern society, but also and more importantly, of the possession of genes which were deemed on balance to be capable of making a positive contribution to future generations of society {e.g. Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 66}.⁴⁷

⁴⁷Particularly in the US context, this might appear to mark a degree of divergence between 'purely' eugenic and racist thought. Despite more recent attempts by, for example, Herrnstein & Murray {1996 - *Bell Curve*} to demonstrate supposed statistical links between 'IQ' and 'race', which has clear eugenic overtones, the fact remains that 'mainstream' eugenic attention switched, around the time of world war two, to individual genetic endowment. Racists (and

This balancing approach is clearly seen in the 1952 words of Herndon, a leading United States clinician, discussing a couple wherein the female had undergone 'corrective' surgery for a genetically determined condition of harelip and cleft palate. In Herndon's opinion, procreation should be encouraged here, because in general the physical and intellectual endowment of this couple was:

sufficiently above normal that their reproduction might be advantageous to society as a whole, offsetting the disadvantage of the possible continuation of the defective gene [responsible for the harelip and cleft palate] {Herndon 1952 quoted in Paul 1998a: 145}.

Herndon was speaking here in the context of genetic counselling, and his chosen vehicle was *The American Journal of Human Genetics*.

Eugenicists as a whole have never envisioned themselves as 'pure' scientists. They have always expected, and sought, 'real world' applications of the body of knowledge which they have accumulated. Eugenics "*is purely an applied science*" in the words of Castle {1916: 3}. This idea had been clearly enunciated in the nineteenth century:

if superior people are desired they must be bred; and if imbeciles, criminals, paupers and otherwise unfit are undesirable citizens they must not be bred {Woodhull 1891, cited by Black 2003: 22},

and is best demonstrated by an examination of the topic of "*germ plasm*" the supposedly immutable means, postulated by Wiesmann in the late nineteenth century (see sections 6.4 and 7.3 above), by which inherited traits and characteristics were believed to be transmitted through the generations {e.g. Keller 2000: 17; Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 27}.

Popenoe and Johnson {1925: 25 - 74} are very clear in their rebuttal of any suggestion that acquired characteristics may be transmitted congenitally. In this process they examine and reject then current theories about 'racial poisons', such as alcohol and nicotine, which were supposed to bring about degeneration of the individual germ plasm and thus cause the children of their users to be born 'defective':

[t]he germ-plasm is so carefully isolated ... that it is almost impossible to injure it, except by treatment so severe as to kill it altogether {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 63}.

Of course if 'good' germ plasm may not be "*injured*" by external influences, then neither may 'poor' material be raised to a higher standard. The immediate effect of this eugenic argument, typified above by Popenoe and Johnson {1925}, is to deflect attention away from the social environment.⁴⁸

sexists) meanwhile continue with their dubious view that whole sections of humanity may be arranged in some form of hierarchy of 'ability'.

⁴⁸At least in the case of pregnant women, this opinion is now reversed. Public health authorities routinely caution about the use of nicotine and alcohol during pregnancy on the grounds that these may cause foetal distress or injury. e.g. "*According to the Surgeon General*", drinking alcohol during pregnancy carries a "*risk of birth defects*" {USA statutory warning notice}.

Since in this view environment cannot influence the germ plasm, the obvious conclusion is that germ plasm instead influences the environment. As a UK official report found, in regard to a so-called 'social problem group':

[t]heir social and economic failure is primarily due to their poor mental endowment Low mentality and poor environment form a vicious circle {HMSO 1929b: 81 para 92}.

It is in this context, of an immutable carrier of genetic endowment which may allegedly lead to social consequences, that a leading USA eugenicist, Laughlin, said in 1914:

society must look upon germ-plasm as belonging to society and not solely to the individual who carries it {quoted in Paul 1998b: 71}.

Besides the expected "*feeble-minded*" and "*insane*" categories which had attracted eugenic attention from the (modern) outset, Laughlin called for the mandatory sterilisation of people deemed to be:

... (3) criminalistic ... (4) epileptic; (5) inebriate (including drug habitues); (6) diseased (including the tuberculous, the syphilitic, the leprous, and others with chronic, infectious, and legally segregable diseases); (7) blind ...; (8) deaf ...; (9) deformed (including the crippled); (10) dependent (including orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps, and paupers) {Pfeiffer 1994: 494}.

It would be easy to dismiss Laughlin, as does Pfeiffer {1994}, as a 'zealous follower of eugenics' and, perhaps, as some form of insignificant crank. Easy but mistaken, for Laughlin was a leader of USA eugenics whose voice was heard, and who enjoyed a certain degree of standing in national and international circles {Black 2003: 49 *et seq*}. As the personal protege of Davenport, who founded the Cold Spring Harbor eugenic facility, Laughlin was appointed Superintendent of the (USA) Eugenics Record Office in 1910. As part of his duties in this post, Laughlin took a leading part in both the Cold Spring Harbor and American Breeders Association activities, with a special interest in "*the problem of cutting off the supply of defectives*" {Black 2003: 57}. The recorded musings of the American Breeders Association actually went further: although not presented as policy, they also mooted the idea of 'euthanasia' {Black 2003: 60}.

7. 9 Structured selectivity: proposals and policies

In the USA eugenic sterilisation was first legalised by a state law enacted in Indiana in 1907 {Black 2003: 67; Ordover 2003: 33/34; Pfeiffer 1994: 483}. Practice had anticipated law, with Pfeiffer noting that, before 1907:

even though there was no legal basis for it[,] Dr. [Harry] Sharpe alone sterilized 600 - 700 hundred (sic - this appears to be a misprint for '6 - 7 hundred') boys in the Indiana State Reformatory {Pfeiffer 1994: 482}.

Black {2003}, in drawing attention to the political lobbying which led to the Indiana law, identifies one of the leading activists as "*Dr. Harry Clay Sharp, physician at the Indiana Reformatory*" {Black 2003: 63}. It would seem that "*Dr. Harry Sharpe*" {Pfeiffer 1994} is, despite the different spelling, the "*Dr. Harry Clay Sharp*" of Black {2003}. It is worth noting

that Black is more modest in his claims of the industry of 'his' Dr. Sharp, stating that he had performed some "206" operations before the law was passed {Black 2003: 66}. The precise figure is immaterial here: the salient fact, evidenced by both Black {2003} and Pfeiffer {1994}, is that a prominent (at state level) member of the USA medical profession was able to act, extra-legally, in order to perform eugenic sterilisation on an appreciable scale.

Black {2003: ch 5} and Pfeiffer {1994} leave no room for doubt that the various USA state sterilisation laws were eugenically-inspired, driven by the negative urge to prevent the procreation of what Popenoe and Johnson {1925} term "*the dysgenic classes*". Black specifically notes the nationwide interest of:

the Cold Spring Harbor stalwarts of the American Breeders Association, its Eugenic Record Office and the Carnegie Institution's Experimental Station {Black 2003: 69}

in the sterilisation debate. Pfeiffer meanwhile, in a context which includes both (USA) sterilisation laws and a wider discussion of legally enshrined disregard of the rights of disabled people (itself an indication of their differential incorporation within the ambient society) is adamant that:

[t]he legal impact ... upon the lives of people with disabilities did not happen by accident. ... One of the primary sources of these prejudicial attitudes which led to the laws is the Eugenics Movement which has its roots in ... especially the work of Charles Darwin {Pfeiffer 1994: 489}.

Within the analytical framework favoured by the present author, Pfeiffer is here describing the means by which an intellectual field may produce effects manifest within the world of phenomena through the agency of social policy. Abstract thought has become life-changing action: the 'metaphysical' has become physical.

The words of Ordover {2003} both reinforce the conclusion that intellectual field effects are to the fore, and move it forwards. Speaking of "*a rash of [USA] sterilization statutes ... between 1907 and 1932*", she informs us that:

*[i]n almost every state that legalized sterilization, eugenics boards were convened. Essentially, these were medical panels established to grant or deny doctors the right to sterilize anyone with a real or imagined physical or developmental disability ... the legislatures had established a physician-run de facto court system. ... Beyond **merging** with the judiciary, medical science had **become** the judiciary* {Ordover 2003: 78/79} (original emphases).⁴⁹

Ordover effectively describes here the way in which intellectual fields may interact with and reinforce one another. In this abstract is found evidence of eugenic intellectual field effects and distinct elements of the over-arching modern cultural field (particularly the high status accorded science and the reliance upon 'expertise'), and the dynamically reciprocal relationship

⁴⁹ There are clear empirical links here to the incorporation of medico-legal 'experts' within the Nazi eugenic social policy process examined in sections 3.11, 3.12 above. Meanwhile, the evidence here reinforces, and is in turn reinforced by, the discussion of chapter five above.

between them. Eugenic thought has influenced society at one of its widest-ranging parts, the law, which is itself in large part designed to enforce a degree of standardisation or 'normalcy' within the ambient societal setting.

Contemporaneously the bureaucracy of (USA state) government has here sub-contracted a part of its functional role as manager of society to the medico-scientific 'experts', whilst medicine has in turn influenced and to some extent sanctified eugenic thought. To return directly to Ordoover:

[t]he linguistic and material composition of eugenic policies relied, and continues to rely, on the interplay of legal, public policy, and medical discourses {Ordoover 2003: 209}.

For Ordoover {2003} then, what is here referred to as the eugenic intellectual field does not exist in a vacuum, nor is it immutable. This is an expected property of field dynamics, and may be readily observed by a comparison of policies between, say, the USA and UK. What is also on view here is the way in which ideology, by energising an intellectual field, may influence social policy. A major result seen above is the implementation of policies of structured selectivity, in that the legislature has taken for itself the right to determine who may not procreate. In the process, a large part of the policing function has been handed to the medical 'expert'.

Despite a strong bias towards eugenicists, who in general agreed with the thinking and ultimate aspirations of their counterparts in the USA, the (UK) Wood Committee of 1929 did not recommend sterilisation in Britain as a panacea for these ills, preferring instead:

segregation: the lowest 10 per cent [of the general population] must be protected from themselves, and society must be protected from their excessive fertility {Mazumdar 1992: 200}.

Put another way, the incarceration in same-sex institutions of individuals deemed to fall within one of the categories under scrutiny was strongly recommended.

Leaving aside what may be a faulty understanding of the mechanics of inheritance, especially of behaviour, what is left of this finding of the Wood Committee is the bald declaration that a particular group of disabled people should not be allowed to take part in 'normal' social activities, nor should their 'disreputable' genes be made available to the societal gene pool. In contemporary twenty-first century terms, the more so when set against the 'right to family life' contained within the European Convention on Human Rights, this is a call for a policy of structured selectivity, leading to their differential incorporation within society, in relation to a designated sector of society. The clear signal is that certain bloodlines should become extinct 'in the public interest'.

7. 10 No short cuts in the UK - the eschewal of sterilisation

It is in this context that the (UK) *Departmental Committee on Sterilisation* was commissioned in 1932, with a mandate to:

examine and report on the information already available regarding the hereditary transmission and other causes of mental disorder and deficiency; to consider the value of sterilisation as a preventive measure ... {HMSO 1934: 3}.

As with the preceding Wood Committee, this later enquiry was open to overtly eugenic influences.

Of the chair(man), Brock, and seven members, three (Brock, Fisher and Tredgold (which latter also sat on the Wood Committee)) are identified as members of the Eugenics Society {Africa2000}. Of these, Fisher was very much a leading figure in that Society {Kevles 1985; Mazumdar 1992, 1999} and had in 1924 advocated the segregation and/or sterilisation of "*the feeble minded*" as a means of achieving "*a thirty-six percent reduction of incidence*" of this supposed condition within a single generation {Kevles 1985: 165}. Apart from these three eugenicists, a fourth member of the committee was "*Miss Ruth Darwin*" {HMSO 1934: 3}, grand-daughter of Charles. She supported research, *via* the Darwin Trust, into "*mental defect, disease or disorder*" {Kevles 1985: 150}.

Confidence in the objectivity of this *Sterilisation Committee* is certainly called into question by an examination of its membership. It is also noticeable that of the fifty-nine individual witnesses called (one, Bond, appeared twice in different capacities), who are named in the Report {HMSO 1934: *Appendix I*}, at least nineteen may be identified as members of the Eugenics Society {Africa2000; Mazumdar 1999}. It should be noted that, by the nature of the proceedings, each witness was considered to have relevant knowledge and expertise to bring to bear on the deliberations of the committee.

Perhaps the most prominent of these eugenic witnesses were Burt, Fox and Shrubsall (who had all previously served on the Wood Committee). Other influential identified eugenicists {Africa2000; Mazumdar 1992} were: Lord Dawson appearing in his capacity as President of the Royal College of Physicians; Lett appearing "*on behalf of the Royal College of Surgeons*" {HMSO 1934: *Appendix I*}; Bond, who appeared twice, both "*on behalf of the Royal College of Surgeons*" alongside Lett and another, and also "*representing the Eugenics Society*" alongside three others {*ibid*}. Besides the (UK) Eugenics Society representatives, a Mrs. Hodson, "*Honorary Secretary of the International Federation of Eugenic Organisations*" {*ibid*} also appeared before the committee.

Of the identified eugenicists {Africa2000; Kevles 1985; Mazumdar 1992} amongst the recorded witnesses to the Wood Committee {HMSO 1934: *Appendix I*}, two were professors

(one of zoology, one of animal genetics), eight were medical doctors and two were eminent surgeons. Also on the witness list are two prominent professors, Haldane (human genetics) and Hogben (social biology), both of whom Kevles {1985} associates with 'reform' eugenics and who opposed the methodology, but by no means the sentiment, of 'mainstream' eugenics.

Of the fifty-nine witnesses called before the Sterilisation Committee, fully one third were either known eugenicists or were closely linked to eugenic thought. The proceedings of this committee again demonstrate both the bureaucratic reliance upon 'expert opinion' to inform policy decisions noted in chapter five above, and the 'expert' status accorded eugenics and eugenicists of the time. Of special note is the decision of the committee, "[a]t the risk of going beyond our reference", to extend its considerations to:

grave physical disabilities ... which have been shown to be transmissible {HMSO 1934: 40}.

It is then at first sight surprising that the Sterilisation Committee flatly refused to endorse compulsory sterilisation {HMSO 1934: 37/38} and, in advocating voluntary sterilisation, discussed at length the necessity of rigorous safeguards to avoid any hint of compulsion {HMSO 1934: 38 - 45, 47}. This appears to represent a marked withdrawal from the 1914 (USA) position of Laughlin, that society should seek effective ownership of an individual's "*germ plasm*" {Paul 1998b: 71, discussed above}. As it was, this Committee, in reaching its final conclusions, leaned heavily towards pragmatic, as opposed to ideological, grounds. In doing this the Committee notes what is in essence a field interaction effect, in that it considers the interplay between societal, political and 'human rights' issues:

[w]e assume that the Legislature would not feel justified in compelling any persons to submit to sterilisation, unless it could be shown beyond reasonable doubt that some at least of their offspring would either be mentally defective or would develop mental disorder. ... [N]o such proof can be produced {HMSO 1934: 37 para 66}.

More pragmatically, and more in keeping with the long-established eugenic fear of 'feeble-mindedness', the committee {HMSO 1934: 38 para 68} draws upon the evidence of "[w]itnesses of great experience" and their shared worries that the introduction of a compulsory sterilisation scheme could act to deter parents of 'suspect' children from seeking advice and guidance.

It is this fear, that:

[a]ny measure which results in "driving defect underground" will gravely impede the administration of the Mental Deficiency Acts {HMSO 1934: 38 para 68},

which appears to be uppermost in the mind of this committee. The committee briefly considers the application of compulsory sterilisation in certain "*exceptional cases*" brought to its notice by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, but again decides on pragmatic grounds that:

sterilisation is at best only a partial remedy for the harm done by such defectives and their anti-social tendencies would be more effectively controlled by segregation {HMSO 1934: 38 para 69}.

Ultimately, this committee recommends that any sterilisation scheme should be strictly voluntary {HMSO 1934: 38-49}.

This finding of the Sterilisation Committee is not so far opposed to the thrust of Laughlin's stance {Paul 1998b: 71} as it may appear to be. In the first instance, there was at the time a long-standing (medieval) UK law preventing the 'emasculatation', and often interpreted as meaning 'sterilisation', of men. This law in its origins was enacted to prevent the permanent maiming of captured soldiers, and in particular the rendering of them as unfit to fight. The committee claim that this bar on castration "*probably had its origin*" as a means to permit of the continued procreation of those liable to military service⁵⁰ {HMSO 1934: 39 para 70}. Were the committee to be correct in this supposition, sterilisation of presumably 'fit' and 'healthy' males would be dysgenic. As such it is to be expected that this would be viewed with concern by eugenicists.

It is seemingly in accord with the thinking of eugenicists to prefer here the UK *status quo* for there is a potential benefit for the national vigour in doing so. That the Sterilisation Committee remained true to the eugenic field which influenced the thinking of so many of its members and witnesses is further evidenced by what it did *not* advocate. It did not suggest that voluntary sterilisation should be legalised *per se*, preferring to recommend that this 'privilege' should be extended, as a special 'right', to certain strictly defined sectors of society {HMSO 1934: 41 para 74}. In other words, this committee was not prepared to advocate the unrestricted right of the majority of individuals to dispose of their reproductive capacity, of ownership of their "*germ plasm*", as they themselves may wish.

7. 11 Willing volunteers?

Unsurprisingly, the group of people to be granted the 'right' to voluntary sterilisation included those identified on 'mental' grounds:

we know enough to be sure that inheritance plays an important part in the causation of mental defects and disorders ... [and] mentally defective and mentally disordered parents are ... unable to discharge their social and economic liabilities or create an environment favourable to the upbringing of children {HMSO 1934: 39 para 71}

and, what is more:

there is reason to believe that sterilisation would in some cases be welcomed by the patients themselves (added emphasis) {*ibid*}.

⁵⁰ Whilst the source is lost to memory, the present writer is of the opinion that the reason was to avoid the perceived lack of aggression of the castrato which would have rendered him unfit for further military service. Possibly the committee here is swayed by eugenic views in seeking a 'dysgenic' explanation for the law.

This finding is:

*more than sufficient, to justify allowing and **even encouraging** ... [such] patients to adopt the only certain method of preventing procreation (added emphasis) {HMSO 1934: 39 para 71},*

It is tempting to speculate, given that only in "some cases" are the "patients" expected to embrace this procedure, as to just how much 'encouragement' may be necessary to achieve any marked degree of efficacy here.

The overall tone of the Sterilisation Committee is emphatically eugenic. The prime consideration of the report is the wellbeing, be it economic, social or genetic, of society as a whole. This is not to suggest that individual rights are disregarded to the same extent as was apparent in certain states of the USA. The emphasis here is on "encouraging", not coercing, people to comply. Nonetheless, with regard to 'voluntary' sterilisation, the Committee:

attach[es] special importance to this ... because of its value in relation to the social problem group {HMSO 1934: 41 para 75}.

However, this self-same "social problem group" is said to consist largely of:

insane persons, epileptics, paupers, criminals (especially recidivists), unemployables, habitual slum dwellers, prostitutes, inebriates and other social inefficients {HMSO 1929b: 80, para 91}.⁵¹

In other words, including many people who may be presumed to be either unusually suggestible or susceptible to subtle pressures.

This inherent vulnerability is recognised by the Sterilisation Committee, leading to a rather awkward passage of reasoning {HMSO 1934: 42, para 76} during which the committee appears to reinterpret radically the meanings of both 'voluntary' and 'casuistry':

higher grade [mental health asylum] patients are capable of understanding what they are asking for [in sterilisation requests] It is true of some [patients] ... that the validity of their consent would be open to question. But the essence of a voluntary system is that those who object should be free to do so. ... [I]t seems to us mere casuistry to discuss how far the patient fully appreciates all the implications of consent {HMSO 1934: 42, para 76}.

It is now clear that this committee is proposing an 'opt-out' system, where the default position is to accept sterilisation, and cares little if at all for the level of understanding of the candidate. Mere lack of objection, by someone who by definition may not realise the seriousness of the position, is here taken to equal 'consent'. Contrary to the principles of (UK) Common Law, this presumed consent is not even to be qualified by the adjective 'informed'. This rather raises the question as to just how 'voluntary' such voluntary sterilisation is to be.⁵² This is a proposed individual surgical solution to an admittedly "social problem", and it is sharply focused on a sector of society differentiated on supposed medical grounds. The ultimate aim, in both the

⁵¹ This definition, drawn from part III of the Wood Committee Report, is specifically adopted by the Sterilisation Committee {HMSO 1934: 54, para 102}.

⁵² A similar argument is considered in relation to eugenic abortion in section 9.8 below.

USA and UK, is to reduce the supposed fecundity and the ability to self-replicate of the "*social problem group*"; to seize control of the relevant ('problematic') fraction of society's "*germ plasm*".

However else one views this, it is an example of a proposed social policy of structured selectivity with an intended outcome of differential incorporation. In this case the operating factor is not one of outright material inequality. It is far more insidious than this, revolving as it does around differentiation between sections of society which are to be encouraged to procreate, or not, as the case may be. This is a division between valued and disvalued genes, between full and partial citizenship. What is more, the Sterilisation Committee does not restrict itself to 'mental defect' or 'disorder'. This is made clear by the use of subtitles: "*Restriction to Mental Cases Undesirable*" and "*The Problem of the Carrier*" {HMSO 1934: 40}. Here, concern widens to include supposedly hereditary:

physical defects which are sufficiently grave in character to justify sterilisation
... [including] *haemophilia, hereditary blindness [and] deaf-mutism* {HMSO 1934: 40/41 para 73}.

These latter specified conditions are particularly informative, for they do not presuppose any potential anti-social or physically dangerous behaviour on the part of the individual. In consequence analysis is not clouded by complicating arguments related to the personal security of others.

In terms of a disability studies' 'social model' analysis discussed in chapter two above, the deliberations of the Sterilisation Committee {HMSO 1934: 40/41} very clearly represent an urge to ensure that individuals fit a societal template. This has close ideological links to the 'medical model' approach (see section 2.2 above) of 'rehabilitation', and is also intellectually related to ideas of 'functionality *versus* deviance' expressed by, amongst others, Parsons {1951}. Rather than considering that society may be re-arranged to accommodate diversity, the Committee here demonstrates the desire to accept the prevailing societal environment as a given and to act instead upon the physiology of individuals.

In a societal field analysis, what is seen here is a complex interaction between diverse field effects. Firstly is seen the influence of modern ideas of 'normality' {e.g. Davis 1997a; Hughes 2002} and 'order' {e.g. Bauman 1990} discussed at length in chapter four above. There is also clearly an urge towards the categorisation of people, which itself relates to the modernist 'rationality' of Weber {1958, 1961, 1978} already noted. In the terms of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*} these are prominent power lines underpinning the modern cultural field. Secondly, and unsurprisingly given the make-up of the committee, are seen eugenic field effects such as the concern with the supposedly "*transmissible*" nature of "*defects*" {HMSO 1934: 40 para 73}. Thirdly there are here discernible echoes of an older field, and one which has fluctuated over time {e.g. Bragg 1997, discussed in section 4.8 *et seq* above}, wherein 'persons of difference'

may become, as Shakespeare {1997: *Title*} has it, "*dustbins for disavowal*"; symbolic repositories of blame for the ills of society.

The wide-ranging effect of the eugenic intellectual field is clearly seen in the words of a member of the British eugenics movement of the period (at least) between 1924 - 1937 {Africa2000}. E W Barnes, Bishop of Birmingham (1924-1953), said in a 1933 public address delivered in Liverpool Cathedral:

[u]nder the harsh social order which prevailed almost to our own time, those human beings who were manifestly unfitted for the struggle and responsibilities of social life failed to survive. The unfit, the defective and the degenerate were eliminated. But of late at great cost to the community we have not only preserved them, but have also allowed them to propagate their like. ... [S]uch blind humanitarianism is neither Christian nor sensible ... [and] [a]s we reflect alike upon the sternness of God and upon the freedom of Christ's teaching from any hint of indulgent good nature, we ought to ... accept ... measures against which religious sentimentality will raise an outcry. If England ... is to save ... the world ... she must be racially sound {quoted in Africa2000 under the entry 'Barnes, Bishop E. W.'}.

Barnes spoke, in 1933, at a time when the Nazi party had barely come to power in Germany and the dangers of excessive eugenic zeal were not necessarily evident. To this extent, ignorance may be grounds for mitigation. However, it would appear that His Grace was not a whole-hearted supporter of Britain's post-war welfare settlement either, being quoted in *The Times* as delivering a speech to Birmingham Rotary Club in November 1949 in which he stated that, at some point in the future:

sterilisation of the unfit would be essential to England's social organization and might well be the complement of the welfare state ... we must get rid of the slovenly, vicious, idle wasters of the community. Unfortunately the welfare state is only too likely to encourage their increase {quoted in Africa2000 under the entry 'Barnes, Bishop E. W.'}.

For him, there were certain sectors of society unfit to breed, or indeed to live. Their bloodlines had proved 'unworthy', and to large extent they could be distinguished in socio-economic terms. In his dismissal of the Welfare State may also be seen a strain of Malthusian fundamentalism which, if nothing else, points towards a continuity of thinking within the Anglican intellectual field.⁵³

If the Bishop's obituary (he died in 1953) in the *Eugenics Review* is to be believed, he went somewhat further than this call for sterilisation, being credited with saying that:

⁵³ Presumably somewhere within the Canons of the Anglican Church is to be found the expectation that a priest will be a practising Christian. It might appear that, at least in the 1930s, there is no such obligation on him (and today increasingly her) to be tainted by "*religious sentimentality*" nor unduly burdened by a sense of a duty of care towards the weak. Others may find in the New Testament Gospels ample evidence of Christ's "*indulgent good nature*" towards all manner of human weaknesses - we might expect a Bishop to have some awareness of the Gospels.

[m]any are beginning to think that medically controlled euthanasia for defective (sic) children should be an element of our social policy {quoted in Africa2000 under the entry 'Barnes, Bishop E. W.'}.

Although the full context of these remarks is not given, their appearance in the *Eugenics Review* might suggest that the Bishop himself was not unsympathetic to these thoughts of "many" of his contemporaries.

Whatever else, Bishop Barnes consistently argues against an all-inclusive society. Rather, he calls for a policy approach steeped in structured selectivity. Specifically, the Bishop advocates the reduced (or non-) incorporation of disabled people within modern society, and in so doing he does not appear to have expressed any idea of voluntarism. There is a sharp focus upon 'pauperisation' and a catch-all category of 'the feeble-minded', which latter includes both the socially inept and those deemed morally 'unsound'. Pauperisation and 'feeble-mindedness' were supposed to run in families {HMSO 1934; Mazumdar 1999}, and were assumed by many eugenicists to be inherited characteristics; or at the least to have a large genetic component alongside a correspondingly small social cause. This allowed societal phenomena such as poverty and what is currently termed social exclusion to become medicalised, with the focus upon individuals and their families, whilst largely absolving society from blame for the ills suffered by people supposedly so 'afflicted'.

Chapter 8: A wider perspective

8. 1 Proem

This chapter is designed to demonstrate that eugenic ideas, or the eugenic intellectual field, spread widely during the earlier part of the twentieth century. Evidence will be adduced here that points to a degree of flexibility, with different societies hosting sometimes distinct varieties of eugenic ideology. In other societies, whilst eugenics remained close to the UK/US model which is the prime focus of this study, there are noticeable variations in the extent to which legislation was used to promote or enforce eugenic ideals. Variations between loci and over time are predicted by intellectual field analysis, and are explicable in terms of field interactions leading to modifications of an original eugenic field.

It is in this cause that this section will initially introduce evidence of the spread of eugenics, before discussing in section two a fundamental disagreement between eugenicists relating to the mechanisms of heredity. The remaining sections of this chapter are then used to provide brief overviews of selected societal experiences of eugenics. The case of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR], as representative of a major (nominally) non-capitalist society, concludes the chapter. In the process, this chapter addresses research questions (ii), (iii) and (iv).

It is clear that the eugenic intellectual field prevalent in the west in the period up to 1945 was not confined to Germany, Britain and the USA. Citing a report⁵⁴ of 1934, Webster informs his reader that, at that date:

10 western nations ... had either introduced, or were in process of introducing, sterilisation laws. Germany was by no means ahead of the field {Webster 1998 unpaginated}.

The urge to combat perceived societal ills by 'improving' the condition of individuals and populations had, however, spread beyond these ten 'pioneer' nations.⁵⁵ Not always directly resulting in legislation, the eugenic intellectual field had exerted an influence on the dominant cultural fields of a significant number of disparate societies. In this context, Adams informs us that between 1890 and 1930, "*eugenics movements developed in more than thirty countries*" {Adams 1990b: 5}. Although he does not catalogue these thirty countries, Adams names the fifteen full members of the International Commission of Eugenics in 1924 as being:

Argentina, Belgium, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States {Adams 1990b: 5}.

⁵⁴ Called by Webster the 'Brock Report', this is the (UK) *Sterilisation Committee* report cited heavily in the present work as HMSO 1934.

⁵⁵ Webster does not name these countries, which were: USA; Canada; Denmark; Switzerland; Germany; Tasmania; New Zealand; Finland; Norway and Sweden {HMSO 1934 109 - 117}.

Alongside these, Adams notes seven associate member countries:

Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Australia, and New Zealand {Adams 1990b: 5}.

Similarly, Schneider {1990} reports that eugenics was:

a widespread phenomenon found at the turn of the nineteenth century in most Western industrial societies {Schneider 1990: 69}

The lesson to be drawn from the foregoing, and developed below, is that the eugenic intellectual field was capable of interacting with a variety of disparate cultural fields. Before moving to consider national effects, it is first convenient to note a fundamental disagreement between eugenicists of different persuasions, and particularly the followers of a Lamarckian school of thought *contra* those who followed Mendelism. Whilst both parties held the same aim, to 'improve' the human condition, and thus shared a common ideological orientation, they differed on their interpretation of the means by which traits and characteristics may be open to environmental influences. Thus whilst the objectives were identical, supporters of one school or the other were wont to develop quite different policy initiatives.

8. 2 'Philosophical' Lamarckism -v- 'scientific' Mendelism

One essential difference between Lamarckism and the 'scientific' Mendelism which rapidly became the 'authorised' western eugenic and genetic paradigm, is to be found in the scientific rigour, or its alleged lack, with which the theories were tested. Writing in the USA in 1916, Castle describes the Frenchman Lamarck (1744-1829) as "*the greatest evolutionist before Darwin*" {Castle 1916: 18}, whilst Osborn {1929: 228} styles him "*the most prominent figure between Aristotle and Darwin*". In the terms of Bourdieu, either view places Lamarck in an influential position in the nascent modern eugenic intellectual field.

Castle {1916: 18-22} provides an overview of Lamarck's ideas which on his reading were founded on three prime principles: that environmental effects may produce heritable mutation; that physical evolution may arise as a response to need (the examples cited by Castle are the growth of horns for fighting and teeth for chewing) and that the continued use, or disuse, of an organ or limb may lead to an inherited characteristic in future generations of, respectively, greater or lesser development of that body part.⁵⁶ The theorisation of Lamarck in the area of evolution is summed-up by Osborn thus:

it is not organs which have given rise to habits, but habits, modes of life, and environment which have given rise to organs {Osborn 1929: 231}.

⁵⁶ "*the more frequent and sustained employment of each organ ... strengthens this organ, develops it, increases it in size, and gives it a power proportioned to the length of its employment; whereas the constant lack of use of the same organ ... weakens it, deteriorates it ... and ends by causing it to disappear*" {Lamarck cited by Osborn 1929: 239}.

Having noted that Darwin shared some, but by no means all, of the ideas of Lamarck, Castle then moves to cite empirical work by Weismann which, although the debate (in 1916) "*has not yet ended*" {Castle 1916: 21}, tended to disprove or at the least challenge Lamarck's basic assumptions. As Castle puts it:

[b]esides showing that there is no sufficient evidence that acquired characters **are** inherited, Weismann pointed out anatomical and physiological reasons why we should not expect them to be inherited (original emphasis) {Castle 1916: 22}.

Although not part of Weismann's argument, his basic premiss appears to be of the order that there seems no cause to suppose that a child of an unlucky family of several generations of amputees would itself be born with a limb missing, yet this might be taken to be the force and direction of Lamarck's reasoning (although he does posit very small increments of change over many generations {Osborn 1929: 221-300}).

Nonetheless, although now largely rejected by western geneticists, there are echoes of Lamarckian thought to be found throughout the ideology of eugenics. This is seen in the possible confusion between social factors (and indeed the effects of socialisation) and heredity discussed in sections 7.3 and 7.4 above (but see also section 9.12 below), and certain provisions of the Nazi law described in section 3.13 above. It is germane to recall:

the admiration which has been accorded to [Lamarck] in Germany by Haeckel and others {Osborn 1929: 229},

and of particular interest in the context of this present inquiry to note:

that his theory of causes ... forms the very heart of the biological system of Herbert Spencer {Osborn 1929: 229}.

Here again, in the words of Osborn, is compelling evidence of the eminent and thus authoritative position of Lamarck within the eugenic intellectual field of modernity.

Curiously, Osborn in his second {1929} edition, which had been "*revised and extended to embrace recent scholarship*" {Osborn 1929: title page}, makes no mention of the 'rediscovery' of the work of Mendel in 1900. This re-awakening of the 1866 thinking of Mendel was accomplished simultaneously but independently by three scholars {Castle 1916: 82; Kevles 1985: 43; Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 429; Watson 2000: 180}. Such serendipitous synchronicity may be seen as mere coincidence on the one hand, or as an effect linked to the 'cultural unconscious' of Bourdieu {1971a} or the 'collective unconscious' of Mannheim {1936} on the other.

In either case, Bateson was the UK champion of Mendelian theory. Strictly speaking, it was to this paradigm that Bateson ascribed the title 'genetics' {e.g. Kevles 1985: 45}. The investigation of Mendelian heredity gave added form to earlier speculation regarding the existence of discrete packages of information which influenced characteristics found in later generations. It was to these packages that Bateson gave the name 'genes'. When used to

describe the results of hybridisation, or 'crossing', Mendelism was found to lend itself readily to the formulation of mathematical 'laws' which could accurately predict the statistical likelihood of a particular trait reappearing in subsequent generations {Castle 1916: 88-108}.

Empirical work led to the observation that characteristics were not propagated in a uniform manner, which led to the idea of 'dominant' and 'recessive' factors which could produce 'reversion' or 'atavism' in a later generation to a trait which had been present in earlier forebears but had not been expressed in any intermediate generations {Castle 1916: 109-121}. It was the Mendelian school of thought which attracted the attention of the mathematical geneticists and eugenicists {Davis 1997a: 14} and which thus provided the 'rational' background which placed genetics (certainly) and eugenics (arguably) within the ambit of 'science'. However, the paradigm shift from Lamarckian to Mendelian thought was neither abrupt nor clear-cut. As Stepan notes:

[t]he centrality of Mendelian genetics and the discrediting of Lysenkoism⁵⁷ have made historians overlook the continued vitality of neo-Lamarckian ideas in French and Latin American biology and medicine in the 1920s and 1930s {Stepan 1990: 120}.

8. 3 Below the (transatlantic) belt: Australia and Brazil

As the 'associate member' list provided above by Adams {1990b: 5, section 8.1 above} indicates, eugenic ideas had spread early to the southern hemisphere. In Australia, a fertile and under-populated country, Malthusian fears of over-population and famine were not a factor. Rather, the perceived demographic problem was twofold: a large and envigoured population was required to settle the land, which called for a high level of fecundity amongst settlers, but from relatively early days fears were expressed in influential quarters that the children of British immigrants were growing on average progressively weaker (which idea is seen in a newspaper report of 1872 noted by Wyndham {2003: 8}) whilst the birthrate declined. In this latter respect it was claimed in 1898, in the learned *Australasian Medical Gazette*, that decreasing (immigrant or 'settler') fecundity represented:

a problem which legislation must deal with soon unless we are content to become a weak and degenerate country {cited in Wyndham 2003: 14}.

This opinion was reinforced in 1903 by the incumbent New South Wales government statistician (Coghlan) who claimed that Australia was faced with a:

seriously diminished and still diminishing birth-rate {Wyndham 2003: 14}.

In the eugenic orthodoxy of the day Australia enjoyed a marked advantage over both the UK and USA for:

⁵⁷ Discussed in section 8.7 below. His theorisation was largely drawn from Lamarckism.

no Australians⁵⁸ were 'born to poverty' and ... the 'hereditary pauper class' had 'no existence here'. Australia was free of old world hatreds and strifes {Wyndham 2003; 15, drawing on Coghlan 1903}.

Eugenic theory held that the (immigrant) Australian population had been self-selected for 'fitness' on the grounds that:

the sick would not risk the ... journey, the timid would seek a more assured American future and the poor could not afford the trip {Wyndham 2003: 12, paraphrasing Huntington}.

This was an apparently ideal environment for the positive eugenics of stimulating birthrates and providing neo-natal and paediatric care and nurture.

This is not to claim that 'negative' eugenic ideas and policies were absent from Australia. On the contrary, negativity was often to the fore. Here, rather than targeting a perceived 'underclass' of 'diseased and inadequate' people contained within the general population, a prime object of eugenic concern was to protect the supposedly superior white immigrants from the allegedly 'inferior races' of native Australian and Asiatic peoples. Although by no means exclusively driven by eugenics {Wyndham 2003}:

the White Australia Policy was one of the greatest eugenic laws ever passed in Australia. ... The [non-white] types we are bringing into it are not coming from the classes we should breed from. They are not people who, mentally and physically, are capable of filling the higher positions in life {Waddy 1929, cited by Wyndham 2003: 22}.

This policy of structured selectivity owed its origins to a proposal made in 1833, and thus largely pre-dates both the Darwinian and (Herbert) Spencerian ideas which in synthesis were to become 'Social Darwinism'. The policy was enshrined in (New South Wales) state law in 1893, and Australian national law in 1901. In both cases it was intended not to restrict white European immigration, but largely to inhibit migration from Asia, and particularly China. The law was, to this end, administered selectively and remained in active use as late as the 1970s {Wyndham 2003: 22/23}.

The White Australia policy has every appearance of being a product of intellectual field interference effects:

[d]octrines of social Darwinism spawned by theories of 'race and stock' were intensified by a heady mix of nationalism, Anglo-Saxon imperialism and Caucasian racism. ... [I]t is impossible to unravel the amalgam of racist, imperialist, eugenic, economic and patriotic views {Wyndham 2003: 23/24}.

Wyndham {2003} is perhaps too negative here with her claim that these influences are "impossible to unravel". It is one of the major strengths of intellectual field theory that just such an analytical approach is facilitated: power lines may be identified and isolated. Here may be seen nation-state formation and an increased concern with economic activity, both of which are identified with the cultural field of modernity {Allen *et al* 1992: 1; Hall, Held & McGrew

⁵⁸ It might appear that Coghlan excepted the indigenous (and often indigent) population.

1992: 3; Macaulay 1889: 554} and discussed in detail in section 4.5 above. On view is the heterophobia of Bauman {1989} examined in section 4.10, alongside the utilitarian ideal which allows for individual rights to be over-ridden by some 'national interest' {Kluge 1999, examined in section 4.4 above}.

Ideas of 'racial fitness' or 'superiority' are seen in the works of Wagner met with in section 3.3 above, and find an echo in the paternal and insulting USA construction of black Americans as 'child-like' noted in relation to the work of Popenoe and Johnson {1925} in section 6.9 above. The incorporation of such ideas into the social policy of a nascent state may perhaps be thought of as representing an attempt to import the 'foundation myth' of Huxley {1944} (noted in section 3.3 above). Certainly, history teaches us that ideas of 'white supremacy' (or 'superiority') have often been to the fore during processes of white colonisation, and these ideas are discernible in Australia as in, for example, parts of North America and Africa. Meanwhile, the fixation on the 'capability' of immigrants is very clearly allied to the major eugenic power line of social utility which is a constant thread throughout the present work, and will be met repeatedly in the following sections. The network of (eugenic) power lines informing this Australian policy of structured selectivity, and its concomitant differential incorporation, whilst closely woven, is not impenetrable.

Moving to Latin America, and specifically Brazil, the observer is immediately alerted to the likely presence of intellectual and/or cultural field effects:

Brazil ... possessed traits which set it apart, scientifically and ideologically, from Nazi eugenics ... and ... from the ... Anglo-Saxon cases {Stepan⁵⁹ 1990: 111}.

Nonetheless, there are also 'traits', or power lines, which have the appearance of being common to most, if not all, national eugenic intellectual fields. The first of these shared power lines, and one which appears to be ubiquitous in the consideration of eugenics, is the onset of modernity. This is most clearly seen with the statement that:

[b]etween 1900 and 1940, Brazil was undergoing profound social and political changes caused by ... industrialization [and] urbanization {Stepan 1990: 111}.

Interestingly, and a point which resonates with both the title and content of section 4.5 above:

eugenics ... was of obvious appeal to an elite convinced of the power of science to create "order and progress" {Stepan 1990: 114}.

Given that Stepan also informs her reader that "*order and progress*" is, or around the time of the first world war was, the official motto of the Brazilian Republic there is reinforcement here for the ideas discussed in section 4.5 above. There, the felt need for 'order' and the sensation of

⁵⁹ Whilst there is an extensive literature on the issue of eugenics relating to the western European and North American areas, this is not the case for the South American continent. As a result, the latter part of this section relies heavily upon the scholarship of Stepan and its findings must be thus qualified. A similar proviso is made in section 8.6 regarding the USSR.

'progress' has been depicted as a defining characteristic of modernity {Bauman 1989, 1990; Hughes 2002}.

A second characteristic of eugenics which has been observed earlier in this work (section 5.2) to have wide currency and strong connections to the modern cultural field is a notion of scientific, indeed 'medico-scientific', validity. In this regard:

the history of eugenics in Brazil must be seen as part of a generalized enthusiasm for science as a "sign" of cultural modernity {Stepan 1990: 113}.

Thus, at least in Brazil of the early twentieth century, eugenics was seen not only as being grounded in science, but also to be imbued with cultural symbolism to the extent that its adoption was assumed to be a mark of the modern state. In the Brazilian case, the espousal of eugenic ideas was indeed to have a 'scientific' consequence, for:

[i]t was the eugenicists ... who offered some of the first public lectures on ... the science of genetics[.] ... [In this way] eugenics could serve as a vehicle for the introduction of genetics in[to] countries unfamiliar with the subject {Stepan 1990: 123}.

Further, and in a manner with which the reader has become familiar in the context of Germany (section 3.5 above), in Brazil:

[e]ugenics appealed ... to an expanding medical profession whose members were eager to promote their role as experts in shaping social life {Stepan 1990: 113}.

There is strong evidence emerging of a propensity for medical practitioners within any modern or modernising society to look beyond the individual, and to concern themselves as a profession with the health of the collective 'social body' (see, for example, sections 3.5, 3.6, 7.5 above, and 9.8, 9.9 below). This appears to be a clear pattern, and one to which this enquiry will return in the contemporary setting (chapter nine below). In a move which is not unexpected, Brazilian eugenics paid particular attention to issues of 'mental health' {Stepan 1990: 118} and perceived links to "*crime, juvenile delinquency [and] prostitution*" {Stepan 1990: 122. Also 124, 135}. In a manner closely analogous to the USA experience in its racial stereotype, and to fears in both the UK and USA (and elsewhere) about some supposedly diseased and alcohol-sodden 'underclass', in Brazil:

the educated elites feared violence and danger from blacks and mulattoes,⁶⁰ who were portrayed as lazy, sick, drunk, and in a constant state of vagabondage {Stepan 1990: 113}.

Rather less predictable was the racial route which Brazilian eugenics followed.

Although not unanimous, there was strong support for the idea that a population of mixed genetic heritage could remain vigorous. Whilst the idea of incipient white supremacy remained powerful, as it did in Australia, in Brazil there was a more relaxed attitude to so-called 'racial mixing' than was the case in much of the modern world. In large part, this attitude

⁶⁰ 'People of dual heritage' in the current UK usage.

may be thought to be related to the fact that many 'elite' Brazilians were themselves of mixed or uncertain heritage {Stepan 1990: 127}, but it also owed much to the political need to promote social cohesion in an ethnically diverse state {e.g. Stepan 1990: 141/142}. Brazilian eugenicists espoused a variant strain of racial theory, which held that because people of dual heritage carried 'white' genes they could produce, by means of continued mating, a progressively 'whiter' stock. As a result, the overall tendency of the population was towards a level of whiteness which could then be associated with the "*purification*" of the Brazilian race {Stepan 1990: 137}. In this, and perhaps unconsciously given the discussion below, Brazilian theorists approached very closely to the Mendelian idea of 'reversion' noted in section 8.2 above.

Brazil had close intellectual and cultural ties with France and, in the eugenic context, shared a reverence for the ideas of Lamarck {Stepan 1990: 120, 122}. This led the early Brazilian eugenicists towards a close consideration of environmental factors, and saw a fusion of ideas of public and race hygiene. It also assisted the trend noted above towards a relaxed attitude to 'racial mixing', for Lamarckian theory suggested that a partially 'degenerate' race could be improved by a more supportive physical and societal environment {Stepan 1990}. Thus both social and socialisation products could, on this view, become embedded in the Brazilian gene pool. Another important area of congruence between Brazil and France was the influence of Catholicism. Whilst a hardening global economic environment in the 1930s tended to push Brazilian eugenicists towards a more pragmatic and 'negative' interpretation of hereditarism, and in particular towards attempts to lessen the fecundity of the 'lower classes' through sterilization and other methods of birth control {Stepan 1990: 127, 135}, the doctrines of the Catholic church acted to resist this {Stepan 1990: 140}. Such cultural and intellectual links between Brazil and France provide a convenient means to return the narrative to the European arena.

8. 4 French eugenics before world war 2

In common with much of continental Europe, and slightly after the UK, France was experiencing a period of rapid modernisation towards the end of the nineteenth century. This process, as elsewhere, led directly to fears about population decline and degeneration {Schneider 1990: 70}. In part these fears arose due to increased military action focusing attention on the physical stature of recruits, in part they were due to the increased visibility of ill-health due to the concentration of population in the expanding cities and towns. However, an important area of concern was the falling birth-rate.

Drawing on official USA government figures compiled in 1915, Popenoe and Johnson {1925: 137/138} reproduce a table which indicates that the French birthrate, at 19 per 1,000 of population in 1912 was the lowest of sixteen countries surveyed. In contrast, the (1909) figure for "*Russia in Europe*" was highest at 44 per 1,000. Of more immediate concern to France, the

1912 figure for the German Empire stood at 28.3 (or 150% of French fecundity). In the competitive European atmosphere of the time this disparity was viewed with alarm {Schneider 1990: 70}. The position of France as a recognized European military power was threatened, for if Germany's population continued to grow at such a rate the French army would become heavily out-numbered. At the same time, and for the same reason, potential German expansionism was perceived as a threat. (In the event the German birthrate declined, an event which is observed to be associated with industrialisation more generally {Schneider 1990; Wyndham 2003}).

France was represented from the outset in 'formal' international eugenics, having sent delegates to the First International Congress of Eugenics (London, 1912) {Black 2003: 235; Schneider 1990: 73} and then having hosted the inaugural meeting of the International Eugenics Committee in Paris the following year {Black 2003: 235}. In common with other countries, such as the UK and USA, there is also a pre-history to French eugenics; a gestation period during which eugenic ideology gained currency and influence. Schneider {1990} traces this gestation to the period after the mid nineteenth century. He sees it as being engendered by a composite of what may appear to be peculiarly French factors such as:

the antibourgeois prejudices of the traditional aristocratic elites {Schneider 1990: 70},

and more widespread concerns relating to:

the apparent rise in the number of criminals, alcoholics, and those afflicted with tuberculosis and venereal disease {Schneider 1990: 70}.

This latter concern about what has come to be thought of as 'public health' has already been met with in the discussion of Germany (section 3.5 above).

It would certainly seem that the major power lines of what was to become the French eugenic intellectual field made an early appearance. Prefacing in 1862 a translation of Darwin's work, Royer urged the end of:

the weak, the infirm, the incurable, the wicked themselves and all the disgraces of nature ... which they perpetuate and multiply {Royer 1862: lxvi, cited by Schneider 1990: 71}.

Given that the inspirer of Social Darwinism, Herbert Spencer {e.g. Wyndham 2003: 8}, had by no means completed his theorisation in 1862, there is support here for a claim that France was at the forefront of the intellectual application of Darwin's ideas to the human population. This is not to suggest that eugenics in France closely mirrored the UK experience. As is to be expected with intellectual/cultural field interactions, there are regional differences. In the French case, at least initially, there was a much more pronounced emphasis on 'positive' eugenic approaches {Schneider 1990: 103} than was the case in many other nations. There was also a fundamental difference in the theoretical foundations of French eugenics for here, as in Brazil, the ideas of Lamarck remained influential until the 1930s {Schneider 1990: 103}.

As a consequence of the dominance of Lamarckian ideas, much more emphasis was placed by French eugenicists upon the environment {Schneider 1990: 72/73} than was the case in, say, the UK and USA. In particular, much attention was paid to the pre- and peri- natal stages of infant life. This emphasis on maternal and foetal health is seen in the work of the obstetrician Pinard and his development of "*puericulture*", said to be:

knowledge relative to the reproduction, the conservation and the amelioration of the human species {Pinard 1899 cited by Schneider 1990: 72}.

With an emphasis not on individuals but on the "*human species*" Pinard was, in 1899, already in tune with the broader intellectual field which would lead in 1912 to the internationalising of eugenics {e.g. Black 2003: 235; Kevles 1985: 63}. In this same year, Pinard co-founded the French Eugenics Society {Schneider 1990: 73}.

The earlier eugenic impulse in France had been, as is noted above, largely 'positive'. Indeed, in 1896 a French social commentator had proposed using the sperm of:

a very small number of males of absolute perfection ... to inseminate all the females worthy of perpetuating the race {Lapouge 1896, cited by Schneider 1990: 71}.

In this is seen the eugenic mainstream utilitarian notion that, amongst other things, the state should properly seize ownership of the nation's 'germ-plasm', discussed in sections 7.10 and 7.11 above and 8.6 below. This idea of wresting control of the individual's right to reproduce, theorised in section 7.11 above as representing a policy of structured selectivity, was anathema to the Catholic church {Stepan 1990: 140}. In French society Catholicism represented an important power line of the cultural field, and this operated to modify eugenic thinking {Schneider 1990: 83}. The situation was further complicated by inter-church rivalries, particularly between the Catholic and Anglican communions. The outspoken (1933) views (discussed in section 7.11 above) of Barnes, Anglican Bishop of Birmingham at the time and a firm supporter of eugenic sterilisation, are diametrically opposed to Catholic orthodoxy.

In the European context, the religious debate was sharpened by a perception that English eugenicists were fundamentally anti-Catholic, and anti-Irish-Catholic specifically {Hasian 1996: 90 *et seq*}. In the global context, but with a keen eye on Europe and the USA, Pope Pious XI issued an encyclical in the mid 1930s, *Casti Conubii*, seen at the time as a riposte to the Anglican approval of contraception and/or sterilisation {Schneider 1990: 82}. Speaking in terms of a "*pernicious practice*", Pious XI castigated those who:

by public authority wish to prevent from marrying all those whom ... they consider ... would ... bring forth defective offspring. And more, they wish to legislate to deprive these of that natural faculty by medical action ... [T]hey can never ... tamper with the integrity of the body, ... for the reasons of eugenics ... {Pious XI cited by Black 2003: 232/233}.

Although a powerful rebuttal of birth control and especially of sterilisation, this encyclical does not proscribe eugenics *per se*. As has been said elsewhere:

[f]or many Catholics, attitudes toward eugenics depended on what **type** of eugenics was being advocated (original emphasis) {Hasian 1996: 111}.

In the French-influenced Brazilian context, it has been noted that, as a Lamarckian influenced eugenics:

kept open the possibility of regeneration, and a place for moral action, it was an approach that fitted in well with Catholic doctrine {Stepan 1990: 121}.

The two major cultural field power lines which exerted influence on the French eugenic field of the day were, then, Lamarckism and Catholicism.⁶¹

Their combined influence has been to 'soften' the eugenic experience in France (and Brazil), as the physical and societal environmentalism of Lamarckism with its insistence on the heritability of acquired characteristics led theorists and practitioners alike towards the 'positive' approach of seeking physical 'improvement' by environmental action. This in turn distracted attention and effort away from the 'negative' eugenic road of attempting to remove unwanted characteristics from the societal gene pool by a policy of differential breeding, or 'structured selectivity' in permitting the 'right' to procreate. The situation was (and is) quite different in a social environment dominated by Protestantism on the one hand, and Mendelian genetics on the other. Such an environment is found in northern Europe.

8. 5 Scandinavian initiatives

Both Webster {1998} and Kerr & Shakespeare {2002: 46 - 61} draw particular attention to Scandinavia, noting the apparent 'rediscovery' of earlier eugenic thinking and social policy in the region by both academia and the press in recent times. In this latter context, an article published in the (UK) "*Guardian*" newspaper stands as an example, both of journalistic hyperbole and to a lesser extent of the 'facts' involved:

[a]ll over Scandinavia, people are facing up to the stain now spreading across their snow-white self-image, as they discover that their governments spent decades executing a chilling plan to purify the Nordic race ... [M]ore than 60,000 Swedish women [were] sterilised from 1935 until as late as 1976 {Freedland 1997}.

Scandinavian eugenic thinking was, in its origins, contemporaneous with the growth of such ideas in the USA, UK and Germany {e.g. Blom 1991; Muller-Hill 1994}, and the major

⁶¹ Addressing the "*Dangers of Genetic Manipulation*" (title) directly, but without using the word 'eugenics', the late Pope John Paul II has since updated the Catholic position: *this kind of intervention must ... respect the fundamental dignity of men (sic) ... avoiding manipulations that tend to modify genetic inheritance and to create groups of different men (sic) Genetic manipulation becomes arbitrary and unjust when it reduces life to an object, when it forgets that it is dealing with a human subject In this case, it exposes the individual to the caprice of others, thus depriving him (sic) of his (sic) autonomy. ... [T]he expression "genetic manipulation" ... covers, on the one hand, adventuresome endeavors aimed at promoting I know not what kind of superman (sic) and, on the other hand, desirable and salutary interventions aimed at the correction of anomalies such as certain hereditary illnesses ...* {John Paul II 1983: unpaginated}.

influence came not from Europe but from the USA {Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 51}. The driving force behind Scandinavian eugenic concerns was not the Malthusian fear of population outstripping natural supplies of food and the other necessities of life. Rather it was the perception that overall population numbers were in decline, coupled with a fear that the 'lower' classes were out-breeding their social 'betters'.

Norwegian census figures demonstrate that, from a high point of 302 live births per thousand married women of child bearing age in 1900, overall national fertility declined steadily to the case where, in 1930, the corresponding figure was 148 {Blom 1991: 22 table 1.1}. The same table clearly indicates that rural fecundity, ranging from a figure of 304 in 1900 to one of 166 in 1930, declined rather less sharply during this period than did urban fecundity, down from 297 to 106 live births per thousand eligible women. This point is reinforced in census figures for the city of Kristiana (later Oslo):- live births per thousand married women of child bearing age declining dramatically from a high of 254 in 1900 to a mere 71 in 1930 {Blom 1991: 22 table 1.2}. This phenomenon was replicated elsewhere in Scandinavia. In 1934, *"Sweden had the lowest birth rate in the world"* {Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 49}. Meanwhile emigration, particularly to the USA, was also of concern in the region. In the early twentieth century, it is reported that *"one-sixth of the Swedish population"* left {Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 49}.

The demographic trend of differential decline in fecundity between urban and rural populations seen in Norway led in some quarters to alarm. During the early twentieth century it was interpreted as portending the potential swamping of *"the more prudent middle classes"* by the *"poorest and least fit classes"* {Blom 1991: 21, citing a Norwegian eugenic pamphlet of 1913}. The Scandinavian reaction to such demographic research was mixed. On the one hand there were calls for positive eugenics, in the form of rewards for maternity in both financial and social status terms {Blom 1991}. On the other hand came calls to 'improve' the 'quality' of the increasingly rare national resource - children - if necessary by restricting the unfettered right of all to procreate. 'Negative' eugenic measures were often felt to indicate a satisfactory route for social policy to follow:

[j]ust to abandon the unfit and helpless would be callous; allowing them to breed unhindered would be folly - but eugenics solved the problem. You could afford to be humane and generous towards them, feed them and clothe them, as long as eugenic measures ensured that they did not increase in number {Hansen 1996 cited by Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 52}.

In other words, a move to introduce policies of structured selectivity.

Policies to restrict the fecundity of designated portions of Scandinavian societies both sprang from and were moulded by the more general eugenic intellectual field of 'the' west. As Muller-Hill {1994: 134} informs us:

[t]here was a time when sterilization was considered **the** treatment of [eugenic] choice (original emphasis).

In Sweden, that time apparently ran from 1935 until 1975 {Muller-Hill 1994: 139} or 1976 {Freedland 1997; Webster 1998}. Elsewhere in the region:

Denmark (1929), Norway (1934) ... and Finland (1935) each passed and implemented eugenic legislation {Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 46}.

Denmark built upon the base of this 1929 law which was, technically at least, concerned with 'voluntary' sterilisation to introduce in 1934 provision for the mandatory sterilisation of selected "mental defectives" {Paul 1998b: 72}.

Notably Denmark, at least in the case of males, went beyond simple sterilisation. There, the (1929) law provided for men to be subjected to "complete bilateral castration" {HMSO 1934: 114}, a procedure which the (UK) *Sterilisation Committee* itself describes as "drastic", before noting that:

after the operation the patients were more even in temperaments, easier to get on with ... and ... their output of work was more satisfactory. ... [T]he operation may be said to have surpassed expectations {HMSO 1934: 114}.

Cynically, it might appear that castration is, as it were, a potential short-cut to producing the docile and productive worker sought by modern capitalism.

8. 6 Beyond the sphere of capitalism

In the disability studies arena there is an influential, but contested, strand of thought which lays much, if not all, of the blame for the disvaluation of disabled people squarely and almost exclusively at the door of capitalism {e.g. Abberley 1987; Finkelstein 1993, 2001; Oliver 1989, 1993}. It is certainly not disputed within this present work that the particular cultural field which informs and permeates capitalism may well act as a catalyst which serves to potentiate the eugenic intellectual field, rather the opposite. Equally, it is not claimed to be the case that materialist forces are absent from supposedly 'communist' societies, a point made by Barnes:

Marxist Communism also has its roots ... in the material and ideological developments ... [of] eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, and ... many of its principal protagonists ... embraced eugenic ideals {Barnes 1997: 19}.

The comments of Barnes lend weight to the idea of a wide-ranging eugenic intellectual field, and that is the thrust of this work. Capitalism, it is claimed here, is but one factor, not the prime mover, in the disvaluation of people on the grounds of 'impairment'.

The works of Bourdieu {1971a, *et al*} suggest that interaction (or, in the language of physics, 'interference') between fields is inevitable. This interference effect may increase, decrease or deflect the potency of one or another field. In essence this point is made, albeit in different terms, by Shakespeare {1997} with his scepticism regarding a "mono-linear" material-economic argument (section 2.3 above). Meanwhile Bourdieu {1985: 20}, often seen

as a leftist or even Marxist commentator, makes much the same point with his talk of his ideas of intellectual fields permitting "*one to avoid all kinds of reductionism, beginning with economism*" (introduced and expanded upon in section 1.5 above). For Bourdieu the economic base of a society does not, of necessity, dictate the form or direction of specific intellectual fields contained within the ambient cultural field.

The point is made by a news report of October 1998, under the headline "*Chinese scientists back eugenics*" {BBC World News 1998}. Although a brief report, this item suggests that a very large majority - "91%" - of Chinese geneticists favour an absolute ban on procreation where both partners have a genetic profile likely to lead to their offspring having a 'genetic' disease. In the words of the researcher involved, Xin Mao:

Chinese culture is quite different [to that of the west], and things are focused on the good of society, not the good of the individual {BBC World News 1998}.

This statement indicates that utilitarian ethical thought and the eugenic intellectual field are not confined to capitalism, although it is questionable as to just how accurate Xin Mao is in assuming that western society adopts a more 'liberal' attitude to "*the individual*". This point has been raised in chapters four, six and seven above and will be returned to in chapter nine below.

The most accessible history of non-capitalist eugenics is that of the USSR from the 1917 revolutions to the apparent onset of modern capitalism of the late 1980s onwards. Nonetheless, in 1990, it was said that "*the history of Soviet eugenics remains a sore subject*" {Adams 1990d: 153}, and that this circumstance has led to a "*dearth of studies on the Russian case*" which is "*lamentable*" {Adams 1990d: 154}. That situation does not appear to have been much improved on in the intervening decade, at least not in English translation. For this reason, the following portion of this study is forced to rely heavily, but not exclusively, upon the scholarship of Adams {1990d}.

The first point to make is that it is unsurprising that there should be a "*history of Soviet eugenics*". Adams {1990d: 153 *et seq*} is clear that Tsarist Russia of the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries was open to, if often suspicious of, intellectual influences from western Europe and the USA (see also Barnes 1997: 19, above). In particular Russia of this period was "*not hostile to science or technology*" {Adams 1990d: 157}, with the seminal work of Galton (F) on eugenics - *Hereditary Genius* - being published in a Russian language edition as early as 1875 {Adams 1990d: 158}.

Both Bourdieu {1971a, 1985} with his 'cultural unconscious', and Mannheim {1936} with his earlier and very similar 'collective unconscious', indicate that once an intellectual field has made its appearance in a broader cultural field context it does not then simply evaporate. Rather the field remains but societal memory of it, and hence access to its component power

lines, may become suppressed (perhaps rather 'repressed' which, in psychological usage, does not of itself imply any conscious agency) from time to time. As Bourdieu puts it:

the cultural field is transformed by successive restructurations rather than by radical revolutions, with certain themes being brought to the fore while others are set to one side without being completely eliminated, so that continuity of communication between intellectual generations remains possible {Bourdieu 1971b: 192}.

In demonstrating the migration of eugenic ideas from the USA and western/northwestern Europe, Adams {1990d} names two Russian scientists as being especially influential in the development of eugenics in their home country, Kol'tsov and Filipchenko. Each of these had received postgraduate training in western Europe before 1917 {Adams 1990d: 159/160}, and both attained academic honours in post-revolutionary Russia {*ibid*}. Kol'tsov is credited with the 1922 statement that:

[e]ugenics has before it a high ideal ... : the creation, through conscious work by many generations, of a human being of a higher type, a powerful ruler of nature and creator of life {cited by Adams 1990d: 162}.

It was largely at the behest of Kol'tsov that the Russian Eugenics Society was founded in the autumn of 1920. This was based in Moscow, although "*local eugenics societies were created in the early 1920s*" in "*other major [Russian] cities*" {Adams 1990d: 166}. These latter at first functioned more or less autonomously, before affiliating to the Moscow society "*only after several years*" {*ibid*} to become truly 'the' Russian eugenics society proper.

Adams notes that, with membership restricted to academics and "*health officials*" {Adams 1990d: 165}, the Russian eugenic movement had much more potential influence on policy than its relatively small number of members might otherwise suggest. More so than in the western movement, itself largely the preserve of a middle class elite, the post-revolutionary Russian movement was close to the levers of state power. This proximity to power was to prove a mixed blessing for, within the cultural field which was to dominate Russia for some seventy years, to be intellectually prominent could readily become equated with being vulnerable to overt and sometimes extreme political pressures.

An association between science and politics was nothing new to post-revolutionary Russia. Indeed, it might appear that in the decades preceding the 1917 revolutions science to some extent contributed to a radicalisation of domestic politics:

[i]n the period 1890 - 1910, ... a new generation of ... Russian scientists and scholars were beginning their careers. ... Many ... of this scientific generation became politically active, seeking to resist tsarist control ... {Adams 1990d: 157}.

This is not to suggest that these activists were necessarily communist or Bolshevik supporters ("*most had liberal democratic sympathies*" {Adams 1990d: 157}; "*the vast majority ... were drawn from that class generally hostile to the October ... Revolution*" {Paul 1998a: 20}), but it is clear that within both the tsarist and post-revolutionary Russian cultural fields subsidiary

academic, scientific and political intellectual fields had large areas of overlap. The examples of pre-Nazi and Nazi Germany (chapter three above), coupled with simple observation of other societal settings, would indicate that this overlap is not unusual. It would certainly appear from the work of Adams {1990d} that such interference between intellectual fields is not peculiar to capitalist societies.

Within the context of post-revolutionary Russian politico-scientific society, Adams {1990d: 169 - 174} draws attention, using the sub-headings "*Russifying eugenics*" and "*Bolshevik Eugenics*", to what are in effect intellectual field mechanics. Here Adams portrays the interplay between science and politics, the interference between intellectual fields, which in his view imbued the imported eugenic field with a particular regional identity.

In a foretaste of the western debate some ten to fifteen years later {see, e.g., Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: chapter 5; Kevles 1985: chapter XI;}, USSR eugenics during the 1920s is seen to struggle to gain and retain credibility. In this process, as in the west, the search for a 'politically correct' nomenclature predominated. This was in essence a change of name, not of ideology:

[b]iologists call eugenics 'human genetics', anthropologists call it 'social anthropology' ... hygienists call it ... 'racial hygiene' {Iudin 1925 cited by Adams 1990d: 170}.

In discussing the position of Iudin (a leading figure in the area of Russian eugenics), Adams concludes that in Iudin's opinion, "*eugenics was a union of "genetics" and "sociology"*" {Adams 1990d: 170}. The definition ascribed here to Iudin in 1925 is identical to one introduced by Castle in the USA of 1916 who describes 'eugenics' as:

"the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally" (quotation marks in original) {Galton (F), cited by Castle 1916: 3}. ... *To determine what are the general principles of genetics ... [is] primarily [a] biological problem[-], but to determine how far these are socially controllable is a problem for the sociologist* {Castle 1916: 4}.

There is little doubt that the post-revolutionary Russian eugenic field, of 1925 at least, retained the essential power lines, and thus the character, inherited from the west *via* tsarist Russia.

However, the USSR political field waxed in power from the mid 1920s, and directly influenced the character of the contemporary eugenic field. Having first embraced the 'negative' eugenics of sterilisation and/or birth control which predominated in the west {Adams 1990d: 174 *et seq*}, Russian eugenics was then faced with both ideological (for this approach could be interpreted as devaluing the 'peasant stock' upon which the revolution was supposedly founded {Adams 1990d: 174}), and pragmatic ("*Russia was experiencing a population implosion*" {Adams 1990d: 176}), political pressures which opposed such a move.

There followed a brief period during which Russian eugenics sought to embrace the tenets of Lamarckism {Adams 1990d: 176 - 179; Mazumdar 1992: 146 *et seq*; Paul 1998a: 20, 1998b: 118} (see sections 8.2 above and 8.7 below), which had already been largely discarded in the west. Put briefly, the Russian approach highlighted the assumption that learned behaviour could be transmitted genetically {e.g. Castle 1916: 18 *et seq*; Kevles 1985: 66; Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 421 - 423} and thus placed great emphasis on social environment. This social environmentalism held at first sight great attraction for a political framework which vilified class excesses and oppression of the recent past, for it taught that social engineering held the promise of bringing about fundamental change in the 'character' of the 'race'. However, both its scientific validity {Adams 1990d: 179} and political soundness ("*if acquired characters are inherited, then ... the proletariat bear ... the traces of all the unfavorable influences which ... a long series of distant ancestors have suffered*") {Filipchenko & Morgan 1925 cited by Adams 1990d: 177}) were found wanting.

Soviet eugenics was, then, left with "*The final option: Positive eugenics*" {Adams 1990d: 179 *subheading*}. This 'positive' approach of encouraging the selective breeding and fecundity of those deemed to carry 'superior' inborn characteristics, be they physical or intellectual, is itself representative of a very old and perhaps original power line within the eugenic intellectual field. Stubbe {1965} and Watson {2003} (discussed in section 6.3 above) both see the urge to 'improve' stock, be it vegetable, animal or indeed human, as the prime and prehistoric motivation for human interest in heredity. Although in the western world the 'negative' approach of restricting breeding amongst 'inferior' groups within society had been to the fore, at least until the 1940s {Adams 1990d: 175}, there had always been an undercurrent of 'positive' eugenic sentiment. Thus when a leading soviet eugenicist declared in 1929 that, "*with the current state of artificial insemination technology ..., one talented and valuable producer could have up to 1,000 children*" {Serebrovskii,⁶² cited by Adams 1990d: 181}, he was arguably returning eugenics to its roots.

In this Serebrovskii was anticipating the direction in which western eugenics would move in the following decades. In the intellectual field context, it is noticeable that here Serebrovskii is very much in tune with a particular power line of 'the' eugenic field noted above in a 'negative' context: the idea that "*germ plasm*" may be considered a societal, not individual, asset. Serebrovskii is very clear on this point, speaking of:

the widespread induction of conception by means of artificial insemination using recommended sperm, and not at all necessarily from a beloved spouse
{Serebrovskii 1929, quoted by Adams 1990d: 180}.

Serebrovskii approaches very closely to the Nazi *Lebensborn* project devised by Himmler (section 3.13 above). Given that Himmler used natural insemination, and thus imposed physical

⁶² Elsewhere Adams {1990d} appears to render this name as 'Serebrovsky'.

limits upon the efficiency of his donors, it would appear that Serebrovskii's proposal was technically more advanced than that of Himmler a decade later.

Given this 'new' soviet direction of 'positive' eugenics, advocated in 1929, it is a shock to his reader when Adams {1990d: 182} states baldly that suddenly, in 1930, the Soviet eugenics movement ended. This statement, if accurate, would deal a heavy, if not fatal, blow to the attempt in this work to build an analytical account based upon the ideas of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*}. With his 'cultural unconscious', Bourdieu seems to argue against the likelihood of an abrupt and final demise of an intellectual field in the absence of a catastrophic collapse of its surrounding cultural field. Certainly Adams {1990d: 182 *et seq*} notes changes to the power lines of this enclosing Russian field, with his talk of the Cultural Revolution of Stalin, but it has been seen above that the Russian eugenic intellectual field had already survived the far greater upheaval of the two revolutions of 1917. A social artefact robust enough to ride out the storms of the change from tsarist to Bolshevik Russia might be expected to overcome the lesser upheaval of Lenin's replacement by Stalin.

8. 7 Political field effects

In the event it appears that Adams, in like vein to Mazumdar {1992} and her supposed end of "*the eugenic problematic*" (discussed in section 9.2 below), rather overstates the case. Undoubtably there was a period in the 1930s and 1940s of great personal danger for the advocates of eugenics, several of whom were purged from the soviet academy, arrested and shot {Adams 1990d: 196/197, 198}. Certainly eugenics and eugenicists became embroiled in political argument, but equally certainly much of this argument revolved around a political dispute about the supposed mechanics of hereditability as opposed to the ideals of eugenics.

Adams is clear that the major dispute was between those who promoted the Mendelian line (widely accepted in the west) of discrete and, at least in the medium term, unalterable 'packets' of physiological information on the one hand. Opposed to them, on the other hand, were those who adopted what was essentially the Lamarckian view that learned or adapted *behavioural traits* could also be inherited by progeny. Of the latter, the leading protagonist, Lysenko, gained political advantage and hence preference for his views. As a result soviet genetic investigation diverged from that of the west {Adams 1990d: 197 - 200}. Meanwhile, in the 1930s, eugenics came under attack in the USSR due to its perceived links or similarities to Nazi social policy in neighbouring Germany {Adams 1990d: 196}. This led to eugenics being doubly damned as, on the one hand, being intrinsically at odds with (Stalinist) socialist ideology, on the other as seeming to be the handmaiden of the abhorred fascism. *Prima facie*, either of these charges would seem to suggest that the over-arching cultural field of soviet Russia was such as to prevent the establishment or continuation of a subsidiary eugenic field.

The argument here is not that the eugenic field was 'lost' in the USSR, but rather that the prevailing political intellectual field was relatively strong. As a result, interference from the political field was enabled to prevent the large-scale implementation of social policies informed by eugenics. This provides an interesting counter-point to the Nazi excesses of eugenic ideas: the lesson is perhaps that a totalitarian state, by its very nature undemocratic, is endowed with a strong and dominant political field. Nonetheless, whilst eugenic policies may well have been suppressed within the USSR of Stalin, the same cannot be said for the associated intellectual field. Rather, it might appear that:

[t]he discipline of genetics, with all of its eugenic and human aspects, went into a kind of "deep freeze" {Adams 1990d: 200}.

In consequence of this enforced 'hibernation' the soviet Russian eugenic intellectual field, it seems, was able to survive some thirty years of official disapproval and suppression.

With the partial relaxation of Stalinist ideology under Krushev, but still at the height of the 'Cold War' between east and west, in the 1960s eugenic and human genetic ideas resurfaced in Russian society. This leads Adams {1990d: 201} to remark that:

the networks that underlay the development of eugenics in the Soviet Union have proved remarkably enduring. They survived the Revolution They survived the demise of "eugenics" ... only to create "medical genetics" in 1934. ... [E]ugenics, medical genetics and genetics were reborn together in the 1960s.

Although he does not use the Bourdieuan analysis adopted in this present work, Adams {1990d} gives in this excerpt a compelling account of the mechanics of intellectual fields. In particular, Adams provides evidence here for the workings of the "*Cultural Unconscious*" of Bourdieu {1971a}. This is not to say that a field is immutable. On the contrary, any given field is highly susceptible to interference effects. Therefore, although 'the' eugenic field has been seen here to have become widely propagated, and despite the supposed influence of 'globalisation' as a force towards homogenisation, it is well to note that, although:

globalization brings about an essential 'sameness' to the surface appearance and institutions of modern social life across the globe ... , it also involves the assimilation and re-articulation of the global in relation to local circumstances {McGrew 1992: 74 citing Hannerz 1991}.

Chapter 9: Eugenics into the twenty-first century

9. 1 Proem

Drawing particularly upon the discussions within chapters two, four and five, this chapter provides a synthesis of the theoretical discussions there, with the observed historical events charted in chapter three. Here, all four research questions are addressed directly. Having investigated the provenance of the eugenic intellectual field which rose to a position of some prominence in the western world in the period between the onset of modernity and, approximately, the end of world war two, this study now moves to consider the final half of the twentieth century and the dawn of the twenty-first. In this chapter lessons learned and insights gained from the earlier part of the investigation will be applied to the contemporary societal landscape(s) of the UK and USA, and the current position analysed in intellectual field terms. The emphasis on Anglo-American experiences arises partly because UK and USA eugenics are well-documented, but also because of the widespread technological and sociological impact of the HGP.

Owing much to the technical and increasingly cultural dominance of the USA in global terms, the closely linked efforts of the UK/USA in the realm of genetic research {e.g. White House 2000} and practice have become ever more representative of the contemporary field as a transnational whole. This is not some ethnocentrically-driven claim of, after the style of Gramsci {1971}, some form of cultural hegemony. It is acknowledged that national eugenic (as opposed to genetic) movements will often retain distinct local characteristics as a result of cultural and/or intellectual field interference effects. Hence:

[whilst] *globalization brings about an essential 'sameness' to the surface appearance and institutions of modern social life across the globe ..., it also involves the assimilation and re-articulation of the global in relation to local circumstances* {McGrew 1992: 74 citing Hannerz 1991}.

Although not using an analysis based upon the theorisation of Bourdieu, McGrew here describes what may be seen as field effects in action. It is on this basis that the UK/USA situation has wider ramifications; that it is representative of the effects of a fluctuating and widespread intellectual field viewed through the prism of a particular cultural field.

The outline of the argument introduced below is that the intellectual field informing eugenics, whilst having undergone modifications as a result of interactions with other fields, remains active and is able to influence social policies. Beginning with a discussion of the alleged decline or even demise of eugenics as a potent force within contemporary society, the chapter will continue with an argument that such a position is potentially in error. A major line of argument will be that, rather than becoming defunct or moribund, the basic ideologies and power lines underlying eugenics became ever more closely associated with the perceived

science of human genetics as it arose from the middle part of the twentieth century onwards. This is the situation referred to by this study as 'eugenetics'.

From this position later sections below will consider current western medical and paramedical practices in the light of the potential influence upon medico-science of eugenic precepts. In particular the contentious topic of 'eugenic' abortion will be considered alongside the opinions of disabled commentators and scholars on apparent and potential consequences for disabled people more generally. As part of this discussion, the idea of a recent social process of *genetic disablement* will be mooted. The final sections here will then consider whether a notion of the appearance of a *genetic 'underclass'* is a credible conclusion to be drawn from the observed effects of genetic research and 'eugenic' influences upon social policy.

9. 2 Eugenics is dead

It has already been seen in section 8.7 above that the claim by Adams {1990d}, that the USSR eugenic field came to an abrupt end in 1930 as a result of political influences, is open to question and may perhaps need qualification. Another major contributor to the eugenics debate, Mazumdar, was to make a similar claim in respect of UK eugenics:

with the coming of the [1948 British] Welfare State and the end of the Poor Law, ... the eugenic problematic was finally to fall apart {Mazumdar 1992: 196}.

So it is that for Mazumdar, and in Britain at least, by the 1950s *"the eugenic problematic was finally to fall apart"* leaving behind a *"residual social biology"*, but one which lacked the *"social activism that had been typical of the movement"* {Mazumdar 1992: 196}. In large part this 1950s situation described by Mazumdar may be attributed, not to the Welfare State, but to widespread international revulsion at the Hitlerian excesses finally exposed to public view in all their horror at the end of world war two. However, as Kevles {1985: ch XI} makes clear, this was but the culmination of a decades long period of growing disquiet at the class bias of the eugenics movement more generally.

With growing ideas of 'equality' reflected by the adoption in the twentieth century, throughout the western democracies, of the universal adult franchise, blatant class discrimination on the primary eugenic movement model was clearly a declining part of the changing dominant intellectual field. The decline of 'old', class orientated, eugenics is a demonstration of the means by which one intellectual field may be modified by another. In this case, the modern intellectual field is clearly dominant, the eugenic one subsidiary or less powerful. This does not mean that such influences will necessarily follow a power gradient unidirectionally from greater to lesser. Rather, this is a reciprocal relationship, as Mazumdar {1992} demonstrates with her talk of the 'eugenics problematic'.

Despite announcing its death in the 1950s, Mazumdar had in the same breath informed us that the self-same "*eugenic problematic*" had become "*intimately interwoven with all current research in human genetics*" {Mazumdar 1992: 196}. So, it would seem, important power lines of the eugenic intellectual field represented by this 'problematic' became copied or transferred to the intellectual field informing human genetics. For Mazumdar to give the appearance of claiming that 'formal' eugenics was a spent force by the 1950s might seem to be disingenuous: the more so since, by 1992, the current direction of human genome research was already clear, as she herself discusses at some length {Mazumdar 1992: *Epilogue and Conclusion*}.

The position of Mazumdar {1992: 6, 196}, that the "*eugenics problematic*" ceased to be of any social or practical relevance in the 1950s, appears to be largely based on the overriding importance of the concept of 'class':

[i]n the case of the science⁶³ of eugenics as it developed in Britain, a central part in the problematic was played by social class {Mazumdar 1992: 1}.

Here, "*social class*" is a major component of the eugenic formulation and, as has been discussed above, this concept was seemingly in decline as an analytical tool throughout the greater part of the twentieth century. The particular 'class' seen as dangerous within this problematic was the 'pauper class' defined purely in terms of welfare dependency {e.g. Mazumdar 1992: 138-142}. This is the 'dangerous class'⁶⁴ of Marx and Engels {1847}, *alias* the 'residuum' or 'lumpenproletariat' {Mann 1992}; the 'pauper class' of the English eugenics movement of the 1920s {Mazumdar 1992: 138-142} or its American contemporary {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 157}; the 'social deviants' (especially those in a long-term 'sick role') of Parsons {1951: 430}; the 'underclass' of Murray {1990, 1994}. What all of these terms have in common is that they have been used to describe collections⁶⁵ of individuals regarded as non-productive: as representing a debit, not a credit, in the societal ledger.

The basis upon which Mazumdar {1992: 196} predicates her claim is that the 1948 Welfare State effectively abolished poverty in the UK. Were this to be the case, then it follows by the same token that the 'pauper class' had been legislated out of existence: thus, Mazumdar's logic appears to claim, (UK) eugenicists were left with no target for their research and no client group to 'benefit' from their prescriptions. This argument is not unchallenged in the social

⁶³ Mazumdar here accords eugenics the status of 'science'.

⁶⁴ "*The "dangerous class", the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue*" {Marx & Engels 1847: 11 ('*Communist Manifesto*')}. It is a telling point that this group on the nether fringes of society has been seen as 'dangerous' by both the middle classes and the revolutionary socialists. Thus Stopes (cited in section 7.2 above) fears that "*we have been breeding revolutionaries*" whilst Marx and Engels fear that the self-same people may tend towards counter-revolution.

⁶⁵ In sociological terms the word 'class' is a misnomer here, for these groups have been redefined on a regular basis {Mann 1992: ch3}.

policy sphere. Mann {1992} argues that the idea of some 'underclass' existing at the very bottom of British society has a long and continuing currency (he also argues persuasively that this idea has little if any real substance). By the 1950s, Titmuss had begun to argue that the nascent Welfare State did little if anything to redistribute income between the social classes {Titmuss 1958}. By 1949 he had noted that benefits under the 1946 National Insurance Act were of lower real value than those of the 1911 Act which it replaced {Wootton 1959: 74/75}.

Wootton is straightforward in her rebuttal of any argument that the policies resulting from the Beveridge Report of 1942 had removed material want. Speaking of *"the astonishing myth that poverty has been eliminated"*, she bluntly states that:

[t]he doctrine that 'The Welfare State has feverishly increased its responsibilities until no one is ill-clad or hungry, and no one experiences real want or poverty' ... appears to-day to have acquired the status of an axiom {Wootton 1959: 74}.

She then continues at length {Wootton 1959: 74 - 80} to cite a large number of researches of her day to support her view that poverty remained alive and potent long after the 1948 benchmark adopted by Mazumdar {1992: 196}. In the course of this, Wootton cites a 1953 report that:

[s]ome seriously ill [NHS] patients in advanced states of semi-starvation presented a typical appearance, identical with that seen among prisoners at the Belsen camp {Wootton 1959: 78},

before noting in the context of 'poverty lines' that:

[t]hese standards are framed always by members of one social class for the benefit (sic) of another; and those who frame them are very unlikely to have had personal experience of life at the levels for which they are prescribed {Wootton 1959: 80}.

Wootton, it would appear, does not share Mazumdar's opinions regarding the efficacy of the 1948 Welfare State which followed Beveridge's 1942 Report.. Neither, for that matter, does Titmuss and it is certain that neither he nor Wootton support any idea of the end of poverty in the UK of the time. Of course, by 1977 Mazumdar was a Fellow of the British eugenics movement {Africa2000} and perhaps, as an 'insider', in a position to know better the deleterious effects of the Welfare State upon the eugenics movement. Interestingly, both Wootton and Titmuss had already achieved this Fellowship status by 1957 and Beveridge, recorded as a Council Member of the movement in 1928, remained a Consultant to that governing Council in 1957 {Africa2000}.

9. 3 A problematic problematic?

The concept of a 'problematic', as used by Mazumdar, {1992} shares many of the characteristics of an 'intellectual field'. For Mazumdar a problematic provides a framework within which research questions may be either posed or proscribed. Hence:

[a] *problematic has been defined as a field of concepts which organises a particular science by making it possible to ask some kinds of questions and suppressing others* {Mazumdar 1992: 1}.

Bourdieu, meanwhile, speaks of:

the methodological autonomization that authorizes the search for the specific logic of the relations established within this [intellectual field] {Bourdieu 1971a: 166}.

In other words, an intellectual field may contain its own "*specific logic*" which will itself act to identify both legitimate and illegitimate lines of enquiry. Bourdieu later returns to this idea:

*intellectual worlds are **microcosms** that have their own structures and their own laws. It is these microcosms that I have called fields* (contrasting typeface in original) {Bourdieu 1993: 181}.

The interplay in Bourdieu's thinking between the "*specific logic*" and the "*structures and ... laws*" which he ascribes to intellectual fields is such as to indicate that here is an analytical approach which is at least as powerful as, and potentially more flexible than, the 'problematic' format of Mazumdar {1992}.

The "*field of concepts*" {Mazumdar 1992: 1} (or, in the language of Bourdieu {1971a, 1971b}, the "*intellectual field*") involved is such that the central proposition is that certain people, or proto-people⁶⁶ as the case may be, are more likely to represent an overall 'loss' than they are an overall 'gain' to their host society. The underlying ethical base here is that utilitarianism which has already been seen, in chapter four above, to be intimately associated with modernity {Kluge 1999; Singer 1993}. This being the case, and applying field theory, it now becomes "*possible to ask some kinds of questions [whilst] suppressing others*" {Mazumdar 1992: 1}. In particular, it is possible to question by these means the statement by Mazumdar {1992: 1} that, by the 1950s, the "*eugenic problematic*" had "*fallen apart*".

The major grounds on which Mazumdar is challenged here are that firstly she has formulated 'her' problematic too narrowly, and secondly that she has confused the core aim of eugenics (to increase the future utility of society) with the manifestations of inter class suspicion and elitism which permeated not just the 'traditional' eugenics movement but also much of the surrounding society of its time. The 'class' dimension may be thought to owe its importance more to the modern cultural field than to the eugenic intellectual one. As a result Mazumdar {1992}, in significant areas, appears to examine the 'wrong' field. Her attention is apparently seduced by the dominant or over-arching cultural field of the period.

Being 'modern', this also contained a strongly utilitarian idea of the importance of promoting the collective good. It was further comprised of power lines relating to: a growing

⁶⁶ Perhaps an idiosyncrasy of the present author, but words such as 'foetus' or 'embryo' have the effect of depersonalising what is, ultimately, a collection of living cells with the potential of becoming a human being if left unhindered.

faith in rationalisation, science and the scientific way {e.g. Durkheim 1933, 1938, 1951; Smart 1990} (which is a continuing feature of the contemporary intellectual field, as will be noted below); a residual belief in the differential value of social classes to society (which is seen above to have decayed over time); a concern with the need for a continuing *order* to society {e.g. Bauman 1989; Giddens 1991; Hughes 2002} and the idea that western modernity was the acme of societal perfection (see, for example, the remarks of Beatrice Webb reported by Freedland {1997: 2} and cited in section 6.9 above). As constituent parts of the dominant cultural field, these shifting power lines held the potential to influence a 'local' or subsidiary field such as the eugenic intellectual one.

In large part Mazumdar {1992} may be thought to describe pressures applied to the eugenic field of the middle twentieth century. The thinking of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*} however suggests that the eugenic (or indeed any) intellectual may itself have an effect upon its contemporaries. No field, whether found in nature or appearing as an intellectual artefact, may be assumed to be solely passive. A particular intellectual field of importance in this reciprocal respect is that of 'science', and it may well be that science is especially open to intellectual field pressures. It has been suggested that:

[t]he most distinguishing characteristic of science separating it from other reality-generating mechanisms like religion, mysticism, poetry, or music is that it is always tentative. Scientific theories represent our best guess ... [b]ut those guesses are continually being revised {Casti 2001: Preface}.

In part this is a restatement of the perceived need of science to foster a sensation of eternal progress (see section 4.5 above), but it also indicates that a tendency towards dynamism may be an integral property of any scientific intellectual field. In other words that external influence may be effective in bringing about change.

Thus it is likely that a somewhat different approach to that of Mazumdar {1992} could prove fruitful. Rather than considering effects *on* the eugenic field, the next section will consider some possible effects *of* this field. The particular target of this approach will be the intellectual field associated with the undisputed science of genetics and as the chapter develops, the focus will narrow to consider its influential offshoot *human* genetics.

9. 4 Human genetics - the acceptable face of eugenics?

Alongside, and in its early days almost indistinguishable from, eugenics grew the present day 'respectable science' of genetics. Genetics of itself is a very large area of study. As Castle {1916} makes clear it encompasses all plants, all animals and, as human knowledge has developed, has also come to include bacteria and viruses within its sphere of study. In its early days, genetics was:

*defined as the science which deals with the **coming into being** of organisms. ... It refers particularly to the ... influence which parents exert on the characteristics of their offspring* {Castle 1916: 3, original emphasis}.

Castle continues in his next paragraph to comment that "*Eugenics ... means almost literally the **science of being well-born***" (original emphasis) {Castle 1916: 3}, before finding that human reproduction as studied by eugenicists is a "*very special case falling under the general laws of genetics*" {*ibid*}. In consequence, in order to comprehend eugenics fully, it is necessary to "*know something of the[se] general laws*" {Castle 1916: 3}. Ultimately, Castle decides that eugenics is the "*applied science*" of the "*social control*" of human evolution whereas, in contrast, it appears that genetics provides the broader based theoretical underpinning. Both eugenics and genetics are, for Castle in 1916, sciences of equal intellectual standing.

The distinction offered by Castle {1916} is in part subtle but is nonetheless very informative. Certainly he limits the scope of eugenics to the application of genetic ideas to humanity {Castle 1916: 4}, but his major line of cleavage lies along the axis of practice and here there is clear evidence of divergence. Indeed, a decade after Castle, this differentiation between genetics and eugenics was made clear:

[t]he science of eugenics consists of a foundation of biology and a superstructure of sociology. Galton, its founder, emphasized both parts in due proportion {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: preface}.

Whilst genetics has the ultimate purpose of determining the *mechanisms* of inheritance, eugenics looks to impose some sense of order upon the *results* of (human) inheritance. Both, the one with its search for rationality and scientific understanding and the other with its overriding concern with order, are apparently modern in ethos (chapter four above).

Gregor Mendel, an Austrian Monk, had experimented in the 1860s with the way in which characteristics were passed from generation to generation of peas, although his observations were unremarked upon in their day and subsequently 'lost' to science. The fundamentals of what became Mendelian inheritance theory were 'rediscovered' and publicised in 1900 {Carlson 1966: 1; Paul 1998b: 7}, although the term 'genetics' was not coined until 1906 (by Bateson) to describe the study of inheritance {Carlson 1966: 16; Keller 2000: 1; Zimmer 2001: 74-78}. Given that 'eugenics' was coined in 1883 by Galton to describe his area of interest surrounding the inter-generational transmission of characteristics, 'genetics' may be seen as an offshoot of an earlier research tradition. The word 'gene' itself, used to describe a then hypothetical hereditary unit, came into use in 1909 {Carlson 1966: 20; Keller 2000: 1}⁶⁷.

⁶⁷ This chronology appears counter-intuitive, if 'eugenics' was coined before 'genetics', and both were coined before 'gene'. The sources are, however, consistent on this point. It may appear that the common root lies in the etymology of the word 'genesis', which by far predates all three with its origins in ancient Greek {Concise Oxford Dictionary 9th ed}.

It will be recalled that Castle, writing as one of the early (USA) experts in the field, states that eugenics "*is concerned with only so much of genetics as concerns man (sic)*" {Castle 1916: 4}. This statement of Castle's may logically be reduced to the equation 'eugenics equals human genetics', a result supported by the remarks of Paul {1998b: 4}:

in the 1910s and 1920s, eugenics was simply considered [to be] applied human genetics.

Although Castle differentiates between genetics and eugenics, he leaves no room for doubt that they are closely connected, with eugenics being a sub-discipline of genetics. Meanwhile Carlson {1966: 3} is able to speak of the Biometrical school of Galton and Pearson, which is closely associated with eugenics, as providing "*serious competition*" for the ideas of Bateson, most closely associated with genetics. Certainly, for Carlson, the two are closely related in the first decades of the twentieth century.

Kevles {1985: 195 *et seq*} draws attention to medical research into blood grouping dating to 1911. The inheritance of blood group was found to follow a pattern related to the rules inferred from the (genetic) work of Mendel. This discovery then fed back into genetic research, to the extent that:

progress in blood groups was rich with implications for human genetics {Kevles 1985: 196}.

A major reason for this importance of blood groups was that they are readily identifiable by means of objective testing, and thus in terms of scientific methodology far superior to eugenic notions of character traits which are most often subjective and anecdotal. The value of blood groups to human genetics lies partly in the fact that they provide a measure of the ratio in which an individual has inherited traits from both parents, which ratio may then be analysed in Mendelian terms.

One mathematical geneticist who did much to reconcile Darwinian theory with Mendelian mechanics was R A Fisher {Davis 1997a: 14}. Fisher was a leading international figure in human genetics in the 1930s and 1940s, although he had a distinguished academic career as a mathematician which began twenty years before this time {Kevles 1985: 210; Ridley 2000: 46}. Drawing upon the corpus of mathematical techniques derived from blood group research, Fisher did much to further both the cause and the reputation of genetics, especially in partnership with Haldane. For Kevles:

Fisher and Haldane were the most productive pair in human genetics on either side of the Atlantic {Kevles 1985: 210}.

As one half of "*the most productive pair in human genetics*", Fisher possessed impeccable academic and scientific credentials. He became Arthur Balfour Professor of Genetics at Cambridge University between 1943 and 1957, and also served as Honorary President of the International Statistical Institute in 1957 {Africa 2000}.

Such connections with the academic establishment, and his leading role within the science of genetics, did not preclude Fisher from membership of the Eugenics Education Society. In fact, he maintained a high profile role within that society over a long period of time, being credited as a founder member of the Cambridge Eugenics Society in 1911 {Mazumdar 1992: 97} and as "*a mainstay of the establishment Eugenics Education Society*" {Paul 1998b: 119}. Having served in various capacities, Fisher is recorded as, in 1957, being a Life Fellow of the Society {Africa 2000}. Certainly in Fisher's case, interests in human genetics and eugenics were not mutually exclusive.

Kevles {1985: 164 *et seq*}, whilst charting the move away from the original eugenic approach centred on class, also draws attention to what may almost be seen as the colonisation (Kevles does not use the word) of human genetics by either eugenicists or their sympathisers:

[m]any of the new visionaries ... happily called themselves eugenicists but stayed out of the [UK and USA] eugenic societies {Kevles 1985: 172}.

As part of this process of change Kevles notes that the 'reform' eugenicists, amongst whom he includes the eminent human geneticists Haldane and Muller, consciously sought to further "*the deployment of genetic knowledge*" as an important tool towards the "*improvement*" of humanity {Kevles 1985: 173}. This 'reform' approach is clearly distinguished from 'old' eugenics by an increased awareness of environmental and socio-economic factors {Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 64, 65; Kevles 1985: 174}. It would, with its emphasis on human and with it societal, 'improvement', however appear to remain very close to that concern:

with only so much of genetics as concerns man (sic), and with only so much of that as is under social control

which Castle {1916: 4} finds to be an axiomatic attribute of eugenics *per se*. The question now becomes one of the real extent of any 'reform' disclosed here.

9. 5 The intellectual environment

As an artefact of human society with its potential origins deep in the prehistory of western civil society, the eugenic intellectual field has the potential to inform, if not to generate, deep and widespread social effects. Indeed Stepan, who speaks of eugenics as both a science and a social movement {Stepan 1990: 110, 1991: 1}, also talks of:

the quasi-international currency of eugenics ... and its connections to many of the large themes of modern history, such as nationalism, racism, sexuality and gender, social hygiene, and the development of modern genetics itself {Stepan 1991: 2}.

At least for Stepan, eugenics has proved to be of great influence not only in the modern development of 'scientific' genetics, but also in some of the most fundamental societal sectors of the modern social world. Stepan here in effect describes an intellectual field in action, with her description of the almost all-encompassing scope of eugenic thought within modern society.

The wider relationship between academia, medicine and (human) genetics also remained strong. In 1932 Ohio State University instituted a Chair in Medical Genetics, with the first incumbent (Snyder) being a former Cold Spring Harbor researcher. Snyder is reported {Kevles 1985: 209} to have said that he had "*grow[n] up in the eugenics shadow ... and had to find my way out of it*". In the same period in Britain the Medical Research Council took an active part in the promotion and funding of genetic research with potential medical applications, establishing a Committee on Human Genetics which itself was the driving force, in 1936, behind the (London) Bureau of Human Heredity {Kevles 1985: 201}.

The support of the Medical Research Council is said to have been of great importance in establishing British status in the area of human genetics research during the 1930s {Kevles 1985: 208}. By this time human genetics had, partly by association with medicine, become established as both a respectable science and an integral part of the academic mainstream. As such, genetic announcements and theories were accorded the gravitas and respect associated with 'science' more generally. The significant power lines of the intellectual field representing genetics had, arguably, become an integral part of the cultural field of the western modern world *via* the medium of human genetics.

As Barnes {1996} makes clear, providers of research funding exert pressures upon researchers which are related to both the practical use of research products and, perhaps of even more relevance here, the level of 'scholarship' assigned by peers to the research process and findings. This is a system which:

compels academics and researchers to write primarily for other academics and researchers {Barnes 1996: 108}.

Further, funders may exert directive pressures over the project {Barnes 1996: 109}⁶⁸. 'The system' has an inbuilt bias towards the orthodoxy of the day. There are no compelling reasons to suppose that this is a purely contemporary phenomenon. Indeed, rather the opposite, for Bourdieu, when speaking of "*social forces*" which "*almost always*" exist "*in all societies*" {Bourdieu 1971a: 174}, comes to the conclusion that, where there is a clash between disparate forces, this battle is

in the name of the[ir] claim to be the fount of orthodoxy, and when they are recognized it is their claim to orthodoxy which is being recognized {Bourdieu 1971a: 175}.

It follows that a worldly-wise researcher will make every effort to ensure that any proposed work and its findings are relevant to the world view of the potential or actual funder. Similarly, it is politic to maintain a close step with the prevailing intellectual field which informs that academic area. In this context Kerr and Shakespeare note that, in the contemporary medical arena:

⁶⁸ "*More than one in 10 scientists claim to have been pressurised by a commercial financial backer to "tailor" their research conclusions...*" {*The Guardian* 23/03/2005: 6}.

[r]esearchers looking for money to investigate a particular disorder or trait tend to frame grant proposals around questions of genetics. ... There is big money in genetic research {Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 106}.

Thus someone researching, say, Down's syndrome (an example cited by Kerr & Shakespeare in the context above) would today frame their proposal around genetics: a century ago, those researching 'feeble-mindedness' would have used the language of eugenics.

This is where what may be thought of as the academic and intellectual equivalents of natural selection are most apparent. Researchers have learned to tailor their applications to suit both the ethos of the major research funders and the expectations of the dominant intellectual field. One effect has been the promotion of certain fields of research at the expense of others. This may seem to have much in common with an evolutionary process, but here the operative force is not simply the immediate battle for material resources found in the world of nature; rather it is primarily the quest for credibility. Ultimately, and claims of 'scientific objectivity' notwithstanding, successful theorems are most likely to be those which not only appear to explain the observed features of a problematic but also exhibit a good fit with the dominant intellectual field of the time.

Far from heralding the 'de-activated' social force and "*residual social biology*" of Mazumdar {1992: 196}, these later twentieth century changes seem to represent a re-energised eugenic intellectual field. A field which has re-established intimate contact with the 'scientific mainstream' of modern society and is, in consequence, enabled and empowered to make pronouncements and inform policy (ie sections 5.3 and 5.4 above) with the full authority of this re-found status. This suggestion is reinforced by Kerr and Shakespeare {2002: 66/67}, who draw attention to the benefits, both in terms of finance and of status, accruing to human genetics from its associations with both the 'natural' sciences of biology, chemistry and physics, and with various branches of medicine more generally. They are themselves very clear that there is a large measure of continuity here:

many of the priorities and much of the rhetoric of eugenics continued in human genetics {Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 63}; [w]hilst eugenics may be more diffuse, its legacy continues {Kerr & Shakespeare 2002: 78}.

It is fully in keeping with this idea that Sinsheimer, a prominent human geneticist and "*an originator of the HGP*" {Kevles 1992: 18}, felt able to claim that:

[t]he old eugenics would have required a continual selection for breeding of the fit, and a culling of the unfit. The new eugenics would permit in principle the conversion of all of the unfit to the highest genetic level {Sinsheimer 1969 cited by Kevles 1985: 267/268; 1992: 18}.

These words are suggestive of a view that any apparent middle twentieth century 'reform' of eugenics is more a cosmetic process than it is a fundamental re-ordering of eugenic ideals and/or ideology. Further support for such an analysis comes from Ordovery:

[e]ugenics has always been an extremely nimble ideology. It cannot be isolated from the movements it bolstered and was conscripted by ... Its longevity relies

on these ... for the simple reason that even as one falls into relative disrepute, others remain intact {Ordovery 2003: Introduction xxvii}. ... [t]he verbiage of eugenics ... has enabled it to extend itself not only to diverse... target groups, but [also] to disparate political philosophies {Ordovery 2003: 207}.

Neel {1994}, self-styled "*Physician to the Gene Pool*" (book title), stands as an illustration of links between human genetics and eugenic-style thinking. In a neo-Malthusian (he mentions the work of Malthus in passing) analysis Neel {1994: ch 16} speaks under the chapter title of "*Just Too Many People*" of his belief that, by uncontrolled fecundity:

humankind is rapidly imperiling the prospects for a comfortable existence and a full and accurate expression of the genetic potential for the species {Neel 1994: 281}.

In a later chapter, entitled "*Genetic Medicine for Populations*", Neel {1994: ch 19} considers reproductive control, speaking enthusiastically of hormonal implant techniques such as Norplant, and noting suggestively that:

[m]ale sterilization through ligation of the vas deferens is a very simple surgical procedure {Neel 1994: 350}.

Neel emphatically does not absolve "*developed*" nations from a need to take action regarding their own populations and societies. He does, however, observe that:

the less-developed countries need to make the maximum effort at reconciling population with resources, and very soon {Neel 1994: 351}.

Given that such resources are limited and finite, this can only be interpreted as a call for lower birthrates amongst such nations.

9. 6 A rose by any other name?

The present acme of human genetic research and knowledge is represented by the Human Genome Project (HGP). The inception of the HGP was announced at, whether significantly or not, the home of the former (USA) Eugenic Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor in May 1986 {Smith 1995 unpaginated}⁶⁹. The initial impetus for the research was not obviously eugenic; it grew out of ongoing studies by the (USA) Department of Energy (DOE)⁷⁰ into potentially heritable genetic mutations caused by the 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings {Smith 1995}. The scope of the initial proposal was widened by the addition of a joint sponsor, the (USA) National Institutes of Health (NIH). It was this DOE/NIH initiative which, on 1st October 1990, became the HGP as it is seen today {DOE undated, current on website 07/04/2001}.

⁶⁹ Smith (retired 1996) was then the Director of the inaugural Human Genome Program. Meanwhile, Cold Spring Harbor has remained a major (USA) genetic research facility.

⁷⁰ Which was formed by the amalgamation of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration {DOE undated} and thus has a strong interest in nuclear development, both civil and military.

Although managed and led by this consortium of USA government departments, and envisaged as a purely USA research project, the HGP was quickly expanded to become "*truly international*" {Smith 1995 unpaginated}. Smith notes an influx of expertise and funding from external organisations, including "*private companies*", and in particular he acknowledges that:

support by the ... Wellcome Trust in the United Kingdom has been extremely important {Smith 1995 unpaginated}.

The HGP is, then, a complex amalgam of research initiatives, and it is perhaps better thought of as an umbrella term encompassing transnational scientific work in the field of human genetics, rather than as a discrete whole 'belonging' to any particular institution or nation state. Certainly this is the flavour of the description offered by Emanuel⁷¹ {2001}:

[t]he [Human] Genome Project is an exciting international, collaborative scientific effort designed to identify, analyze, and determine how all the genes in the human body are organized {Emanuel 2001 unpaginated}.

Thus the HGP is essentially and specifically concerned with 'pure' research into the fundamentals of human heredity. This marks a distinction between researchers into genetics on the one hand and practitioners in the field, such as genetic counsellors, on the other. The latter concern themselves with the application of HGP research products and are, then, more closely concerned with the ethics of practice.

The technical details of current research into human genetics are beyond the scope of this enquiry, which is focused firmly on the social policy implications. In this latter context a common theme which runs throughout much of the writings of human genetics researchers is the potential to eradicate, or in some circumstances treat, inherited characteristics which are labelled as being 'diseases' {e.g. Caplan 1992; Collins 1995; Collins *et al* 2003; Emanuel 2001; Patrinos & Drell 1997; Roberts 2001; Watson 2000}. In social policy terms, the HGP is firmly oriented towards public health on the grand scale.

Such orientation is not of itself objectionable to most (if not all) social commentators, a point already made in section 1.3 above, and although it resonates with certain eugenic ideals it is by no means indicative of eugenic influence. Many different ships may approach the same port without necessarily forming a fleet with shared objectives under unified command. In the general case public health schemes operate by improving the life chances of individuals and thus have the very real potential to benefit each and every member of a given society. However the HGP in particular, and human genetics as a whole, deviates in important respects from this general case.

Perhaps most importantly, the 'traditional' approach towards public health programmes has been a blanket one. Thus with vaccination schemes, for example, the aim has been to

⁷¹ "*Director, Human Genetics Center;... Upham Chair in Pediatrics*" at University of Pennsylvania {strap to title of Emanuel 2001}.

include as many as possible of the general population, with an ideal of 100% coverage, in the programme. In like manner, efforts to eradicate or greatly reduce the incidence of diseases such as typhoid, cholera and malaria have sought to benefit the individual by bringing about change in the environment shared by all (the introduction of clean water supplies, sewage disposal and swamp clearance respectively). In contrast, since wholesale manipulation of the human genome is not a realistic prospect now or in the foreseeable future, genetic manipulation or intervention is currently only feasible at the individual level.

This is a point made forcefully by Shakespeare {1995}, and one which is considered in some detail in the next following sections. The essence of Shakespeare's 1995 thesis is that from his interpretation of a disability studies social model perspective, discussed in more detail in chapter two above, the HGP is firmly espoused to medical model ideas of the origin of 'disability'. In particular he points to the unremitting location of 'disability' within the individual, and sees this in terms of an evolution of eugenic notions:

*the biological determinism and eugenic implications of the Human Genome Project are simply yesterday's bad practice, with better technology. **We may not be seeing eugenics at the level of population and nation, but we are seeing eugenics at the levels of individuals and families** (added emphasis) {Shakespeare 1995: 30}.*

This perceived change in emphasis is what may separate the HGP from other public health-oriented endeavours.

The underlying fear of Shakespeare {1995} is that contemporary and future research into human genetics may in effect invert previous approaches to public health. He speaks of "*a strategy of eugenics by eliminating defective (sic) foetuses*" {Shakespeare 1995: 31}, and he implies that this marks a departure from earlier practice. If Shakespeare is correct, and the next following sections will introduce a significant body of academic opinion which tends to reinforce his views, then what is seen is potentially a form of 'massaging' the statistical treatment of populations. Rather than improving the living conditions of a society as a means of decreasing the incidence of disease and/or impairment, it may seem as if the tendency of current human genetics research leans towards reducing the incidence of (congenital) disease/impairment in order to 'improve' the health of the societal whole. This is a contested thesis, but it is suggested here that human genetics has a case to answer.

The HGP organisers have been clear from the outset that human genetic research is fraught with complex ethical issues, not the least of which is 'eugenics'. In recognition of this, a portion of funding has been set aside to support work on the "*ethical, legal and social implications*" of HGP research. This department is generally known by the acronym ELSI {DOE undated}. There is no suggestion here that the HGP *as an organisation* is directly involved in activities which may be considered as eugenic. The present writer does not deny the great potential for good which resides within genomic research. There is no criticism here of

the stated aspiration of a subsidiary of the (USA) National Institutes of Health, the National Human Genome Research Institute, to:

participate directly in translating the promises of the HGP into improved human health {Collins *et al* 2003: 2}.

What is deprecated here, in a manner directly analogous to the disability studies critique of the 'Medical Model of Disability' (section 2.3 above), is any attempt to 'improve the health' of society by operating at the level of individuals.

9. 7 The birth of 'eugenetics'?

Eugenic ideology is certainly extant and its adherents are fully cognisant of, and excited by, the advance of genetic research. In a paper presented to the 1999 conference of the Galton Institute (the most recent incarnation of the English Eugenics Education Society {Mazumdar 1999; Whitney ⁷² 1999}), one contributor waxes lyrical about the future eugenic potential of genetic research:

[t]he first century or two of the new millennium will almost certainly be a golden age for eugenics. Through application of new genetic knowledge and reproductive technologies the Galtonian Revolution will come to fruition. ... [F]or the first time, the major changes will not be to ideas alone, but rather the major change will be to mankind (sic) itself {Whitney 1999: 1}.

This statement marks an aspiration to, as it were, return eugenics to its former position {*e.g.* Castle 1916} as an applied science active within the societal arena. As part of this process, Whitney {1999} confidently anticipates the reunion of eugenics and (human) genetics. This would mark a full turn of the wheel, for as Stepan has it:

eugenics and genetics have [recently] been linked together in scholarship as they once were in reality {Stepan 1990: 110},

and Whitney {1999} most certainly envisages a marriage between the two in "*reality*" rather than theory.

In developing his argument, Whitney {1999} points to the arsenal of reproductive technology which genetics has provided. This collection of tools ranges from the relatively low technology techniques of artificial insemination and egg donation, which between them offer the opportunity to eschew the genetic component of either (or indeed both) 'parents', to the high-technology procedure of nuclear substitution ('cloning'). This latter is of particular interest to Whitney, for it is claimed that by this means:

the blind (sic) chance and dumb (sic) luck of sexual reproduction can be eliminated {Whitney 1999: 2}.

In particular, Whitney suggests that by this means the particular chance genetic combinations which give rise to "*geniuses*" may be retained within the societal pool, and replicated at will.

⁷² Whitney was then professor of psychology at Florida State University {Griffiths 1999}.

This interest in 'genius', which is directly traceable to Francis Galton, is suggestive of a reassertion of the 'positive' eugenic urge. As Watson, co-discoverer of the double-helical property of DNA, is reported as saying:

I'm for using genetics at the level of the individual. Enhancement means making better I think it is human nature, the drive to make things better {Radford 2003}.

This does not, however, signal a turning away from the 'negative' route of avoiding supposedly 'dysgenic' children. Watson has clear and unambiguous views about the use of genetic testing. Noting that such tests, whilst indicative of a condition, "*do not cure*", he continues:

[b]anishing genetic disability must therefore be our primary concern. We must never ... live under the misconception that we will ever effectively control the majority of genetic diseases {Watson 2000: 224}.

After discussing very briefly the topic of (eugenic) abortion, Watson concludes that, in the case of "*a genetically disabled fetus*", this is:

incomparably more compassionate than allowing an infant to come into the world tragically impaired {Watson 2000: 225}.

This stance of Watson is very close to that of Whitney. The latter notes, in relation to pre-natal screening, that the application of genetic technology to testing for Down's syndrome and assorted "*single-gene disorders*" offers the promise that:

[i]nstead of suffering the agony (sic) and long term problems of a defective child, the pregnancy can be terminated and replaced with a healthy baby {Whitney 1999: 3}.

Meanwhile Sulston, "*Britain's leading geneticist*" ⁷³{Bourne 2004: 1}, adds weight to the argument of both Watson and Whitney:

I don't think one ought to bring a clearly disabled child into the world. ... if we can select children who are not going to be severely disadvantaged then we should do so If we can alleviate suffering by any means, that is a good thing. This is one area where we can do so {Bourne 2004: 1}.

Whilst Sulston {Bourne 2004}, and indeed Watson {2000: 225; Radford 2003}, are clear that this should remain "*a matter of choice by the parent*", it is a moot point as to just how 'free' such parental choice may be:

[t]he very existence of a test for foetal abnormality can create pressures to use the technology. ... Having had a test, there are further pressures if it indicates the presence of foetal abnormality {Shakespeare 1998: 676}; *[i]f people are to have genuine free choice ... [they must be] confident that society is willing to share burdens* {Independent Living Institute undated unpaginated}.

Sulston {Bourne 2004: 1}, Watson {2000} and Whitney {1999} very clearly illustrate the utilitarian aspects of eugenic thought. A foetus is not for them a proto-person, but rather a collection of cells which are to be assessed and either 'passed fit' or simply discarded and "*replaced*". To beget a "*defective child*" is to be sentenced to "*suffer[...] the agony*" which, it is

⁷³ And, at the time of the article, vice-chairman of the (UK) Human Genetics Commission. Winner of a 2002 Nobel Prize for his work in human genetics {Bourne 2004}, he is also seen as one of the leading lights in the inception of the HGP {Roberts 2001}.

assumed, must accompany this event. This eugenic mind-set may be discerned in the 'health care professions' more generally⁷⁴. A good exemplar of this position is to be found in the area of genetic counselling, which represents the interface between medico-scientific investigation on the one hand and the social application of such research 'products' on the other. In an earlier incarnation, genetic counselling has already been briefly encountered here, in section 3.12 above, as a part of the German eugenic drive towards a more 'efficient' population {e.g. Paul 1998a: 135, 1998b: 123; Weindling 1989: 424}.

The root ideas of difference and unworthiness, leading to the encouragement or discouragement of procreation, have already been seen here to be representative of the major power lines of the eugenic intellectual field. They are also to be found within the contemporary practice of genetic counselling, and Paul is explicit that this is no coincidence:

[i]n the 1950s and 1960s, genetic counseling was characterized by most of its practitioners as an extension of eugenics {Paul 1998a: 133},

going on to cite the originator of the term 'genetic counselling', Sheldon Reed:

the term 'Eugenics' has fallen by the wayside and 'Counseling in Human Genetics' is taking its place {Paul 1998a: 134}.

It is unlikely to be coincidental that this change in nomenclature took place in 1947 {Paul 1998a: 133}, a time when the debate about Nazi involvement in 'eugenics' was at its height.

Furthermore, it would appear that genetic counselling does not always confine itself to either medical or individual family concerns. Ingle {1973: 81}, for example, is clear that:

a substantial percentage of steady welfare clients should not have children ... , [as] to be born into a culture that enslaves may be as much of a handicap ... as to be born with defective genes.

This amounts to a medical model approach towards what is today frequently considered to be a social problem, poverty. As such, this idea does not draw upon scientific research so much as the eugenic ideology seen in the discussion of the 'feeble-minded', or the 'social problem group', examined in chapters six and seven above. The remedy for Ingle {1973} is "*genetic counseling*", with the very clear expectation that potential parents found amongst "*steady welfare clients*" will be dissuaded from procreation. It is no doubt sound advice to anyone to consider carefully socio-economic factors when contemplating parenthood, but it is not clear just where the "*genetic*" factor fits this particular equation. Rather, it would seem, Ingle remains firmly under the influence of eugenic ideology and he follows the well-worn path towards identifying the 'welfare dependent' as 'dangerous' mapped in section 9.2 above.

9. 8 Reproductive choice - real or illusionary?

As the preceding section demonstrates, genetic counselling does not always draw back from discouraging procreation in certain circumstances. In the USA, which has a powerful anti-

⁷⁴ Although individuals are free to, and often do, act on grounds of conscience.

abortion lobby, Ordover {2003: 200 *et seq*} draws attention to the practice of 'persuading' young women from the lower socio-economic groups to accept surgical implantation of the long-acting contraceptive Depo-Provera as part of a programme to combat poverty. In Europe, it might appear that eugenic policy is even more clear-cut:

*[a]t the 1994 Disabled People's International European Women's Committee Meeting women from five countries shared experiences of medical professionals **demanding** the termination of their pregnancies and forced sterilisation as a means of controlling the disabled population {Rock 1996: 124} (added emphasis).*

Official sources, for example the USA Government Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDCP] in its “*Strategic Plan*” {CDCP 1997, current on website 17/7/00}, are clear that genetic counselling:

... does not include preventing the birth of people with specific genotypes...,

and the American Society of Human Genetics [ASHG] is emphatic:

[t]he American Society of Human Genetics deplores laws, governmental regulations and any other coercive effort intended to restrict reproductive freedom or constrain freedom of choice on the basis of ... genetic characteristics of potential parents or ... potential offspring {ASHG 1998, current on website 2/4/2003}.

However, there may well be a mismatch between policy as promulgated and policy as operationalised. As was discussed at length in sections 3.9 - 3.12 on the German experience, there is historical evidence available of a tendency within modernity for government to 'sub-contract' the interpretation and application of social policy to an 'expert' body, in this case the medico-scientific establishment. The theoretical underpinning of this has been examined in chapter five above.

An academic and bioethicist with very close connections to the HGP is unambiguous about the *actual* role of health-care professionals in this area:

[m]uch of the profession of genetic counseling really centers around helping couples avoid the creation of fetuses or children that will have serious birth defects ... {Holme 1995 section II}.

This view is reinforced by Keller with her comment that:

“prevention” means preventing the births of individuals diagnosed as genetically aberrant - in a word, it means abortion {Keller 1992: 296}.

Neel {1994} takes this logic to its ultimate conclusion, calling for:

*an increased provision of genetic counseling and prenatal diagnostic services, with the objective of providing the option of abortion **It is presumed that those parents who elect abortion ... will then choose to have a child free of the particular disease** (added emphasis) {Neel 1994: 393}.*

There is seeming tacit acceptance of this same position to be found within the 'genetics' White Paper published by the UK government {Department of Health [DoH] 2003}. Much of this document is couched in optimistic and 'therapeutic' terms, but it is noted on page 12 that:

most NHS genetics work is concerned with inherited disorders caused by a defect in a single gene The treatment and care of patients with these disorders costs ... about £2 billion each year.

Thus these conditions are both expensive to treat and a major target of current UK human genetics concerns. The DoH concern with cost here is reminiscent of the words of Popenoe and Johnson {1925: 178} (cited in section 6.9 above): "*society is putting a heavy burden of expense ... on coming generations*".

The White Paper, having discussed the integration of services such as genetic counselling and testing, undertakes to "*ensure*" that, by 2005 in England:

all pregnant women are offered antenatal screening for Down's syndrome and are then counselled by midwives to help them make an informed choice {DoH 2003: 42 para 3.29}.

This, alongside the introduction of other genetic tests, will have the "*benefit*" of "*enabling more informed reproductive choice*" {DoH 2003: 43 para 3.33}. Tellingly, the White Paper also prioritises the aspiration that:

by 2006 genetic test results should be available ... within three days where the result is needed urgently (e.g. for prenatal diagnosis) {DoH 2003: 30 para 2.26} (bold typeface in original).

It may seem unlikely that this presumption of 'urgency' will be conducive to a calm and considered decision making process on the part of the prospective parent(s). Indeed, the only feasible clinical need for urgency here is to enable an abortion to be performed at the earliest opportunity in the event of a so-called 'positive' result.

The idea of 'reproductive choice' is also linked in the White Paper to the topic of *in vitro* fertilisation [IVF], whereby those deemed at especial "*risk*" of passing a genetic "*disorder*" to their children may opt to have a cultured embryo screened to ensure its fitness before implantation. Whilst still of questionable efficiency, in that the likelihood of pregnancy is not particularly high for any single course of 'treatment':

for some couples this is a preferable alternative to prenatal testing and possible abortion {DoH 2003: 74 para 6.9} (added emphasis).

In this, the Department of Health is in near-perfect step with the eugenic march of Whitney, who notes that IVF:

makes possible a wide range of procedures [for example] diagnosis, genetic manipulation and a whole series of further techniques such as embryo preservation {Whitney 1999: 2}.

Although reassuringly couched in coded or conditional language ("*counselled by midwives*", "*informed reproductive choice*", "*possible abortion*"), there are clear indications in the White Paper {DoH 2003} that should a (potentially expensive) genetic 'disorder' be detected abortion is a likely outcome. This finding is supported by Davis {2003}, speaking of the clinical role of midwife counsellors:

they admit that counselling would become more directive, that is, leading the couple towards [abortion] in response to the severity of the abnormality detected {Davis 2003 unpaginated}.

Meanwhile the (USA) National Society of Genetic Counselors [NSGC] in its electronically published “Resolutions” {NSGC 2000}, whilst in general cautiously circumspect, is clear that:

*[t]he NSGC, as an organization, publicly supports a woman's right ... to prenatal diagnosis and access to safe and legal abortion {NSGC 2000: 1} The offer of CF [Cystic Fibrosis] screening should be **timed to maximize reproductive options ... i.e. ... as early as possible in the pregnancy** {NSGC 2000: 3} (added emphasis).*

This has ramifications as to how the results of genetic testing are likely to be put to use in practice. Pfeiffer {1994: 495} is adamant that in the USA women found to be carrying a “defective” (not restricted to specific conditions) foetus are, in general, actively advised to abort. In similar vein, in Britain it has been said that:

[p]regnant women ‘at risk’ of giving birth to a ‘handicapped fetus’ ... are encouraged to have abortions {Oliver & Barnes 1998: 66},

or, as French {1994: 113/114} has it:

[m]any people view genetic counselling as a helpful way of preventing disabled children from being born.

Perhaps the starkest statement is that of Rock who was at the time of writing, in 1996, co-chair of the Womens' Group of the British Council of Organisations of Disabled People:

[m]edical intervention in reproductive technology and genetic engineering (and genetic counselling) are all geared towards eradicating disability {Rock 1996: 126}.

Emotive as the words of Rock {1996} may appear to be, they are supported by existing (UK) social policy. One of the four legal grounds for justifying an abortion is that:

[t]here is substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormality as to be seriously handicapped {Shapiro 1987: 188}.

There is, as will be discussed in the next section, a strong suspicion that the interpretation of “seriously handicapped” has undergone a process of “slippage” akin to that remarked upon by Lifton {1986: 56} in the context of the Nazi T4 programme (section 3.12 above). Of more immediate concern here is the fact that:

[i]n 1990, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act in the United Kingdom ... placed no upper gestational limit on termination of pregnancy when there is “substantial risk of serious handicap” {Savulescu 2001: 165}.

In other words, a 'defective' proto-person may be aborted at any time before 'natural' birth.

9. 9 Heterophobia rules - perhaps

The emphasis on the 'eradication' or 'prevention' of disability seen above has close and obvious links to the rhetoric of eugenics examined throughout this enquiry. It also has serious

implications for disabled people both as individuals and collectively. The personal case has been put powerfully by Davis (A) in 1999, but cited here from a later, unpaginated, electronic source. As Davis informs her reader, she is:

fully aware that about 85% of babies who would otherwise grow up to be like me are now aborted, following a positive pre-natal screening result {Davis 2003}.

Davis does not then claim to be objective, but rather states her position clearly from the outset, in the manner recommended by, amongst others, Mannheim {1936} and Myrdal {1970} (see section 1.4 above). Davis is in no doubt about the framework of norms and values which society has constructed around the area of pre-natal screening:

[t]here is a clear expectation that abortion will follow a positive screening test {Davis 2003 unpaginated}.

Interestingly, she does not query the use of the word 'positive' in either of these quoted passages. It might seem oxymoronic to hold that a so-called 'positive' test may lead to what are decidedly negative personal effects for so many fetuses and, as Davis makes clear, for the majority of pregnant women concerned.

Of course, and in the eugenic utilitarian tradition, it could be argued that the outcome for society is nonetheless 'positive' in reducing 'social costs'⁷⁵ of the type noted by Parsons {1951} and discussed in section 4.6 above. In the terms used there, by aborting an 'impaired' foetus society avoids the consequences of the 'premature functional death' of the proto-person. Eugenically this 'saving' may then be applied to the conception, birth and nurturing of an 'acceptable', 'healthy', child: one who is more likely to provide a return on this investment. This social cost element is noted by Davis {2003}, although here she focuses on the material aspect of it:

[a] very strong factor is the idea that eliminating those with congenital disabilities (sic) "saves money".

This is neither the sole nor major factor for Davis, however, who expresses her belief:

that much of the enthusiasm for pre-natal screening and eugenic abortion stems from an unconscious fear of, and prejudice against, people with disabilities {Davis 2003 unpaginated}.

If Davis {2003} is correct in her diagnosis, of a fear-driven drive to eradicate congenitally disabled people from society, then she moves beyond a purely materialist explanation of contemporary disablement, and broaches the topic of 'normality'. This idea is reinforced by the comment that, in the USA, society as a whole doesn't:

want to deal with people who do not fit the standard of physical attractiveness and normalcy {Lehrman 2000 unpaginated}.

Although there are certainly considerations of monetary costs expressed, it is a moot point as to whether these are motivating factors or convenient camouflage. There appears to be much here

⁷⁵ Apart from the material, these include the emotional energy and the time invested in child-rearing by parents and society.

of the "*garden culture*" of Bauman {1989: 92}, the modern search for normalcy discussed in section 4.7 above.

Although writing of a restricted category of disabled people, those who are "*paralysed and deformed, most of us in wheelchairs*" {Hunt 1966a: 145}, Hunt offers a great deal of insight into this possible societal attitude of seeking to eliminate 'non-standard' people from modern society:

[f]or the able-bodied, normal world we are representatives of many of the things they most fear - tragedy, loss, dark and unknown. Contact with us throws up in people's faces the fact of sickness and death in the world. ... A deformed and paralysed body attacks everyone's sense of well-being and invincibility {Hunt 1966a: 155/156}.

With his talk of a "*normal world*" Hunt {1966a} is clearly speaking within the constraints of the cultural field of modernity. He offers what would appear to be a convincing explanation for the observed urge to 'purge' society of impairment to whatever extent is possible. Shakespeare is in no doubt that this process is both established and ongoing:

[d]isabled people are scapegoats. It is not just that [they] are different, expensive, inconvenient, or odd: it is that they represent a threat - either ... to order; or to the self-conception of western human beings - who ... [view] themselves as ... able ... to conquer the limitations of their nature through the victories of their culture {Shakespeare 1997: 235}.

Here, in the words of Hunt {1966a} and Shakespeare {1997}, is a plausible trigger for the "*heterophobia*" of Bauman {1989} (discussed in section 4.10 above). Impairment, particularly of a type which is immediately apparent, offends the sense of order and 'normality' which permeates the modern cultural field (discussed at length in chapter four). Alongside this, congenital impairment may also be thought to present a visible sign of the failure of the medico-scientific community to contribute to the constant 'progress' of humanity in the modern project, which is to assert the attainment of scientific dominance over nature.

It might be thought that pregnancy has become in many instances provisional. As such, the continuance of a *provisional pregnancy* to full-term is increasingly dependent upon the 'satisfactory' completion of pre-natal screening (which may or may not have a 'genetic' component). This owes more to the modern cultural and eugenic intellectual fields and their concerns with, respectively, normalcy and societal 'health' than to an outright materialist ideology. This point is clearly made by a prominent bioethicist:

[m]any physicians and nurses equate difference with disease ... the clinician has tended to regard the disease as that state in which the limits of the normal have been transgressed {Caplan 1992: 3, drawing on Murphy 1975}.

Thus to be different is to be 'diseased', and to be 'diseased' is to be at risk of being aborted. This 'theoretical' risk of abortion has been seen recently in the UK to be no longer a matter of supposition.

As was seen earlier in the chapter, the (UK) Abortion Act allows 'late' termination in the case of a foetus subject to a "*serious handicap*". There is evidence that this definition has, in practice, become degraded, to the extent that:

[s]ome 26 abortions on foetuses with cleft palates have taken place since 1995 {Cullen 2003}.

Cullen, himself born with this condition, expresses his surprise that he is, it would seem, "*seriously handicapped*". This issue was brought to the forefront of (UK) public attention by an action launched to challenge the December 2001⁷⁶ abortion of a twenty-eight week term (and thus unlawful under the general provisions of the Act) foetus on these grounds {Day 2004}. At the very least this is evidence of an extremely liberal interpretation of the law. At worst, it is indicative of late abortion on the grounds of 'difference' - heterophobic abortion.

There appears to be much in common here with the ideas of Harrison {2001} and Harrison with Davis (C) {2001} on 'structured selectivity' leading to 'differential incorporation'. The element of selectivity is seemingly rigidly structured: either a foetus is 'perfect' or it is not, and only the 'perfect' are expected to proceed to term. Meanwhile, the differential in the degree of societal incorporation afforded the proto-person could hardly be starker: literally life or death. Finally, the whole process is sub-contracted by government and/or society to the medico-scientific institution.

9. 10 From intellectual field to material deprivation

The foregoing remarks do not, however, imply that intellectual field effects relating to 'normality', or indeed to aesthetics, are devoid of material consequences for disabled people. This point is made with some force in this section, and the mechanisms explored both here and in the following parts. The contention is that, emotive as it may be, eugenic abortion is neither the only nor, in a social policy context, necessarily the most important example of genetically determined structured selectivity. Unfeeling as it may appear, the dead or the aborted have no claim on society. This is not the case with the living. There is a body of evidence which suggests that the growth in the incidence of genetic testing, coupled with technological advances, could have serious effects on people found to have a 'defective' genetic structure.

World economic conditions in the final quarter of the twentieth century, particularly the 1973 'OPEC crisis', coupled with what appears to have been a paradigm shift in domestic

⁷⁶ As of 17th March 2005 this case has not been resolved. The latest development is that the Crown Prosecution Service has declined to prosecute the doctors concerned on the grounds that they had acted in good faith in their interpretation of the Abortion Act. A further action seeking judicial review of this decision is possible {"*The Guardian*" {March 17th 2005: 5}. One lesson to be drawn here is regarding the role of 'expert' interpretation, which may lead to the "*slippage*" observed by Lifton {1986: 56} (section 3.12 above) relating to the T4 'euthanasia' programme. The tendency to allow professions to interpret policy has been noted in the German context in sections 3.12 and 3.13 above and in the more general modern case in section 5.4.

politics in the USA under Reagan and in the UK under Thatcher in the 1980s, have led to changing attitudes towards state-funded welfare:

[t]he [UK] post-war welfare state represented a commitment to a one-nation democracy based on universal rights of citizenship; neo-conservative policy represents a return to the two-nation society of the past. [This] ... seems well under way in the United States and the United Kingdom {Mishra 1990: 97}.

An important part of this process of change, in both the USA and UK, has been a retreat from direct state provision of welfare benefits and pensions. As a result greater emphasis has come to be placed by social policy practitioners upon the role of employers on the one hand, and individuals *via* private insurance policies on the other, as providers of welfare {Genewatch UK 2001: 3, 6; Johnson 1987, 1990; Mishra 1990; Savage & Robins 1990}. The (UK) Human Genetics Commission (HGC) remarks that:

insurance is increasingly seen as an essential social good that is required to buy a house, secure income and provide for long term care. The role of insurance is changing {HGC undated: 126 para 7.24}.

In effect an insurance contract is a gamble between policy holder and insurer. The insurer is driven by the commercial need to generate profit, the consumer by a desire to provide against future risk. This leads to an inevitable conflict of interests between the parties, for the insurer will require evidence of the level of risk whilst it is to the benefit of the policy holder to seek to present the most advantageous profile {Keefer 1999}. One result of this is that:

[a]bout 30 percent of all applications for individual health insurance are denied; small percentages are granted with higher premiums or with specific medical conditions excluded {Greely 1992: 265}.

There is a very clear reason to fear the effects of increasing genetic testing on people found to have a 'defective', or even 'suspect', genetic endowment. Indeed,

[t]he possibilities for genetic discrimination are obvious {Nelkin 1992: 188},

and this is emphasised by media reports such as:

the use of genetic testing ... could create an insurance underclass, with people ... unable to get cover, a mortgage or insurance for long-term care {Sunday Express 21/12/1997: 58}.

The situation may be very wide-ranging, for Greely {1992} makes the salient point that in the USA, of a total population of "250 million":

about 150 million have private group insurance, usually as an employee or as an employee's spouse or dependent. Another 10 to 15 million people, many of them self-employed, rely on insurance policies they have purchased themselves {Greely 1992: 265}.

It appears that some two-thirds of Americans are directly dependent upon the commercial insurance market for access to welfare benefits, and thus at risk of some form of discrimination.

However this is not as straightforward as it may appear, for over half of the population relies upon employment-related insurance.⁷⁷

A major social policy problem here is that, in a free market economy, the vendor is under no obligation to supply a product, or to supply a product at a uniform price. Just as the prospective purchaser has the right to compare 'value for money', so does the vendor have the right to consider profitability and risk. In the UK case, for example, compulsory motor insurance is provided by the private sector. Premiums are based on risk assessment and have no upper limit. No insurer is obliged to accept a 'bad risk', with the result that some prospective drivers may be either priced out of the market or simply refused insurance. Similarly, life and medical insurance policies are assessed on the basis of risk {Keefer 1999 section III}. In the USA, Greely {1992} notes that insurance companies routinely take account of health factors and indicators. Such considerations may well lead to the exclusion of certain people from welfare provisions, for ultimately:

insurance, through the risk classification process, is discrimination. The key is determining whether the discrimination is fair or unfair (emphasis in original) {Keefer 1999 section IV}.

Keefer {1999 section IV} cites in this context the case of a child in the USA who was subject to a genetic condition, Hurler syndrome. The child's prognosis was poor in so far as this condition is linked to "*mental retardation* (sic)". The child was refused life insurance, which Keefer finds to be "*fair discrimination*".

The major ethical problem in this is, of course, whether or not discrimination in something as fundamental to modern social organisation as the provision of work, pensions, health care and nursing care can ever be thought 'fair'. If the state is to attempt to withdraw from benefits provision and promote the reliance of individuals upon commercial insurers, then it must accept the workings of the market. On the other hand, if the market is acknowledged to be discriminatory, and is unfettered, then there are wider implications for those excluded.⁷⁸

Legislation or voluntary self-regulation by regulators are two possible avenues by which discrimination may be avoided or, at least, minimised. The preferred option in the USA is to legislate on access to genetic information, rather than specifically on the end use of such data {Keefer 1999 section V}, whilst self-regulation is favoured in the UK {Genewatch UK 2001: 4}. Indeed, the UK has:

the unenviable reputation of becoming the first country to officially sanction genetic testing for insurance purposes {Genewatch UK 2001: 4}.

⁷⁷ This point is reinforced by news reports in April 2005 of a severe financial crisis within the major US firm General Motors attributed to the costs of providing employee health care (*e.g.* BBC News 24, 22.45hrs 23/03/2005).

⁷⁸ Such considerations are not restricted to those with a 'poor' genetic endowment. There is an equal chance of someone whose genotype indicates longevity being discriminated against when seeking to purchase, for example, a pension annuity.

The present position within the UK is that a voluntary agreement with the Association of British Insurers [ABI] limits the use of genetic test results to policies with a value over £300,000 {Human Genetics Commission undated: 133 para 7.57}. Given recent UK house price inflation, the figure of £300,000 is likely to affect an appreciable proportion of applicants for life, mortgage protection and endowment policies.

The (UK) Human Genetics Commission has raised concerns over the efficacy of this voluntarism:

[t]he current system is not achieving the objectives which were envisaged when it was created. The most cogent recent criticism of it is that expressed by the House of Commons Committee on Science and Technology, which concluded that individual insurance companies were not equally observing the ABI Code of Practice, that they were using genetic tests that had not been approved by GAIC, and that currently there seemed to be no satisfactory means of monitoring and enforcing the Code. The HGC agrees with this assessment of the situation {Human Genetics Commission 2001: 3}.

Hence it is salutary here to recall the words of Hilberg cited in section 1.2 above:

we can no longer assume that we have a full grasp of the workings of our social institutions ... {cited by Bauman 1989: 83}.

This cautionary note sounded by Hilberg has more recently been reinforced in the respected pages of the journal *Science*:

increased medical predictive power ... represents a societal challenge in terms of medical insurance ... [for] once powerful genetic diagnostic tests are in place, it will be hard to withstand pressure from the insurance lobby {Paabo 2001 unpaginated}.

In both the USA and UK personal insurance provision is perhaps seen as being the most pressing concern, but it has been observed that:

a recent American survey revealed 582 cases of people who were refused jobs or health insurance because of 'flaws' in their genes {Genewatch UK 2001: 6}.

Citing a 1999 report of the UK Human Genetics Advisory Committee⁷⁹, the same source notes that:

[a]n employer may lawfully require a prospective employee to undergo genetic testing It is not unlawful to discriminate on the basis of the result of such tests {Genewatch UK 2001: 6}.

This notion, of 'lawful' discrimination, does not sit easily alongside the pronouncement of Blair that "[w]e should attack discrimination in all its forms" {Blair 1997 unpaginated}. It would seem that there is a credibility gap between rhetoric and action in this area.

9. 11 A genetic 'underclass'?

The consideration of potential socio-economic effects arising from developments in human genetic techniques goes beyond the clearly material ramifications discussed above. There is a possible escalation of the situation to include psychic effects on individuals and

⁷⁹ Now the Human Genetics Commission

societal factors which, with sublime irony, may lead to the realisation of earlier fears expressed by the eugenicists of a century ago of 'danger' to society (chapter seven above). The irony lies in the realisation that this situation arises not because of 'impairment' *per se*, but as a result of diagnostic tools provided by human genetics *via* HGP research.

Particularly within the academic area of social policy, the concept of an 'underclass' is contested {e.g. Mann 1992}. The basic suggestion made by supporters of the notion is of the presence of a sub-stratum of society which lacks adhesion to the societal whole. There are parallels with both the *alienation* of Marx and the *anomie* of Durkheim, but most strikingly with the eugenic ideas put forward by, for example, Stopes (section 7.2 above). As a contested idea there is clearly no 'authoritative' definition, but the formulation of Charles Murray (which seeks to apply US thinking to the UK situation) will be used here as an example. Murray {1990} offers a tripartite diagnostic tool to detect the presence of an 'underclass' within a given societal context. The legs of his tripod are "*illegitimacy*" {Murray 1990: 4-13}, "*crime*" {Murray 1990: 13-17} and "*unemployment*" {Murray 1990: 17-23}. Noticeably, these three phenomena have all been linked by past eugenicists as indicative of a "*dysgenic class*" {e.g. Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 176 *et seq*}, and people contributing to one or the other have often been labeled with the shorthand description "*feeble-minded*" (see section 7.5 above).

The present author is unaware of any credible research which has in contemporary times sought to determine a genetic factor leading to the reluctance of mothers to enter into matrimony. This is not the case with the remaining two-thirds of Murray's tripod. For convenience, 'work' will be considered here, followed by 'crime'. As has been discussed in the preceding section, there is evidence that genetic factors may play a role in restricting or removing the opportunity to gain employment in contemporary society.

Murray {1990: 22 *subtitle*} declares that "*Work is at the Centre of Life*" (original capitalisation). The thrust of his argument here is that the act of working leads to societal cohesion as people form networks and relationships, gain skills, acquire self-esteem and become self-supporting. Withdrawal from the world of work, for Murray, means that the unemployed may become "*barbarians*" {Murray 1990: 23}. In similar manner, Parsons {1951} finds that unemployment is both dysfunctional and dangerous to modern society (see section 4.6 above). Both of these analysts look at the topic from the perspective of society. The theme of access to employment as representing both a key human right and leading to full citizenship in modern society may also be found in the writings of T. H. Marshall:

"[i]n the economic field the basic civil right is the right to work" {Marshall 1950: 15}; "[o]f paramount importance is the duty to work" {op cit: 78}.

Marshall is very clear as to the fundamental nature of this reciprocal exchange between state and citizen - the one has a duty to facilitate work, the other to perform it.

Blair, in his first public speech as (UK) Prime Minister, adds a political dimension to the idea of work as cementing individual to societal collective. For him:

[w]ithout skills and opportunities people become detached not just from work, but also from citizenship in its wider sense. ... Today the greatest challenge ... is to refashion our institutions to bring [a] ... workless class back into society and into useful work {Blair 1997 unpaginated}.

In this quote, Blair is not speaking of disabled people, nor does he mention anyone excluded from work by genetic considerations. His immediate context is a policy imperative:

to tackle what we all know exists - an underclass of people cut off from society's (sic) mainstream, without any sense of shared purpose {Blair 1997}.

The importance of work to, specifically, disabled people, or indeed to those with a 'suspect' genetic structure, may have escaped the political spotlight. This is not the case with those approaching the topic from a different direction, that of disabled people themselves. Here, there is full agreement both with the suggestion that to be classed as 'unemployable' is to be forcibly "*cut off from society's mainstream*" and that this leads to people becoming "*detached ... from citizenship*" {Abberley 1999}. The point is made forcefully:

[w]ith less than one third of those in the relevant age group in employment in Britain today, for many disabled people the demand for access to work is seen as a crucial component of the struggle for equality. Both the British government and European programmes put entry to the workforce at the core of their strategies to combat social exclusion {Abberley 1999: 11}.

The idea is recurrent throughout the (UK) disability studies literature and is made explicit in the seminal UPIAS document "*Fundamental Principles of Disability*" {UPIAS 1976}. Access to the world of work has become a cornerstone of disability studies and disability activism {e.g. Abberley 1987, 1999; Barnes 1992, 2000; Finkelstein 1980 amongst many}. This determined approach has to some extent been recognised by the employment provisions of the 1995 (UK) Disability Discrimination Act.

What is a problem in the present context is the manner in which 'disability' has historically been constructed by disability scholars and UK domestic policy makers alike. Whether one adheres to a social or medical model of disability, present theory and practice tends to presuppose an extant 'impairment' which has concrete and current effects. For example in the seminal thinking of UPIAS, which restricts its debate to those who are 'physically impaired':

*[d]isability is something imposed **on top of** our impairments ...* (added emphasis) {UPIAS 1976:3}.

Here, 'disability' cannot exist without some 'impairment' upon which it may be located. In like fashion, the (UK) Disability Rights Commission (DRC) declares that:

[a] person has a disability (sic) if he (sic) has a physical or mental impairment, which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his (sic) ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities {Disability Rights Commission 2003: 187}.

Meanwhile, the medical (or individual, or individual medical) model approach is largely based on 'incapacity' or 'ill-health' {e.g. Oliver 1990b unpaginated}. Hence:

what is important in the medical model is the view that an impairment causes continuing health problems {Finkelstein 1996: 7}.

With their assumptions of an 'impairment' which is either 'physical' {UPIAS 1976}, affects "*ability to carry out ... activities*" {DRC 2003} or "*causes continuing health problems*" {Finkelstein 1996, characterising a medical model}, it appears that none of these constructions of 'disability' would readily apply to someone whose genetic endowment was indicative of some future *potential* impairment. In order to prevent misunderstanding, the DRC is explicit on this point:

[i]f a genetic condition has no effect on ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, the person is not covered [by the Disability Discrimination Act] {DRC 2003: 191}.

It follows from this that, in the UK, it is not unlawful to discriminate directly against someone who has been found to have a genetic predisposition towards developing some future impairment. There is nothing in law to prevent the estrangement from the world of work of someone who is, as it were, *genetically impaired*. Meanwhile the theoretical approach which is widespread within, and arguably fundamental to, disability studies does not obviously cater this situation. The potential is here for a new but not yet fully recognised societal phenomenon: *genetic disablement*.

9. 12 Are criminals *really* born?

Returning to Murray {1990, 1994} and to the final leg of his 'tripod' approach to a supposed 'underclass': behaviour, and more precisely criminality. He is in no doubt that "*the habitual criminal is the classic member of an underclass*" {Murray 1990: 13}, and in particular expresses concern about "*violent crime*" {Murray 1990: 14} and "*drug abuse*" {Murray 1990: 31}. Revisiting this theme four years later, Murray speaks of "*crime*" and "*widespread drug and alcohol addiction*" {Murray 1994: 18} as factors which pose serious dangers for society. For Murray {1990, 1994} criminality is socially transmitted (although he has also co-authored a controversial work on the alleged genetic and racial components of intelligence {Herrnstein & Murray 1996}). This view of the pre-eminence of environment as the causative factor of criminality has not always been seen as persuasive.

Fears of innate criminality are, by now, a familiar part of the eugenic mindset {e.g. Kevles 1985: 62, 71} (chapter six above: see also chapter seven). As early as 1876 the 'scientific' die was cast by Lombroso, who confidently identified a sub-species of humankind: the born criminal, or *Homo delinquens* {Carlson 2001: 42-46}. The mode of thinking represented by Lombroso's 'discovery' was, from the start, a cornerstone of the eugenic theory

of a 'degenerate' subset of modern society. For Black, by the late nineteenth century in the USA:

leading social progressives ... now saw crime and poverty as inherited defects ... [and this] created a fertile reception for the infant field of eugenics {Black 2003: 25}.

Intellectual fields may vary over time, in science as in high arts or *haute couture*, and by the 1930s many 'social progressives', eugenicists and especially human geneticists had come to agree with a finding of the (USA) Myerson Report, issued on the authority of the American Neurological Association in 1936:

[h]uman conduct and character are matters of too complex a nature, too interwoven with social conditions ... to permit any definite conclusions to be drawn concerning the part which heredity plays in their genesis {cited by Kevles 1985: 166}.

The emphasis was, by the middle period of the twentieth century, clearly moving from genetics to sociology as an explanatory mechanism for criminal behaviour.

However, the work of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*} suggests that ideas, once expressed in an intellectual field, are persistent. They may lie dormant, but this is hibernation not death, and they may later be re-activated. Thus Wilson, in the 1970s, proposed that much human behaviour was genetically determined, in an approach which has become known as "*Sociobiology*" {Kevles 1985: 272-275} (and is fiercely contested amongst sociologists and other commentators {Montagu 1980b}). In more contemporary times the search for a hereditary causation of human 'morality', criminality and behaviour more generally has regained 'scientific' status as the province of a recent sub-division of human genetics, behavioural genetics.

The association of genetic endowment with criminality is emotive. As Tam {1996: 1} notes:

[t]he possibility that genetic research might identify 'genes for criminal tendencies' has stimulated intense controversy.

The first point to make, as Tam {1996} is also clear, is that despite press reports to the contrary the accepted view in behavioural genetics is that:

single genes do not determine most human behaviors {McGuffin *et al* 2001 unpaginated}.

Although this statement clearly does not rule out the possibility of simple genetic determination of some unspecified behaviour(s), the thrust of the paper is that such a case would be rare. This is not to say that (poly) genetic factors to behaviour are equally rare:

nearly all behaviors that have been studied show moderate to high heritability - usually, to a somewhat greater degree than do many common physical diseases { McGuffin *et al* 2001 unpaginated}.

It is worth pausing to consider this statement, for it implies that genetic testing for behavioural characteristics is more reliable than that for disease. Since it has been seen in section 9.8 that society as a whole, and the medical profession in particular, is relatively at ease with the idea of aborting 'diseased' fetuses, it is a moot point as to whether or not a similar attitude will come to prevail with regard to potential 'social deviance' revealed by an allegedly more reliable genetic test. This is not a fanciful position.

Caplan {1992} discusses the case of a foetus which, having been tested for (and 'cleared' of) Down's Syndrome was incidentally found to have an abnormal chromosome structure of XYY as against the 'normal' XY or XX. Later, *"in counseling sessions"* the parents were informed that *"a few researchers"* had speculated upon a possible *"connection between criminality"* and XYY syndrome {Caplan 1992: 5}. The proto-person was destroyed on the grounds of nothing more than a vague suspicion of a possible genetic predisposition to *"criminality"*. This leads Caplan to raise the questions:

[i]s XYY syndrome a disease? If not, why were the parents told that it had been detected? And if it is, is it a disease which merits aborting ...? {Caplan 1992: 5}.

The thrust of Caplan's paper is that genetic testing is in reality not so much a test for 'disease' as a search for 'abnormality'. The immediate lesson may appear to be that a detected abnormality is very likely to be constructed as a 'defect', and a 'defective' proto-person aborted. At the very least genetic testing opens the door to identifying suspected proto-criminals and potential 'deviants'.

Certainly not all 'deviant' behaviour is criminal *per se*, but McGuffin *et al* identify Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder [ADHD] and the rather vague trait of *"aggression"* as two of the behaviours being studied by behavioural geneticists {McGuffin *et al* 2001 unpaginated}. In the UK ADHD is widely perceived as a medical condition possibly leading to unruly and arguably antisocial behaviour. There are *"an estimated six to eight percent of [UK] children"* said to be subject to ADHD, with *"the families of 42,500 children"* in receipt of Disability Living Allowance⁸⁰ on behalf of their 'affected' children {McKinstry 2005}. When the costs of medication are added to the levels of welfare benefits for these children, the 'problem' of ADHD has direct financial as well as social implications. The genetic component of ADHD has been traced to *"three contributory loci"* {McGuffin *et al* 2001 unpaginated, table}, which suggests that genetic testing is likely to prove diagnostic for this condition.

Another source is more specific on the topic of 'aggression' mentioned by McGuffin *et al* {2001}, and in the context of a particular family with a history of male criminality including attempted rape, assault and arson reports that *"Molecular Genetics techniques have identified a possible culprit gene"* {Tam 1996: 5}. Tam does not claim that this gene has been definitively

⁸⁰ Thus ADHD is officially an 'impairment' in the UK.

proven to be the culprit, but clearly it is a strong contender. Genetic testing is relatively straightforward and accurate in the instance of a monogenetic condition. In this particular case of 'aggression', as in haemophilia, the 'suspect' gene is 'carried' by females but expressed in males. This raises the ethical issue of whether society should seek to prevent the birth of a female foetus who would herself display no 'deviant' traits, but whose son(s) may pose serious threats to society. It has already been observed within the human genetics literature that:

[i]f ... determination of the sex of the fetus were performed in all pregnancies fathered by hemophilic males and every female fetus aborted, then the frequency of the hemophilia gene would be reduced {McKusick 1969: 189}.

Given the observed utilitarian approach of eugenics in general, the likely response to an identified 'aggressive' gene of this type may be assumed to be 'abort the female'.

Both Murray {1990, 1994} and Blair {1997} express a fear that substance addiction is disruptive to society and indicative of an 'underclass'. In this, they are repeating the concerns of many eugenicists throughout the twentieth century, although the dominant position within eugenics has varied between the idea that addiction is deterministically inherited:

the predominant view [at the turn of the nineteenth century] supported by most eugenicists, was that [alcoholism] had been inherited either directly or as a predisposition passed on from father to son {Wyndham 2003: 246};

that it is of no relevance to eugenic studies of hereditarianism:

parental alcoholism did not affect the intelligence or physique of the offspring {Wyndham 2003: 247, paraphrasing a 1910 report of the Galton Laboratory for National Eugenics};

and the 'middle way' approach that:

alcoholism and criminality are not wholly due to heredity {Popenoe & Johnson 1925: 214}.

The current behavioural genetics position is that, although specific causative genes or combinations thereof remain to be identified:

studies indicate that 40-60% of an individual's risk for an addiction, whether it is to alcohol, opiates or cocaine, is genetic. ... A major focus of current research is to explore the ... influence of genetic factors {Nestler & Landsman 2001 unpaginated}.

With around a fifty percent chance of an inherited predisposition to addiction, this seems rather more definitive than the very vague suspicions reported above by Caplan {1992} relating to XYY syndrome which led to abortion. Given the huge impetus of the HGP and associated advances in technology and technique, it is reasonable to suggest that the identification of causative, or at the very least suspicious, genes and genetic markers related to addiction will not be long delayed. Indeed, although press reports merit caution, it has already been claimed that:

[i]f you cannot say no to that one last drink, or to the biggest piece of chocolate cake ... it may just be in your genes {Daily Express 18/10/2004: 23}.

The article continues, to identify the "*crucial*" gene, DRD2, which is reportedly linked not so much to addiction as to susceptibility to peer pressures. In some regards, this idea approaches earlier eugenic notions of the 'suggestible' person who is at risk of becoming a 'social problem'.

9. 13 Chapter summary

This chapter has traveled far, from the seeming obituary of eugenics presented by Mazumdar {1992} in section 9.2, through the rise of human genetics and its apparent espousal of eugenic principles, to the application of HGP 'products' in firstly diagnostic advances and latterly in life trajectory predictions. The concluding sections here have suggested that the use of predictions based upon genetic testing techniques may have the unintended but potent effect of constraining certain people by limiting the opportunities allowed them to engage in 'normal' (and 'normative') socio-economic activity. Hence genetic research findings may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy *par excellence*; one which prescribes rather than predicts the subject's life-chances.

There is a largely invisible but unifying thread which runs throughout this chapter. This is the power line of the modern cultural field (met with in section 4.5 *et seq* above) which relates to ideas of an 'orderly progress', able to be shaped or guided by human intervention, leading society to a more desirable condition. In this context eugenics is one particular subsidiary intellectual field energised or stimulated by this power line, and perhaps the most pertinent power line of this subsidiary field is the one relating to agency. There is an implicit assumption associated with this power line that there exists a body of experts whose members, sanctified by their knowledge and relationship to the cultural field of modernity, know what is best for the collective. This idea was encountered in section 5.4 above, notably with the words of Marshall {1950: 136} quoted there, that "[a]uthority passes to the professional, who must give him (sic) [ie the 'common' person] *what he needs, rather than what he wants*". The notion of a 'knowing elite' is one which apparently permeates modern society, from the authoritarian and paternalistic political right to the 'false consciousness' of Marxism.

Overall, the evidence of this chapter may be thought indicative of a situation wherein the eugenic intellectual field, which attained some degree of prominence in the modern era, remains active and potent. It has arguably interacted with the 'thoroughly modern, scientific' intellectual field of genetics to produce a distinct 'eugenic' flavour to contemporary society. This observation gives rise to the question of what attitudes may be thought to define any such eugenic society. In this regard the words of Malkin (2001) have a certain suggestive power:

[w]e have become obsessed with quality of life at the expense of the sanctity of life. But championing abortion as a government-sponsored method to "avert tragedies" - that is, to kill undesirable babies - is not the sign of a merciful society. It is the sign of a cruelly utilitarian one that views "less-than-perfect" human beings as burdensome and disposable {Malkin 2001 unpaginated}.

Chapter 10: Conclusions

10. 1 Proem⁸¹

The conclusions to this investigation are not intended to be prescriptive. Rather, the intent is to identify particular power lines (or, indeed, discrete fields) which are able to exert influence within the context of the contemporary western world. This is not a sterile exercise in 'academic' activity, for an analytical approach based upon the concept of intellectual fields carries with it a key to action. There are very clear parallels with issues surrounding anti-racism and feminism, where directed pressures have had measurable effects in reducing the levels of discrimination. In the disability arena, similarly, some progress has recently been made in changing individual and collective attitudes to the social effects of impairment. In none of these areas has sufficient change as yet been wrought, but each of these journeys have begun.

This enquiry has investigated the provenance of eugenic ideas and ideology in the modern era. The preferred analytical framework has been the idea of an interlocking matrix of power lines and fields of intellectual force drawn specifically from the work of Bourdieu {1971a, 1971b, 1985, 1993}, but with a seeming resonance with earlier work by other scholars and especially that of Mannheim {1936}.

To provide direction to the enquiry a series of research questions was proposed in 1.2. These questions will be considered here in the light of the finished investigation. For ease of reference, they are:

- (i) *Is there available evidence of some continuity, whether evolutionary or not, of 'eugenic' belief systems between ancient and modern eras?*
- (ii) *Is there evidence of a particularly 'modern' effect on eugenic thinking or practice?*
- (iii) *Is there evidence to support an idea of continuity in thinking between eugenics and (human) genetics?*
- (iv) *Are there identifiable effects flowing from the modernisation of eugenics upon the topic area of social policy directed towards 'disability'?*

Before moving to the specifics, a brief resume of the major themes encountered in the investigation will be presented in the next section, before a final more general conclusion is offered.

⁸¹ References to internal discussions and evidence will, where a particular section is cited, omit the 'chapter' reference and the word 'section'. Hence a referral to 'chapter one section one' will appear more simply as '1.1'; 'chapter two section five' becomes '2.5'.

10. 2 Major themes

There are two threads which run throughout the investigation. The first is an analytical methodology, the intellectual/cultural field theory derived from several of the works of Bourdieu. The second is what is here taken as a specific intellectual field, that informing eugenics. Moving first to theory, this is a contested topic area in the social sciences. The present author does not intend to engage in any process of evangelism here, nor does he particularly wish to attempt to shake the faith of those committed to one or another manner of gaining understanding of the social world. It is rather the case that he is not convinced by the rigid structure of Parsonian-style functionalism, nor is he persuaded by those theories which are heavily dependent on materialism. Certainly modern society is home to materialist pressures, as apparently are many other contemporary societies, but it might seem that human society is more complex than this. This idea is supported throughout the narrative by references to Shakespeare {1997} and Harrison (with Davis) {2001}.

This is where the 'field theory' of Bourdieu has its attractions. Bourdieu is by no means oblivious to, or dismissive of, either materialism or social 'class'. On the contrary, he proposes that such phenomena are manifestations of field effects. This is an important point, for it modifies certain assumptions made by other thinkers about 'cause and effect' relationships in society. Thus for example, after the style of Bourdieu, materialism is not the prime driving force in a materialist society: it is itself an effect of intellectual activity, albeit a potent one.

What this means for disability studies is that there is in this theory the possibility of achieving a great degree of change in the position of disabled people without the prior necessity of bringing about fundamental alteration to the structure of society. Social change may to large extent be distanced from societal change, and disabled people may not, then, be forced to first engage in the "*class struggle*" of Finkelstein {2001; 5} (2.3). Disability and party politics may be separated which, given that disabled people represent the full spectrum of party politics (and social classes), may act to lend necessary cohesion amongst disabled people in their efforts to gain social recognition.

Using the eugenic intellectual field as a surrogate for that of disablement, this investigation has demonstrated that, although eugenics has proved to be both powerful and resilient, it has been from time to time and place to place modified by other field effects (chapter eight). Of particular interest here is the evidence of sections 8.6 and 8.7, which collectively suggests that under certain circumstances cultural or political field effects may be effective in suppressing the eugenic intellectual field, although eugenics did later resurface in the USSR when political attention was diverted. The present author does not advocate the application of Stalinist authoritarianism, nor does he propose to execute eugenicists as did

Stalin {Adams 1990d: 196-198} (8.7), but he does point to the lesson that an intellectual field may be modified by direct action.

10. 3 Question (i)

Is there available evidence of some continuity, whether evolutionary or not, of 'eugenic' belief systems between ancient and modern eras?

In chapter six both the prehistory and history of eugenic thinking were considered in some detail. In 3.3, in the specific case of Germany, it was noted that there seemed to exist some national sense of longing for a connection to a heroic past. This was there conjectured as being part of a supposed need within modernity for a 'foundation myth' (proposed by Huxley {1944}), as justification for the formation and continuation of that societal artefact seen as peculiar to modernity - the nation state. The point was made in 3.2 that modernity itself is founded intellectually on the Enlightenment, which drew its inspiration in large part from the classical era.

Overall, there would seem to be something within the cultural field of modernity which leads to an urge to seek legitimation for contemporary thought by reference to the past. An urge, that is, to demonstrate some degree of continuity. It is in keeping with this observation that 'early modern' eugenicists such as Roper {1913} (6.3), nineteenth century philosophers like Bentham and Mill (4.4) and the contemporary ethicist Singer {1993} (4.4) should appeal to alleged ancient Greek practices and precedents. The point is made later (6.7) that the urge to establish 'legitimate' continuity may lead to a revision rather than a vision of history.

Despite this apparent connectivity with the past the re-examination in 6.2 of ancient sources, and particularly of Plato's *Republic*, casts doubt on the actual degree of continuity between ancient and modern ideas and practices. This reservation is enhanced by the discussion in 4.7 - 4.9 of European attitudes and actions in relation to impairment during the first millennium of the Christian (or Common) Era. The evidence from this discussion is of a disjunction in ideology here, of a movement away from the largely pragmatic utilitarian approach discernible in the arguments of Plato.

The root of Plato's argument is that the societal collective should take precedence over the individual, and this may be thought to have a clear connection with the development from ancient Greek roots of utilitarian ethical approaches by Bentham and Mill (4.4). Certainly these latter acknowledge an intellectual debt to Greek philosophy, but theological positions with their roots around the time of Christ (not specifically confined to Christianity, as the evidence of Dean & Khan {1997, cf Dwyer 2000: 34} demonstrates (4.8)) suggest that a different view rose to prominence in the period between classical and modern ages.

During the two thousand or so years which separate ancient and modern, the evidence of Bragg {1997} and Winzer {1997} in chapter four suggests that Europe was exposed to two different streams of thought. On the one hand the largely Christian traditions of the middle east and southern Europe {Winzer 1997} (4.7, 4.8), on the other an initially pagan, but later Christian, ethos brought from Scandinavia {Bragg 1997} (4.9). The broadly Christian component of this dual heritage emphasised not the importance of some earthly societal collective, but the supremacy of a divine being. In consequence, at least in theory, individuals were valued not in terms of their social utility, but in terms of their standing before the deity: a world view which does not in general support eugenic thought. The future of the race, here, lies not with humanity but with some deity.

In such a theistic society the idea that humanity may directly influence its own futures is nothing short of heresy, and indeed the idea of 'change' itself is problematic. Established religion, of any variety, has a tendency towards a conservative perspective. It is the basic premiss of Weber's thesis in *The Protestant Ethic* ... that northwestern European society was only enabled to move from the stagnation of a traditional feudal ethos because of a religious revolution (4.2, 4.3). The evidence of Macaulay {1889} (4.3) supports this interpretation.

The Norse influence discussed by Bragg {1997} (4.9) is more complex, but the picture presented there is of a society which was largely individualised. As such, there is a seeming disinterest in the collective as an entity with a corresponding lack of an idea of the 'health' of society. This attitude, or mindset, again does not provide the nutrient of social utility which eugenic ideology requires in order to flourish.

These observations lead to the first finding, **that there is a discontinuity in the transmission of belief systems between ancient and modern societies**. This finding contradicts a preconceived idea of the present author, who had expected to find the opposite. The evidence is of a concern with, or knowledge of, eugenic ideas in ancient times and a superficially similar concern in modern times, but with a long-lasting hiatus between the two. Such a finding may, perhaps, be explained by an appeal to the idea of a 'cultural' or 'collective' unconscious found in the works of Bourdieu {1971a *et al*} and Mannheim {1936} (1.5). The relevant idea is that, once formulated, an intellectual artefact is not lost, but may lie dormant or neglected within an 'unconscious' repository {Bourdieu 1971b: 192} (4.9, 8.6).

10. 4 Question (ii)

Is there evidence of a particularly 'modern' effect on eugenic thinking or practice?

Here the evidence is clear. Modernity, or in the terms used here the modern cultural field, has been seen to contain a strong reverence for 'order' {Bauman 1989, 1990; Hughes

2002} (4.5) which corresponds to a 'power line' in the thinking of Bourdieu {1971a}. Alongside this is a concern with 'normality' {Davis (LJ) 1997a; Parsons 1951} and the interaction between these two power lines has led to what Bauman {1989} has described as a "*garden culture*" (4.7). In such a culture, the impetus is towards maintaining order and normality by a process of 'weeding-out' the unwanted and disvalued.

To continue this horticultural analogy, the force of the evidence is that eugenic thinking in the modern era has equated to that of a head gardener: an 'expert' whose function is to tend the societal 'garden'. To this end, modern eugenicists have consistently sought to identify the 'weeds' (3.6, 3.10, 7.5, 9.8), and to devise mechanisms for their quarantine and/or removal (3.8, 3.11, 6.5, 7.10, 7.11, 9.8). This is a very different process to that discussed by Plato (6.2, 6.4), who focuses upon social utility. In the modern case, whilst materialist issues such as 'cost' and utility remain of concern (3.8, 3.11, 4.6, 4.7, 6.8, 7.5, 9.8, 9.9), there is also a non-materialist 'aesthetic' concern for 'normality'. This may lead to a proto-person being aborted purely and simply on the basis of some detected 'difference', even if nothing is known about the bodily or behavioural portents of the observed deviation from the 'norm' {Caplan 1992} (9.9). In Bauman's garden, if one is not demonstrably a flower then the supposition is that one must be a weed. This need for clear-cut decisions on questions of conformity has a resonance with the practice and theory of modern bureaucracy (5.4, 5.5), itself based upon the rationality which Weber {1947, 1948, 1961} finds to underlie and inform modernity (4.2, 4.5, 5.4).

In the growth of professions within modern society (5.4) is seen another line of demarcation between ancient and modern. Here is found a sanctioned body of expertise empowered to make authoritative judgments on behalf of wider society {Marshall 1950} (5.7). In particular, within modernity the medical profession has come to be viewed, and to view itself, as the protector of the health and vigour of the collective (3.5 - 3.7, 6.6, 9.5). Eugenics, having allied itself with, or 'colonised', the science of human genetics (9.5) has acquired the respect accorded the 'scientific' by modernity {Milgram 1963, 1977} (5.3). Eugenic pronouncement has moved, under the influence of the modern cultural field, from the 'subjective' "this person does not seem to have the required potential to become useful to society" to the 'scientific' and 'expertly objective' "this person will not make the grade".

Hence the second finding here is that **there is an identifiably modern effect on the character and standing of eugenics**. In the analysis derived from Bourdieu, the eugenic intellectual field has been modified by the interference activity of the modern cultural field.

10. 5 Question (iii)

Is there evidence to support an idea of continuity in thinking between eugenics and (human) genetics?

There is ample evidence for a continuity of both thought and policy between the later nineteenth century eugenicists and the twenty-first century human geneticists. This is demonstrated by the extensive argument set out in chapters seven to ten above, an argument which is encapsulated in the words of Sinsheimer {1969, in Kevles 1985: 267/268} which appear in section 9.5:

The old eugenics would have required a continual selection for breeding of the fit, and a culling of the unfit. The new eugenics would permit in principle the conversion of all of the unfit to the highest genetic level,

and those of Whitney {1999: 1} which close section 9.6:

[t]he first century or two of the new millennium will almost certainly be a golden age for eugenics. Through application of new genetic knowledge and reproductive technologies the Galtonian Revolution will come to fruition. ... [F]or the first time, the major changes will not be to ideas alone, but rather the major change will be to mankind (sic) itself {Whitney 1999: 1}.

Neel's work, amongst others, demonstrates the desire of human geneticists to 'advise' women on the state of their foetus, and offer an opinion on the subject of abortion with the idea that she will later opt to birth a "*child free of the particular disease*" {Neel 1994: 393} (9.8). This is both utilitarian and eugenic, for the precept is that the 'damaged' foetus be discarded and replaced by a 'normal' one. The evidence of Ingle {1973: 81} (9.7) is to the effect that genetic counselling contains within it an idea of social utility which appears to be closely related to similar eugenic ideas seen at the opening of the twentieth century (7.2).

As argued throughout chapter nine, there is no room for doubt that the tenets and objectives of eugenics have been enthusiastically taken on by human geneticists. This conclusion is not surprising for it has been seen that, as Kevles {1985}, Mazumdar {1992} and Kerr & Shakespeare {2002} all note, the 'founding fathers' of human genetics had their academic and ideological roots in the eugenics movement (7.7). This is, in the terminology adopted by the present author, the advent of 'eugenetics'. The third finding of this enquiry is that **eugenic ideology has been adopted by practitioners of human genetics.**

10. 6 Question (iv)

Are there identifiable effects flowing from the modernisation of eugenics upon the topic area of social policy directed towards 'disability'?

All human activity, for Bourdieu, takes place in one or another "*space of possibles*" {Bourdieu 1993: 179} (1.5) defined by the relevant intellectual field. Meanwhile, any given intellectual field is also open to modifiers emanating from the encompassing cultural field of the age. The direction of Bourdieu's argument is that social policy initiatives, for example, are effectively circumscribed by the constraints of the 'space of possibles' contained by the ambient cultural field. In the particular context of this enquiry, that cultural field is the one of 'modernity'.

The investigation of the flowering of eugenic ideas within a setting prescribed by the modern cultural field has, of course, been central to the study. The central theme is of a seeming ubiquity of such ideas, and this has been analysed in 'intellectual field' theoretical terms. The suggestion is that a powerful eugenic field has generated a particular 'space of possibles' relating directly to the social policy arena, and that this space has been colonised or adopted by other areas of intellectual activity, especially social policy and medicine.

Chapters four and five have looked in some detail at particular intellectual developments associated with this modern cultural field. One such development is the genesis of Protestant ideas {Weber 1958} which, amongst other things, arguably legitimised the growth of materialism with its emphasis on 'work' as an end in itself rather than simply as a means to survival (4.2) (which follows from the discussion of materialism as itself a field effect in 10.2 above). Alongside this, and of prime concern here, modern society is seen to be fundamentally bureaucratic in structure (3.2, 5.4 - 5.7). This form of governance implies a reliance on expertise on the one hand, and allows of the sub-contracting of policy formation and promulgation to suitably qualified and approved 'expert bodies' on the other. This is seen in its extremes in the German case (3.8 - 3.12), but to lesser degree elsewhere (5.7, 7.9 - 7.11, 8.3 - 8.5, 9.8, 9.9).

Meanwhile, the changing status of medical practitioners, as medicine moved from a 'traditional' to a 'scientific' paradigm and assumed 'professional' standing, has been examined in both the German context (3.5) and the more general case {Parsons 1951} (5.1, 5.2). Within the modern social framework, 'the doctor' has been accorded equal status with 'the scientist', and this confers the title 'expert'. This endows the holder with authority and esteem {Milgram 1963, 1977; Parsons 1951} in modern society (5.3). An accredited 'expert' may pronounce with authority on behalf of society {Marshall 1950: 136} (5.7). Given the societal status within modernity of medicine and its practitioners (chapter 5), there is a degree of pressure towards adopting, or being forced to adopt, a medical perspective in relation to the problems of society (chapter 7). This may then have the reciprocal effect of reinforcing the standing of medicine, for now it is allowed to define the 'problem' which it is set to address.

The evidence suggests that, over the period of the twentieth century, the focus of medical concern has tended to shift away from the individual and towards the collective (3.9, chapter seven, chapter nine). Given the medical impulse to seek to 'cure', and the focus upon society as the primary 'patient', the impetus is towards the eradication of 'disease' *per se*. The evidence of Caplan {1992: 3} (9.9) is such as to suggest that medicine has adopted a conservative attitude towards 'risk', to the extent that (genetic) difference has become entwined with disease. In this way the category of 'impairment' has been substantially widened, and this in turn has implications for disabled people more generally.

Alongside this effect is that which arises from the influence of social policy, which in both the USA and increasingly the UK is tending towards state withdrawal from direct supply of welfare benefits. A favoured policy option is to encourage (and perhaps force) individuals to rely upon commercially supplied insurance-based benefit packages, and the results of an ever-increasing range of genetic tests 'for' a predisposition towards a number of non-evident conditions are of commercial interest to insurers (9.10). Whilst codes of practice, and to some extent laws, have been introduced in both the USA and UK the fact remains that within the latter it is not unlawful to discriminate against an individual on the basis of a genetic test result {GeneWatch UK 2001: 6} (9.10). Indeed, in the case of insurance policies exceeding £300,000 it is current and accepted practice within the UK for insurers routinely to take account of any available genetic test results (9.10).

As was explored in 9.10 - 9.12, there is evidence of the potential for a 'genetic underclass' to emerge, or indeed be produced, in modern society: a group of people effectively denied full citizenship on the basis of genetic endowment. The suggestion of Hilberg that modern society is in danger of losing its collective *"grasp of the workings of our social institutions, bureaucratic structures [and] technology"* {Bauman 1989: 83} (1.2, 9.10) remains current and valid. The fourth and final finding here is that **a possible field interaction process between modernity and eugenics has potentially tended towards the medicalisation of what have often been seen as societal artefacts. As a result 'impairment' and 'disability' have been reinterpreted to include a wider range of human conditions, and medical intervention is increasingly thought appropriate to maintain 'normality'.**

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